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“The spirit of the depths even taught me to consider my
action and my decision as dependent on dreams. Dreams
pave the way for life, and they determine you without you
understanding their language. One would like to learn
this language, but who can teach and learn it?
Scholarliness alone is not enough; there is a knowledge
of the heart that gives deeper insight. The knowledge of
the heart is in no book and is not to be found in the
mouth of any teacher, but grows out of you like the green
seed from the dark earth. Scholarliness to the spirit of
this time, but this spirit in no way grasps the dream,
since the soul is everywhere that scholarly knowledge is
not” (RB I, 2, "Soul and God")
“Killing off would-be prophets is a gain for the people. If
they want murder, then may they kill their false prophets.
If the mouth of the Gods remains silent, then each can
listen to his own speech. He who loves the people
remains silent. If only false teachers teach, the people
will kill the false teachers, and will fall into the truth
even on the way of their sins. Only after the darkest night
will it be day: So cover the lights and remain silent so
that the night will become dark and noiseless. The sun
rises without our help. Only he who knows the darkest
error knows what light is” (RB II, 21, "The Magician", §
152-153)
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ABBREVIATIONS
NIETZSCHE
AC = The Anti-Christ (1888); translated by Judith Normann In: The Anti-Christ, Ecce
Homo,Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writigs (edited by A. Ridley), Cambridge
University Press, New York/Cambridge 2005/2007
DD = Dithyrambs of Dionysus (1888-1889); translation available at: 
www.thenietzschechannel.com
EH = Ecce Homo (1888); translated by J. Normann, cit.
eKGWB = Digital Critical Edition (edited by P. D'Iorio, 2009 –)
FW = The Gay Science (1882/1887), translated by Josefine Nauckhoff, edited by Bernard
Williams, poems translated by Adrian Del Caro, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge/New York 2001-2008
GD = Twilight of the Idols (1888); translated by J. Normann, cit.
GM = Genealogy of Morals (1887); translated by Ian Johnston, Richer Resources
Publications Arlington, Virginia 2009
GT = Birth of Tragedy (1872); translated by Ian C. Johnston, Blackmask Online
2000/2003
JBG = Beyond Good and Evil (1886); translated by Helen Zimmern, in: The complete
Works of Friedrich Nietzsche (edited by O. Levy), T. N. Foulis, Edinburgh and
London 1909
KSA = Historisch-Kritische Ausgabe (edited by G. Colli and M. Montinari, De Gruyter,
Berlin / New York 1967 –)
M = Daybreak (1881), translated by J. M. Kennedy (The Dawn of the Day), George
Allen and Unwin, London 1924
MA I = Human, All Too Human I (1878), translated by Alexander Harvey, Charles H. Kerr
& Company, Chicago 1908
MA II = Human, All Too Human II (1879), translated by Paul V. Cohn, George Allen and
Unwin, London 1911/1924
NcW = Nietzsche contra Wagner (1888-1889), translated by J. Normann, cit.
NF = Nachgelassene Fragmente
UBDS = David Strauß: the Confessor and the Writer (1873), in: Thoughts out of Season,
Blackmask Online, 2002
UBHL = On the Use and Abuse of History for Life (1874), in: Thoughts out of Season,
Blackmask Online, 2002
UBSE = Schopenhauer as Educator (1874), in: Thoughts out of Season, Blackmask Online,
2002
UBWA = Richard Wagner in Bayreuth (1876), in: Thoughts out of Season, Blackmask
Online, 2002
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WA = The case of Wagner (1888); translated by J. Normann, cit.
WL = On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense (1873); translation available at:
http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl201/modules/Philosophers/Nietzsche/Truth_and_
Lie_in_an_Extra-Moral_Sense.htm
WM = Miscellaneous Maxims and Opinions (MA II, 1979)
WS = The Wanderer and his Shadow (MA II, 1879)
Za = Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883-1885), translated by W. Kaufmann, Penguins, New
York 1969/1984
The first time a work of Nietzsche's appears in the text, the original title will be given in square brackets.
References to works and Nachlaß will be given according to KSA numbers of volume and page.
References to Nietzsche's letters will be given according to eKGWB enumeration criteria.
When translations affect the original meaning too much, the text will be left in German.
 
JUNG
CW = The Collected Works of C. G. Jung, translated by Gerhard Adler and R.F.C. Hull,
Routledge, London 1953 –
MDR = Memories, Dreams, Reflexions (1961), recorded and edited by Aniela Jaffé,
translated by Richard and Clara Winston, Vintage Books, New York 1989
RB = The Red Book: Liber novus (1913-1959), edited and introduced by Sonu
Shamdasani, translated by Mark Kyburz, John Peck, and Sonu Shamdasani, W. W.
Norton & Company, New York / London 2009
SNZ = Nietzsche’s Zarathustra: notes of the seminar given in 1934-1939, edited by James
L. Jarret (two vol. Bollingen Routledge, London 1989; part I, reprint 2005; part II,
reprint 1994)
WSL = Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido. Beiträge zur Entwicklung des Denkens
(1912), zweite Auflage, Franz Deuticke, Leipzig and Vienna 1925
When translated from German, the original title of Jung's writings will be given in square brackets.
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INTRODUCTION
In spite of these trepidations I was curious, and finally
resolved to read him. Thoughts Out of Season was the
first volume that fell into my hands. I was carried away
by enthusiasm, and soon afterward read Thus Spake
Zarathustra. This, like Goethe's Faust, was a tremendous
experience for me. Zarathustra was Nietzsche's Faust, his
No. 2, and my No. 2 now corresponded to Zarathustra
though this was rather like comparing a mole hill with
Mount Blanc. And Zarathustra – there could be no doubt
about that – was morbid. Was my No. 2 also morbid?
This possibility filled me with a terror which for a long
time I refused to admit, but the idea cropped up again
and again at inopportune moments, throwing me into a
cold sweat, so that in the end I was forced to reflect on
myself (MDR, p. 102)1
1. A LIFE-LONG CONFRONTATION
1.1 JUNG'S EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND
On 14 November 1913, Jung heard his “soul”'s voice for the third time. He felt confused, having
no idea whose voice that could be, and still trying to figure out the meaning of the catastrophic
visions he had been seized by since a few weeks earlier. He asked the voice if it was “God”
speaking; if “God” was “a child, a maiden”; to which the voice replied: “You are lying to yourself!
You spoke so as to deceive others and make them believe in you. You want to be a prophet and
chase after your ambition”.2 The question of being a “prophet”, as well as the meaning of
“prophets” for our time will be a major issue of Jung's thinking. Such question and what Paul
Bishop has defined as “question of meaning”, or “search for meaning’”3 come together in Jung's
approach to his own existence and writing. But what does it mean to be a “prophet”, according to
Jung? And who are the “prophets” of our time?
1 The text was first published by Aniela Jaffè, Erinnerungen, Träume, Gedanken in 1961, after Jung's death. Although
it has been considered a valuable biography by several authors since its publication, its historical reliability is highly
questionable, as significant changes and omissions have been made by its editors (See S. Shamdasani, “Memories,
Dreams, Omissions”, in: Spring: A Journal of Archetype and Culture 57 (1995); reprinted in P. Bishop (ed.), Jung in
Context. A Reader, Routledge, London and New York 2003, pp. 33-50). However, it remains a suggestive testimony
of Jung's rethinking his childhood memories.
2 RB I, 2, “Soul and God”, p. 233.
3 P. Bishop, Carl Jung, Reaktion Books, London 2014, pp. 75-78.
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Carl Gustav Jung was born on 26 July 1875 in Kesswil on Lake Constance. After only six
months, his family moved to Laufen (near the Falls of the Rhine), where they lived until he was
four years old. In 1879, Jung's family moved again, this time to a village near Basel (Klein-
Hüningen), where they settled and he received his education.4 Although his family was not a rich or
influential one, he had the chance to attend excellent schools, namely Unteres and Oberes
Gymnasium in Basel (formerly known as Pädagogium). According to Jung's high school curricula,
he never attended philosophy classes during his studies at Oberes Gymnasium.5 Yet his
philosophical education took place at that time, thanks to private readings in his father's library,
which kept the seventeen year-old Carl Gustav strongly involved, while he was mainly concerned
about the theological issue on God and evil. According to his memories, it was not easy to find texts
from philosophers in the library of Johan Paul Achilles Jung who, being a parson, regarded them as
“suspect because they thought”. Nevertheless, the young boy managed to first come across the
second edition of the General Dictionary of the Philosophical Sciences [Allgemeines
Handwörterbuch der philosophischen Wissenschaften, nebst ihrer Literatur und Geschichte]
(Leipzig, 1832) by Wilhelm Traugott Krug, and then Christian Dogmatics [Christliche Dogmatik]
(Zurich, 1869) by Alois Emanuel Biedermann. At the same time, he read several pieces of English
literature, and engaged with more specific philosophical matters by dealing with Pythagoras,
Heraclitus, Empedocles, Plato and Meister Eckhardt, all authors that he particularly enjoyed. He
then faced other philosophers, whose ideas he did not find equally stimulating, i.e. Schoolmen and
St. Thomas – whose Aristotelian intellectualism appeared to him “more lifeless than a desert”, as
well as Hegel, whose language sounded “as arrogant as it was laborious”. The “great find resulting
from [his] researches was Schopenhauer”, however, who “was the first to speak of the suffering of
the world, which visibly and glaringly surrounds us, and of confusion, passion, evil – all those
things which the others hardly seemed to notice and always tried to resolve into all-embracing
harmony and comprehensibility”. Because he was engaging in Schopenhauer's philosophy so much,
and was struggling to find a negotiation between a “blind” Will and the intellect, Jung eventually
sympathised with Kant, who let him find the way to solve his problem: Schopenhauer “had
committed the deadly sin of hypostatizing a metaphysical assertion, and of endowing a mere
noumenon, a Ding an sich, with special qualities”.6
4 MDR, pp. 6-15.
5 School curricula, teachers' judgements and grades are available at Staatsarchiv Basel.
6 MDR, pp. 60-72. Jung read Eduard von Hartmann, too (ibid., p. 101). Plato also appears in Jung's Greek programme
during his third and fourth year at Oberes Gymnasium. As reported by his teacher, Theodor Plüss, the class had to
read: Euthyphron (chapters 1-8), Apology (first speech), Phaedo (chapters 1-13, 63-67, with particular stress on
Socrate's personality). On Jung's reception of Schopenhauer, see M. Liebscher, “Schopenhauer und Jung”, in: D.
Schubbe and M. Kossler (ed.), Schopenhauer-Handbuch. Leben, Werk, Wirkung, Metzler, Stuttgart 2014, pp. 312-
316.
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The reason why Jung was so concerned with the issue of evil, was because he was going
through a crucial religious crisis, having experienced that “God” could not be reduced to the
concept of “goodness”, but had to include evil in his attributions. Therefore, at the age of sixteen,
Jung was looking for previous thinkers who could back him up on his hypothesis. Facing the issue
from a theological perspective did not seem to work with him, nor were his father's “expatiations”
fruitful; he found them “sentimental-sounding and usually incomprehensible as well as
uninteresting”. The problems with his father culminated when they had to face the concept of the
Trinity, which the parson preferred to skip, claiming that he understood “nothing of it” himself. At
this point, the young Jung was more and more concerned, and still seeking answers. Probably
guessing such an anxiety, Mrs. Emilie Preiswerk-Jung, Carl Gustav's mother, suggested him to read
Goethe's Faust. The book “poured into [his] soul like a miraculous balm”, for the protagonist
appeared to him as “someone who takes the devil seriously and even concludes a blood pact with
him – with the adversary who has the power to frustrate God's plan to make a perfect world”.
Nonetheless Jung never sympathised with him, whose behaviour he judged far too naïve; rather, he
likened himself more to the figure of Mephistopheles, who seemed to him “cheated in quite a
different sense: he had not received his promised rights because Faust, that somewhat characterless
fellow, had carried his swindle through right into the Hereafter”. This character made “the deepest
impression” on Jung, who immediately put him in connection with the “mystery of the mothers” in
terms of “initiation”. Thanks to the fact that he had highlighted the role of evil in a wider world
perspective, Goethe appeared to Jung as a “prophet”, but “having dismissed Mephistopheles by a
mere trick” was something he could not forgive the German writer for.7
According to Jung's German and Greek teacher in his first year at Oberes Gymnasium, Emanuel
Probst, some pieces by Goethe had already been part of the German programme. Still among Jung's
school curricula, it is possible to verify what a key role the classics have played in his educational
background more broadly. The main authors treated were: Ovid, Caesar, Livius, Cicero, Catullus,
Tibullus, Tacitus, Xenophon, Homer, Lysin, Sophocles Aeschylus, Schiller, Chamisso, Uhland,
Shakespeare, Molière, Bernardin de Saint-Pierre, Delille, Claris de Florian, M.me de Stäel, Guisot,
Lamartine, Casimir Delavigne, Thiers, A. Dumas père, V. Hugo, E. About, Lafontaine, Töpffer, etc.8
In fact, keen interest and familiarity for both ancient and modern classics shine through all of Jung's
works, as well as his lexical choices. Furthermore, during his university years (still in Basel), Jung
was a fellow of the prestigious fraternity “Zofingia” – of which several well-known personalities,
such as Jacob Burckhardt, had previously been members –, where various topics were discussed on
7 MDR, pp. 36-60.
8 German, Greek, Latin and French curricula available at Staatsarchiv Basel.
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a regular basis, raging from philosophy to science, and of course literature. Keeping this in mind,
and thinking of the famous legend according to which Jung would have been an illegitimate great-
grandson of Goethe's,9 the weight of Jung's humanistic education might have gone further than a
scholastic reading of texts. In this sense, it is thus arguable that he regarded himself as belonging to
a humanistic tradition, by the side of the scientific legacy traditionally connected to his profession
as a psychiatrist.10
1.2 NIETZSCHE'S PRESENCE IN THE EVOLVING OF JUNG'S THINKING
Jung's humanistic background emerges especially through the references to several authors who
assiduously occur in his published works. Among these, a crucial role is played by Nietzsche,
particularly regarded as the author of Thus Spoke Zarathustra [Also sprach Zarathustra] (1883-
1885), a work which definitely impressed Jung throughout his lifetime. Besides Jung's 1934-1939
seminar, expressly dedicated to a psychological interpretation of Zarathustra, this work appears to
be mentioned, among his published texts, “at least 87 times”, as reported by Paul Bishop.11
Sometimes the purpose of such mentions is to show Nietzsche as a clinical case, other times the
philosopher appears to Jung as anticipating some of the key concepts of analytical psychology and
revealing deep and aware experience with the unconscious.12
As written above, Jung grew up and studied in Basel. In particular, he attended Oberes
Gymnasium, which – as already pointed out – was quite a prestigious school. Among its teachers, it
could be proud of some of the most influential characters of the 19th century, such as Jacob
Burckhardt and Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, indeed. During Jung's years as a student, Professor
Nietzsche had already retired and was spending his last days in a state of complete folly in Germany
(in his mother's house in Naumburg until 1897, then with his sister in Weimar, where he died on 25
August 1900). In Basel his name was still associated with insanity, and a certain dread of going
through a similar destiny arose in Jung, according to his memories, who hesitated for a long time
9 MDR, p. 35
10 On the weight of the humanities in Jung's education, with particular regard to Goethe and Weimar Classicism, see: P.
Bishop, Analtytical Psychology and German Classical Aesthetics: Goethe, Schiller, and Jung, 2 vols., Routledge,
London 2008; P. Bishop, Carl Jung, cit. To have an idea of the wideness of Jung's readings, see S. Shamdasani, A
Biography in Books, Norton and Company, New York and London 2012.
11 P. Bishop, “Jung’s annotation of Nietzsche’s works: an analysis”, in: Nietzsche-Studien 24 (1995), pp. 271-314.
12  For the sake of clarity, my investigation is not going to enter the debate on the unconscious and its possible
existence or nature: any time the word “unconscious” appears in this text, it will have to be read within the historical
framework of its jungian understanding. Any philosophical question on this topic is not meant to be part of this
work. If it refers to a different position than the jungian one, it will be placed within quotation marks. To have a
historical excursus on the development of the concept of the unconscious in philosophy, see (alphabetically): M. B.
Buchholz and G. Gödde (eds.), Macht und Dynamik des Unbewussten: Auseinandersetzungen in Philosophie,
Medizin und Psychoanalyse, Psychosozial Verlag, Giessen 2005; G. Gödde, Traditionslinien des Unbewußten:
Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Freud, Edition Diskord, Tübingen 1999; A. Nicholls, M. Liebscher (eds.), Thinking the
Unconscious. Nineteenth-Century German Thought, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2010.
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before approaching his texts, despite his intellectual curiosity. Various rumours concerning
Nietzsche and his eccentricity might have affected Jung's reception of him. During his university
years, after having postponed his planned reading, he eventually decided to start from Nietzsche's
Untimely Mediations [Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen] (1873-1876), then he passed to Zarathustra.
As reported by Jung in Memories, Dreams, Reflexions, since his first reading of the book,
Zarathustra has appeared to him as a “morbid” text, where a confrontation with what he will later
call “unconscious” seems to play the main role. Despite a possible reinterpretation of his first
experience with Nietzsche's text, due to his old age at the time of recalling his memories, linking
Zarathustra with Nietzsche's innermost reality remains a steady element in Jung's understanding of
the text. Indeed, such a psychological reading of the work, despite a light evolution during the
development of Jung's theories, can be considered as consistent in his thinking. Jung's first extended
discussion on Zarathustra was in his medical dissertation, where he recognised in chapter “Of Great
Events” an example of cryptomnesia – a case of unconscious plagiarism – from Blätter aus
Prevorst by Justinus Kerner (1831-1835).13 The above evolution goes parallel with Jung's view on
poetry, whose categories – he never stopped believing – Zarathustra could fit in. In 1912,
Nietzsche, as well as other authors, was often quoted by Jung to contrast Freud's idea of poetic
creation with his own theory. In 1907, Freud's understanding of creation was that of a poet's
personal experience, brought about by his past, and with no other aim than solving the tension
caused by a repressed memory in order to proceed in life.14 In 1912, Jung proposes to regard poetry
as the product of a collective experience, or better, of the encounter with the collectivity present in
oneself. His idea is namely that poetry can result from introversion, that is the “regression” of the
libido towards introspection. In this process, mythological representations can spontaneously occur,
to signify continuity in human capacity for representation. The meaning of such representations,
therefore, is now to be read in connection with the future, since all their creative power lies in their
universal symbolic nature. To endorse his theory, Jung quotes from “Der Dichter und das
Phantasieren”, where Freud defines myths as “distorted vestiges of the wishful phantasies of whole
13 CW 1, §§ 140-142 and 180-184. In order to prove his hypothesis, Jung had a short correspondence with Elisabeth
Förster-Nietzsche, the philosopher's sister, who confirmed that both herself and her brother had engaged with
readings from Kerner during their childhood. See P. Bishop, “The Jung/Förster-Nietzsche Correspondence”, in:
German life and letters 46 (1993), pp. 319-330.
14 S. Freud, “Der Dichter und das Phantasieren” (1907). On Nietzsche's role during Jung's estrangement from Freud,
see M. Liebscher, Libido und Wille zur Macht. C.G. Jungs Auseinandersetzung mit Nietzsche, Beiträge zu Friedrich
Nietzsche 15, Schwabe, Basel 2012, pp. 93-10; M. Liebscher, “Die 'unheimliche Ähnlichkeit'. Nietzsches
Hermeneutik der Macht und analytische Interpretation bei Carl Gustav Jung,” in: Ecce Opus 81 (2003), pp. 37-50,
M. Liebscher, “Jungs Abkehr von Freud im Lichte seiner Nietzsche-Rezeption”, in: R. Reschke (ed.), Zeitenwende-
Wertewende. Internationaler Kongreß der Nietzsche-Gesellschaft zum 100. Todestag Friedrich Nietzsches vom 24.-
27. August 2000 in Naumburg, Protokollband des Naumburger Nietzsche-Kongresses, Akademie Verlag, Berlin
2001, pp. 255-260, and P. E. Dixon, Sailing a Deeper Night, Peter Lang, New York; Washington, D.C./Baltimore;
Boston; Bern; Frankfurt am Main; Berlin; Vienna; Paris 1999, pp. 147-193.
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nations, the [age-long] dreams of youthful humanity”, and compares it with aphorism 13 from
Nietzsche's Human, all too Human [Menschliches, Allzumenschliches] (1878), which reads, indeed:
“in sleep and in dreams we pass through the whole thought of earlier humanity”. In this sense, Jung
makes use of Nietzsche to reverse Freud's view advocating that “infantile thinking and dream-
thinking are simply a recapitulation of earlier evolutionary stages”. In fact, Jung's purpose is to
extend Freud's conceptualisation by stressing the “archaic” contents of the unconscious, over their
closeness to the dreamer's personal past: “All this shows how much the products of the unconscious
have in common with mythology. We should therefore have to conclude that any introversion
occurring in later life regresses back to infantile reminiscences which, though derived from the
individual past, generally have a slight archaic tinge”.15 Other than as a forerunner of his theory on
dreams, Nietzsche is mentioned by Jung in the same text quite frequently, to support his own new
view on mythology. In this sense, Jung takes as examples some of Nietzsche's aphorisms, as well as
Dithyrambs of Dionysus [Dionysos-Dithyramben] (1888-1889), among pieces by Goethe and
Hölderlin, which seem to anticipate the importance of introversion, as well as to reveal a deep
experience with the collective unconscious.16 Moreover, according to Freud, the only ability of an
artist was to convert his suffering to creative energy, so the only task of a psychoanalyst should be
to help him solve his personal conflicts. Therefore, speculation on art was excluded from the
framework of psychological investigation.17 In opposition, since the poet appears as a real medium
between external world and collective unconscious, analysing artistic creation is not only justified
by Jung and depth psychology, but also exalted. Some years later, in regard to the relation between
poetry and psychology, he will write: “Although the two things [psychology and art in general]
cannot be compared, the close connections which undoubtedly exist between them call for
investigation. These connections arise from the fact that the practice of art is a psychological
activity and, as such, can be approached from a psychological angle”.18 A few paragraphs below, in
15 CW 5, §§ 21-40 (WSL, p. 25) (see also S. Shamdasani, Jung and the Making of Modern Psychology, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge 2003, p. 140). Later on, Freud made use of the same quotation from Nietzsche's
Human, All-Too-Human in the fifth edition of his Interpretation of Dreams (1919): “We can guess how much to the
point is Nietzsche's assertion that in dreams 'some primaeval relic of humanity is at work which can now scarcely
reach any longer by a direct path'; and we may expect that the analysis of dreams will lead us to a knowledge of
man's archaic heritage, of what is physically innate in him. Dreams and neuroses have seemed to have preserved
more mental antiquities than we could have imagined possible; so that psycho-analysis may claim a high place
among the sciences which are concerned with the reconstruction of the earliest and most obscure periods of the
beginning of the human race” (S, Freud, The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, edited by J.
Strachey and A. Freud, The Hogarth Press, London 1906-1974, vol. 5, VII, (B)).
16 CW 5, §§ 142-146; 444-446; 471-472; 592-596 (WSL, pp. 89-93; 281-283; 297-298; 358-365).
17 See, S. Freud, Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie (1900-1905), Eine Kindheitserinnerung des Leonardo da Vinci
(1910), Der Wahn und die Traüme in W. Jensens “Gradiva” (1906/1912), Das Interesse an der Psychoanalyse
(1913).
18 “On the Relation of Analytical Psychology to Poetry” [“Über die Beziehungen der analytischen Psychologie zum 
dichterischen Kunstwerk”] (1922/1931), CW 15, § 97.
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order to contrast Freud's “reductive method”, which approaches the artist only in terms of
pathological subject, he will take again Nietzsche as an example:
The results are no doubt very interesting and may perhaps have the same kind of scientific
value as, for instance, a post-mortem examination of the brain of Nietzsche, which might
conceivably show us the particular atypical form of paralysis from which he died. But what
would this have to do with Zarathustra? Whatever its subterranean background may have
been, is it not a whole world in itself, beyond the human, all-too-human imperfections,
beyond the world of migraine and cerebral atrophy?19
Although this way of regarding art as a link to collectivity remains the same, in the 20's Jung's
focus is mainly on the relation between the artist's personality and his unconscious, as well as on
work creation typology. It is safe to say his opinion on Zarathustra follows this development. In
Psychological Types [Psychologische Typen] (1921), Nietzsche is frequently taken as an example
for an introverted type, and his Birth of Tragedy [Die Geburt der Tragödie] (1872) aids Jung to
define the categories of introverted intuition and extraverted sensation through the relation between
Apollinian and Dionysian.20 Furthermore, Jung mentions Zarathustra in order to show the antithesis
between a poet's typological attitude, namely introversion, and the contents of the collective
unconscious. He explains:
But what creative minds bring up out of the collective unconscious also actually exists, and
sooner or later must make its appearance in collective psychology. Anarchism, regicide, the
constant increase and splitting off of a nihilistic element on the extreme Left, with a
programme absolutely hostile to culture – these are phenomena of mass psychology, which
were long ago adumbrated by poets and creative thinkers.21
Zarathustra is then considered as separated from “the collection of philosophical aphorisms,
which are accessible to philosophical criticism because of their predominantly intellectual method”,
in order to oppose against Bergson's “intuitive method”, which appears to Jung as an “intellectual”
one. Jung argues that “Nietzsche made far greater use of the intuitive source and in so doing freed
himself from the bonds of the intellect in shaping his philosophical ideas”, this is why his
“intuition” brought about a “work of art”, rather than a philosophical work, “largely inaccessible to
philosophical criticism”.22 Such a stress on the artist's relation to collectivity culminates in Jung's
19 Ibid., § 103.
20 CW 6, §§ 223-242.
21 Ibid., §§ 322-326 (quote from § 322).
22 Ibid., § 540 (italic ours). See H. Bergson, “Introduction à la Métaphysique” (1903), in: H. Bergson, An Introduction
11
reading of Zarathustra in terms of “inflation” from the 30's on. During Jung's development on his
theory on archetypes, as it will be explained better in next paragraph, Nietzsche appears to Jung as
identified with the archetype of the “Wise Old Man”, thus becoming a direct spokesman for the
unconscious. In “'Ulysses': A Monologue”  [“«Ulysses». Ein Monolog”] (1932), Jung compares
Joyce's character of Ulysses, namely “a true demiurge who has freed himself from entanglement in
the physical and mental world and contemplates them with detached consciousness”, to Nietzsche's
Zarathustra and Goethe's Faust: “the higher self who returns to his divine home after blind
entanglement in samsara”.23 Zarathustra pathological side, that is the prophetical representation of
psychic disorders of its author, is associated by Jung with Picasso's figure of Harlequin:
Harlequin is a tragically ambiguous figure […]. He is indeed the hero who must pass through
the perils of Hades, but will not succeed? That is the question I cannot answer. Harlequin
gives me the creeps – he is too reminiscent of that 'motley fellow, like a buffoon' in
Zarathustra, who jumped over the unsuspecting rope-dancer (another Pagliacci) and thereby
brought about his death. Zarathustra then spoke the words that were to prove so horrifyingly
true of Nietzsche himself: 'Your soul will be dead even sooner than your body: fear nothing
more!' Who the buffoon is, is made plain as he cries out the rope-dancer, his weaker alter ego:
'To one better than yourself you bar the way!' He is the greater personality who bursts the
shell, and this shell is sometimes – the brain.24
Still in similar terms Zarathustra is linked with Goethe's Faust in “Forward to Suzuki's
'Introduction to Zen Buddhism'” (1939), where Jung describes both works in terms of “wholeness”
experiences, where the predominance of the unconscious makes them much closer to Eastern
creations than to European literature tradition. This also explains why they both appear so tough to
understand for a European.25 Ultimately, with the arrival of totalitarianisms, Zarathustra prophetical
capacity increases its meaning and comes to represent a mirror for future European happenings. In
this sense, Jung guesses in Zarathustra Dionysian leitmotiv a hidden reference to the destructive
to Metaphysics, (translated by T. E. Hulme), G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York and London 1912, p. 7: “By intuition is
meant the kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what
is unique in it and consequently inexpressible”. The opposite approach to reality, according to Bergson, is
“analysis”, which “on the contrary […] reduces the object to elements already known, that is, to elements common
both to it and other objects”. Jung criticises the intellectual element in Bergson's position, highly influenced by
Neoplatonism. In fact, by Jung's definition, intuition corresponds to an irrational function. On Jung's reception of
Bergson, see S. Shamdasani, Jung and the Making of Modern Psychology, pp. 227-230 (in relation to the quoted
text, pp. 229-230); P. A.Y. Gunter, “Bergson and Jung”, in: Journal of the History of Ideas 43 (1982) pp. 635-652
(reprinted in: P. Bishop, Jung in Contexts. A Reader, cit., pp. 265-282).
23 CW 15, § 192.
24 “Picasso” (1932), ibid., § 214.
25 CW 11, §§ 905-906. Originally, Jung wrote his forward to the German translation of Suzuki's text, Die grosse
Befreiung: Einführung in den Zen Buddhismus (1934) (C. Weller, Leipzig 1939).
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archetype of Wotan, that is the collective psychology of the Germans in the 30's26. Similarly, after
the war, in order to explain Hitler's rise in Europe, Jung utilises a few metaphors from Zarathustra:
like Nietzsche's incapability to accept his Shadow has prevented him from recognising the divine as
an independent entity, and has led him to project such perfection onto the Übermensch, so the
Germans have not been able to recognise their Shadow in Hitler and have idealised him. Now their
feeling of guilt is the same as Nietzsche's “pale criminal”.27
As already argued, the original opinion on Zarathustra as a product of Nietzsche's encounter
with his innermost nature does not seem to change throughout Jung's life; at the same time, a certain
fear of going through a similar destiny seems to increase during Jung'g reading of Zarathustra. In
this sense, Jung's experience with Nietzsche does not stop at the intellectual level an can be defined
in terms of a real confrontation. It is never to forget that Nietzsche also appears to be determinant in
Jung's characterisation of the archetype of the Self. According to what he reports in his seminar on
Zarathustra, Jung decided to read Zarathustra for the second time in 1914, when he was indeed
concerned with the problematic of the Self. Nietzsche's understanding of the Self – or the way Jung
perceived it – triggered Jung's conceptualisation. The passages where Nietzsche dwelled upon this
idea seemed “very important” to him, “yet – he concludes – I could not make use of it because one
misses in Zarathustra the concept of the unconscious”.28 Furthermore, interesting parallels between
some of Jung's archetypes or concepts and Nietzsche's images and metaphors have been highlighted
by a few scholars. Paul Bishop, for example, has noticed how close Jung's idea of the Anima is to
Nietzsche's personification of Life in Zarathustra chapters “The Dance Song” and “The Other
Dance Song”, as well as to Nietzsche's overall representation of Ariadne. His hypothesis is
supported by a few inscriptions “Anima” along the text of “The Other Dance Song” in Jung's
personal copy.29 Still Bishop has also shown a few passages from Nachlaß (dating from Human,
All-too-Human, II), Zarathustra and Genealogy of Morals [Zur Genealogie der Moral] (1887),
where the metaphor of the shadow is used in a way that seems to anticipate Jung's archetypical
conceptualisation of the same name.30 Martin Liebscher has pointed out the significant parall
between Jung's metaphor of “Lebensmittag”, namely that particular moment of life corresponding
to the regression of libido, and Nietzsche's “grosser Mittag”, which Jung himself openly refers to.
26 “Wotan” (1936), CW 10, § 373. See M. Liebscher, “'Wotan' und 'Puer Aeternus'. Die Zeithistorische Verstrickung
von C. G. Jungs Zarathustrainterpretation”, in: Nietzsche Studien 30 (2001), pp. 329-350.
27 “After the catastrophe” [Nach der Katastrophe] (1945), CW 10, §§ 400-443. Cfr. Za I, 6, KSA 4, 45-47. On Jung's
interpretation of “On the Pale Criminal”, see P. Bishop, “Estrangement from the Deed and the Memory thereof:
Freud and Jung on the pale criminal in Nietzsche’s Zarathustra”, in Orbis Litterarum 54 (1999), pp. 424-438.
28 SNZ I, p. 391.
29 P. Bishop, The Dionysian Self: C. G. Jung’s reception of Friedrich Nietzsche, De Gruyter, Berlin, New York 1995,
pp. 200-204.
30 Ibid., p. 315.
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The key role is played by biographical similarities between the authors, which have led Jung to
associate the age of 36 with the turning point from which life dramatically diverts its path, the
thought of death follows, and a new way of conceiving life takes place. In particular, the
biographical similarities mentioned concern the fact that both Jung's and Nietzsche's fathers were
parsons, who both died prematurely and were depicted by their sons in terms of tenderness and
morbidity. Nietzsche's father died at 36; at the same age Nietzsche went through a meaningful
health crisis which led him to “rediscover life” [ich entdeckte das Leben gleichsam neu], as reported
by him in Ecce Homo (1888). Furthermore, Jung was 36, when his estrangement from Freud
happened.31
2. JUNG'S PSYCHOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING OF NIETZSCHE
2. 1 JUNG'S SEMINAR ON ZARATHUSTRA: A PROBLEMATIC READING
During the years 1934-1939, in Zurich, Jung gave a seminar entirely dedicated to a
psychological reading of Zarathustra. Apparently, the proposal did not come from him, but rather
from someone else, still enthusiastic about his previous seminars on dreams and visions. Jung
accepted and spent five years trying to take on a meticulous analysis of Nietzsche's text. The official
language was English, and the translation used was by Thomas Common (The modern Library,
New York)32, with the only exception of chapter “The Night Song”, which Jung decided to quote in
German from his Kleinoktav-Gesamtausgabe (Naumann and Kröner, Leipzig 1899-1911), “because
it is of such a musical quality that it expressed something of the nature of the unconscious which is
untranslatable”.33
Jung's interpretation is grounded on two presuppositions, namely Zarathustra as the
representation of Nietzsche's meeting with the unconscious, and the character of Zarathustra as the
“Wise Old Man”, that is to say, one of the possible manifestations of the Spirit archetype.34 In
support of the former hypothesis, Jung refers to a specific testimony of Nietzsche's, i.e. his
31 M. Liebscher, Libido und Wille zur Macht, pp. 93-10, and M. Liebscher, “Jungs Abkehr von Freud im Lichte seiner
Nietzsche-Rezeption”. On Nietzsche's description, see EH, KSA 6, 266-267. A couple of monographic studies have
been also published on Nietzsche and Jung, in which the authors have tried to show philosophical similarities
between both thinkers in their search for wholeness: the already mentioned monograph by P. Dixon, Sailing a
Deeper Night, and L. Huskinson, Nietzsche and Jung. The Whole Self in the Union of Opposites, Brunner-
Routledge, Hove/New York 2004. However, the lack of historicity in the approach to Jung's comprehension of
Nietzsche, as well as a not negligible inaccuracy while handling informations, prevent both the above texts from
being helpful in the field of scholarly research (see Liebscher's review to Huskinson's book, “Nietzsche und Jung”,
in: Nietzsche-Studien 35 (2006), pp. 393-397). Another study on Nietzsche and Jung is: G. Parkes, “Nietzsche and
Jung: Ambivalent Appreciations”, in J. Golomb, W. Santaniello and R. Lehrer (eds.), Nietzsche and Depth
Psychology, SUNY Press, Albany 1999, pp. 205-229.
32 The year of publication misses in Jung's volume.
33 SNZ II, p. 1142.
34 SNZ I, pp. 3-37. Details of Jung's interpretation will be debated in chapter 3.
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description of Zarathustra composition as an experience of independence from his own will. In
Ecce Homo, the philosopher describes the origin of his work in terms of “inspiration”, stressing the
speed of his writing in particular.35 Autonomy and impulsivity lead Jung to link Nietzsche's writing
to an unconscious process. In order to endorse the possibility of Zarathustra's being an archetype,
instead, Jung quotes from the poem “Sils Maria”, where we are told that “the one became two”, and
Zarathustra would “pass by” Nietzsche.36 According to Jung, such a dualistic perception reflects
Nietzsche's experience of Zarathustra as separate from himself, yet belonging to his mind, thus
manifesting the very essence of any archetypical encounter. Furthermore, Jung highlights
Nietzsche's highly poetic tone as an example of inflation, namely of his identification with the
archetype of the “Wise Old Man”. In fact, Jung's analysis might be summarised in terms of a fight,
within Nietzsche's mind, between “I” and unconscious, where the latter tries consistently to be
recognised by the former but, not succeeding, is each time either rejected or projected. Behind
Nietzsche's experience, the Self tends indeed to become manifest and to lead him to the completion
of his individuation process. By virtue of “darwinistic” and “materialistic” prejudices though, the
philosopher appears to Jung as incapable of dealing with the idea of an incorporeal entity
independent from his conscience, and fails to recognise any of its manifestations. At the same time,
Nietzsche is also 'seized' by the archetype of the “Wise Old Man”, namely the only unconscious
manifestation that he is able to accept. As a philosopher on the one hand, and as an introverted,
intuitive type on the other, he is more likely to admit spirit as an autonomous phenomenon, rather
than a possible sensual appearance of the Anima or any other archetype. Precisely for this reason,
however, the encounter with the unconscious does not present any of those protections which a
good relation with one's own Anima or Animus could guarantee, and may therefore lead to the
catastrophic identification with the autonomous power experienced.
According to Jung, therefore, Nietzsche is “inflated” with the character of Zarathustra and
cannot accept his Shadow, which is consequently projected onto figures such as “the last man” or
“the ugliest man”, as well as onto all the characters and situations that appear inferior, dark,
feminine, corporeal or chthonic, irrational. In fact, the spirit represents height, sunlight, masculinity
and logic or rational thinking. In the same way, all the feminine aspects of the Anima are either
incorporated by Zarathustra himself (the clearest example is giving by his love for dance), or
projected onto a form of immature eroticism emerging through images such as the dancing girls or
the doves. Zarathustra appears to Jung as depicting the evolving of Nietzsche's contradictory
attitude towards the experience he is living: on the one hand, through the death of God, he tries to
35 EH III, § 25, KSA 6, 339-340.
36 FW Anhang, § 13 KSA 3, 649.
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deny what cannot be grasped within the framework of the conscience; on the other hand, through
his strong and blind exaltation of dance and corporeality, he seems to project this denied divine
attitude onto a materialistic view of the world. But the unconscious cannot be denied or rejected,
and through an enantiodromia – Jung utilises this phrase, which he attributes to Heraclitus, in order
to represent the transformation of a term into its contrary – it ends up turning one's conscious
attitude into its opposite. Therefore, Nietzsche's projected Shadow takes its revenge on the “I” by
turning Nietzsche's introverted intuition into its contrary, that is the extraverted sensation of the
“Dionysian orgy” which the book seems to culminate with.37
From the point of view of Nietzsche's philosophy, such an understanding of his text might
appear as a misreading, and a few scholars have already brought out the most relevant aspects of
this interpretation, as well as investigated possible mediators for Jung's reception of Nietzsche.38
The most significant points of such a 'misreading' regard Jung's apparent lack of awareness towards
Zarathustra parodistic purposes,39 as well as the questionability of its fundamental assumptions. To
this respect, a few further details might be added. First of all, despite the description proposed in
Ecce Homo, Nietzsche's Nachlaß presents a significant amount of pages that show how slow and
accurate Nietzsche's writing was. Of course Jung is aware of how important it was for Nietzsche to
re-elaborate and develop his images, but he takes such an accuracy for an example of rejection of
the unconscious, instead of stressing the philosopher's 'philological' background: in more than one
occasion, he points out Nietzsche's need for rational explanations, as well as complex constructions,
towards unexplainable manifestations and worrying signals.40 Then it is questionable wether or not
Zarathustra was actually experienced as an independent reality. To rely on Nietzsche's poem is not
37 SNZ I, p. 143.
38 See M. Liebscher, “Zarathustra – Der Archetypus des 'Alten Weisen'”, in: Nietzscheforschung 9 (2002), pp. 234-245;
P. Nill, “Die Versuchung der Psyche: Selbstwerdung als schöpferisches Prinzip bei Nietzsche und C. G. Jung”, in:
Nietzsche-Studien 17 (1988), pp. 250-279. I have also contributed in the same direction, G. Domenici, “Overleaping
oder Surpassing? Die problematische Lektüre der Geschichte des Seiltänzers bei C. G. Jung”, in M. Ates (ed.),
Nietzsches Zarathustra Auslegen. Thesen, Positionen und Entfaltungen zu »Also sprach Zarathustra« von Friedrich
Wilhelm Nietzsche, Tectum Verlag, Marburg 2014, pp. 207-219. On a Jungian approach to the issue, see M. Lindner,
“»Ein tiefstes Erlebnis«. C. G. Jungs Lektüre von Nietzsches ›Also sprach Zarathustra‹ anhand seiner Seminare
1934-39”, in: R. Lesmeister and E. Metzner (eds.), Nietzsche und die Tiefenpsychologie, Verlag Karl Alber, Freiburg
and Munich 2010, pp. 107-120. It might be eventually interesting to notice that the question concerning Jung's
reading of Nietzsche was debated a few times in Italy as well, still from a depth psychological perspective: see
Innamorati M., “La presenza dello Zarathustra di Nietzsche nelle opere di Jung”, in: Giornale storico di psicologia
dinamica 29 (1991), pp. 73-93; M. Pezzella (ed.), Lo spirito e l’ombra. I seminari di Jung su Nietzsche, Moretti &
Vitali, Bergamo 1995; G. Rocci, La maschera e l’abisso. Una lettura junghiana di Nietzsche, Bulzoni Editore,
Rome 1999; and M. Gay and I. Schiffermüller (eds.), Lo Zarathustra di Nietzsche: C. G. Jung e lo scandalo
dell'inconscio, Moretti & Vitali, Bergamo 2013.
39 On this aspect, see P. Nill, “Die Versuchung der Psyche”, p. 268. On Zarathustra as a “conscious parody” of
Nietzsche, see H. Gadamer, “Das Drama Zarathustra”, in: Nietzsche-Studien 15 (1986), pp. 1-15 (also quoted by
Nill). 
40 SNZ I, pp. 226-231, 315, 368-369, 483, 506, 526-531, 755-757; SNZ II, pp. 780-795, 1043-1045, 1087, 1215-1243,
1289-1305.
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sufficient evidence for any archetypical experience in his 'meeting' with Zarathustra. Again,
Nietzsche's Nachlaß presents different re-elaborations of “Sils Maria”, which let guess a poetic
intent, rather than a hasty collection of unusual encounters.41 Moreover, to consider Zarathustra as a
manifestation of the “Old Wise Man” archetype is not obvious at all, above all because Nietzsche's
character does not seem to be outside a temporal dimension, which, on the contrary, gives his role
strength and effectiveness.42 Even if this presupposition was admitted, it would not still be easy to
include Nietzsche within the category of inflation: several times he recognises to be part of his
contemporary scene, thus showing no refusal of the Shadow, but rather a full awareness of his own
inferiority. In Ecce Homo he declares: “Granting that I am a decadent, I am the opposite as well”.43
Finally, a position of total rejection of the unconscious in Nietzsche is not to be taken for granted,
since he frequently questions the nature of concepts such as “soul” or “ego” – especially in relation
to their possible materialistic meaning – and depicts them as delusions.44 It is also equally difficult
to consider Nietzsche's view as influenced by darwinism, if one thinks of his hard criticism to
Darwin.45
Even regarding the philosophical contents of Jung's understanding of Zarathustra, a few details
must be pointed out. First of all, throughout his seminar, Jung believes to guess in Nietzsche's
Übermensch a symbol for the wholeness represented by the Self. However, if one wanted to find
such a wholeness in Nietzsche's philosophy, then it would be his conception of the Dionysian to be
exalted, rather than this hypothetical man. The Übermensch is more likely to be somehow
understood as Nietzsche's perception of what Jung would call “individuated man”. He represents
indeed the one who has experienced the uncontrollable totality of a Dionysian becoming and has
learnt how to cope with it, by loving his necessary condition and turning the violence of imposition
into creative power. Precisely in similar terms, Jung's individuation process leads to first discover
the Self as an external and uncontrollable reality within one's own mind, and then to accept it and to
let it act on one's own personality, thus allowing it to “realise”; or, with Nietzsche's vocabulary, to
become “who one is”. Another problematic point in Jung's philosophical understanding of
41 See, for instance, NF 1882-1883 4 [145], KSA 10, 157: “Ganz Meer, ganz Mittag, ganz Zeit ohne Ziel / Ein Kind,
ein Spielzeug / Und plötzlich werden Eins zu Zwei / Und Zarathustra gieng an mir vorbei”.
42 Cfr. M. Liebscher, “Zarathustra – Der Archetypus des 'Alten Weisen'”, p. 245: “so wird Zarathustra im Sinne der
Lehre von der ewigen Wiederkehr gerade in dem Moment zu einem solchen Archetypus, als dieser die Ewigkeit in
sich trägt”, and P. Nill, “Die Versuchung der Psyche”, pp. 263-264: “Im Gegensatz zum Archetyp ist Zarathustra
nicht zeitlos, sondern sein Alter und Älterwerden strukturieren den Text. Ebenso wie die höchst wichtigen Tages und
Jahreszeitangaben gehören sie in den Zusammenhang von Nietzsches Metaphysikkritik: Gegen Schopenhauer,
gegen das 'Priester-Ideal' verkündigt der Anti-Priester Zarathustra die Zeit als Element des Lebens – und den
Augenblick als großen Mittag der Ewigkeit”.
43 EH I, § 2, KSA 6, 266.
44 JGB I, §§ 12-23, KSA 5, 26-39.
45 According to Nietzsche, if one wanted to postulate finality, this should not be found in the struggle for life, but
rather in power's self-overcoming (GD IX, § 14, KSA 6, 120). On a detailed analysis of Nietzsche's criticisms to
Darwin, see D. R. Johnson, Nietzsche's Anti-Darwinism, Cambridge University Press, New York 2010.
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Zarathustra, lastly, concerns the absence of consciousness in Nietzsche's representation of feminine
elements, which would remain on an unconscious level, being therefore either integrated in
Zarathustra's personality (like the dance, as already remarked) or projected onto erotic scenes.
However, studies have been conducted, where Nietzsche's attention to the feminine was brought
out.46 In particular, one of the most important figures of Nietzsche's philosophy is Ariadne:47 not
only is she the protagonist of the dithyramb “Klage der Ariadne”,48 but her characterisation occurs
in several unpublished fragments dating from the time of Zarathustra. Above all, while commenting
on “The Night Song” in Ecce Homo, Nietzsche writes:
Nothing like this has ever been composed, ever been felt, ever been suffered before: this is
how a god suffers, a Dionysus. The answer to this sort of dithyramb of solar solitude in the
light would be Ariadne... Who besides me knows what Ariadne is! … Nobody until now has
been able to solve riddles like this, I doubt anyone has ever seen riddles here. – Zarathustra
rigorously determines his task – it is mine as well –, and there can be no mistake about what
he means: he is affirmative to the point of justification, to the point of salvation, even for
everything past.49
2.2 THE “RED BOOK”: LIBER NOVUS
About 20 years before Jung's Zarathustra seminar, in 1912, Jung went through a complicated
period, in both a personal and a professional sense. It is now common knowledge that his
estrangement from Freud's psychoanalysis took place at that time, as well as the publication of the
first draft of Symbols of Transformation under the title Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido, which
indicated the beginning of a new theory.50 Probably due to this intense personal tension, too, in 1913
Jung was literally 'assailed' by visions, which he transcribed at first in his Black Books.51 At that
time, he realised the need for solitude and introspection, and decided to take up on the challenge
that such fantasies were violently offering him, by letting them flow into his life. A little later, they
were even collected and re-elaborated by him in a new work (although he did not stop with the
46 See, for example, D. F. Krell, Postponements, Woman, Sensuality, and Death in Nietzsche, Indiana University Press,
Bloomington 1986, especially pp. 14-31.
47 One of the most famous text has been written by G. Deleuze: Nietzsche, sa vie, son œuvre: avec un exposé de sa
philosophie (1965), PUF, Paris 2005.
48 DD, 7, KSA 6, 398-402.
49 EH III, Za, § 8, KSA 6, 348. It is not to forget that Nietzsche calls Cosima Wagner “Ariadne” in some of his very
last letters (3 January 1889, eKGWB 1241, 1242, 1242a).
50 Jung's writing on libido, unconscious and the archetypes are numerous. His theory has been developed slowly, and
sometimes it does not provide precise definitions. Nonetheless it is possible to find a certain coherency within Jung's
exposition. See, in particular, CW 8, §§ 328-420; CW 9, 1, §§ 1-110; CW 9, 2, §§ 1-67. To have a detailed excursus
on Jung and “the science question”, see S. Shamdasani, Jung and The Making of Modern Psychology, pp. 87-99.
51 S. Shamdasani, “Introduction”, in: RB, p. 202.
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Black Books transcription), which he decided to call Liber Novus. Later on, he also decided to paint
his visions, as well as other meaningful images connected to them, and to integrate such
representations in the same book. He kept working on this work until the end of the 20's, and
reflecting on it until the last days of his life. In fact, in 1916-1917 he had other fantasies which gave
birth to the “Septem Sermones ad Mortuos”, while the “Epilogue” was written in 1959. This
unusual work remained unpublished until 2009, when Sonu Shamdasani, after several years of
research, decided to publish it posthumously. He gave it the name of “The Red Book” [“Das rote
Buch”], because that was the phrase used by Jung and his closest acquaintances in order to refer to
the monumental book, due to its huge red leather cover.52 It is written in folio, with gothic
characters and miniatures, and is divided into three parts: “Liber Primus”, “Liber Secundus”,
“Scrutinies” (which includes “Epilogue” and “Appendices”). Regarding its general contents, it must
be noticed that it is composed by visions and commentaries. Furthermore, Jung frequently quotes
from the Bible; in a few visions the style reaches nearly poetical tones; symbols and metaphors are
recurrent throughout. The protagonist is Jung's “I” and the main story is told in first person. If one
wanted to bring out 'philosophical' contents more broadly, it could be stated that Liber Novus can be
represented as teaching and symbolising the experience of a transformation. Indeed, the process can
be summarised as a continuative development from the perspective of the sense [Sinn], to the
nonsense [Unsinn] – which can be placed as its own Shadow – towards the realisation of a supreme
meaning [Übersinn]. If accepted, the nonsense can be integrated by the sense and become one with
it, creating a new and superior perspective; if not accepted, the only consequence is that it turns into
absurdity [Widersinn], leading any development attempt to failure. The most significant symbol of
the supreme meaning is the “Birth of a New God”, which, in terms of Jung's Psychology, represents
the discovery of the Self [Selbst].53
2.3 JUNG'S ZARATHUSTRA OR NIETZSCHE'S LIBER NOVUS?
It can be stated that, similarly to Jung's Liber Novus, Zarathustra was written in quite a dark
period of its author's life. After Nietzsche's disappointment with Wagner's ideology – with his
consequent estrangement from Bayreuth environment –, and the worsening of his health conditions
– which led him to retire from his professorship position in Basel in 1879 – in 1882, he went
through one of the deepest and saddest failures of his life, namely the end of his friendship with
Paul Ree and Lou von Salomé, along with a severe refusal from her to his insistent marriage
52 On the whole history of Liber Novus publication, see S. Shamdasani, “Introduction” and “Editorial Note”, in: RB,
pp. 193-226.
53 A quite helpful introductory commentary to Liber Novus has been written by B. Nante,“El libro rojo” de C. G.
Jung. Claves por la comprension de una obra inexplicable Siruela, Madrid 2010, 2011.
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proposals. Right after that, he traveled intensively around Switzerland (Engadin), Italy and
Provence, published the first four parts of the Gay Science [Die fröhliche Wissenschaft]
(1882/1887), and came across a few meaningful intuitions, highly significant for his philosophy
henceforth. Such intuitions were collected and published in four parts (each of them called “book”)
around the period 1883-1885, under the title of “Also sprach Zarathustra”.
Zarathustra “First Book” consists of a “Prologue” and 22 “Speeches”, all the others are
characterised by speeches, narrations, with the addition of a few dreams and visions of
Zarathustra's. The main stylistic features regard the utilisation of dithyramb; several mythological or
literary references; as well as an abundance of symbols and metaphors, often with a parodistic
purpose towards Luther's Bible. Zarathustra is the actual protagonist but, apart from his speeches,
the text is written in third person. If one wanted to sum up the philosophical main topic of the book,
the “death of God” should be highlighted. Such a situation symbolises the most extreme nihilistic
perspective, which brings two different attitudes: a negative and a positive one. The first one
corresponds on the one hand to the “last man”'s attitude, that is, not caring about the death of God,
despite the acknowledgement of being responsible for it; on the other hand, a negative attitude
belongs to the “superior man”, who not only is more than aware about his own responsibility, but
also suffers because of such situation, yet is not strong enough to overcome it. The criterion for
overcoming Nihilism is represented by the thought of the eternal return and its actual acceptation;
whereas the possibility of such overcoming is symbolised by the figure of the Übermensch, that is,
the one who has said “yes” [Jasagen] to life in all its positive and negative sides, namely in all its
nonsense. This figure represents the only possible positive response to the “death of God”.54
In Jung's own Zarathustra volume, among several underlinings and annotations, it is possible to
find many references to Liber Novus. One could then argue that Jung's unusual reading of
Zarathustra was originated by a sort of confusion in his mind between Nietzsche's text and his own
Liber Novus, that is to say, Jung read Zarathustra as if it was Nietzsche's Liber Novus. Both texts
are indeed close to each other not only because of their style and in a way their contents, but also
because Nietzsche and Zarathustra appear in Jung's work. Most of the times, this appearance is
implicit, and takes place just through hidden quotations or references to Nietzsche's main concepts.
Besides that, it is also possible to find a few explicit quotations, and, even more important,
Nietzsche appears in a vision as a proper character. Thanks to Liber Novus, furthermore, it could be
now possible to better understand all those passages in Jung's seminar on Zarathustra which seem
to be completely obscure and far away from Nietzsche's purpose. What characterises Jung's reading
of Zarathustra, it can be stated, is precisely a hidden allusion to his Liber Novus, which might have
54 All these themes will be treated in chapters 2 and 3.
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led him to overlook some significant philosophical differences and analyse the text from a mere
psychological standpoint. It is known that Jung had already read Zarathustra before his first
visions, but this does not invalidate our hypothesis: firstly – as it will be better shown in chapter 1
and was already partly anticipated at the beginning of this introduction – Jung's impression of
Zarathustra as a 'prophetical' representation of Nietzsche's encounter with his innermost and
dangerous personality originates since his very first reading, and remains the same throughout his
life; secondly, the urge he felt in 1914 to reread the text and have a further confrontation with its
author is a matter which cannot be disregarded. It can be even argued that 1914 marks the division
between two different levels in Jung's reading: before that time, it was the encounter with a
“prophet” and the eternal contents of his innermost nature to be stressed; after that, it was the
psychic danger of experiencing the unconscious.
Both texts can surely be considered as personal experiences,55 and in several letters Nietzsche
refers to his text in terms of “solitude” and “incomprehension”.56 Moreover, both the forth part of
Zarathustra and the entire Liber Novus were originally meant for a closed group of readers, and not
for an official publication. Emma Jung, Toni Wolff, Cary Baynes, Wolfgang Stockmayer were the
only people certainly involved by Jung in his adventure, though it is still possible that someone else
had knowledge of it. He discussed with them the possibility of a publication but then refused,
feeling that the right time for letting his experience be known had still to come.57 Similarly,
Nietzsche withdrew the only few copies available of Zarathustra, IV and regretted about having
given them to someone not yet ready for his philosophy. Precisely such a proximity in the relation
between author and text might have led Jung to 'confuse' Nietzsche's Zarathustra with his Red
Book.
3. MISREADING OR 'REVALUATION'?
3.1 THE UNCONSCIOUS AS A PERSPECTIVE
55 It is also possible to link the personal component of both Zarathustra and Liber Novus to the question of the truth
and the insufficiency of science (see L. Lupo, «Also spricht meine Seele». Lo Zarathustra di Nietzsche nel Libro
rosso di Jung: la verità come vita tra esperienza ed esperimento, in P. Gori and P. Stellino (eds.), Teorie e pratiche
della verità in Nietzsche, Pisa: ETS, 2012, pp. 133-156).
56  On 12 February 1887, he wrote to Overbeck from Nice: “Dagegen will ich keinen Augenblick leugnen, daß ein
andres Faktum mir schrecklich weh thut und mir auch beständig gegenwärtig ist: daß in eben diesen fünfzehn Jahren
auch nicht Ein Mensch mich 'entdeckt' hat, mich nöthig gehabt hat, mich geliebt hat, und daß ich diese lange
erbärmliche schmerzenüberreiche Zeit durchlebt habe, ohne durch eine ächte Liebe getröstet worden zu sein. Mein
ganzer 'Zarathustra' ist aus dieser Entbehrung gewachsen – wie unverständlich muß er sein! Welche absurden
Erinnerungen habe ich in Hinsicht auf die Wirkung, die er gemacht hat! Er hat erbittert , wenigstens eine gewisse
Art von Menschen: dies ist bisher seine einzige tiefere Wirkung gewesen. – Indessen – indessen – ich bin 'intelligent'
genug, um auch dies als gutes Zeichen zu nehmen. Zuletzt habe ich keine Zeit , mich sehr um die 'Meinung über
mich' zu bekümmern: es giebt eine erschreckliche Menge von Problemen, die auf mich drücken. Und was für
Probleme! Wenn ich nur den Muth hätte, Alles zu denken , was ich weiß...”(BVN 1887, eKGWB, 798).
57 See S. Shamdasani, “Introduction”, RB, pp. 212-213.
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Arguing that Jung read Zarathustra as if it was Nietzsche's Liber Novus is not meant as a
negative criticism, in fact it opens up a new interpretative perspective. If Nietzsche's aim is to
propose a text able to reflect the paradoxical complexity of Dionysian becoming, which creates and
destroys itself its own values, and overcomes itself in its own self-affirmation process, then a
psychological reading mirrors one of the possible will to power perspectives and, therefore, sticks to
Zarathustra purpose.58 As Martin Liebscher has convincingly pointed out, Jung's interpretation can
be read as a form of transvaluation, according to Nietzsche, whereas reading Nietzsche from a pure
psychological position would mean a certain presumption, which, with Nietzsche's words, could be
expressed as a form of “will to truth”. This means precisely to impose only one perspective on the
totality of the will to power possibilities.59 In this sense, to read Zarathustra as the mere product of
an ill mind would be nothing but reduction, which means it might also be that, but it is not
acceptable to put Nietzsche's psychological processes as the only way his text should be taken on. In
fact, sticking to a multi-perspective reading does not exclude the possibility that Jung's
interpretation is true or at least plausible, it just does not admit this single view as 'the' truth.
Zarathustra under-title is “a Book for All and None” indeed, meaning that a multiple reading was
originally thought as its main feature. Giorgio Colli, to this extent, has stressed the esoteric shade of
the text, beside its immediate exoteric meaning:
Thus spoke Zarathustra is “a Book for All” and with that Nietzsche has meant to start off a
revolutionary reform within philosophical argumentation [...]. This work, therefore, may also
be regarded as a large scale fight; but what remains remote, hidden, unaccessible, at the
bottom of it, muddies the clarity of communication. The contemptuous, Heraclitean, coldness,
from which such an expression pours, perpetuates towards a kind of ambiguity, that can be
only externally connected to a symbolic relation, a gap between signifier and signified.
Therefore, it is also a “Book for None”.60
Nietzsche himself has publicly highlighted the unavoidability of interpretation in Beyond Good
58 To defend such a position towards Nietzsche's understanding of Zarathustra, the amount of posthumous material,
published aphorisms or commentaries, as well as letters and secondary literature is so wide, that I reckon it would be
pointless to mention it here. I would rather remind of an article of mine, which summarises the main points of my
thesis: G. Domenici, “Eine 'göttlich künstliche' Sprache. Zarathustra als Beispiel für Nietzsches Lebenskunst”, in
Nietzscheforschung 21 (2014), pp. 231-240.
59 Martin Liebscher, Libido und Wille zur Macht, pp. 155-164.
60 G. Colli, Scritti su Nietzsche (1980), Adelphi, Milan 1995, pp. 113-114. Translation is my own [Così parlò
Zarathustra è “un libro per tutti” e con esso Nietzsche ha inteso introdurre una riforma rivoluzionaria
nell’esposizione filosofica. [...]. Quest’opera può dunque essere vista altresì come una battaglia di vasta portata; ma
quello che sul fondo di essa vi è di remoto, nascosto, inaccessibile, intorbida la chiarezza della comunicazione. Il
distacco sdegnoso, eracliteo, da cui sgorga quell’espressione si perpetua in una ambiguità, che solo esteriormente si
può ricondurre a un rapporto simbolico, a un salto tra significante e significato. Perciò si tratta anche di “un libro per
nessuno”].
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and Evil [Jenseits von Gut und Böse] (1886), only one year after the publication of the last part of
Zarathustra: “Everything profound loves masks. The most profound things of all even have a hatred
for images and allegories”. Indeed, in any kind of conversation – even, and above all, when it
comes to dialogue with a written text – every given information is mediated, thus filtered by the
listener – or the reader – and the original meaning of a word, a phrase, a sentence tends to slightly
vary. Consequently, the deeper the meaning, the more likely it is its original sense being
misunderstood. So, Nietzsche concludes in his aphorism: “Every profound spirit needs a mask; even
more, around every profound spirit a mask is continuously growing, thanks to the constantly false,
that is, shallow interpretation of every word, every step, every sign of life he gives”.61 Already at the
time of Zarathustra composition, while meditating on the perfect “style” to express particularly
profound concepts, Nietzsche wrote down, in form of a personal note: “The more abstract the truth
to teach, the more we need to firstly seduce our senses, in order to grasp it” [Je abstrakter die
Wahrheit ist, die man lehren will, um so mehr muß man erst die Sinne zu ihr verführen].62 Thinking
of how significant it was for him to preserve a 'philological' approach to both writing and reading,
one could argue that also Zarathustra was meant to be read “slowly”.63 A “slow” reading may
prevent from misunderstanding the author's original intention. At the same time though, as
mediation seems to be unavoidable, the creation of a new meaning accompanies any reading. It
might not be a case that Nietzsche's biggest stress on revaluation arises at first during his writing of
Zarathustra, III, in parallel with his deepest reflections on the eternal return.64 Furthermore, Jung is
not the only one who has approached Nietzsche in a psychological way: as it is well-known, Lou
von Salomè's biography of him is oriented to an analysis of his personality in first place; other
popular or less popular biographies have been written since then, with a similar focus.65
Moreover, it is highly remarkable that Jung worked on his Liber Novus while developing most
of his depth psychological main concepts. So, if it is true that Jung experienced Nietzsche as part of
a continuos line started from Weimar Classicism, and to which he himself felt to belong – regardless
61 JGB 2, § 40, KSA 5, 57-58.
62 NF 1[45] July-August 1882, KSA 10, 23 (translation is my own).
63 Cfr. M Vorrede, § 5, KSA 3, 17.
64 See T. H. Brobjer, “The Origin and Early Context of the Revaluation Theme in Nietzsche's Thinking”, in The
Journal of Nietzsche's Studies 19 (Spring 2010), pp. 12-29.
65 L. Andreas von Salomè, Friedrich Nietzsche in seinen Werken,Verlag von Carl Konegen, Wien 1894. Just to take a
few examples, Karl Löwith suggested to read the most significant characters in Zarathustra as characters of
Nietzsche's dialogue with himself (K Löwith, Nietzsches Philosphie der ewigen Wiederkehr des Gleichen; 1935-
1956; Meiner, Hamburg 1978, pp. 188-189. Also quoted in P. Bishop, The Dionysian Self, p. 274); Werner Ross
proposed to call Nietzsche's philosophy of years 1872-73 “Tiefenphilosophie”, in analogy with depth psychology
[Tiefenpsychologie] indeed (W. Ross, Der ängstliche Adler. Friedrich Nietzsches Leben; 1979; Kastell Verlag
GmbH, München 1997/98 p. 370). He understands Nietzsche's philosophy “als eine Philosophie nämlich, die ihre
Gänge unter alle bisherigen Systeme bohrt und sie von dorther in die Luft sprengen will”. And he adds: “Sie fühlt
sich nicht als Fortsetzerin der alten Denk-Architekturen, sondern als Testamentsvollstreckerin”.
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of Nietzsche's actual belonging, which is still to debate –,66 then investigating Nietzsche's presence
in Liber Novus might make clearer his overall weight in Jung's theories. As written above, Jung's
humanistic education is an essential element to understand and contextualise most of his thoughts,
especially in the case of a work whose organisation mirrors a medieval manuscripts, and which
presents similarities with William Blake's works – given by the association of paintings and text –,
by the side of “unreferenced citations and allusions to works of philosophy, religion, and
literature”.67 On the other hand, Liber Novus itself contributes to cast new light on Jung's unusual
interpretation of Zarathustra and by so doing gives even more value to Nietzsche's expectations
regarding his text. An accurate analysis of such a reading is therefore worthy and interesting, even
from a Nietzschean perspective. Ultimately, bringing out Nietzsche's presence within Jung's
innermost experiences does not mean to deprive Liber Novus of its value. On the contrary, it can
help highlight some elements which he felt the need to confront with. Therefore, such an analysis
does not seem to be disrespectful towards Jung's intent, either. To this purpose, Paul Bishop's
position can be lastly recalled:
Throughout The Red Book, we find a number of concerns that are reminiscent of texts from
the period of German Idealism, and provide the cultural historical context for approaching
Jung’s long-withheld masterpiece. An awareness of this context does not detract from Jung’s
inventiveness or originality; on the contrary, it enables us to appreciate his achievement all the
better. Nor is it simply the case that Jung marshalled a number of sources when he undertook
to produce The Red Book, along the model that he took a previously existing pack of cards
and simply reshuffled them. Rather, my argument is that Jung is working on the same
intellectual and experiential terrain as the German Idealists (in the broadest sense of the term),
including Goethe and Schiller. Their problems are his problems; equally, his problems are
ours.68
66 The influence of Weimar Classicism on Nietzsche's philosophy has been the main argument of a couple of texts
edited by Paul Bishop: P. Bishop and R. H. Stephenson (eds.), Friedrich Nietzsche and Weimar Classicism, Camden
House, Rochester NY 2004; P. Bishop (ed.), Nietzsche and Antiquity. His Reaction and Response to the Classical
Tradition, Camden House, Rochester NY 2004. A certain proximity between Nietzsche, Weimar environment, and
its most influential characters, such as Goethe, Schiller and Hölderlin, has been debated in: G. Baioni, La filologia e
il sublime dionisiaco. Nietzsche e le “Considerazioni inattuali”, in F. W. Nietzsche, Considerazioni Inattuali (Italian
translation of Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen, 1873-1876), Turin: Einaudi, 1981, pp. V-LXII; V. Vivarelli,
“Empedokles und Zarathustra. Verschwendeter Reichtum und Wollust am Untergang”, Nietzsche-Studien 18, 1989,
pp. 509-536; H. von Seggern, Nietzsche und die Weimarer Klassik, Francke Verlag, Tübingen 2005. Although it is
undeniable to regard Goethe and Hölderlin as relevant figures both in Nietzsche's texts – which quite often offer
several explicit as well as implicit allusions to them – and in his student years – when he used to refer to Hölderlin
as his “favourite poet” –, it is not easy to defend Jung's opinion. Surely Nietzsche considered Goethe as an
extraordinary man (GD IX, 49, KSA 6, 151-152), and exalted his personality in several occasions. But his anti-
German position, started off especially after his estrangement from Wagner and, above all, from Wagnerians, is too
strong to postulate a sense of belonging to German Idealism.
67 S. Shamdasani, “Introduction”, RB, pp. 202-203.
68 P. Bishop, “Jung's Red Book and its relation to aspects of German Idealism”, in: The Journal of Analytical
Psychology 57 (2012), pp. 335-353 (p. 337).
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3.2. STRUCTURE OF THE WORK
What such an analysis requires is to find a common ground that could have offered elements to
both Liber Novus and Zarathustra. The issue will be therefore investigated by firstly wondering
how Jung would have ever put Liber Novus and Zarathustra together. As anticipated, he describes
his very first reading of Nietzsche's text as “a tremendous experience”, exactly as it had happened
with Goethe's Faust. In fact, “Zarathustra was Nietzsche's Faust, his No. 2”, that is to say, that part
of its author's personality which did not depend on his historical belonging, on his 'here and now',
but referred to an inner and uncontrollable other reality, timeless and incorporeal. The first time
Jung went through the experience of a “No. 2” was exactly within himself, and the reason why
Zarathustra was terrifying him so much, was that his “No. 2 now corresponded to Zarathustra”.
This had a strong effect on him, who eventually claimed: “in the end I was forced to reflect on
myself.” However, it is not so obvious to admit that such a link between Nietzsche's “No. 2” and his
own “No. 2” would have been possible, even if Jung had not already read Faust. Of course, as he
tells Aniela Jaffè, Nietzsche's mental conditions were well-known in Basel during Jung's school
days, so that the association Nietzsche-folly – hence the association Zarathustra-Nietzsche's “No. 2”
– was taken for granted by everyone.69 But the first time that an author's “No. 2” was related to a
work of his in Jung's mind, was with Goethe.
As it will be argued more exhaustively in chapter 1, Jung has also frequently regarded other
works in similar terms: Dante Alighieri's Commedia, Richard Wagner's Ring, Tristan and Parsifal,
Carl Spitteler's Olympian Spring (and not seldom Prometheus and Epimetheus), William Blake's
poetry and paintings, etc. In 1930, Jung specifically takes such works as examples for the “mode of
artistic creation” defined by him as “visionary”, namely where “the experience that furnishes the
material for artistic expression [...] is something strange that derives its existence from the
hinterland of man's mind, as if it had emerged from the abyss of prehuman ages [...]” and “to
which” the artist “may easily succumb”.70 Besides the authors mentioned above, Jung frequently
associates inner experiences also to Hölderlin's Song of Destiny [Schicksalslied] (Hyperion) and
Vischer's Auch Einer.71 In particular, among all these authors, the most frequently (and
significantly) put by Jung in connection with Zarathustra are: Goethe, Hölderlin, Spitteler and
Vischer. For this reason, it is worthy to investigate their “visionary” works by pointing out possible
similarities in both contents and style. Furthermore, parallels, or even common historical
69 Ibid., pp. 101-102.
70 “Psychology and Literature” [“Psychologie und Dichtung”] (1930/1950), CW 15, §§ 139-141. See also CW 6, §§
288-326, 448, 434-460; SNZ, p. 224.
71 CW 5, §§ 619-620; CW 9, 1, § 576; CW 15, § 178; CW 6, §§ 158, 627; SNZ, pp. 871, 887, 1445-1446.
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contingencies in the lives of these authors' will be also highlighted. To conclude this first part, a
return to Liber Novus is necessary, in order to wonder if such work could ever fit in the same
category as well. The answer is given by Jung himself, who describes the feeling of intense anxiety
during his first visions in the same way he had described his “No. 2”, Faust and Zarathustra
experiences.72 Apart from these descriptions, also historical-environmental details are to be noticed,
if one intends to consider Liber Novus as a “visionary” work: a few of mutual acquaintances with
Nietzsche's, a brief argument with Spitteler, important mediators (such as Burckhardt and
Bachofen) to the same tradition of “visionary” authors, as well as Basel, where Jung lived and
studied till the end of his university carrier, and whose buildings had been shared also by Nietzsche
and Spitteler. As argued by Bishop, ultimately, a few significant elements recurring in Liber Novus
have been apparently inspired by Goethe, Vischer, Hölderlin and German Classicism.73
In chapter 2, Nietzsche's presence in Jung's Liber Novus is investigated: first all the implicit and
often general allusions are presented and endorsed through philological archive work, which allows
to furnish evidence among Jung's personal underlinings and annotations in his complete Nietzsche's
Kleinoktav-Gesamtausgabe.74 The focus is mainly on images such as desert, lion, serpent, dwarf and
72 Cfr RB I, p. 231: “It happened in October of the year 1913 as I was leaving alone for a journey; that during the day I
was suddenly overcome in broad daylight by a vision: I saw a terrible flood that covered all the northern and low-
lying lands between the North Sea and the Alps. It reached from England up to Russia, and from the coast of the
North Sea right up to the Alps. I saw yellow waves, swimming rubble, and the death of countless thousands. This
vision lasted for two hours, it confused me and made me ill. I was not able to interpret it. Two weeks passed then the
vision returned, still more violent than before, and an inner voice spoke: 'look at it, it is completely real, and it will
come to pass. You cannot doubt this.' I wrestled again for two hours with this vision, but it held me fast. It left me
exhausted and confused. And I thought my mind had gone crazy. From then on the anxiety toward the terrible event
that stood directly before us kept coming back. Once I also saw a sea of blood over the northern lands”; and RB
“Scrutinies”, § 2, p. 336: “I did not know what work was mine, since everything was dark. And everything became
heavy and doubtful and an endless sadness seized me and lasted for many days. Then, one night [25 May 1914], I
heard the voice of an old man. He spoke slowly, heavily, and his sentences appeared to be disconnected and terribly
absurd, so that the fear of madness seized me again. For he spoke the following words: 'It is not yet the evening of
days. The worst comes last. The hand that strikes first, strikes best. Nonsense streams from the deepest wells, amply
like the Nile. Morning is more beautiful than night. Flowers smell until they fade. Ripeness comes as late as possible
in spring, or else it misses its purpose.' […] This sadness did not leave until the 24th June 1914.” (italics ours).
73 P. Bishop, “Jung's Red Book and its relation to aspects of German Idealism”, cit. Occasionally the text presents a few
references to Spitteler as well.
74 Jung read Zarathustra at least three times: during his university years in Basel, in 1914 and at the time of his Zurich
seminar. According to him, all the main annotations presented in his personal copy were written down in 1914, as he
was majorly concerned with the problem of the Self, as already said (SNZ I, p. 391). Nevertheless it is arguable that
several inscriptions belong to a later period, due to his intense referring to problematics which appear central in
those years and not relevant at the time of Liber Novus. Indeed, during my research at C. G. Jung's personal library
in Küsnacht, I found a headed paper of his with a couple of I-Ching hexagrams written down. We know he came
across chinese philosophy a few years after his second reading of Zarathustra, it is therefore likely that the paper
dates back to the 30's. Furthermore, it was found in the mid of the postface written by Förster-Nietzsche and Gast,
where all the most significant lines referring to Nietzsche's fear of illness and contagion are underlined, and a few
marginalia present phrases occurring in Jung's seminar comments. Sometimes Jung refers to archetypes, so it is easy
to put those references in connection with Jung's 30's reading, since those concepts started to be developed later then
1914. In a few cases though, it might result difficult to distinguish between 1914 and 30's annotations, if not
impossible. This all means that a philological research is not to be read as an incontrovertible piece of evidence to
determine whether or not Jung was actually refer to Zarathustra while writing Liber Novus or to Liber Novus while
commenting on Zarathustra. Nonetheless, having such a huge amount of annotations in almost all of Nietzsche's
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sun path. Then the explicit references to, as well as quotation from Nietzsche – and particularly
Zarathustra – are analysed from the point of view of a more specific philosophical content, namely
in terms of what was called Jung's 'confrontation' with Nietzsche. Whereas the first part of this
chapter concerns symbology above all, in the second part the stress is on three essential aspects of
Jung's understanding of Nietzsche: folly, the relation between teaching and imitating, the question
of the death of God.
In chapter 3, Jung's seminar on Zarathustra is confronted with Liber Novus. In particular, all
those passages in which Jung's interpretation does not come across as extremely coherent with
Nietzsche's philosophy are compared with those Liber Novus lines which Jung is more likely to
refer to. This is firstly the case with Jung's stress on Nietzsche's failed individuation and the
presuppositions of such a theory: Zarathustra as the Old Wise Man, Nietzsche's Übermensch as a
symbol for the Self, Nietzsche's solitude and his negation of the unconscious. A second point of this
study regards Jung's tendency to overanalyse some animal figures which do not play any essential
role in Zarathustra comprehension, but appear quite significant in Liber Novus. The main elements
of this last part are: the couple serpent-bird; the black scarab; frogs, toads and swamp; lion and
doves.
As it has been pointed out throughout this introduction, it is important to keep the field of
interpretation as open as possible in both cases with Zarathustra and Liber Novus. Furthermore, if
one agrees with Sonu Shamdasani that “the role of Philemon in Jung's work has analogies to that of
Zarathustra in Nietzsche's work and Virgil in Dante's”,75 it really makes sense to let Zarathustra
'have a dialogue' with Philemon and confront the crucial aspects of their 'teachings'. In order to
draw our conclusions, Nietzsche's understanding of the “death of God” will be compared with
Jung's need for the “birth of a new God”; so their consequential interpretation of Christianity will
become a major question. Finally, the meaning of “self-overcoming” to both authors, and in both
Zarathustra and Liber Novus, will be considered.
works, makes such a hypothesis more than plausible.
75 S. Shamdasani, “Introduction”, RB, p. 202.
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CHAPTER 1
“VISIONARY” WORKS AND LIBER NOVUS
He who sleeps in the grave of the millennia dreams a
wonderful dream. He dreams a primordially ancient
dream. He dreams of the rising sun.
If you sleep this sleep and dream this dream in this time
of the world, you will know that the sun will also rise at
this time. For the moment we are still in the dark, but the
day is upon us.
He who comprehends the darkness in himself, to him the
light is near. He who climbs down into his darkness
reaches the staircase of the working light, fire-maned
Helios (RB II, 5, “Dies II”, p. 272)
1.1 “VISIONARY” WORKS
1.1.1 JUNG'S DEFINITION AND CHARACTERISATION
As anticipated in the introduction, in “Psychology and Literature” (1930/1950), Jung puts a
distinction between psychological and visionary works:
For the sake of clarity I would like to call the one mode of artistic creation psychological, and the
other visionary. The psychological mode works with materials drawn from man's conscious life –
with crucial experiences, powerful emotions, suffering, passion, the stuff of human fate in general.
All this is assimilated by the psyche of the poet, raised from the commonplace to the level of
poetic experience, and expressed with a power of conviction that gives us a greater depth of human
insight by making us vividly aware of those everyday happenings which we tend to evade or to
overlook because we perceive them only dully or with a feeling of discomfort. The raw material of
this kind of creation is derived from the contents of man's consciousness, from his eternally
repeated joys and sorrows, but clarified and transfigured by the poet. There is no work left for the
psychologist to do […].
The gulf that separates the first from the second part of Faust marks the difference between the
psychological and the visionary modes of artistic creation. Here everything is reversed. The
experience that furnishes the material for artistic expression is no longer familiar. It is something
strange that derives its existence from the hinterland of man's mind, as if it had emerged from the
abyss of prehuman ages, or from a superhuman world of contrasting light and darkness. It is a
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primordial experience which surpasses man's understanding and to which in his weakness he may
easily succumb.1
Within such a “visionary” mode of artistic creation, Goethe is not alone with his Faust II:
Nietzsche's Zarathustra and Dithyramb of Dionysus belong to the same category, as well as Dante's
Commedia; Wagner's Ring, Tristan, and Parsifal; Spitteler's Olympian Spring [Olympischer
Frühling] (1900-1906); Blake's Poetry and Paintings; the Shepherd of Hermas; Francesco Colonna's
Hypnerotomachia; “Jacob Boehme's poetic-philosophic stammerings”; “the magnificent but
scurrilous imagery of E. T. A. Hoffman's tale The Golden Bowl”. Furthermore, in “more restricted
and succinct form”, this primordial experience is said to constitute the essential content of Rider
Haggard's She and Ayesha, of Benoît's L'Atlantide, of Alfred Kubin's Die andere Seite, of Meyrink's
Das grüne Gesicht, of Goetz's Das Reich ohne Raum, and of Barlach's Der tote Tag”; though “the
list might be greatly extended”.2 Indeed, Jung seems to extend the list by describing other works
with similar phrases elsewhere. The most remarkable examples are: Spitteler's Prometheus and
Epimetheus [Prometheus und Epimetheus] (1881); Hölderlin's “Song of Fate” [Schicksalslied]
(from Hyperion, 1797/1798; 1789); Vischer's novel Auch Einer (1879). In Psychological Types,
Jung analyses Spitteler's metric novel as the representation of “the introverted and extraverted lines
of development in one and the same individual, though the poet has embodied it in two independent
figures and their typical destinies”.3 A few paragraphs below, while commenting on Prometheus'
soul that appears as a feminine entity, “separate from his individual ego”, he states:
And, just as the unconscious world of mythological images speaks indirectly, through the
experience of external things, to the man who surrenders wholly to the outside world, so the
real world and its demands find their way indirectly to the man who has surrendered wholly to
the soul; for no man can escape both realities. If he is intent only on the outer reality, he must
live his myth; if he is turned only towards the inner reality, he must dream his outer, so-called
real life.4
 Prometheus has indeed to experience the “real world”; whereas his brother needs to “live his
1 CW 15, §§ 139-141.
2 Ibid., § 142. Interestingly, a few years earlier, Jung had suggested that the participants in his seminar on analytical
psychology would choose and read one of these following texts as examples of the Anima in literature: She,
L'Atlantide, Das grüne Gesicht (C. G. Jung, Introduction to Jungian Psychology, Notes of the Seminar on Analytical
Psychology given in 1925, Revised Edition edited by Sonu Shamdasani, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2012,
pp. 127-128). Hermas, Nietzsche, Wagner, Dante and Goethe were already gathered together by Jung in 1921, as
representing the tradition of “the relativity of the symbol” (CW 6, §§ 408-412).
3 CW 6, § 276. According to such an interpretation, Prometheus would represent introversion and Epimetheus
extraversion.
4 Ibid., § 280.
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myth”. Jung then compares Spitteler's representation of the myth with Goethe's “Prometheus
Fragment” (1773), and argues that whereas Spitteler appears to embody an “introverted type”,
Goethe “belongs more to the extraverted […] type”. Despite many similarities concerning the two
Promethean figures and their peculiar relationship with their “soul[s]”, “one essential difference
remains. Goethe's Prometheus is a creator and artist, and Minerva [his soul] inspires his clay images
with life. Spitteler's Prometheus is suffering, rather than creative; only his soul is creative, but her
work is secret and mysterious”. Differently from Goethe's, Spitteler's Pandora represents the
“equivalent” of the amount of Prometheus' libido withdrawn from the outer world; she is a product
of the unconscious to balance Prometheus' introversion. The jewel “she wants to give to mankind to
ease their sufferings” is “an unconscious mirror-image that symbolizes the real work of the soul of
Prometheus”, “it is a God-redeemer, a renewal of the sun”. Indeed, it “symbolizes a renewal of
God, a new God, but this takes place in the divine sphere, i.e., in the unconscious”. As Epimetheus
represents “the relation to the world”, the “rational attitude and orientation to objects”, Pandora's
gift cannot find its place among humans, who are “incapable of appreciating the true value and
significant of the jewel”. Promethean and Epimethean sides therefore appear “dissociated”, and the
rebirth of the God can happen only at the end of the story, when the “enantiodromia” leads
Epimetheus to negotiate with Behemoth and allow him to take away the divine children:
“psychologically, this means that the collective, undifferentiated attitude to the world stifles a man's
highest values and becomes a destructive force, whose influence increases until the Promethean
side, the ideal and abstract attitude, places itself at the service of the soul's jewel and, like a true
Prometheus, kindles for the world a new fire”.5 Still in the same section, Jung compares Spitteler's
work with Parsifal, Zarathustra, Faust II. In all these works, “the solution of the problem […] is
religious. It is therefore not surprising that Spitteler too is drawn towards a religion setting”, even
though here “the specifically religious problem loses in depth, though gaining in mythological
richness and archaism”. Differently from Nietzsche and Goethe, Spitteler does not seem to be
conscious of “the meaning of the symbol” in his work; Zarathustra and Faust, therefore, appear
“far more satisfying aesthetically than Spitteler's Prometheus, though the latter, as a more or less
faithful reflection of actual processes of the collective unconscious, has a deeper truth”. A different
and deeper level of awareness will be achieved by Spitteler in his later Olympian Spring
[Olympischer Frühling] (1906-1909), where “the renewal of God” will play the main role.6 Lastly,
in order to show how important it is to accept the uniting symbol – represented in Spitteler's novel
by the third son of God, Messias – Jung cites from Blake's poem “The Marriage of Heaven and
5 CW 6, §§ 288-311. See also §§ 434-435.
6 Ibid., §§ 324-326.
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Hell”, which “summarizes to simplify the fundamental ideas of Spitteler”: “These two classes of
men are always upon earth … the Prolific and the Devouring … Religion is an endeavour to
reconcile the two”.7
Another possible “visionary” author is Hölderlin, who was already quoted in Wandlungen und
Symbole der Libido, in order to endorse Jung in his representation of libido regression. Among all
his poems, “Song of Fate” seemed to represent the most significant example of “divine heavenly
bliss” [göttlich-infantile Seligkeit]. At that time, however, what interested Jung were the psychic
consequences of too a deep introversion of libido, and the first stanza of Hölderlin's poem was
interpreted as a symbol for such a danger. It reads, indeed: “You move up there in the light / On
easeful ground, blessed Geniuses! / Bright divine airs / Touch you lightly [/ As the player's fingers
Her holy strings]”. In his 1952 version, Jung develops the symbolic meaning of Hölderlin's poem in
terms of “renewal”. This time, he quotes from the second stanza: “Fateless, like the sleeping /
Infant, breathe the heavenly ones, / Chastely guarded / In modest bud; their spirits / Blossom
eternally, / And the quiet eyes / Gaze out in placid / Eternal Serenity”, and comments that “it is
enviable prerogative of the gods to enjoy everlasting infancy”. According to the poem, “Hölderlin
was never able to forget this first and greatest happiness whose haunting presence estranged him
from real life”.8 in 1950, in “A Study in the Process of Individuation”, Jung compares the drawing
of a mandala with Hölderlin's poem and writes, right before reporting its verses:
The numerous wavy lines or layers in the mandala could be interpreted as representing the
formation of layers of skin giving protection against outside influences. […] In our mandala
the cortices are boundary lines marking off the inner unity and protecting it against the outer
blackness with its disintegrating influences, personified by the serpent. The same motif is
expressed by the petals of the lotus and by the skins of the onion: the outer layers are withered
and desiccated, but they protect the softer, inner layers. The lotus seat of the Homs-child, of
the Indian divinities, and of the Buddha must be understood in this sense. Hölderlin makes use
of the same image [...].9
7 Ibid., § 460.
8 CW 5, §§ 619-620 (WSL, p. 377; Jung cites only the first four lines of the stanza); italic ours. “Song of Fate” reads:
“Ihr wandelt droben im Licht / Auf weichem Boden, selige Genien! / Glänzende Götterlüfte / Rühren euch leicht, /
Wie die Finger der Künstlerin Heilige Saiten. / / Schicksallos, wie der schlafende / Säugling, atmen die
Himmlischen; / Keusch bewahrt In bescheidener Knospe, / Blühet ewig / Ihnen der Geist, / Und die seligen Augen /
Blicken in stiller Ewiger Klarheit. / / Doch uns ist gegeben, / Auf keiner Stätte zu ruhn, / Es schwinden, es / fallen 
Die leidenden Menschen / Blindlings von einer / Stunde zur andern, / Wie Wasser von Klippe / Zu Klippe /
geworfen, Jahr lang ins Ungewisse hinab”. (F. Hölderlin, “Schicksalslied”, in: F. Hölderlin, Hyperion oder Der
Eremit in Griechenland, in: Sämtliche Werke, Stuttgart 1957, p. 143; the first stanza is translated in: F. Hölderlin,
Hyperion and Selected Poems, edited by Eric L. Santner, Continuum, New York 1990).
9 CW 9, 1, § 576 (translation modified).
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In Psychological Types, Jung takes Hölderlin's “Patmos” as an example of “redeeming symbol”:
“Near is God / And hard to apprehend. / But where danger is, there / Arises salvation also”. As
shown in the poem, even an excess of divine might be dangerous; the symbol therefore arises as
“the saving factor”, the element “which embraces both conscious and unconscious and unites
them”.10 Furthermore, in 1932, the poet is associated with Nietzsche, Goethe and Joyce, for his
prophetical capacity towards Modernism.11
The last author to be considered as part of the same category is Friedrich Theodor Vischer. Jung
writes in Psychological Types: 
His [the introverted type's] ideal is a lonely island where nothing moves except what he
permits to move. Vischer's novel, Auch Einer, affords deep insight into this side of the
introverted psychology, and also into the underlying symbolism of the collective
unconscious.12
Among these “visionary” works, a few of them deserve particular attention, since they appear to
be compared by Jung with Zarathustra pretty much consistently. These are: Faust II; “Song of
Fate” (hence Hyperion); Olympian Spring and Prometheus and Epimetheus; Auch Einer. For
instance, the “destructive element in the Epimethean attitude” is compared by Jung with Nietzsche's
“Ass Festival in Zarathustra” in Psychological Types.13 However, it is in his seminar on
Zarathustra, that Jung highlights such proximity quite significantly. So he argues that “there are
quite certainly primordial experiences in Faust, but others are taken from his wide mystical
reading” and “only by analysing [Olympian Spring] as we are analysing Zarathustra, could we
make out which is the genuine experience and which is elaboration”, referring to a comparison with
Prometheus and Epimetheus.14 On 5 June 1935, the “Bush soul” – of which Nietzsche's relation to
Zarathustra would be an example – is compared to Auch Einer motto, namely “Die Tücke des
Objekts”.15 A similar comparison had already been made on 30 January 1935, in regard to
Zarathustra chapter “Backworldsmen”, and Nietzsche's criticism to disregard for body: “You will
then observe that the German philosopher tells about the die Tücke des Objekts. And the more you
curse them, the more you see speech figures which insinuate life into them”.16 While analysing “On
10 CW 6, § 446
11 “'Ulysses': A Monologue”, CW 15, § 178.
12 CW 6, § 627. 
13 CW 6, § 312. See also § 322.
14 SNZ I, p. 224 (7 November 1934).
15 Ibid., p. 528.
16 Ibid., p. 352. See Za I, 3, KSA 4, 37. “Beyond the sphere of their body and this earth they now fancied themselves
transported, these ungrateful ones. But to what did they owe the convulsion and rapture of their transport? To their
body and this earth” (translation by Thomas Common). Zarathustra as an experience was already associated with
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the Happy Islands”, Jung compares Zarathustra's animals with Prometheus', and establishes that as
the tiger represents the latter's Anima, so the lioness embodies Zarathustra's. Moreover, he adds that
“In Prometheus the lion is the will to power, and the dog is the sentimentality, the weakness, the
craving for love and tenderness”.17 In the following session, he compares Nietzsche's representation
of the “Happy Island” to a mandala “in which the god expresses himself”, exactly as in Hölderlin's
“Song of Fate”, that he quotes in this occasion as well.18 Lastly, on 7 December 1938, Jung
compares Joyce's and Spitteler's experiences to Nietzsche's, even if these authors appears to him as
if they tried to deny the unconscious in their works.19
As already argued in regard to Jung's impression reported in Memories, Dreams, Reflexions,
what seems to keep Zarathustra and Faust II together is their capacity to reveal their authors as
prophets. Leaving the unconscious component aside, it is truly remarkable that a few significant
peculiarities occur in all these “visionary” works. In the next sections of this chapter, the focus will
be on such works, aiming to draw stylistic similarities, common ground and mediations.
1.1.2 RETURN TO MYTHOLOGY
At a first glance, such “visionary” works do not seem to share significant common features
concerning their style. Indeed, Faust and Olympian Spring are metric poems; Hyperion and
Prometheus are free verse poems – the former is even written in the form of an epistolary novel –;
Auch Einer belongs to the genre of novels more broadly; Zarathustra presents a mixed style, which
cannot unequivocally fit into one precise category. However, since Jung could grasp a certain
similarity in all these works, it is arguable to wonder whether there is something to be noticed in
them, apart from their presumable reflecting “the hinterland of man's mind, as if it had emerged
from the abyss of prehuman ages”.20 In fact, a few recurrent motifs in their style deserve to be
highlighted; above all they all present highly symbolic patterns, particularly recalling the Bible and
ancient Greek mythology. Mythology in general seems to be the most significant element in all of
these “visionary” works.21
Vischer's Auch Einer in Memories, Dreams Reflexions, where Jung expressed his fear of going through a destiny
similar to Nietzsche's by stating that “I feared I might be forced to recognize that I too was another such strange bird
[daß ich wie Nietzsche 'Auch Einer' war]” (MDR, p. 102).
17 SNZ II, pp. 871 (26 February 1936).
18 Ibid., p. 887 (4 March 1936): “So the god of the underworld, or the water world, which is the collective
unconscious, brings up that Happy Island upon which the god is seated; on that flower he can be nursed. You may
remember, perhaps, that the German poet Hölderlin uses exactly the same image of the god”.
19 Ibid., pp. 1445-1446. As the editor points out, Jung is likely to refer to Spitteler's reaction to his Psychological
Types. The writer had indeed responded to Jung's analysis by stating that his characters were merely fictional figures
and did not symbolise anything more.
20 CW 15, § 141.
21 A peculiarity also concerns the authors' relation with these texts: Faust, Hyperion, Zarathustra IV were never
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In Faust II,22 along with the protagonist's political rise, his cognitive development is
represented. This is moved by the feminine ideal, which is depicted by Goethe through the most
traditional Greek mythological figures, such as the mothers or Helena. Besides, significant biblical
motifs are also recurrent: Mephistopheles embodies a hellish figure who played with Faust's
knowledge avidity by betting with God against Faust's salvation. The whole work evokes angels
and devils recurrently, and the very last scene of the book describes a traditional fight between
celestial and hellish potencies, contending for Faust's soul. As pointed out by Burton Feldman, the
utilisation of mythology in Goethe's Faust differentiates from “subsequent romantic use of the
myth”, for the fact that he neither dissolves nor subordinates “Nordic, Pagan and Christian myths”
one on behalf of the other; rather, Goethe “seeks a balance between these contrasting and often
contradictory mythic elements that later writers either deliberately destroy or lose”. As advocators
of one of the opposite tendencies, namely of retaining “older myths” but subordinating “them
decisively to Christian and modern purposes”, the author mentions Wagner, Novalis and Hölderlin,
indeed.23 In this sense, it can be stated that Hyperion represents the modern quest of the lost Greek
society – utterly unattainable for the moderns –, and the conflict provoked by such search in the
German reality of the late 18th century. The plot describes a young Greek, possessing a classic
education, who decides to fight against the Turkish army during the very first attempts to achieve
independence – during the so-called “Orlov Revolt” (1770), more specifically. The aim of the
protagonist is to bring back Greece cultural and religious atmosphere, motivated by his passion for
history and legends from his country. The story is spaced out by a journey to Europe with a
relatively short break in Germany, and the structure of the novel is composed of letters from
Hyperion to Bellarmin, his closest friend, as well as a few letters to Diotima, the woman he is in
love with. The temporal structure is a circular one, and Greek and German experiences merge
consistently throughout the novel. As argued by Feldman, “Hölderlin […] takes literally what
romantic mythologists from Herder on taught but never practiced so intensely: that myth must be
livingly experienced to be understood, and that regaining such mythic depth and life may help
redeem modern man”. In the poem, such motif comes together with one of Hölderlin's more mature
issues, i.e. “waiting for divine appearance”, still a romantic and Christian theme, but re-elaborated
considered ready to be shared with readers; Goethe, in particular, kept working on his work till his very last days.
22 Goethe worked on Faust throughout the period 1772-1832, that is to say, from his first elaborations of Urfaust until
his death. His first publication of Faust, a Fragment [Faust, ein Fragment] (1790) was followed by the first edition
of Faust I, in 1808, to which a second edition followed in years 1828-1829.
23 B. Feldman, The Rise of Modern Mythology, 1680-1860, Indiana University Press, Bloomington 1972, p. 262.
Another modern re-elaboration of myth is represented, according to the scholar, by poets such as Wordsworth,
Whitman or Melville, who “often seek a mythic condition for their thought and gain it largely by dismissing
traditional myth in their original, integral form” (ibid.). Lastly, he analyses Keats' and Joyce's utilisation of myths
and states that the former “seeming to deal with directly with Greek myths, profoundly transforms these into original
symbols”; the latter, in his Ulysses, lets “the 'mythic' dissolve[] into ironic or shadowy background” (ibid.).
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in the direction of what could be called the 'leading' role of the poet: the Gods might indeed “not
have vanished, but may have only withdrawn because of man's own indifference, corruption, and
'forgetfulness'”; the poet is the balancing element which enlightening human minds trough his
works.24
The whole plot of Auch Einer boasts to be – in an openly anti-Hegelian and anti-idealistic
polemic – a criticism against any aesthetic conception being grounded on “ideal” and trying to
freeze “real” through the illusion of pre-established harmony. Ironically, the novel plays on the
impossibility to escape destiny, which objects deceitfully seem to impose to the subject that is
ignoring them (“die Tücke des Objekts”).25 A few references to ancient Greece – especially to Greek
drama – are to be found in this novel as well. In particular, mythological references play one of the
main roles in the novel, as the centre of the story concerns the fictitious myth about an ancient tribe
living by the Lake Zurich, the so-called “Pfahldorfgeschichte”. In this story, life and tradition of
such tribe are made up in detail; above all, their religious system and rituals are described
meticulously, through their profession of belief in a goddess called “Selinur”, namely “die grosse
Mutter alle Dinge, die da wohnet im Monde, die da gesponnen hat auf heiliger Spindel Erde und
Waffer und Luft und Gras und Bäume und Tiere und Menschen und diesen oft erschienen ist als
weisse Kuh”.26 One of the aims of this work is, indeed, to highlight the necessity to abandon realism
and idealism radicalisms, and to promote, instead, what someone has defined as “poetical real-
idealism”. This represents an alternative approach to reality, which borrows much of its essence
from Prutz's and Schlegel's views. In this sense, the entire world can be read as a poem in which
each single human individual is a poet, even if not aware, and possesses all the necessary tools to
interpret it from his own perspective. This is why symbology, cosmology and mythology achieve
such a decisive role in Vischer's works, and in Auch Einer in particular.27
It is safe to say Spitteler's Olympian Spring – for which he was awarded of the Nobel Prize in
1919 – presents mythological references, its title giving an example on its own. Indeed, the iambic
hexameter poem represents a revisitation of the history of Olympians. As pointed out by Gilbert
Highet, the story of Greek gods is told “with a strangely enlarged view of the universe as
24 Ibid., pp. 329-330.
25 Cfr. T. Althaus, “Von den Stockwerken des Lebens und von der Tücke des Objekts. Friedrich Theodor Vischers
Roman Auch Einer und sein Held als Phraseur”, in  B. Potthast and A. Reck (ed.s), Friedrich Theodor Vischer.
Leben – Werk – Wirkung, Universitätsverlag Winter, Heidelberg 2011, pp. 169-169. Interestingly – even if not
relevant for the purpose of this investigation –, among the advocators of “idealism”, the scholar puts Nietzsche as
well.
26 F. T. Vischer, Auch Einer. Eine Reisebekanntschaft (1878), Heffe & Becker Verlag, Leipzig, “Erster Teil”, pp. 77-89;
90-270 (quote from pp. 139-140).
27 Cfr. P. Bishop, “Jung's Red Book and its Relation to aspects of German Idealism”, cit., pp. 353-355: “In a letter to
David Friedrich Strauß of 27 May 1838, Vischer once defined himself as ‘a cross between philosophy and poetry’
(Zwitter zwischen Philosophie und Poesie), and as ‘an amphibian of idealism and realism’ (Amphibium zwischen
Idealismus und Realismus)” (ibid., p. 353).
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background. We do not meet the Olympians first as divine children. […] No, they are immortals,
and so they are never born. We first see them lying in the underworld, sleeping a sleep which seems
to have had no beginning. Like veins of gold a thousand miles deep in the earth, they could slumber
unseen in the dark forever”.28 Indeed, also the old Kronos and the inhabitants of his kingdom, after
being defeated, do not really die but fall in an everlasting sleep in the underworld. In Spitteler's re-
elaboration, the real ruler, above gods, earth, and underworld, is Ananke, representing destiny and
necessity, namely “der gezwungene Zwang”.29 However, the Olympians are all depicted with their
popular characteristics, and, although rethought in its deepest meaning, the story does not contradict
its tradition. In Prometheus and Epimetheus, it is equally easy to guess mythological echoes, as the
title suggests this time too. It is indeed another revisitation of Greek tradition, namely of the popular
legend of the two brothers Prometheus and Epimetheus. Some of Spitteler's characters are the same
as in the original myth, e.g. the brothers themselves and Pandora. At the same time, however,
further characters appear, whose features reveal other Greek, as well as mythological, references:
one of the God's three children is called “Mythos”, whilst his daughter's name is “Doxa”. Moreover,
Prometheus' “soul” is referred to as “Sophia”, and the under-title of the book is “Ein Gleichnis”,
thus suggesting Christian inspiration. Indeed, Christian and Gnostic references are to be found
throughout.30 As it was in Faust, the story begins with a conflict between two non-human potencies:
God is sick and intends to protect his beloved people from continuous threats of his arch-enemy's,
Behemoth. Also in this case, a messenger comes down on earth. This time, however, the messenger
is an angel who informs Prometheus about God's will. Furthermore, God's last child bears the name
of “Messias”, even though at the end of the story, it will be Myth to ascend to God's throne.31
28 G. Highet, “A Neglected Masterpiece: 'Olympian Spring'”, in: The Antioch Review 12: 3 (Autumn, 1952), pp. 338-
346 (p. 341). As the reviewer also notices, the work presents different registers, depending on the context of the
scene depicted, among which the conspicuous presence of Swiss German dialectal elements is to be remarked.
Highet writes: “Sometimes long passages of satire (comparable to Milton's description of limbo or the naughtier
parts of Ariosto) are filled with weds and cries and turns of phrase which are not only coarse but downright vulgar.
This will strike some readers as being one of the most serious faults in the poem. […] On the other hand, there are
many passages of purely poetic description which are broken by no such error of taste. Spitteler was Swiss and lived
most of his life in Switzerland. His imagery, therefore, has the bright and super-childlike clarity of Swiss landscapes
and often shares the grandeur of the Alps. His figures cannot be called heavy or clumsy. Often they sound as
interesting as the new chords used by Debussy or Strauss, and especially when two or three come together they
make his imagery and his atmosphere brilliantly clear” (ibid., p. 339).
29 C. Spitteler, Olympischer Frühling (1900/1906), Eugen Diederichs, Jena 1910, “Erster Gesang”.
30 See G. Highet, The Classical Tradition: Greek and Roman Influences on Western Literature (1949), Oxford
University Press, Oxford / New York 1976, p. 529.
31 On Spitteler's necessity to recall a character such as Prometheus, capable of challenging the Gods, in order to
counterbalance “Christ” and the model he generated, see F. Buri, Prometheus und Christus. Grösse und Grenzen von
Carl Spittelers religiöser Weltanschauung, A. Francke Ag., Bern 1945, pp. 30-40. On Spitteler's transformation of
the original myth and its enrichment through Platonic, Gnostic and Neo-Platonic elements, also in comparison with
Goethe's, Herder's, Byron's and Shelley's re-elaboration of the same myth, see O. Kluth, Carl Spitteler et les sources
de son génie êpique. Un essai, Imprimerie Sonor, Genève 1918, pp. 25-28. In particular: “Le Prométhée de Spitteler
semble d'abord n'avoir rien de commun avec son ancêtre que le nom. La form connue du mythe, celle du Titan
enchaîné et coupable, se trouve ici complètement abandonné. Mais à y regarder de plus près et à prendre ces deux
héros dans leur acceptation la plus humaine, on trouvera que l'un et l'autre furent des isolés de par leur génie, qu'ils
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To conclude this first discourse, Zarathustra mythological and biblical references have been
partly discussed already, and even more will be added in next chapters. For this reason, there is no
need to repeat or anticipate anything here, but just recalling their relevant presence. After all,
Nietzsche himself referred to his text as a “fifth 'gospel'” [fünftes „Evangelium“], as he wrote to his
editor Ernst Schmeitzer from Rapallo, on 13 February 1883: “Es handelt sich um ein kleines Werk
(kaum hundert Druckseiten), dessen Titel ist Also sprach Zarathustra. Ein Buch für Alle und
Keinen. Es ist eine 'Dichtung', oder ein fünftes 'Evangelium' oder irgend Etwas, für das es noch
keinen Namen giebt: bei weitem das Ernsteste und auch Heiterste meiner Erzeugnisse, und
Jedermann zugänglich”.32
What was called 'return to mythology' is majorly visible through the frequent utilisation of
recurrent symbolical patterns in all the works mentioned above. Such images as the sun or the
journey (often associated with a wanderer); the idea of sacrifice and transition, as well as the death,
are features recurring in all “visionary works”. In both Zarathustra and Faust II, the invocation to
the sun occurs significantly;33 in Prometheus, Spitteler regularly refers to the sun, its daily path and
seasons, whenever a new discourse has to be introduced.34 Another recurrent motif concerns, as
said, travelling, often in solitude: Faust travels from a place to another throughout the evolving of
the story; Hyperion calls himself a voluntary exiled who has travelled from Greece to Sicily, then to
Germany and finally back to Greece. The whole first part of Vischer's Auch Einer, moreover,
describes the accidental meeting between the protagonist, the writer “A. E.”, and a man who will
unexpectedly become his heir, during a journey on a train – its under-title is “Eine
furent la proie de souffrances surhumaines, et que rien ne put fléchir leur volonté inébranlable. De la légende
consacrée, pourrait-on dire, Spitteler n'a gardé que l'essence, et à son tour, il a inventé un nouveau mythe dans lequel
il a placé son personnage” (p. 26).
32 eKGWB, letter n. 375; italics ours. He also wrote to his sister Elisabeth and his brother in law Bernahrd Förster from
Sils Maria, on 29 July 1885: “Es ist Schade, daß Ihr nicht die Seiten aufgeschnitten habt, wo von meinem
'tiefsinnigen Evangelium' und 'meiner klassischen Formulirung des höchsten Ideals menschlichen Strebens' geredet
wird. – Hopsa! reden wir von etwas Vernünftigerem! Das Lama [Elisabeth] hat neulich einen so rührenden Brief an
mich geschrieben: ich bitte Euch, sie dafür in meinem Namen schönstens zu streicheln” (ekGWB, letter n. 614). In
Nachlaß, the same concept appears again: “Oder auch als eines vielverschlungenen Fußwegs, der immer wieder
unvermerkt zu jenem gefährlichen und vulkanischen Boden hinlockt, aus dem das eben genannte Zarathustra-
Evangelium entsprungen. So gewiß auch dies 'Vorspiel einer Philosophie der Zukunft' keinen Commentar zu den
Reden Zarathustra’s abgiebt und abgeben soll, so vielleicht doch eine Art vorläufiges Glossarium, in dem die
wichtigsten Begriffs- und Werth-Neuerungen jenes Buchs – eines Ereignisses ohne Vorbild, Beispiel, Gleichniß in
aller Litteratur – irgendwo einmal vorkommen und mit Namen genannt sind” (NF 6[4] 1886; Summer 1886 - Spring
1887, KSA 12, 234). On Nietzsche's understanding of such formula, see S. Giametta, “Lo Zarathustra di Nietzsche
come quinto evangelio”, in: Criterio: nuova serie filosofica 1; 2 (1988), pp. 48-62; 114-127.
33 See, for instance, J. W. Goethe, Faust II, 3. Akt, vv. 8909-8912: “Tritt hervor aus flüchtigen Wolken, hohe Sonne
dieses Tags, / Die verschleiert schon entzückte, blendend nun im Glanze herrscht. / Wie die Welt sich dir entfaltet,
schaust du selbst mit holdem Blick. / Schelten sie mich auch für häßlich, kenn' ich doch das Schöne wohl”; Za
Vorrede, 1,  KSA 4,11-12. Nietzsche's sun motif will be further discussed in next chapters (see 2.2.3; 3.2.3).
34 For example: “Und als nun bei des Morgens vollerm Licht erwachete der Menschen Volk und schauete das heil'ge
Haupt, da rafften sie sich auf und schmückten sich mit Hast und eileten in dichten Haufen von den Bergen zu der
Stadt und von der Stadt zur allgemeinen Wiese vor des Engels Thron zu hören ihres Herren Wahl und Urteil” (C.
Spitteler, Prometheus und Epimetheus. Ein Gleichnis,1881, Eugen Diederichs, Jena 1906 p. 13).
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Reisebekanntschaft” –; in the Pfahldorfgeschichte, as expected from any proper myth, a few
moments of hero's travels and solitude are depicted. In Prometheus and Epimetheus, as well as in
Olympian Spring, several episodes describe journeys and wanderings (in Prometheus, Pandora's
being sent on earth is likely to represent the most significant example). Lastly, Zarathustra travels
consistently from his cave on the mountains to cities, islands and woods, waiting for his “teaching”
to be understood. In this sense, the protagonists of most of these texts come across similar
landscapes, such as mountains – meant as symbols of wisdom, opposing to cities –, forests, deserts
(which remind of biblical imagination, more generally). Furthermore, all these “visionary” works
share the frequent utilisation of natural motifs, such as plants and wild animals.35 Moreover, in all
these texts, magic or supernatural creatures appear quite frequently, not rarely coming from the
underworld. Still in this perspective, the transposition of the feminine element onto a supernatural
level lies at the core of all these works. Faust embodies the continuous quest of the perfect feminine
symbol: Gretchen in the first part, Helena and the mothers in the second. Hyperion falls in love with
Diotima, who gives him motivation and strength to leave his country and fight; her loss will cause
him unbearable pain. In Olympian Spring, the ability to decipher the “book of stone” with the “rules
of destiny” is only given to the Sybille;36 in Prometheus and Epimetheus, Prometheus' feminine
“soul” is the reason why he refuses the angel's proposal and gives up his kingdom on behalf of his
brother. In the Pfahldorfgeschichte, the adoration of the goddess “Selinur” is at the centre of any
other action; besides, it is to be recalled that the “druid” “Alpin”, the hero of the story, is in love
with a maiden, “Sigune”, who lives with her father and takes care of her siblings – introduced since
the beginning, she complements Alpin's role in the narration. Nietzsche – as pointed out in the
introduction – defines the figure of “Ariadne” as the essential element to balance and complete
Dionysus and his solitude.
1.2 “VISIONARY” AUTHORS
1.2.1 THEOLOGY
Besides the fact that all the authors appear to enjoy playing with names, pseudonyms, and false
identities,37 other features might be considered, which keep them linked together. First of all, they
35  To this respect, in particular the lion image deserves to be remarked. In Faust II, Hyperion, Auch Einer, lions are
occasionally recalled metaphorically to represent courage and value; in Prometheus and Zarathustra, the lion occurs
as a real character.
36 C. Spitteler, Olympischer Frühling, cit., “Erster Gesang”.
37 Spitteler published Prometheus under the name of Carl Felix Tandem; Vischer used the pseudonym of Deutobold
Symbolizetti to publish his first edition of Faust III (1862), namely a parody of Goethe's masterpiece, then
republished in 1886 (F. T. Vischer, Faust. Der Tragödie drittel Teil (1862/1886), Reclam, Stuttgart 1978. Cfr. A.
Reck, Friedrich Theodor Vischer – Parodien auf Goethes »Faust« (Beihefte zum Euphorion 53), Winter, Heidelberg
2007); Hölderlin used the name of Scardanelli to write from the tower in Tübingen, at the time of his mental illness;
Goethe pretended he was called Johann Philipp Möller during his travel to Italy (1786); Nietzsche, as it is well-
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all seemed to show interest in theology. With the only exception of Goethe, all the “visionary”
authors here considered studied theology, even if only for a short period of time. However, Goethe
had also quite a deep interest in the subject, as it will be further explained later.
Johann Christian Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843) was raised and educated in Swabia. He
attended the religious schools of Denkendorf, Maulbronn, and the famous Stift in Tübingen, where
he studied theology, philosophy and philology. His family boasted a religious tradition, especially
from the maternal side (his grandfather was a pietist parson); he was therefore expected to become a
theologian as well. However, in 1793, Hölderlin decided to become a private preceptor, supported
by Friedrich Schiller. Such a profession did not seem to be his design either, so he moved to
Thuringia and studied philosophy in Jena in 1795. He spent there only one year, but during that
time, he could enjoy Fichte's lectures, and deepen his relationship with Schiller. In the following
year, he settled down in Frankfurt, where he was assigned the role of private teacher, but due to an
affair with the lady of the house where he was working, such a job lasted only for a short time. After
that, he tried to succeed as a writer while working as a private teacher, until madness burst into his
life irreversibly.38 Although Hölderlin abandoned the faculty of Theology, he never ceased to be
engaged in theological issues, by taking on a position often defined as “pantheistic”. As pointed out
by a few scholars, already in Tübingen, the poet could experience a strong tradition in which
Spinoza's thinking was dominant. In particular, Hölderlin's pantheistic view appears to be
influenced by a more dialectical thinking: as part of nature, man can be regarded as divine, but
because of his experiencing the wound of life – through the uniqueness of the moment – he
perceives the distance between himself and nature, and suffers accordingly. The divine wholeness
finds its resolution in the dynamic process of life and its flowing through time; the individual, by
experiencing such a fleetness, feels suffering, solitude and otherness towards the world, so that he
can relate to the divine only in terms of unreachability. Right before the separation, however, man,
world and divine appear united in a state of perfection; for such suffering encourages to be
withdrawn and meditative, to the point of auto-reflection. At this stage, man can now acknowledge
the divine in nature and reunite with it in a different way and on a different level. Poetry is the
perfect medium for such purpose, since it recreates the same process and leads to experience the
same feeling of divine unity. Greek myth, in particular, appears as the most effective instrument for
known, loved to play with his identity by creating a tension between himself and his role as a writer, and Ecce
Homo is surely the best literary example (see T. Brücker, “Lebenskunst als Schreibkunst. Der Author von Ecce
Homo”, in: Nietzscheforschung 21 (2014), pp. 209-220); he also – wrongly – boasted Polish roots for his surname,
Niëtzky or Nietzky (NF 21[2], Summer 1882, KSA 9, 681; eKGWB, letter n. 324, 28 July 1862 to Raimund Granier,
from Gorenzen).
38 Cfr. M. Castellari, Hyperion nello specchio della critica, Cooperativa Universitaria Editrice Milanese, Milan 2002
pp. 15-21. In Tübingen, Hölderlin studied with Hegel e Schelling, with whom remain in contact throughout his life.
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a representation of the perfect union of human and divine; it also proposes an everlasting model,
still inspiring at any age.39
Friedrich Theodor Vischer (1807-1887) came from a tradition of evangelic theologians and his
father, parson in Württemberg – who passed away when the author was only seven years old – was
a representative of Rationalistic Theology. It is most likely due to his family financial situation that
Vischer decided to studied theology in Tübingen. Differently from his friend David Friedrich
Strauß, Vischer did not seem to be particularly involved in religious debates; at least not as much as
he was concerned with aesthetics. Nonetheless, he accomplished his study in 1832 and worked for
the Lutheran church of his region. His passion for philosophy and philology led him to habilitate for
teaching both subjects as well. In 1834, he started to teach and in 1844 he achieved a full
professorship. During his inaugural lecture though, his anti-pietistic theologian position caused him
a two-year suspension. As suggested by Ulrich Köpf, to understand Vischer's relation to theology,
three directions are to be investigated, i.e. a “biographical-psychological”, a “scientific” and a
“historic” one. In the first field of analysis, all the aspects of Vischer's relation to his family
mentioned above are to be considered; the second category has to be read as related to his
philosophical position – namely determined by a strong Hegelian resonance, in which the only
significant aspect of religion is its relation to the absolute, so that dogmas and rigidity are denied, as
it represents the first step of the “Spirit”, followed by beauty and philosophy. The last possible
approach to the issue of Vischer and religion concerns his relation to his contemporaries, in
particular his criticism to New Pietism. Vischer and Strauß were taught by Ferdinan Christian Baur
about the importance of a mythological reading of the New Testament and of a similar approach to
the Bible overall; Strauß grounded his Life of Jesus [Das Leben Jesu] (1835/1836) on such teaching
indeed. Vischer, above all, blames contemporary Pietism for not being able to approach religion
from a “modern” or “mythic” perspective; and for showing off too a radical religious attitude, in
order to presumably hide a lack of faith. In so doing, Vischer stresses the contradictions within the
movement, as well as their radical positions, such as extreme rationalism, or supernaturalism.
Vischer's understanding of religion can be arguably regarded as in the same tradition of Hegel's
“speculative theology”, in which contemporary man can reach his past through a mythological
approach to the Scriptures.40
39 H. Gottschalk, Das Mytische in der Dichtung Hölderlins, Cotta, Stuttgart 1943, pp. 54-67. As the author points out,
Hegel appears to be strongly influential in such a view. On more specific considerations on pantheism in Hyperion,
see E. Craig, The Metaphysic of the Romantic Era (1996), Oxford Scholarship Online, Oxford 2003, pp. 162-172.
40 U. Köpf, “Friedrich Theodor Vischers Verhältis zu Theologie und Kirche”, in: B. Potthast, A. Reck (ed.), cit., pp. 67-
78. Vischer took position in the debate twice: “Dr. Strauß und die Wirtemberger” (1838), in: Hallischen
Jahrbüchern für deutsche Wissenschaft und Kunst, and “Über allerhand Verlegenheiten bei Besetzung einer
dogmatischen Leherstelle un der gegenwärtigen Zeit” (1839) (ibid.). See D. F. Strauß, Das Leben Jesu, Osiander,
Tübingen 1835-1836. Strauß was also the aim of Nietzsche's first Untimely Meditation, entitled David Strauß, the
40
Nietzsche (1844-1900) could be proud of his Lutheran roots just as much – as it will be
discussed better in the conclusions – from his both maternal and paternal side. He attended the
religious school of Schulpforta, and then began to study theology and philology in Bonn in 1864. In
only a few months, he first abandoned theology, then changed university and settled in Leipzig.
Since this issue will be discussed at the very end of this investigation, only a few significant
elements will be brought out in this section. First of all, as many scholars have pointed out,
Nietzsche's reflection can hardly be separated from his Christian education. Karl Schlechta, for
instance, defines Zarathustra as a “secularised hell” [säkularisierte Hölle] by interpreting
Nietzsche's philosophy as only possible within the framework of Christian categories – whose
values would be complementary to Zarathustra. According to his understanding, the only result
emerging from Zarathustra would be a triumph of resignation and discomfort.41 Recently, Julian
Young expressed himself against more traditional positions which regarded Nietzsche as an atheist,
such as those of Kaufmann, Bäumler or Bertram, and stressed Schopenhauer's inspiration on
Nietzsche's purpose as a “religious reformer”.42 A meticulous investigation on Nietzsche and his
religious education has been undertaken by Joahnn Figl, in his Nietzsche und die Religionen. The
scholar analyses Nietzsche's knowledge on religion from his year in Naumburger Gymnasium and
Schulpforta on. Interestingly, along with Christian, pre-Christian and non-Christian religions,
Nietzsche appears to have had a wide knowledge on Indian and Eastern religions as well, since his
earliest education in Pforta.43 Finally, Peter Köster's collection of articles Kontroversen um
Nietzsche: Untersuchungen zur theologischen Rezeption deserves to be recalled. Majorly stressed
by the author is the impossibility of any theological reading of Nietzsche not intending to 'revaluate'
their own fundamentals. Nietzsche's greatest merit, indeed, would be having highlighted the auto-
contradiction present in any theological reflection. In his investigation, the author seriously
discusses and questions the most traditionally shared opinions on Nietzsche and Christianity by
Confessor and the Writer (1873).
41 K. Schlechta, Nietzsches grosser Mittag, Klostermann, Frankfurt A. M. 1954, p. 66
42 J. Young, Nietzsche's Philosophy of Religion, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2006, p. 2: “First, while most
conclude from his scathing assaults on established religions in general and on Christianity in particular, as well as
from the naturalistic tenor of his later thought, that Nietzsche was, quite obviously, an ‘atheist’, I hold that he never
was. Though atheistic with respect to the Christian God, Nietzsche, I hold, ought to be regarded as a religious
reformer rather than an enemy of religion. Second, while most readings take Nietzsche to be an ‘individual-
individualistic’ philosopher I take his concern to lie, first and foremost, with community”; and: “In a word,
Schopenhauer is against the ‘demythologising’ of religion – a theme which, as we will see, reappears in Nietzsche’s
critique of David Strauss in the first of the Untimely Meditations. What Schopenhauer is really getting at, here, is –
as Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor observes – that, unlike temporal power, religion needs mystery to provide it with
authority. Mystery creates authority by utilising our awe before the unknown” (ibid., p. 12).
43 J. Figl, Nietzsche und die Religionen. Transkulturelle Perspektive seines Bildungs- und Denkweges, De Gruyter,
Berlin / New York 2007, pp. 35-38. On Nietzsche's knowledge on Indian religion, Emerson's influence is also
investigated (ibid., pp. 130-131).
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showing a certain radicalism in Nietzsche's understanding of theology.44 Such irremediable
contradiction was the core of Franz Overbeck's speculation in his book Über die Christlichkeit
unserer heutigen Theologie (1873), published contemporarily to Nietzsche's first Untimely
Meditation. Nietzsche and Overbeck shared a house in Basel, where they both were teaching, and
remained friends until the very end of Nietzsche's conscious life.45
Carl Friedrich Georg Spitteler (1845-1924) had also seriously engaged with theological issues
since his youngest years, especially due to his frequently visiting the Widmann family. Mr.
Widmann, the father of Carl's friend Josef Viktor (“Peppi”) and Anna (his first love), had been a
Jesuit monk, strongly influenced by Strauß' Life of Jesus, then converted to protestantism.
Eventually he moved to Liestal and worked as a parson.46 During his years as a young student,
Spitteler lived with his aunt, far from the rest of his family; thus he spent much of his time with his
friend Josef Viktor and his family. In particular, as reported by his biographers, Spitteler loved to be
entertained by long theological discussion with Mr. Widmann. Such a figure is likely to have played
a significant role in his decisions, to the point that even in the curriculum presented before his
theology final exam in 1971, Spitteler wrote: “Zwar ist der Confirmationsunterricht, den ich bei
meinem hochverehrten und geliebten Herrn Prf. Widmann genoss (und privatim) im Stande
gewesen, diesen Geist der Welt zurück- aber nicht abzuhalten; mit der Pause, die nach der ersten
Communion in äusserlichen kirchlichen Leben eintrat, stellte sich auch die innere Entleerung
heraus”.47 Such a sense of “emptying” [Entleerung] had been experienced by him before, more
specifically at the time of choosing his university carrier. Precisely such a conflict with traditional
protestantism led him to the study of theology, among whose issues Spitteler was mainly concerned
with the question of man's relation to God and the divine. Already in the 233 these written in May
1862, Spitteler was setting his goal in showing weak points of Christian doctrine. First of all, he
wanted to contrast “human dignity” [Würde des Menschen] with the feeling of inferiority preached
by the Church, by highlighting the divine element in man through incarnation (polemically against
the qualities of opposition and exteriority traditionally attributed to the Christian concept of God).
Secondly, the understanding of “Sin” [Sünde] was investigated and criticised, to which the idea of
“mistake” [Fehler] was counterposed, and the concept of “repentance” [Reue] was substituted with
the possibility of “improving” [verbessern]. Man and the divine had to be understood as parts of the
44 P. Köster, Kontroversen um Nietzsche: Untersuchungen zur theologischen Rezeption, Theologischer Verlag, Zürich
2003. Cfr. M. Liebscher's review, in: Journal of Nietzsche Studies 29 (2005), pp. 71-74.
45 F. C. Overbeck, Über die Christlichkeit unserer heutigen Theologie (1873), in: F. Overbeck, Werke und Nachlass
Schriften bis 1873, vol. 1, Metzler, Stuttgart and Weimar 1994. Cfr. A. Pellegrino, La città piena di idoli: Franz
Overbeck e la crisi della teologia scientifica, ETS, Pisa 2005.
46 Cfr. R. Faesi, cit., pp. 14-17.
47 Cited in F. Buri, cit., pp. 9-10 (italic ours).
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same wholeness, to which the sin could also belong in a different perspective: “God wants sin; else
he would be miserable” [Gott will die Sünde; er wäre sonst unglücklich]. Although Spitteler had
been dreaming of becoming a poet since he was sixteen, and then attempted a jurisprudential carrier
to follow his father's example (a state officer), such a determination in re-examining Christianity
pushed him to study theology in Zurich during the period 1865-1870. After having completed his
study, he moved to Russia and Finland and worked as a private preceptor. In 1879, Spitteler
returned to Switzerland and finished his carrier by working on primary education and journalism.48
Johann Wolfgang Goethe (1749-1831) dedicated much of his time to theological studies in his
youngest years, even though his university plan was meant to involve the study of law. Also his
father, indeed, was a state officer and planned for his son a similar carrier. At the age of sixteen,
Goethe joined the faculty of Jurisprudence at University of Leipzig – culture-wise more stimulating
than his hometown Frankfurt am Main. However, the three years he spent there were not pleasant to
him, and culminated with a sudden – and relatively obscure – return to Frankfurt, where he
remained for a while. His psychological discomfort did not seem to disappear, until he met Susanna
Klettenberg, a friend of his mother's, and approached Gnosticism and alchemy. The lady belonged
to a semi-Moravian sect, and professed a form of Christianity in which a certain tendency to Pietism
was blended with “introspective mysticism”of occultism, Neo-Platonism and Hermeticism. Thus,
Goethe started to face authors such as Nostradamus, Paracelsus, Agrippa von Nettesheim, Böhme,
Van Helmont and Welling. In such readings, he hoped to find alternatives to traditional sciences, as
well as to fulfil his need for introspection. Thanks to his practitioner, he even experimented some
alchemic products on himself and in a short time recovered. In 1770, he completed his study of law
in Strasbourg. However, Goethe's relation to religion had even deeper roots, as well as even deeper
consequences. It can be dated back to 1755, when the Lisbon earthquake took place and upset his
imagination of a creative God, protector of his creatures. Besides, still in his childhood, he read the
48 Ibid., pp. 11-29, and R. Faesi, cit., pp. 21-48. After the death of his mother in law (1893), Spitteler did not need to
work anymore and decided to invest his full time in literature. His ideas on religion can also be found in
Prometheus, as remarked by Buri. In particular, Spitteler's focus appear to be the issues of evil and redemption;
hence the problem of illness and the need for a “sick God” to build his metric novel on. The novel, indeed, can be
read as a reversal of God's traditional attributions (omnipotence, omnipresence, omniscience, justice and holiness)
into their opposites, to symbolise his loss of power towards the Creation. By comparing the first version of the poem
with the edition published in 1924 (Prometheus der Dulder), Buri analyses the evolving of the issue in Spitteler's
writing (F. Buri, cit., pp. 71-85). Already as a young student, Spitteler had composed a short poem, “Der Ketzer”,
centred on the same necessity of redefining the relationship between human and the divine: “Ei, ihr Gaukler, ei, ihr
Beliaspfaffen Ihr! / 's ist ein Trost von Storh, ein Glaube von Papier. / Hat die Kirche keine Arznei vorhanden, /
Wozu ist enn Christus schliesslich auferstanden? / Eine Instituz, die nicht auf Wahrheit zielt, / Die sich vor den
Rätseln feig beiseite stiehlt / Und sich vor dem Denken druckt ins Symbolum, / Ist ein Kinderplappart, ein
Ridiculum. / Nennt Euch Priester oder nennt Euch Theologen, / Eure Botschaft, Eure Weisheit ist erlogen”. Thus his
will to 'challenge' Christ through a character as Prometheus seems to be a characteristic of Spitteler's thinking since
his earliest years (ibid, pp. 5-8). As already observed, Spitteler's understanding of religion owes much to Gnosticism
as well (O. Kluth, cit., pp. 25-28).
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Bible, as well as the sacred epic poem by Klopstoc, Der Messias (1748-1773).49 Several scholars
have dealt with the issue of Goethe and religion, and different aspects have been brought out: often
his keen and deep propensity to religious reflection emerged; other times, the merely aesthetic
meaning of religious feeling was stressed above all. What is common to all these studies, however,
is Goethe's peculiar dedication to religious issues and debates.50 In particular,  Goethe openly called
himself a “pantheist”. So in a letter to Jacobi, dating 6 January 1813:
Als Dichter und Künstler bin ich Polytheist, Pantheist hingegen als Naturforscher, und eins so
entschieden wie das andre. Bedarf ich eines Gottes für meine Persönlichkeit, als sittlicher
Mensch, so ist dafür auch schon gesorgt. Die himmlischen und irdischen Dinge sind ein so
weites Reich, daß die Organe aller Wesen zusammen es nur erfassen mögen.51
Several times, indeed, he even displayed a predilection for Spinoza – whose thinking he first
came across in 1773 – by making use of sections from his Ethics (1773), in order to ground his
argument on nature. Moreover, Goethe was also fascinated by Kant, and he engaged in complex
philosophical debates with Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. Regardless of the question of Spinoza's
philosophy as an actual representation of pantheism, Goethe significantly recognised the
philosopher as such and used his thought to identify his own reflection in a precise philosophical-
religious tradition.52 Lastly, the wideness of Goethe's knowledge on religion is not to be forgotten:
as a child, he was educated as a Lutheran; in Leipzig he came across Pietism; in Italy he got to
know Catholicism; thanks to Susanna Klettenberg, he became passionate about Gnosticism and
alchemy. To this all, his interest in Eastern religions and Hebraism is to be added, the latter being
known by him since his childhood.53 In particular in his earliest writings, Goethe questioned the
Christian understanding of Providence, as well as Christ's role as the actual funder of Christianity:
49 J. R. Williams, The Life of Goethe. A Critical Biography, Blacwell, Malden 1998, pp. 1-13.
50 On Gnosticism and its influence on Goethe, as well as on a possible reading of Faust in that direction, see S.
Hajduk, “Goethes Gnostiker: Fausts vergessener Nihilismus und sein Streben nach Erlösungswissen”, in: Goethe
Yearbook 17 (2010), pp. 89-118; on a possible contextualisation of Faust within the religious debate contemporary
to Goethe, see J. H. Smith, Die Gretchenfrage: “Goethe and Philosophies of Religion around 1800”, in: Goethe
Yearbook 18 (2011), pp. 183-204 (according to this author, the evolving of different views and understandings on
religion throughout the work would follow the development of the religious discourse at that time). On Goethe's
relation to religion more broadly, see H.J. Simm (Ed.), Goethe und die Religion. Aus seinen Werken, Briefen,
Tagenbüchern und Gesprächen, Inseln, Frankfurt a. M. 2000. On Goethe's understanding of Christianity in a wider
aesthetic perspective, see H. Thielicke, Goethe und das Christentum, Piper Verlag, München 1982. On Goethe's
ambivalent relation to Catholicism, see E. Kock, “Fasziniert und verärgert. Das widersprüchliche Verhältnis des
Dichters zum Katholizismus“, in Rheinischer Merkur 23 (1999), pp. 16-25. See also V. Di Chio, Bisogno di maestri.
Una proposta formativa, Armando Editore, Roma 2010, pp. 136-140 (in particular, p. 137, footnote 274).
51 Cited in: N. J. Hörisch, “Religiöse Abrüstung: Goethes Konversions-Theologie”, in: v. B. Beutler and A. Bosse
(eds.), Spuren, Signaturen, Spiegelungen: Zur GoetheRezeption in Europa, Böhlau, Köln / Weimar / Wien 2000, pp.
31-44 (34).
52 See. H. Lange, “Goethe and Spinoza: A Reconsideration”, in Goethe Yearbook 18 (2011), pp. 11-33.
53 Cfr. H.J. Simm (ed.), cit.
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according to him, Christianity was only a political institution originally. In his view, the idea of
divine could take place only in a representation of the world, meant as a harmony and wholeness.54
1.2.2 BASEL AND ITS ENVIRONMENT
As anticipated, Nietzsche taught Philology at Pädagogium and University in Basel; the former
was the same school where Spitteler studied in his teen, and that a few years later also Jung would
attend. One of the most influential figures in Basel was Jacob Burckhardt; he was a colleague of
Nietzsche's, as well as a former teacher of Spitteler's at Pädagogium. At the time of Jung's
adolescence, Burckhardt and Bachofen were quite old but still present in Basel; Jung even reported
to have seen them walk on Basel streets.55 Since its foundation in 1454, University of Basel has
always boasted a certain academic freedom, coming to represent an important model of
independence for other institutions (e.g. for University of Bologna). By putting itself as a melting
pot of different cultures – above all French and Italian – it has always shown up as cosmopolitan
and supranational. Following post-Napoleonic geographic and political readjustments, Basel was
asked to choose between two possible models: that of French “grandes Écoles” – more oriented
towards professional skills –; or the humboldtian one, whose only purpose was its students's
Bildung. The latter indeed was chosen as a model; in 1820 a few reformations took place, aiming
above all at breaking off from the narrowness of academic environment, and opening up to Basel
citizenship. Accordingly, a few hours of professorship contracts had to be dedicated to public
lectures, and all the professors had to teach additional classes or seminars at Pädagogium. Figures
such as Burckhardt or Bachofen played their major parts in this context.56
According to Lionel Gossman and his monograph Basel in the Age of Burckhardt (2000), both
Bachofen and Burckhardt came from families settled down in Basel since the XVI century, both
belonging to the medium-high class, and both oriented to giving religious education to their
children. Johan Jacob Bachofen (1815-1887) was brought up as a Calvinist, thanks to Burckhardt's
father, who was a parson and prepared him for his Confirmation. The parson had also published a
Lehrbuch des christlichen Religionsunterrichts für die kirchen des Kantos Basel, officially
54 His poem “Prometheus” (1772-1774/1789) can be read according to that (Cfr. C. Weber, “Goethes Prometheus:
Kritik der poetischen Einbildungskraft”, in Goethe Yearbook 16 (2009), pp. 101-134). A similar but more mature
understanding can also be thought in regard to Faust. On 3 January 1830, he wrote to Eckermann: “Der Faust ist
doch ganz etwas Inkomniensurables, und alle Versuche, ihn dem Verstande näher zu bringen, sind vergeblich. Auch
muss man bedenken, dass der erste Teil aus einem etwas dunkeln Zustande des Individuums dieses Dunkel reizt die
Menschen, und sie mühen sich daran ab, wie an allen unauflösbaren Problemen hervorgegangen. Aber ebendieses
Dunkel reizt die Menschen, und sie mühen sich daran ab, wie an allen unauflösbaren Problemen” (…).
55 MDR, p. 111.
56 C. E. Schorske, “Formation civique et culture savante à Bâle: Bachofen et Burckhardt”, in: Histoire de l'education
62 (1994), pp. 15-30; see also E. Bonjour, “Zur Gründgeschichte der Universität Basel”, in: Schweizerische
Zeitschrift für Geschichte 10 (1960), pp. 59-80. It might be of interest to recall that C. G. Jung's grandfather was in
charge of reforming the faculty of Medicine.
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approved, where Calvinism came across as strongly influenced by Illuminism and Pietism, the
doctrine of predestination was found to have less value, whereas man's divine nature was stressed,
man being “the noblest part of Creation”. Bachofen attended quite successfully the most prestigious
schools in Basel, culminating with Pädagogium (1831-1834), where he could study both the
humanities and sciences. At the end of his period there, he decided to deepen his knowledge of
Latin and Greek at the University of Basel, where he stayed until 1835. Although there is no
evidence that he attended De Wette's theology classes, it can be stated that this name played a major
role in Bachofen’s future myth conception. De Wette, indeed, was a friend of Creuzer's and shared
with him the opinion that Old and partly New Testaments had to be read symbolically, so that the
Scriptures could keep affecting their readers even in modern or contemporary age, and despite
dogmas. In fact, by freeing the Bible from historical facticity, it could achieve a mythological
meaning. Bachofen then left to Berlin, where he stayed until 1937, and studied Laws, although he
decided that his curriculum should focus on a more historical approach. Among his teachers, names
such as Ranke, Böckh, Lachmann and Savigny are to be recalled. His Doctoral dissertation was
written in Basel in 1838, but immediately afterwards, he left once more and spent one year in Paris
and two in England, both travels were significant experiences for his personal education. On his
way back, Bachofen decided not to carry on his family trade tradition; he would therefore start an
academic carrier – in 1841 he was indeed assigned the chair of Roman Law in Basel. After only
three years, however, he decided to give up his position, due to the scandal provoked by the liberal
journal Neue Basler Zeitung, where it was reported that several professorships were assigned to too
young fellows. He was not direct target of such criticism; nevertheless, he made the decision to
retire and become private preceptor, without fully giving up a close relationship with Basel
University, where he kept delivering expert advice. Even if with no official role, Bachofen remained
around the academic environment of Basel throughout his life; Nietzsche himself was said to attend
his house on a regular basis.57 From his teaching indeed, the philosopher drew part of his dichotomy
between Apollinean and Dionysian in the Birth of Tragedy. In Das Mutterrecht (1861) and Das
lykische Volk und seine Bedeutung für die Entwicklung des Altertums (1862), Bachofen
distinguished for the first time between these two categories, in order to highlight the “matriarchal”
and obscure element of the most ancient societies, as counterposed to the rational understanding
implicit in the moderne idea of “state”. Still the same distinction was then applied to Rome in Die
Sage von Tanaquil (1870), in which Rome was interpreted as the intersection between West and
East, ancient and modern, matriarchal and patriarchal, nature and law. Lastly, due to a few
anthropological and ethnological studies (Antiquarische Briefe, I, 1880; II, 1886), Bachofen was
57 L. Gossman, Basel in the Age of Burckhardt, University of Chicago Press, Chicago / London 2000, pp. 111-127.
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able to let his theory focus more on the “matriarchal” organisation of pre-patriarchal societies. He
thus dedicated much of his time to the analysis of funeral lamps (Römische Grablampen nebst
einigen anderen Grabdenkmälern vorzugsweise einiger Sammlung... mit Ausführungen zu einzeln
Theilen der Römischen Gräbsymbolik, published by his descendants in 1912) and primitive
religions. According to Gossman, Creuzer's influence on this aspect can be considered relevant:
Bachofen read Creuzer's Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker (1819-1823) quite deeply, and
shared with it the dualistic view of erotism-spirituality, which corresponded to his own distinction
between interiority and exteriority, personal history and history of humanity. What gained
significance above all, was the attention to symbol, meant as the linkage between ancients and
moderns, civility and generations, through which the study of history could succeed. Indeed, our
interest in History appears to be kept alive by our quest of past traces, permeating present and
giving it meaning. Such an interest in symbology also justifies Bachofen's attention to the
“Dionysian” and the darkest sides of ancient societies. Equally, it might have affected his opinion
on writing as not meant for general audience, but for elite groups; despite the unavoidability of
misinterpretations by any reader, due to their filtering contents through their own interests or
expertises.58
Such a view on writing was also shared by Carl Jacob Christoph Burckhardt (1818-1897),
intimate friend of Bachofen's since their childhood. As partly anticipated, his father was a
successful clergyman, nominated Antistes of the Swiss Reformed Church, who had studied in
Heidelberg and had Creuzer as a teacher. The young Jacob attended the same schools as Bachofen,
and had the same teachers, in addition to Luigi Picchioni, teacher of Italian, once active member of
Carboneria, whom Burckhardt felt particularly close to, to the point that he dedicated to him his
second edition of The Civilisation of the Renascence in Italy [Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien]
(1860). After having completed his studies at Pädagogium, he moved to Neuchâtel to learn French
for a while; there he realised how problematic it would turn out to find a job in Basel, other than
following the tradition of his family – his grandfather was a clergyman as well – and study
theology. Still in Neuchâtel, he also came across Charles-Henri Godet, expert of classics and
preceptor of several members of aristocracy across Europe. By the time of his first year at Basel
University, Burckhardt was able to speak Italian and French fluently, and had some knowledge of
English; he had studied drawing and composed music for poems by Goethe and Schiller; he had
58 Ibid., pp. 140-153. See F. Creuzer, Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker, Leske, Leipzig und Darmstadt 1822.
Cfr. S. Gödde, “'... das Unendliche im Endlichen gebären ...' 'To Bring Forth the Infinite in the Finite': the Process of
Signification in Creuzer’s Theory of the Symbol”, in: Flaubert: Revue Critique et Génétique 2010 (4); J. H. Blok,
“Quests for a scientific mythology: F. Creuzer and K.O. Muller on history and myth. (Proof and Persuasion in
History)”, in: History and Theory 33, 4 (December 1994), pp. 26-51, and E. Howald, Der Kampf um Creuzers
Symbolik: eine Auswahl von Dokumenten, J.C.B. Mohr P. Siebeck , Tübingen 1926.
47
written a few poems himself, and collected exerpta from classic texts and commentaries. He kept a
keen interest for Greek and Latin (he also knew Hebrew fundamentals) throughout his life.
Although he attended the faculty of Theology, Burckhardt kept taking Greek classes with Wilhelm
Vischer, and deepening his passion for history and German language thanks to Wackernagel; both
teachers played an important role in his formation. The former was crucial in transmitting to him
the idea of human insufficiency before Providence, i.e. the unavoidability of fate; the latter passed
to him the notion of a development in literary genres, which follows the development of man's
attitude to history from beliefs to critical ability. Lastly, Burckhardt was also impressed by De Wette
– from whom he learnt religion impoverishment in relation to the increasing modern (i.e. rational
and critical) speculation – and Hagenbach, who taught him about the history of Medieval Church.
His father had been a pupil of De Wette's as well, and he had been also impressed with his different
approach to the Bible, according to which the figure of “Christ” could be interpreted as a myth.
Nearly at the end of his university carrier, Burckhardt decided to abandon the study of theology and
to attend the faculty of History in Berlin, where also Bachofen had attended some classes, a few
years earlier. He also spent some time studying with Welcker, then in Bonn, before going to Paris
first and finally getting back to Basel in 1843. He became Professor of History of Art, but could not
feel comfortable in such narrow environment; thus he spent much time in Berlin, as well as in those
lands which would be called “Italy” shortly later, and which the scholar felt particularly attracted to,
especially due to their historical-cultural testimony. In 1848, Burckhardt established in Basel
steadily, and alternated his lectures between University and Pädagogium.59 What differentiates his
approach to history from his contemporaries – but brings it closer to Ranke's –, is his understanding
of mankind as a whole and of history as the history of its evolution; different parts of such an
“organism” corresponding to different cultures, the relationship between cultures deserves much of
attention. Therefore, cultural history, rather than political, had to be privileged; since its actual
subject is man. In this sense, culture is regarded as immortal, for the trace of interactions among
men still exists through centuries. Religion or State are two important elements to be investigated,
as human relationships originate in these.60 Later on, Burckhardt will focus more on threatening
situations for a human community, and will give attention to the “great men”, but he will never
cease to consider the study of the past helpful to the understanding of the present or of the future.
Lastly, similarly to Bachofen, Burckhardt was also under the spell of Creuzer (and Welcker) in his
understanding of Greek society. In particular, his stress was on paganism and discordance with
Christianity – differently from the predominant theories at that time. As it was with Bachofen,
59 L. Gossman, cit, pp. 204-235.
60 Ibid., pp. 249-261.
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Burckhardt also highlighted the darkest and hidden element of the ancients Greeks, and, similarly to
Nietzsche, the strong link between paganism and death, in contradiction with what traditionally
expected. Religions and myths were regarded as symbolic lenses through which two different
epochs could be connected, once stripped of their contingent elements, so that they could finally
reveal a universal message.61
By quoting from Gossman indeed, Bishop highlights a strong Goethean echo on ground of
Bachofen and Burckhardt. Goethe's distinction between “analysis” and “synthesis” could be
regarded as representing the same distinction between “causal” and “symbolic” introduced by
Bachofen – and then largely recalled by Jung – in “a paper read to the Basel Historical Society on
15 December 1864 entitled ‘The Basic Laws of the Development of Nations and of
Historiography’”. According to Bachofen, a causal explanation finds its roots and purpose on
determined temporal sequences, furnishing interpretations grounding on “what preceded [events]
and what followed”; this method represents Goethe's understanding of “analytical”. A “symbolic”
explanation, instead, “'[...] supposes a view of the whole’, explaining events ‘as the manifestation of
the whole in the part’, and, being synthetic, involves ‘powers of imagination, insight, and
sympathetic understanding that far exceed the methods of analysis’”. Bishop also observes: “ […]
Bachofen’s empiricism implied ‘a kind of Goethean attentiveness to the object world with a view to
discovering its internal laws, as opposed to the Kantian and Enlightenment effort to grasp the
world’ by means of comparison, examination, distinction, abstraction, deduction, and
demonstration”. Quite similarly, Bishop recognises Goethean elements in Burckhardt's
understanding of “imagination” in his lectures. First, Burckhardt utilises the “Goethean term
'Anschauung'”; second, he stresses the importance of imagination in reconstructing the history of
past civilities. According to Bishop, such an active role of imagination and “contemplation” allows
to overcome a merely aesthetic approach to ancient world.62 
As argued above, Bachofen and Burckhardt had seriously engaged with Creuzer's understanding
of symbol; as it is well-known, Creuzer was also a friend of Goethe's. Goethe wrote in Maxime und
Reflexionen:
Wort und Bild sind Korrelate, die sich immerfort suche, wie wir an Tropen und Gleichnissen
genugsam gewahr werden. So von jeher, was dem Ohr nach innen gesagt oder gesungen war,
61 Ibid., pp. 269-279.
62 P. Bishop, Analytical Psychology and German Classic Aesthetics. Goethe, Schiller and Jung, cit., pp. 50-53: “Here
[letters to Willibald Beyschlag (14 June 1842) and Karl Fresenius (19 June 1842)], as elsewhere, Burckhardt liked to
use the Goethean term, Anschauung, and in his lecture course on The Aesthetics of the Plastic Arts, he emphasized
the role of the imagination in appreciating (ancient) works of art – ‘imagination’, he insisted, ‘must complete the
work of the eye’ (die Phantasie muß ergänzen)” (p. 52).
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sollte dem Auge gleichfalls entgegenkommen. Und so sehen wir in kindlicher Zeit in
Gesetzbuch und Heilsordnung, in Bibel und Fibel sich Wort und Bild immerfort balancieren.
Wenn man aussprach, was sich nicht bilden, bildete, was sich nicht aussprechen ließ, so war
das ganz recht; aber man vergriff sich gar oft und sprach, statt zu bilden, und daraus
entstanden die doppelt bösen symbolisch-mytischen Ungeheuer.63
Also, as already said, Hölderlin was in contact with Schiller, and thanks to him, he could meet
Goethe personally. The first impression of Hölderlin's official visit to Goethe is described by the
latter with these words:
Gestern ist auch Hölderlin bei mir gewesen; er sieht etwas gedrückt und kränklich aus, aber er
ist wirklich liebenswürdig und mit Bescheidenheit, ja mit Ängstlichkeit offen. Er ging auf
verschiedene Materien auf eine Weise ein, die Ihre Schule verriet, manche Hauptideen hatte er
sich recht gut zu eigen gemacht, so daß er manches auch wieder leicht aufnehmen konnte. Ich
habe ihm besonders geraten kleine Gedichte zu machen und sich zu jedem einen menschlich
interessanten Gegenstand zu wählen. Er schien noch einige Neigung zu den mittlern Zeiten zu
haben, in der ich ihn nicht bestärken konnte.64
 However, the two had already accidentally met in 1794. Hölderlin was spending some time in
Schiller's place, and a “taciturn stranger” called in to see Schiller, who was eager to give him a copy
of the journal Thalia, where Hölderlin's “Fragment of Hyperion” and “Das Schicksal” were
published. For some reason though, the young poet misheard the name pronounced at the time of
the official introduction, and did not exhibit particular reverence; instead, he came across as quite
“indifferent”. Only at night could he hear by someone that Goethe had come over that day. This is
arguable the reason why also in the following year, when both writers met again for the second
time, Goethe assumed an utterly formal attitude. Nevertheless, Hölderlin got a totally positive
impression of that second meeting, as reported in the letters he sent to Neuffer and Hegel.
63  J. W. Goethe, Maxime und Reflexionen (1809-1829/1931), “Aus Kunst und Altertum”, in: J. W. Goethe,
Gedenkeausgabe der Werke, Briefe und Gespräche, cit., Vol. 9, pp. 497-676 (p. 517). Cfr. also p. 520: “Es sind
immer unsere Augen, unsere Vorstellungsarten; die Natur weiß ganz allein, was sie Will, was sie gewollt hat”.
64 Goethe to Schiller, letter dating 22 August 1797, in: J. W. Goethe, “Briefwechsel mit Friedrich Schiller”, in:
Gedenkeausgabe der Werke, Briefe und Gespräche, herausgegeben von Ernst Beutler, Vol. 20, Artemis-Verlag,
Zürich 1949, pp. 401-405 (p. 404). In his answer, Schiller cannot help but reveal a certain enthusiasm while
describing Hölderlin, so that he even compares him to Schlegel, by calling him a “poetical genius”: “Es war mir sehr
angenehm, daß Hölderlin sich Ihnen noch präsentiert hat, er schrieb mir nichts davon, daß ers tun wollte, und muß
sich also auf einmal ein Herz gefaßt haben. Hier ist auch wieder ein poetisches Genie, von Schlegels Art und Weise;
Sie werden ihn im Almanach finden. Er hat Schlegels Pygmalion nachgeahmt und in demselben Geschmack einen
symbolischen Phaeton geliefert. Das Produkt ist närrisch genug, aber die Versikifation und einzelne gute Gedanke
geben ihm doch einiges Verdienst” (Schiller to Goethe, 7 September 1797, ibid., p. 418). Hölderlin, on the other
hand, was being quite docile towards Schiller and his teachings (cfr. Hölderlin's letter to Schiller on August 1797, in:
F. Hölderlin, Briefe, Lichtenstein Verlag, Weimar 1922, pp. 167-170).
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According to Eudo C. Mason, Goethe's cordial attitude might be attributed to his respect for his
friend Schiller, without being able to really forget their very first meeting: indeed, anytime Goethe
had to mention Hölderlin, he would never express positive judgements on him. Besides, as the
scholar points out, Hölderlin's relationship with Schiller had such an impact on the former, that he
seemed to suffer from his severity throughout their correspondence (which lasted until 1801).
Hölderlin's veneration and respect for both Schiller and Goethe never vanished, to the point that he
asked for a copy of his translation of Sophocles's dramas being sent to both in 1804; likely in the
hope to please Goethe.65 Although the debate on Goethe's actual influential role on Hölderlin's
writings is still open, it is arguable to admit, still with Mason, that “similarities” do exist, between
Hölderlin's mature works and Goethe's, especially concerning Faust ein Fragment (1790).66 Among
these, he highlights the importance of the Faustian Erdgeist for the evolving of Hölderlin's
Hyperion. In particular, he recognises too a deep difference between Hölderlin's utilisation of Greek
mythology and the allegoric meaning with which his contemporaries made use of myth; such
utilisation – at the same time – appears as far from his contemporaries as it seems close to Goethe.
Although Hölderlin fell into madness before Faust I was published (1808), Mason does not exclude
the possibility that he had previously come across the manuscript in Schiller's house, even.
However, a major influence from Faust might be found on Empedocles (1793-1800), whereas
Hyperion appears to resemble Werther (1774/1787).67
Vischer too spent some time in Switzerland, precisely in Zurich, from 1855 to 1866. He also had
a short correspondence with Burckhardt, who sent him four letters in the period 1854-1867. The
tone of these letters is friendly and colloquial, and the topics generally concern Burckhardt's
research and travels. Among these letters, unfortunately, only the first one has kept Vischer's
answer.68 In the last months of his life, Vischer composed an essay entirely dedicated to symbol. Its
contents appear in harmony with Burckhardt's ideas, as well as with the peculiar utilisation of
symbols discussed above in relation to Goethe and Hölderlin. What he majorly criticised was the
limitless use made by his contemporaries of symbols, without a proper reflection. What is mostly
stressed is the ungraspable yet immediate essence of symbols if compared with ideas, which are
thus intuited through an image, without mediation, or total identification with it. The process of
symbolic experiencing evolves together with humanity: in a first stage, represented by myth and
magic, man tends to identify with symbols; then his reflectivity increases, and symbols are meant as
65 Cfr. E. C. Mason,  Hölderlin and Goethe, Lang, Bern / Frankfurt/M 1975, pp. 9-21.
66 Ibid., pp. 31-33 (cfr. Also pp. 82-83).
67 Ibid., pp. 95-113. However, alongside such similarities, the differences highlighted by Feldman are also to be
recalled (see infra, 1.1.2).
68 G. Leyh (Hg.), Vier Briefe Jacob Burckhardts an Friedrich Theodor Vischer, Corona, Hamburg 1936/1937. In a
letter dating 14 January 1866, Schiller is also mentioned.
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allegories; finally man gains the ability to reflect, and relates to symbols in a more detached way.
However, the first step does not imply a negative process; on the contrary, it aids reflection to better
grasp ideas: the religious symbol of Maria's virginity, for instance, makes it easy to represent and
comprehend the idea of “pure femininity” [reine Weiblichkeit].69
As Anticipated, Burckhardt was Spitteler's History teacher at Pädagogium (1861-1863);
furthermore, Spitteler also attended some of his lectures during his first years at Basel University.
As argued by some scholars, Burckhardt's inspiration might appear in the dynamical conception of
Spitteler's cosmology in Prometheus, as well as in his choice to make use of epos to better represent
and spread such a dynamic. Through this, indeed, the link between past and present seems to
emerge violently.70 There is no evidence of a possible mediation from Bachofen, instead.
Nonetheless, it is important to recall Philip Theisohn's opinion, according to which the necessity of
a dualism grounding the myth of Prometheus – that is to say, the couple of brothers, two elements
complementary and indispensable – can be interpreted as a reflection of Bachofen’s division
matriarchal-patriarchal.71
As a last remark, it might be of interest to recall that Nietzsche and Spitteler got to know each
other through a complicated correspondence, dominated by misunderstandings on either side. At the
time of Nietzsche's professorship in Basel, Spitteler was completing his education abroad; however,
rumours on a talented young professor of Philology reached him. According to what he reports,
after he published Prometheus anonymously, a few acquaintances of his – among whom a few
former students of Nietzsche's – insisted that the book was sent to the philosopher. As it is easy to
imagine, Spitteler never gave his permission, but when three years later Zarathustra come out, he
suspected that Nietzsche might have read his text and got some inspiration from it. However, in
summer 1887, Nietzsche took an interest in Spitteler's work – possibly through the mediation of
Widmann, copyeditor of the journal Bund – and promised him to help him with the publication of
his Aesthetica. Shortly afterwards, Spitteler was invited by the German writer Ferdinand Avenarius,
living in Dresden at that time, to collaborate to his project Kunstwart, another journal. A few
69 F. T. Vischer, Das Symbol (1887), in: F. T. Vischer, Kritische Gänge, Bd. 4, pp. 420-456. Cfr. H. Bausinger,
“Zwischen Dilettantismus und Wissenschaft: Friedrich Theodor Vischer”, in B. Potthast, A. Reck:, cit., pp. 1-14 (p.
10); and S. Richter, “Die 'Gunst des Zufalls'. Vischers äesthetischen Schriften als transitorische Dokumente der
Wissenschaft vom Schönen”, ibid., pp. 261-275 (in particular pp. 271-272).
70 Cfr. R. Faesi, cit, p. 12; F. Buri, cit., p. 21; P. Theisohn, Totalität des Mangels, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg
2001, pp. 93-94; C. Meissner, Carl Spitteler. Zur Einführung in sein Schaffen. Mit einem Anhange Carl Spitteler /
Eugenie. Eine Dichtung, Diederichs, Jena 1912, pp. 6-7. As pointed out by this last scholar, Schopenhauer played
also a part in Spitteler's cosmology. On a precise analysis of Spitteler's relationship with Burckhardt, see W.
Stauffacher, Carl Spitteler. Biographie, Zürich, München 1973, pp. 165-178; on Spitteler's reception of
Schopenhauer, see J. Mockrauer-Bähr, “Spittelers Randglossen zu den Parerga und Paralipomena”, in:
Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch 46 (1965), pp. 18-44; J. Aler, “Dichterglossen. Carl Spitteler liest die Parerga und
Paralipomena”, in: ibid., pp. 45-66; O. Rommel, “Schopenhauer und der 'Olympische Frühling'”, in: ibid., pp. 67-65;
V. Lo Cicero, „A Reappraisal Of Spitteler's View Of Schopenhauer“, in: The Germanic Review 39 (1964), pp. 37-49.
71 P. Theisohn, cit., pp. 113-114.
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months later, Widmann asked him to review some of Nietzsche's works, which caused him feeling
uncomfortable, not having proper philosophical skills. He ignored that he owed Avenarius' proposal
to Nietzsche; not only that, he even felt mocked by the philosopher, who had offered him help and
never got back to him so far. No wonder Nietzsche did not respond well to these first reviews. In
spring 1888, Nietzsche contacted him again, still showing interest in his Aesthetica; in autumn,
Spitteler came across The Case of Wagner [Der Fall Wagner] (1888), and decided to review it for
the journal Bund.72 This time, Nietzsche's reaction was positive and he even planned to meet
Spitteler in Switzerland. In this lapse of time, Nietzsche's attitude towards Spitteler was ambivalent.
The opinion on his writing skills were never questioned, and he kept looking for a publisher for
Spitteler's Aesthetica, even if disappointed with his reviews and behaviour.73 When he eventually
succeeded, that is to say, when Credner agreed to published Spitteler's work, Nietzsche wrote to
Köselitz: “Etwas ist mir gelungen, worüber Sie lachen werden: ich habe jenem Spitteler
(unangenehmen Angedenkens), unaufgefordert, aber im Bewusstsein, daß sonst Niemand etwas für
ihn thut, einer Verleger für einen dicken Band Aesthetica verschafft: Firma Veit & Co (Hermann
Credner in Leipzig, ein 'amateur' meiner Literatur) Sp<itteler> hat sich gehütet, mir dafür zu
danken”.74 The whole misunderstanding between these two authors was brought about by a
proximity between Prometheus and Zarathustra, which many of their contemporaries also
perceived.75 In regard to his relationship with his contemporaries, Spitteler did not take part in
debates, preferring to remain silent. The first time he expressed his opinion was indeed in 1908,
when he decided that it was about time to tell about his business with Nietzsche:
Ich habe zwanzig Jahre lang geschwiegen, weil ich immer schweigen wollte, und ich wollte
immer schweigen aus den nämlichen Gründen, warum ich auch über mein Verhältnis zu
Keller, Mayer, Jacob Burckhardt und Böcklin beharrlich schweige: weil ich der Ansicht bin,
das geht die Öffentlichkeit nichts an, und ich nicht trabante. Jetzt breche ich mein Schweigen,
72 C. Spitteler, Meine Beziheungen zu Nietzsche, Süddeutsche Monatshefte, München 1908, pp. 12-40. On 10 February
1888, after having read the first reviews by Spitteler, Nietzsche wrote to him from Nice and showed his
disappointment. In a draft, he even called himself “indignant” (eKGWB, letter n. 987). In the version he sent to him,
he wrote: “[...] Herr Spitteler hat eine feine und angenehme Intelligenz; leider lag, wie mir scheint, die Aufgabe
selbst in diesem Falle zu sehr abseits und außerhalb seiner gewohnten Perspektiven, als daß er sie auch nur gesehen
hätte. Er redet und sieht Nichts als Aesthetica: meine Probleme werden geradezu verschwiegen, – ich selbst
eingerechnet. Es ist nicht ein einziger wesentlicher Punkt gennant, der mich charakterisiert. Und zuletzt fehlt es auch
im Reiche des Formalen, zwischen vielen Artigen, nicht am Übereilungen und Fehlgriffen [...]” (ibid., letter n. 988).
73 See the draft of a letter to Hermann Credner on 25 February 1888 (ibid., letter n. 999).
74 (ibid., letter n. 1000).
75 One of the most significant testimony is represented by Meissner's comparison between Prometheus and
Zarathustra. According to the scholar, despite a few similar stylistic elements, a substantial difference exists in
Nietzsche's and Spitteler's purposes. The former would aim at spreading a message translatable into concepts,
therefore he would make use of a poetical language regardless of his purpose; the latter – the “poet” Spitteler –
could not help using poetry, for the richness of his contents could no way be forced into philosophical concepts (C.
Meissner, cit., pp. 27-31). A similar comparison also appears in O. Kluth, cit., pp. 98-99.
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weil ich dazu gezwungen werde, weil ich nicht mehr schweigen kann, weil es gilt, mein
Gesicht zu schützen.76
1.2.3 LIBER NOVUS AS JUNG'S “VISIONARY” EXPERIENCE
As pointed out in the introduction, Jung's feeling of proximity to Nietzsche's and Goethe's
prophetical experiences makes it possible to regard Liber Novus as Jung's “visionary” work. This
seems to be confirmed also through its style and contents, as well as through descriptions or phrases
used by Jung while referring to that experience, as previously argued. So, he describes the
emotional state following his first fantasies happening in October 1913 by stating: “It left me
exhausted and confused. And I thought my mind had gone crazy. From then on the anxiety toward
the terrible event that stood directly before us kept coming back.”77 As anticipated, his Faust and
Zarathustra experiences are depicted as bringing about a similar anxiety in him, to the point that he
“was forced to reflect on” himself.78 Also, as it is going to be investigated more closely in next
chapters, similarly to “visionary” works, Liber Novus puts itself as a prophetical experience.
Furthermore, as in all “visionary” works, representations of transition, death and sacrifice are quite
recurrent motifs in Liber Novus; as well as abundant references to biblical and mythological
symbology occur prominently. As it will be argued in next sections, some of Liber Novus main
episodes concern the “sacrifice of the hero”, the “death” and rebirth of “God”, and the whole story
represents a transition, namely the process leading to the realisation of the “self”. Even more,
mythology doubtless plays one of the main roles, also in regard to its psychological origin and
effects. In a letter to J. A. Gilbert dated 20 December 1929, Jung discusses his method in terms of
“mythology” indeed:
 
I found sometimes, that it is of great help in handling such a case, to encourage them, to
express their peculiar contents either in the form of writing or of drawing and painting. There
are so many incomprehensible intuitions in such cases, phantasy fragments that rise from the
unconscious, for which there is almost no suitable language. I let my patients find their own
symbolic expressions, their 'mythology'.79
As anticipated, Paul Bishop has brought out the importance of Weimar Classicism and German
Idealism for Jung and Liber Novus, to such an extent that he even defines Jung's work as “a kind of
76 C. Spitteler, Meine Beziheungen zu Nietzsche, cit., p. 6.
77 RB I, p. 231.
78 MDR, p. 102.
79 Jung's Archive (see S. Shamdasani, “Introduction”, in: RB, p. 216).
54
extreme revisioning of Vischer's novel [Auch Einer]”.80 Surely there is much of Auch Einer in Liber
Novus, as well as of Faust II, which Jung had always felt attracted to, even though he did not find
the courage to interpret it seriously, until he came across alchemy.81 According to Jung's
understanding, what characterises Faust II, is indeed the possibility of transcending the personal
layer of the unconscious, and reach the “prophetical” ability to talk about unknown things.82
Equally, traces of Spitteler and Hölderlin are quite easy to be found in Liber Novus. As it is going to
be argued in following chapters, Nietzsche's presence is equally recurrent, if not even more.
Furthermore, it is not to disregard the fact that Jung grew up and studied in Basel, and he came
across figures such as Burckhardt, Overbeck, Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche, Lou von Salomè,83 and
Spitteler himself (to whom he sent his Psychological Types). From Burckhardt, he also claimed to
have borrowed the idea of “original images” [Urbilder]. Also, Jung had a strong interest in theology
as well, and came from a tradition of parsons: “In my mother's family there were six parsons, and
on my father's side not only was my father a parson but two of my uncles also”.84 Throughout his
life, he strongly engaged in debates with characters such as Victor White, Martin Buber, Richard
Wilhelm, D. T. Suzuki, showing a keen interest not only in Christianity, but also in all Western and
Eastern religions. Lastly, Jung spent much of his time dealing with Gnosticism, Greek and Egypt
mythology, as well as with alchemy, extending such interest to ancient religions, equal to his
80 P. Bishop, “Jung's Red Book and its relation to aspects of German Idealism”, cit., pp. 354. He writes: “Indeed, there
is much about The Red Book that invites us to think of it almost as a kind of extreme revisioning of Vischer’s novel,
whose characteristics include a complex structure and a confusing multiplicity of styles and narrative voices; a
lengthy (and, for most readers, interminable) interpolated story, the so-called ‘Pfahldorfgeschichte’, about a tribe of
pre-historic Lake-dwellers, with its laborious references to their mythology; as well as the striking and occasionally
moving formulations of its aphoristic reflections”.
81 “Schon mein ganzes Leben habe ich mich um den Faust herumgedrückt. Er hat mich nie losgelassen, aber ich habe
es nie gewangt, etwas Richtiges darüber zu sagen, sondern machte nur Anspielungen. Nun bin ich aber doch in die
Falle gegangen, wie Sie sehen! Ich hatte allerdings so gewissermaßen eine Entschuldigung durch die Alchemie. Sie
hat mir heimlicherweise einige Türen geöffnet zum Faust. Und ich muß schon sagen, erst durch das Studium der
Alchemie bin ich dem Faust einigermaßen auf die Spur gekommen” (C. G. Jung, “Faust und die Alchemie. Vortrag
im Psychologischen Club, Zürich, vom 8. Oktober 1949”, in I. Gerber-Münch: Goethes Faust. Eine
tiefenpsychologischen Studie über den Mythos des modernen Menschen, Verlag Stiftung für Jung'sche Psychologie,
Küsnacht ZH 1997, pp. 13-37; p.15).
82 Iid., p. 35.
83 See P. Bishop, “Jung's annotation of Nietzsche's works: an analysis”, cit., pp. 276-281. As Bishop also points out,
Jung met Ludwig Binswanger, the nephew of Otto Binswanger, professor of Psychiatry in Jena and director of
asylum at the time of Nietzsche's admission. See also SNZ I, p. 635 (25 October 1935): “Overbeck always handled
Nietzsche with gloves; I kew him. He was a typical refined historian, a very learned man, and in all his ways
exceedingly polite and careful not to to touch anything that was hot; he appreciated the great genius in Nietzsche,
but the man Nietzsche he handled most carefully. Of course Nietzsche called anybody a great friend of his, and
people were very polite naturally, but they could not touch him. For instance, I know a man whom Nietzsche
considered one of his great friends. He was a professor of internal medicine, a highly educated man, very musical,
and Nietzsche would often go to his house – one never knew exactly when; he would appear suddenly and sit down
at the piano and played for hours on end. He spoke to nobody and nobody could speak a word to him. And then he
went away and said what a nice evening it had been”, and SNZ II, p. 862 (26 February 1936): “I wish I could show
you old man Jacob Burckhardt as I saw him practically every day, walking near the Cathedral coming from the
University library”.
84 MDR, p. 42.
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interest in modern ones.85
85 On Jung's reception and understanding of Gnosis, see A. Ribi, The Search for Roots. C. G. Jung and the Tradition of
Gnosis, Forward by Lance S. Owens, Gnosis Archive Books, Los Angeles and Salt Lake City 2013.  It
is not to be forgotten that a Gnostic codex found in Nag Hammadi (Egypt) was named “Jung Codex” in honour of
him. On an accurate investigation on an actual link between Hermeticism and Egyptian tradition, see G. Fowden,
The Egyptian Hermes. A historical approach to the late pagan mind, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New
Jersey 1986.
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CHAPTER 2
NIETZSCHE IN LIBER NOVUS
Then suddenly the spirit seized me and carried
me to a desert country in which I read
Zarathustra (SNZ I, p. 259)
2.1  NIETZSCHE AND LIBER NOVUS STYLE
As anticipated, Jung has never published a work called “The Red Book”. Surely significant
visions happened to him and doubtless he kept reflecting on that material for decades; nevertheless,
what was first published in 2009 is not part of Jung's planned Collected Works. What this means in
the context of this study, is that Jung's strong Nietzschean inspiration is not easy to be traced and
investigated, and several variables have to be taken into account. Such complexity can be well
summarised by arguing that Liber Novus reading offers two layers: visions and style. On the first
level, one finds Jung's direct experiences with his inner-world, that is visions, voices heard from his
innermost being, encounters with unusual characters or paradoxical happenings. All this happened
to Jung in a precise and relatively short lapse of time, namely from 1913 to 1916, with the gap of
one year from Summer 1914 to Summer 1915. Beside the 'raw material' of such an experience,
Liber Novus is also characterised by comments, paintings or drawings; the text is written in folio
and in Gothic type, in several drafts and versions, and chapter initial letters are quite often painted
in miniature. Jung's fantasies, in fact, are re-elaborated, commented and represented through
images. This latter part of his work kept Jung busy for quite a long time, that is, pretty much
consistently until 1928, and occasionally until 1959 (when the “Epilogue” was written).
Nietzsche occurs quite prominently in both layers. In visions, he appears as a proper character
during the asylum episode; sometimes a sentence or phrase from Zarathustra is pronounced; other
times characters, atmospheres or motifs remind of Zarathustra, as well as of concepts or ideas
expressed by Nietzsche elsewhere. In nearly all of these cases, Nietzsche's appearance happened
after January 1914, that is to say, a few months before Jung's second Zarathustra reading, which
took place in Winter 1914-1915. However, from September 1915 onwards, Nietzsche becomes one
of the main targets of the conversations between Jung's “I” and Philemon, although his presence
often remains implicit.
But Nietzsche also represents a deliberated choice of Jung's while re-elaborating his work. At
the moment of picking a model for Liber Novus style, he recognised in Nietzsche one of the closest
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cases to his own experience, even though Zarathustra seemed to him “too strongly consciously”
and aesthetically elaborated.1 This second layer shows a different way of reading Nietzsche's
presence concerning Jung's retrospective comments on his previous fantasies. Sometimes Nietzsche
remains hidden and can be only guessed through revisitations of Zarathustrian phrases or similar
stylistic choices, as well as through numerous quotes from the Bible or mythological literature (both
German and Greek), which play a significant role in his writings too. Other times, instead,
Nietzsche and his philosophy appear more clearly. This level is as helpful as the former to
reconstruct and analyse Jung's interpretation of Nietzsche, since it permits to individuate those
elements – in both a purely philosophical and a merely stylistic way – which Jung reckoned
important and usable as valid prototypes.
 By reading markings and annotations on Jung's own copy of Nietzsche's texts, it is possible to
furnish more evidence of Nietzsche's effective presence, especially in those references that might
sound too generic.2 Not rarely, indeed, alongside Zarathustra passages, Jung wrote down sentences
or remarks referring to his Liber Novus. In some cases, thanks to these annotations, it is also
possible to integrate other comments on Nietzsche in published works, whose interpretation might
sound slightly obscure, thus making them clearer: by using Liber Novus as a source, the
development of Jung's interpretation can be more accurately reconstructed, and the material written
in edited texts can become strongly enriched.3
If the question about the reason why Jung sometimes recalls a biblical symbol by expressing it
in Nietzschean terms, rather than taking it directly from its original source might raise
1 See his letter to J. B. Lang, who had sent him some personal fantasies: “I am glad that you have discovered all on
your own this area of work which is ready to be tackled. Up to now, I lacked workers. I am happy that you want to
join  forces  with  me.  I  consider  it  very  important  that  you extricate  your  own material  uninfluenced from the
unconscious, as carefully as possible. My material is very voluminous, very complicated, and in part very graphic,
up to almost completely worked through clarifications. But what I completely lack is comparative modern material.
Zarathustra is too strongly consciously formed. Meyrink retouches aesthetically; furthermore, I feel he is lacking in
religion sincerity” (March 1918, Private possession, Stephen Martin).
2 The issue concerning the annotations dating in relation to Jung's readings of Zarathustra and the development of
Liber Novus  has been previously discussed (see infra, “Introduction”, § 3.2).
3 An example can be taken in this sense. In the 1952 edition of Transformations and Symbols of the Libido, Jung
comments on the Zarathustra shepherd episode by arguing: “If you want the snake to bruise your heel you have only
to tread on its head” (CW 5, § 586). In his seminar on Zarathustra, Jung interprets “Of the Adder's bite” in relation
to the same image, and puts the chapter in connections to “Of the Vision and the Riddle” (SNZ, pp. 755-756). Since
there is no reference to any heel in Nietzsche's text, this comment might sound a bit unusual. If one has in mind
Liber Novus chapter “First Day”, whose motifs present several relevant similarities with Zarathustra, the sentence
“But the poison of the serpent, whose head you crush, enters you through the wound in your heel” (RB II, 8, p. 279)
might be considered the missing link between “The Vision and the Riddle” and its explanation expressed in
Transformations and Symbols of the Libido. The heel motif will occur, in a quite similar context, also in chapter
“The Magician” (RB II, 21, p. 317). Since the connection heel-serpent evokes biblical and mythological images,
such link makes also possible to understand Jung's interest in reading Zarathustra in those terms. Indeed, already in
1912, referring to an unconscious essence in the eternal relation serpent-path-sacrifice of the hero, Jung had put in a
footnote of Transformations and Symbols of the Libido a quotation from Genesis 49:17: “Dan will be a snake by the
roadside, a viper along the path, that bites the horse’s heels so that its rider tumbles backward” (WSL, p. 390). All
this part will be further discussed in next section (see infra, 2.2.2).
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spontaneously at this point, a possible explanation can be likewise naturally given as an answer.
Such slowness, dedication and secrecy let figure out Liber Novus as the mirror of a real
confrontation experience in Jung's life. Citing Nietzsche, one could argue that it represents a sort of
“transvaluation” of Jung's old “idols”, oriented to getting rid of their all too strong influence or
fascination, and proposing a new and more personal thinking, independent from them but still
inspired by their teaching. In this sense, what comes up from Nietzsche's presence in Liber Novus is
his duple link with folly and the “death of God”: by refusing the possibility of a rebirth of God, one
inevitably falls into madness. Jung's confrontation with Nietzsche is thus centred on proving him
wrong on the one hand, and, consequently, saving himself from the fear of mental illness on the
other. No wonder one of the strongest and recurrent motifs of this psychological fight is indeed the
Bible; thus several biblical quotations are likely to be regarded in relation to a hypothetical dialogue
with Nietzsche.
Following parts of this chapter will be divided into two sections, pointing out at first Nietzsche's
implicit presence in both visions and consciously chosen metaphors, and, later on, all those explicit
references to Nietzsche that characterise some meaningful scenes from Liber Novus. In the first
part, three groups of symbols will be investigated, which seem relevant to both Liber Novus and
Zarathustra comprehension: desert and lion; poisonous serpents and dwarf; sun, sunset and Eastern
wisdom. It is not to deny that these can be recurrent in other pieces of literary, biblical or
philosophical production, but the way they have been used by Jung seems to allude precisely to
Nietzsche. In some of these cases, Jung's annotations on his Zarathustra copy present clear
references to Liber Novus; other times, Nietzsche's presence can be guessed by consulting Jung's
published works and confronting his interpretation of such Zarathustrian symbols with the way
similar images recur in Liber Novus. Most of these references, however, belong to layer 2, that is,
they are to be found in Jung's retrospective reflections or re-elaborations. The last part of this
chapter wants instead to focus more on how Jung's direct confrontation with Nietzsche can be read
in Liber Novus. To this end, all those references which seem to openly allude to the German
philosopher (not rarely quotes or crypto-quotes from his texts) will be analysed, as well as his role
as a character. These themes have been grouped into three categories too: folly as the other side of
life; mocking, teaching and imitating; death and rebirth of God. Also in this case, such allusions
recur more frequently in layer 2, even though one of the most significant fantasies (layer 1) of Liber
Novus is represented by the meeting with Nietzsche and the conversation with the librarian on
Nietzsche's significance for contemporary religious issues.
It might be eventually noticed that, as anticipated, what has just been called “Nietzsche's
explicit presence” mainly manifests itself in the last eight chapters of “Liber Secundus”, and
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culminates in “Scrutinies”, turning into a sort of proper response to Zarathustra, as well as to other
texts which Jung has been having a confrontation with. Here, indeed, layers 1 and 2 are strongly
entwined, and Jung switches from fantasies to comments or reflections consistently. However, this
very last part has been set aside – besides a few remarkable passages –, since it is going to play one
of the main roles in the next chapter, as this Liber Novus section represents one of the most
significant sources for a comparison between Liber Novus and Jung's Seminar on Nietzsche's
“Zarathustra”.
2.2 SIMILAR SYMBOLOGY: NIETZSCHE'S HIDDEN PRESENCE
2.2.1 DESERT, LION AND TRANSFORMATION
The very first Red Book chapter, “The Way of What is to Come”, begins with four biblical
quotations; the last one (Isaiah, 35:1-8) represents the image of a blossoming desert where “waters
break out, and streams in the desert”.4 A few lines below, the desert symbol is used by the “spirit of
the depths”, in order to bring out the sacrifice as a necessary condition of every new starting:
But the spirit of the depths said: 'No one can or should halt sacrifice. Sacrifice is not
destruction, sacrifice is the foundation stone of what is to come. Have you not had
monasteries? Have not countless thousands gone into the desert? You should carry the
monastery in yourself. The desert is within you [Die Wüste ist in euch]. The desert calls you
and draws you back, and if you were fettered to the world of this time with iron, the call of the
desert would break all chains. Truly; I prepare you for solitude'.5
In Zarathustra chapter “Among the Daughters of the Desert”, Nietzsche writes: “the desert
4 RB I, 1, “The Way of What is to Come”, p. 229. It reads: “Isaiah said: The wilderness and the solitary place shall be
glad for them; and the desert shall rejoice, and blossom as the rose. It shall blossom 'abundantly, and rejoice even
with joy and singing… Then the eyes of the blind shall be opened, and the ears of the deaf shall be unstopped. Then
shall the lame man leap as a hart, and the tongue of the dumb sing: for in the wilderness shall waters break out, and
streams in the desert. And the parched ground shall become a pool, and the thirsty land springs of water: in the
habitation of dragons, where each lay, shall be grass with reeds and rushes. And an highway shall be there, and a
way, and it shall be called way of holiness; the unclean shall not pass over it; but it shall be for those: the wayfaring
men, though fools, shall not err therein”. The previous three quotations are: “Isaiah said: Who hath believed our
report? and to whom is the arm of the Lord revealed? For he shall grow up before him as a tender plant, and as a
root out of a dry ground: he hath no form nor comeliness; and when we shall see him, there is no beauty that we
should desire him. He is despised and rejected of men; a man of sorrows, and acquainted with grief: and we hid as it
were our faces from him; he was despised, and we esteemed him not. Surely he hath borne our griefs, and carried
our sorrows: yet we did esteem him stricken, smitten of God, and afflicted” (Isaiah 53: 1-4); “For unto us a child is
born, unto us a son is given: and the government shall be upon his shoulder: and his name shall be called Wonderful,
Counsellor, The mighty God, The everlasting Father, The Prince of Peace” (Isaiah 9:6); “And the Word was made
flesh, and dwelt among us (and we be held his glory; the glory as of the only begotten of the Father), full of grace
and truth” (John 1:14).
5 Ibid., p. 230 (italics ours).
60
grows: woe to him who harbours desert!” [Die Wüste wächst: weh Dem, der Wüsten birgt]6. In
Transformations and Symbols of the Libido, Jung quotes Nietzsche's Dithyrambs of Dionysus
version of the same poem in order to show an intuition of the ancient “mysterious truth” about the
link between life and death, mythologically symbolised through the image of “the sinister mother
who secretly lays a poisonous snake in his [hero's] path to undo him”. Exactly as this character,
every source of life also contains the seeds of death within itself.7 Jung recalls Nietzsche's words:
Here I sit,
Or rather,
Here I am swallowed down
By the smallest oasis.
Yawning it opened
Its lovely lips –
[...]
All hail to that whale
If he provides thus
For his guest's welfare!
[...]
Hail to his belly,
If it is
Such a lovely oasis belly!
[...]
The desert grows; woe to him who hides deserts!
Stone grinds on stone, the desert gulps and strangles.
Monstrous Death, glowing under his tan,
Stares and chews... his life is his chewing...
O man burnt out by lust, do not forget:
You are the stone, the desert, the death's head!8
Returning to Liber Novus, what follows the quoted words is the decision to go to the “desert of”
his “own self” and experience the state of loneliness that the spirit of the depth has announced. The
vision dated 28 November 1913 starts with these words:
6 Za IV, 16, KSA 4, 380, (translation ours).
7 CW 5, §§ 596-597. Nietzsche's citation was present already in the first edition (WSL, p. 362).
8 DD 2, “Among the Daughters of the Desert”, KSA 6, 383-87. Jung quotes without brackets. 
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Sixth night. My soul leads me into the desert, into the desert of my own self. I did not think
that my soul is a desert, a barren, hot desert, dusty and without drink. [...] Why is my self a
desert? Have I lived too much outside of myself in men and events? Why did I avoid my self?
Was I not dear to myself? But I have avoided the place of my soul. I was my thoughts, after I
was no longer events and other men. But I was not my self, confronted with my thoughts. I
should also rise up above my thoughts to my own self. My journey goes there, and that is why
it leads away from men and events into solitude [Einsamkeit]. Is it solitude, to be with
oneself? Solitude is true only when the self is a desert.9
The “desert” metaphor represents a peculiar biblical motif, quite recurrent in literature as well,
in order to allude to the dangers of solitude. But solitude also appears an essential element towards
inner enrichment and renewal. Jesus was tempted by Satan in the desert; Flaubert describes St.
Anthony temptations in the Egyptian desert;10 the incessant quest of the “wanderer” in the forth part
of Zarathustra stopped for a while when he found his oasis in the desert with the dancing girls
“Suleika” and “Dudu”. In the solitude of his own desert, Jung's “I” encounters significant figures,
some of them representing old prophets or saints, such as Elijah (with his daughter, Salome), and
the “anchorite” Ammonius. This latter deserves attention in the first place, in regard to the discourse
on desert and transformation. In chapter “The Remains of Earlier Temples” – where the allusion
might be to the temple of Jerusalem –, while commenting on his vision dated 5 January 1914, Jung
realises the necessity of combining together his 'human' and 'animal' elements; that is to say, of
becoming “a man again who carried within himself the conflict between a longing for the world and
a longing for the spirit”. His purpose is to become “conscious of your self”, namely to reach the
point of a complete independence from the external world and its influence on his own decisions.
Such a state is symbolised through the image of the lion, and compared to its opposite
“chamaleonesque” nature:
After all the rebirths you still remain the lion crawling on the earth, the XAMAI ΛEΩN
[Chameleon], a caricature, one prone to changing colors, a crawling shimmering lizard, but
precisely not a lion, whose nature is related to the sun, who draws his power from within
himself who does not crawl around in the protective colors of the environment, and who does
9 RB I, 4, “The Desert”, pp. 235-236.
10 G. Flaubert, La Tentation de Saint Antoine (1849-1874), Charpentier Et Cie, Paris 1874. It is interesting that Paul
Bourget makes use of this novel, and precisely of the character of St. Anthony, in order to read Flaubert's
psychology in terms of “decadence”. The stress on an intellectual image of “reality”, “feelings” and “sensations”,
before “reality”, “feelings” and “sensations”, mirrors the central role of thinking. The temptation would represent
indeed a desire to become one with “matter”, which would  perfectly contrast such intellectualism, and would show
the “disproportion” typical of decadence (P. Bourget, "Gustave Flaubert", in: Essays de psychologie contemporaine,
Plon-Nourrit, Paris 1883; pp. 111-173).
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not defend himself by going into hiding.11
What is happening here follows Jung's second meeting with two important characters who now
appear as completely transformed: The Red One – who has been the protagonist of the very first
“Liber Secundus” chapter – and Ammonius, whom Jung's “I” has just encountered as an
“anchorite”. These characters tell Jung's “I” that they got to know each another in Italy and are now
traveling together. The Red One, who had at first appeared as “the devil”, has now learnt how to
dance and has become religious. But in the first meeting that they had (26 December 1913), it was
actually Jung's “I” who spoke of dancing in relation to religion:
I know how to dance. Yes, would we could do it by dancing! Dancing goes with the mating
season. I know that there are those who are always in heat, and those who also want to dance
for their Gods. Some are ridiculous and others enact Antiquity, instead of honestly admitting
their utter incapacity for such expression.12
Nietzsche writes in Zarathustra: “I should believe only in a God who understood how to dance”
[Ich würde nur an einen Gott glauben, der zu tanzen verstünde].13 Jung has underlined the word
“dance” in his personal copy,14 and has drawn a double mark alongside, together with an “x” sign
referring to an annotation written below: “too much devil” [zuviel Teufel]. At the end of the chapter,
another passage connected to dancing is marked: “Now I am nimble, now I fly, now I see myself
under myself, now a God dances within me” [Jetzt bin ich leicht, jetzt fliege ich, jetzt sehe ich mich
unter mir, jetzt tanzt ein Gott durch mich].15 The last sentence is totally underlined, the word “God”
presents even a double underlining, while a vertical mark accompanies the text. As written above,
after the first conversation with The Red One, Jung has recognised “the devil” in him (more
precisely, he has recognised his “own devil”). Zarathustra chapter “Of Reading and Writing”,
therefore, is quite likely to be connected to The Red One in Jung's mind. Thus it is possible to admit
that also “The Remains of Earlier Temples” presents the same link. To this respect, it is to be
11 RB II, 7, p. 276-277. After this dialogue, towards the end of the episode, Jung will decide to “wander to the far
East”. The opposition lion-chameleon is again a biblical one, namely the dichotomy Christ-Jude (John 5:5).
12 RB II, 1, “The Red One”, p. 260.
13 Za I, 7, “Of Reading and Writing”, KSA 4, 49.
14 F. W. Nietzsche, Also Sprach Zarathustra, Kleinoktav-Gesamtausgabe, Naumann and Kröner, Leipzig 1899-1911.
Available at Jung's personal library in Küsnacht (Zurich).
15 KSA 4.50. Also in “Of the Higher Man” there is another reference to the necessity of learning how to dance and it is
double-marked in Jung's text: “You Higher Men, the worst thing about you is: none of you has learned to dance as a
man ought to dance – to dance beyond yourselves!” (“to dance beyond yourselves” is even underlined) (Za IV, 13,
KSA 4, 358). The relation dance-devil is also highlighted in the Prologue, where Jung has several times underlined
the word “devil”. In particular, in the episode of Zarathustra's encounter with the old man after the ropedancer's
death, referring to being hungry, Jung has annotated: “[he] should devour the devil” [sollte den Teufel fressen].
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considered that Jung changed the title of that chapter from the Handwritten Draft to the Corrected
Draft by substituting “Sixth Adventure” with “Degenerate Ideals”,16 thus stressing the closeness to
Nietzsche's fight against idols and ideals. Another probable allusion to Nietzsche deals with the
reference to the mythological Greek Hyperboreans, figures that do not belong to Zarathustra but
occur a couple of times in other text of Nietzsche's (known by Jung), referring to “free spirits”.17
Since one of these references happens in The Anti-Christ and this Liber Novus dialogue refers to
paganism and dualism between Christ and Antichrist, it is not to be excluded that Jung is here
alluding to Nietzsche again.
Returning to the lion symbol, it is important to remark that at the end of Jung's German version
of Zarathustra, a meaningful inscription – quite surely written in a later period – reads:
Eigentlich um nun die gewonnene Einsicht in die menschliche Natur wirklich zu leben und
nicht bloss zu denken. Daraus würde ein Kampf mit den Löwen entstehen und aus seiner
Überwindung würde der puer aeternus, eben das Kind entstehen. Das fällt aber schon in die
Krankheit.18
Facing the lions means a necessary step towards that transformation process which Jung will
later call “individuation”. The lions represent a repulsion against instincts, that is, an usual conflict
with the inner side of human nature. Only once such a fight has been faced, and when it is over, it is
possible to achieve a different and wider view on oneself, on the one hand, and on human nature
more broadly, on the other. But such an effort implies another unavoidable confrontation: illness.
Indeed, taking this challenge also means facing madness, as well as the risk of loosing oneself in it.
According to Jung, that is precisely what happened to Nietzsche, who, already scared by their
presence, refused to fight with the lions. In his German version of Zarathustra, “Among the
Daughters of the Desert” displays several underlinings and marks, among which, near the lines
“Ah! / Roar Once Again, / Roar morally! / Roar like a moral lion / Before the daughters of the
desert!” [Ha! / Noch Ein Mal brüllen, / Moralisch brüllen! / Als moralischer Löwe / Vor den
16 See S. Shamdasani, footnote 80, RB II, 7, p. 275.
17 See S. Shamdasani, footnote 84, ibid. In “The Wanderer and his Shadow”, Nietzsche compares children's happiness
to Hyperboreans': exactly like these figures, they live on earth and can only figure out an earthy life, with no notion
of heaven or fear of Christian judgment (MA II, WS, 265, KSA 2, 666-67). At the beginning of The Anti-Christ,
Nietzsche writes: “we are Hyperboreans”, meaning the he had finally found the way to reach an ancient happiness
again and overcome Modernity (AC 1, KSA 6, 169). Several other mentions occur in Nachlaß, to signify how
important this metaphor was to the philosopher: 1873, 29 [125], KSA 7, 688; 1886-87, 5 [46], KSA 12.200; 6 [26],
KSA 12, 246; 1887-1888 11 [118], KSA 13, 56; 1888, 14 [77], KSA 13, 256, 14 [156], KSA 13, 341, 15 [118], KSA
13, 477, 18 [17], KSA 13, 537, 19 [4], KSA 13, 543.
18 “In fact now [one should try] to really live the gained knowledge on human nature and not only to think it. From that
a battle with the lions would arise and from its overcoming the puer aeternus, namely the child would arise. That
already means illness, though” (Jung's personal library in Küsnacht).
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Töchtern der Wüste brüllen!],19 a meaningful inscription reads: “Morals has devoured the other leg”
[Die Moral hat das andere Bein gefressen].20 Besides, the phrase “Grimme[n] gelbe[n]
blondgelockte[n] Löwen-Unthiere?” (“Angry, blonde-maned / Lion-monster?”, KSA 4.384) is
underlined and displays a pencil inscription: “S[ee]. Below” [S. unten], where Jung probably refers
to the passage mentioned above and to his own comment. Lastly, in the essay “On the Psychology
of the Unconscious” [“Über die Psychologie des Unbewussten”] (1917-1943), Jung quotes
Zarathustra lions indeed, in order to demonstrate Nietzsche's incapability to truly accept his
instincts, despite what he would aim to teach through his philosophy:
He talked of yeah-saying and lived the nay. His loathing for man, for the human animal that
lived by instinct, was too great. Despite everything, he could not swallow the toad he so often
dreamed of and which he feared had to be swallowed. The roaring of Zarathustrian lion drove
back into the cavern of the unconscious all the 'higher' men who were clamouring to live.21
Both Jung's annotation and the quoted passage do not refer only to “Among the daughters of the
Desert” but also to Zarathustra chapter “Of the Three Metamorphoses”. Here the transformation
process begins with the necessity to enter the “dirty water” and “not to disdain cold frogs and hot
toads” [kalte Frösche und heisse Kröten nicht von sich weisen]. This is followed by a travel within
“the loneliest [einsamsten] desert” of oneself, where one stops carrying the weight of old values
(like the camel) and becomes lion, that is to say, one becomes “lord in his own desert” [Herr sein in
seiner eigenen Wüste]. The lion is only a transition element though; for it can just fight and rebel
against the dragon – symbol of pre-established values – but is not yet capable to “create new
values”. Such a task belongs to the last result of the third metamorphose, namely the child, symbol
of “innocence and forgetfulness, a new beginning”.22 The difference between Jung's psychological
19 Za IV, 16, KSA 4, 384-85. These lines are entirely underlined and supported by a vertical mark along the text in
Jung's own copy.
20 If compared with the English version used by Jung during his seminar (F. W. Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra. A
Book for All and None, translated by Thomas Common, The modern Library, New York 1909 –; available at Jung's
personal library in Küsnacht), the same preoccupation concerning the relation between the girl's leg, the lion and
Nietzsche's morality emerges quite clearly: “Oh, pity for that loveliest other leg!” [Oh schade um dieses liebliche
andre Bein (ibid., KSA 4, 384. In Jung's English copy, p. 306) is underlined; in the German text, that and the
previous lines (“Sie hat es verloren! / Es ist dahin! / Auf ewig dahin! / Das andre Bein!”) [She has lost it! / It has
gone! / Gone forever! / That other leg!] are accompanied by a vertical sign (“Sie hat es verloren” is even
underlined).
21 CW 7, § 37. The same image of the roaring lion also occurs in “The Transcendent Function” (1916/1957), this time
referred to the “ugliest man” (CW 8, §162). The reference to Nietzsche's toad dream also occurs in Transformation
and Symbols of the Libido (CW 5, § 47, footnote 1; WSL, p. 36, footnote 1). In this dream, Nietzsche's hand
becomes transparent and a toad sits on it; instead of being reluctant to the animal, Nietzsche's instinct is to swallow
it, and that is what he does.
22 Za I, 1, KSA 4. 29-31. In Jung's Zarathustra copy, the words “camel”, “lion”, “child”, “desert”, “be lord”, are
underlined. “Lord” [Herr] belongs to biblical terminology again.
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reading and Nietzsche's idea is apparently that according to the former, one should face the lions;
according to the latter, the spirit must become lion itself. But fighting against the lions means first
of all recognising them as a part of oneself (therefore becoming lion), and only after this point,
going beyond them by experiencing the difference between oneself and one's own morals.
Following Jung's interpretation, Nietzsche was instead identified with those moral lions that roared
against the lowest human instincts, and could not distance himself from them by accepting his
instincts.
Referring to Liber Novus again, what follows “The Remains of Earlier Temples” is the meeting
with Izdubar narrated in chapter “First Day” (8 January 1914). Later on, while reflecting on this
fantasy, Jung writes: “if we are surrounded by night, our brother stands in the fullness of the light,
doing his great deeds, tearing up the lion and killing the dragon”. The reference to Nietzsche is
quite arguable, also thinking of other motifs recurring in the chapter, such as the image of God as
“sick” or strictly depending on human imagination, or of some allusions to light and darkness that
can recall Zarathustra “Night Song”. As it will better argued in the second half of this chapter,
Nietzsche's presence in the Izdubar episode can be considered explicit, indeed.23 Furthermore, the
same figure of the toad occurs sometimes in Liber Novus. In “The Magician”, for instance, the new
born God is a “son of frogs”. The birth of this “new God” symbolises the culmination of a
transformation path which recalls the three metamorphoses in Zarathustra. Some lines above the
description of the frog-God, the same old reference to desert appears again in Jung's reflection:
The word has become heavy for me, and it barely wrestles itself free of the soul. Bronze doors
have shut. Fires have burned out and sunk into ashes. Wells have been drained and where
there were seas there is dry land. My tower stands in the desert. Happy is he who can be a
hermit in his own desert. He survives.24
23 RB II, 8, p. 280-281. “I cannot reach the blinding power of the sun, just as he, the Powerful One, cannot reach the
ever-fruitful womb of darkness” does not sound far away from Nietzsche's words: “Light am I: ah, that I were night!
But this is my solitude, that I am girded round with light” (Za II, 9, KSA 4.136). Another reference to the same motif
was already present in the previous chapter: “I want to exist from my own force, like the sun which gives light and
does not suck light” (RB II, 7, p. 277). All the allusions to Nietzsche in “Second Day” and following chapters will
be further investigated in sections 2.2.3 and 2.3.3. Quite interestingly, a similar image also occurs in Auch Einer, in
regard to the “unknown god”: “Aber nein, nein! Nicht dunkle, dumpfe Macht ist er, er ist hell, offen, ganz offen.
Licht ist er, er scheint durch alles und in alles, da ist alles durchsichtig. […] Drei Dinge ist er: das Sein, der Tod und
der Geist. […] Aber dieser Gott ist ein dunkler Gott und ein Abgrund. Und es sind andere Männer gekommen noch
weiter her von einem breiten Eiland im grossen Wasser […]. Sie glaubten, er sei auch die Sonne, und sprachen von
ihm: 'Licht ist sein weg und sein Rad, Sonnenschein sein Wagen, und mit Geisterschwingen schwebt er über den
Wassern, gross ist er in Land und Meeren, der grösste in allen Welten” (F. T. Vischer, Auch Einer, cit., pp. 196-197;
italics ours).
24 RB II, 21, § 189 [6] Draft, p. 327. Moreover, in the same chapter another reference to the “Basilisk egg” occurs, as
in “Second Day”; it is then arguable that these two chapters were somehow meant by Jung as linked. The same
image also appears in one of Nietzsche's poems, “Glory and Eternity” [Ruhm und Ewigkeit], which Jung quotes in
Transformations and Symbols of the Libido, in order to show the importance of introversion for a new creation and
rebirth: “How long already have you sat on your misfortune? / Give heed, lest you hatch me / An egg, / A basilisk
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Being able to “be a hermit in his own desert” is the criterion for succeeding in the confrontation
with oneself and bringing to completion such process of transformation. But this is not simple at all,
and, while commenting on his vision described in chapter “The Way of the Cross” (27 January
1914), Jung shows the possibility of failure by referring to Zarathustra again:
He who goes to himself climbs down. Pathetic and ridiculous forms appeared to the greatest
prophet who came before this time, and these were the forms of his own essence. He did not
accept them, but exorcized them before others. Ultimately; however, he was forced to
celebrate a Last Supper [Abendmahl] with his own poverty and to accept these forms of his
own essence out of compassion [Mitleid], which is precisely that acceptance of the lowest in
us. But this enraged the mighty lion, who chased down the lost and restored it to the darkness
of the depths [Da aber empörte sich der Löwe seiner Macht und scheuchte das Verlorene und
Wiedergebrachte in das Dunkel der Tiefe zurück]. And like all those with power, the one with
the great name wanted to erupt from the womb of the mountain like the sun [sonnengleich aus
dem Schoße der Berge hervorbrechen]. But what happened to him? His way led him before
the crucified and he began to rage. He raged against the man of mockery [Mann des Spottes]
and pain because the power of his own essence forced him to follow precisely this way as
Christ had done before us. Yet he loudly proclaimed his power and greatness. No one speaks
louder of his power and greatness than he from whom the earth disappears under his feet.
Ultimately the lowest in him got to him, his incapacity; and this crucified his spirit, so that, as
he himself had predicted, his soul died before his body [seine Seele eher starb als sein
Körper].25
Compassion [Mitleid] is precisely Zarathustra's “last sin”26: in the last part of the book, in fact,
egg / From your long travail” (DD 8, KSA 6.402). Jung comments: “The hero is himself the snake, himself the
sacrificer and the sacrificed” (CW 5, §§ 592-593; WSL, p. 358), which is a further – this time implicit – allusion to
another dithyramb by Nietzsche, “Amidst Birds of Prey” [Zwischen Raubvögeln]: “Hunted by yourself, / Your own
prey, Bored into yourself. / Now – Solitary, only yourself for company, / Twain in the knowledge you possess, / In
the midst of one century of suspect memories, Memories, / Tired from every injury, / Frozen by every ice, / Neck /
strangled by the rope-noose that you tied, your own auto-knower! / Your own auto-hangman!”
(DD 4, KSA 6.391). This latter is also quoted by Jung in both 1912 and 1952 editions of Transformations and
Symbols of the Libido (see infra, 2.2.2, footnote 57; 3.3.1, footnote 117). In “Descent into Hell in the Future” it
occurs again: “I myself am a murderer and murdered, sacrificer and sacrificed” (RB I, 5, p. 239). In “After the
catastrophe” (1945), Jung will explain that in terms of “collective guilt”, and he will quote Nietzsche again, referring
to Zarathustra “On the Pale Criminal” (CW 10, § 417). The same image of the “king of toads” [Froschkönig] also
occurs in Spitteler's Imago (Eugen Diederichs Verlag, Jena 1922, p. 62). Lastly, the “swamp water” [Sumpfwasser]
was already mentioned in Jung's comment on his fantasy described in “One of the Lowly” (29 December 1913) (RB
II, 3, p. 266).
25 RB II, 20, p. 310. Some lines above, Jung had presumably already referred to Nietzsche by writing: “the disgust of
whoever wants to enter into his own life can hardly be measured. Aversion will sicken him. He makes him self
vomit”.
26 Za IV, 2, “The Cry of Distress”, KSA 4, 301.
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his love to men prevents him from really despising the lowest ones and all his teaching attempts
fail. After sharing his “Last Supper” [Das Abendmahl]27 with the higher men, Zarathustra takes all
his guests by surprise while celebrating a pagan religious ceremony and venerating an ass.28 In that
very moment, he realises that people are not ready for his wisdom yet. The following day, he wakes
up “like a morning sun emerging from behind dark mountains” [wie eine Morgensonne, die aus
dunklen Bergen kommt] and finds, outside his cave, a roaring “mighty [starke(n)] lion”, whose
presence and tenderness let him realise that the time for his teaching has finally come:
'Compassion [Mitleid]! Compassion with the Higher Man! He cried out, and his countenance
was transformed into brass. Very well! That – has had its time!
My suffering [Leid] and my compassion – what for them! Am I striving for Happiness? I am
striving for my works!
Very well! The lion came, my children are near, Zarathustra has become ripe, my hour has
come: –
This is my morning, my day begins: rise up now, rise up, great noontide [grosser Mittag]!'
Thus spoke Zarathustra and left his cave, glowing and strong, like a morning sun emerging
from behind dark mountains.29
In Jung's personal text, the first three quoted lines are nearly completely underlined and
alongside, the following inscription is visible: “the lion of morality chases away human nature” [der
Moral Löwe scheucht das Menschliche weiter Weg]. There are a couple of other reading marks in
the first part of the chapter; the sentence “But I still lack my rightful men” [Aber noch fehlen mir
meine rechten Menschen] is underlined and, in the following page, the words “moralistic roaring
lion” [moralischer Brülllowe] are written in pencil. Ultimately, exactly as at the end of Zarathustra
the protagonist finds a lion outside his cave, “Liber Secundus” ends with the figure of a God
emerging “from the water […] with a swirling lion mane”.30
The solitude question raised by Jung at the very beginning of his experience, along with his
response to it, can also explain his later understanding of Nietzsche's “Among the Daughter of the
desert”. Jung's words “Why did I avoid my self? Was I not dear to myself? But I have avoided the
place of my soul”31 do not sound too far away from the words expressed by Nietzsche not only in
27 Za IV, 11, KSA 4, 353-355.
28 On the role of the ass in Zarathustra, IV, with particular regard to its religious meaning and tradition, see J.
Salaquarda, “Zarathustra und der Esel: eine Untersuchung der Rolle des Esels im Vierten Teil von Nietzsches 'Also
sprach Zarathustra'", in: Theologia Viatorum 11 (1973), pp. 181-213.
29 Za IV, 19, “The Sign”, KSA 4, 405-408; translation modified.
30 RB II, 21, “The Magician”, p. 329.
31 RB I, 4, “The Desert”, pp. 235-236.
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the poem, but also in another chapter of Zarathustra. Indeed, in “Of the Virtuous”, Zarathustra cries
out: “Your virtue is your dearest self. The ring's thirst is in you! To attain itself again – to that end
every ring struggles and turns itself”32. In Jung's own Zarathustra copy, the sentence presents a
vertical mark along the text and the words “ring's thirst is in you” are underlined. While
commenting on his previous vision (15 November 1913), Jung had expressed himself this way: “If
your virtues hinder you yom salvation, discard them, since they have become evil to you. The slave
to virtue finds the way as little as the slave to vices”.33 This sentence reminds of another significant
Zarathustra phrase, pronounced by the protagonist of chapter “On the Chairs of Virtue”: “And even
when one has all the virtues, there is still one thing to remember: to send even these virtues to sleep
at the proper time”.34 This all suggests that, in his 1914 reading of Zarathustra, Jung associates
Nietzsche's experience with his own. In this sense, according to Jung's later annotations on “Among
the Daughters of the Desert”, it is arguable that Nietzsche's “self” appears to Jung as “a desert” and
it is therefore unavoidable, for the philosopher, to be devoured by his own solitude. Roaring against
the girls means indeed to rebel against the possibility of a confrontation with oneself's strangeness,
that is remaining stuck in the aridity of one's own thoughts, instead of trying to actually experience
them. By accepting to face his own strangeness in Liber Novus, Jung has also accepted to measure
the desert of his own self in order to verify his capability to survive such a strength. Nietzsche, by
contrast, appears to have succumbed. As already anticipated, in the second part of the book, the
philosopher will incarnate Jung's encounter with madness, indeed. Almost at the end of his Liber
Novus experience, namely in “Scrutinies”, Jung tells his soul: “The solitude of this acceptance
terrifies me. I dread the madness that befalls the solitary”, to which she replies: “As you already
know, I have long predicted solitude for you. You need not be afraid of madness. What I predict is
valid”.35 At the same time, Jung also appears as trying to proof the importance of such a
confrontation by showing Nietzsche's personal collapse caused by his refusal. This is shown quite
clearly through the allusion to the ropedancer's tragic fate at the end of the last quoted sentence
from “The Way of the Cross”: “his soul died before his body”. In “Prologue”, Zarathustra says to
the dying ropedancer: “Your soul will be death even before your body: therefore fear nothing
more!” [Deine Seele wird noch schneller todt sein als dein Leib: fürchte nun Nichts mehr!]. The
whole sentence is underlined in Jung's Zarathustra and quoted again in the essay “On the
Psychology of the Unconscious”, exactly some lines above the already mentioned lion, in order to
show that passage as a prophecy on Nietzsche's own destiny, brought about by the contradiction
32 Za II, 5, KSA 4, 121; translation ours.
33 RB I, 3, “On the Service of the Soul”, p. 235.
34 Za I, 2, “Of the Chairs of Virtue”, KSA 4, 33. (cfr. S. Shamdasani, footnote 70, RB I, 3, “On the Service of the
Soul”, p. 235).
35 RB “Scrutinies”, § 2, p. 336.
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between his teaching and his life.36
2.2.2 POISONOUS SERPENT AND DWARF
In a vision dated 12 December 1913, Jung's “I” is in a cave, flooded by dark water. On the
opposite side, he sees a red stone that he knows he “must reach”, despite the fear he is feeling and
the “frightful noise of shrieking voices” pervading the cave. Finally, he takes it and finds another
“dark opening in the rock”, from which he can hear “underground waters” flow, and can see “the
bloody head of a man on the dark stream” with “a large black scarab floating past on the dark
stream”. He carries on with the description:
In the deepest reach of the stream shines a red sun, radiating through the dark water. There I
see – and a terror seizes me – small serpents on the dark rock walls, striving toward the
depths, where the sun shines. A thousand serpents crowd around, veiling the sun. Deep night
falls. A red stream of blood, thick red blood springs up, surging for a long time, then ebbing. I
am seized by fear. What did I see?37
Serpents are important symbols for the development of Liber Novus. Commenting on the vision,
Jung realises that it is now time to give up his too heavy 'scientific' knowledge and be open to its
counterparts, namely to his soul. He prays to his soul with these words: “protect me from the
serpent of judgment, which only appears to be a healing serpent, yet in your depths is infernal and
agonizing death”.38 The “serpent of judgment”, because of serpents' misleading nature, hides behind
36 CW 7, § 36. Jung deals with the Christian meaning of the lion symbol in Symbols of Transformation (CW 5, §§ 524-
526). He shows the lion symbolising “the tribe of Judah” in the Old Testament, as well as the devil in the New
Testament. In particular, the symbol of the lion is connected to Christ's role as a hero, as equivalent to the bull
symbol for Mithraic Mysteries, where “the cult-hero has to fight the bull; in the 'transitus' he carries it into the cave,
where he kills it. […] The struggle in Christ's soul in Gethsemane, where he wrestles with himself in order to
complete his work; then the 'transitus,' the carrying of the cross, when he takes on his shoulder the symbol of the
deadly mother and in so doing carries himself to the grave, from which he will rise again after three days – all these
images express the same fundamental thought: that Christ is a divinity who is eaten in the Lord's Supper”. Cfr. Also
ibid., § 671: “On the Mithraic monuments we often come across a strange symbol: a krater (mixing-bowl) with a
snake coiled round it, and a lion facing the snake like an antagonist. […] It looks as if they were fighting for the
krater. The krater symbolizes the maternal vessel of rebirth, the snake fear and resistance, the lion raging desire. The
snake almost assists at the bull-sacrifice by gliding towards the blood flowing from the wound. It seems to follow
from this that the bull's life – its blood – is offered to the snake, that it is a sacrificial offering to the powers of the
underworld, like the blood drunk by the shades in the nekya of Odysseus. […] the bull symbolizes the living hero,
whereas the snake symbolizes the dead, buried, chtonic hero. But as a hero […] the snake also stands for the
devouring mother”. In several passages, Jung stresses the zodiacal meaning of the lion, namely that of “domicilium
solis”, “the fierce heat of midsummer” (ibid., § 600, footnote; see also §§ 176, 425). These three connotations
attributed to the lion (the Christian, the mythological, and the zodiacal one) were already present at the time of
Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido (1912).
37 RB I, 5, “Descent into Hell in the Future”, p. 237.
38 Ibid., p. 238. It might also be interesting that such a heavy “knowledge has a thousand voices, an army roaring like
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Asclepius' “healing serpent”, symbol of a wild and natural wisdom, far away from science and
rationality. In this sense, such animal also deceives those who believe to reach it. This is exactly
what is happening to Jung, who writes in his 1952 edition of Transformations and Symbols of the
Libido: “serpent dreams always indicate a discrepancy between the attitude of the conscious mind
and instinct, the snake being a personification of the threatening aspect of that conflict”.39 As
anticipated, at the end of “Liber Primus”, Jung's “I” comes across the characters of Elijah and
Salome. Elijah is an old man, namely the biblical prophet, and Salome, a blind girl, is apparently his
daughter, although Jung's “I” realises she should rather be Herod's daughter. The former is said to
represent forethinking [Vordenken]; the latter pleasure [Lust], and it is also revealed that she loves
Jung's “I”. The serpent is defined in terms of “a third principle”, necessary to keep these both
principles united; for it is that earthly [erdhaft] element indeed, to be “a stranger to both principles
although it is associated with both”. It “has the weight of the earth in itself but also its changeability
and germination from which everything that becomes emerges”, and through its connection with
longing [Sehnsucht], it reminds of life and reunifies the opposites.40 In fact, this figures have a
double meaning, that is to say, beside their healing power, serpents also preserve the destructive
force of their poison. This is well symbolised through the appearance of the white serpent as a
second element, necessary to resolve the event at the end of the episode.41
As a motif, serpents occur many times in Liber Novus, with both their healing and destructive
attributions. As these qualities are mainly derived from the Bible, those scenes where serpents are
depicted as dangerous present some elements that can be easily found in Nietzsche as well. Just as a
comparison, the following example can be taken:
lions”. On Jung's specific interpretation of Aesculapius cult and the coiled serpent as its symbol, see CW 5, §§ 577-
579.
39 CW 5, § 615 (translation modified).
40 RB I, 9, “Mysterium Encounter”, p. 247. He explains: “It is always the serpent that causes man to become enslaved
now to one, now to the other principle, so that it becomes error”. Two chapters later, he will add: “That which is
lacking in the pure principle appears as the serpent” (RB I, 11, “Resolution”, p. 253). It can be interesting to notice
that the serpent is compared with a bridge [Brücke] connecting the opposites. With the same metaphor, the
Übermensch is introduced in Zarathustra more than once.
41 RB I, 11, “Resolution”, p. 251 (25 December 1913): “The rock separates day and night. On the dark side lies a big
black serpent, on the bright side a white serpent. They thrust their heads toward each other, eager for battle. Elijah
stands on the heights above them. The serpents pounce on one another and a terrible wrestling ensues. The black
serpent seems to be stronger; the white serpent draws back. Great billows of dust rise from the place of struggle. But
then I see: the black serpent pulls itself back again. The front part of its body has become white. Both serpents curl
about themselves, one in light, the other in darkness. Elijah: 'What did you see?' 'I saw the fight of two formidable
serpents. It seemed to me as if the black would overcome the white serpent; but behold, the black one withdrew and
its head and the top part of its body had turned white.' E: 'Do you understand that?' I: 'I have thought it over, but I
cannot understand it. Should it mean that the power of the good light will become so great that even the darkness
that resists it will be illumined by it?' Elijah climbs before me into the heights, to a very high summit; I follow. On
the peak we come to some masonry made of huge blocks. It is a round embankment on the summit. Inside lies a
large courtyard, and there is a mighty boulder in the middle, like an altar. The prophet stands on this stone and says:
'This is the temple of the sun. This place is a vessel, that collects the light of the sun.'”. The double meaning of any
symbol will characterise Jung's archetypes in his later thinking, and the serpent will be considered by him an
archetype too.
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Elijah climbs down from the stone [vom Steine herunter], his form becomes smaller in
descending, and finally becomes dwarflike [zwerghaft], unlike himself.
I ask: 'Who are you?'
'I am Mime, and I will show you the wellsprings. The collected light becomes water and flows
in many springs from the summit into the valleys of the earth.' He then dives down into a
crevice. I follow him down into a dark cave. I hear the rippling of a spring. I hear the voice of
the dwarf [Zwerg] from below: 'Here are my wells, whoever drinks from them becomes
wise.'42
Here the main allusion is certainly to Wagner's Ring, the dwarf himself claiming to be Mime;
however, a few  similarities with the episode narrated in Zarathustra chapter “Of the Vision and the
Riddle” can be also recalled, despite the contextual difference of the two episodes. In the scene
depicted by Nietzsche, in particular, Zarathustra metaphorically faces the “spirit of gravity” through
a verbal fight with a dwarf. This latter address Zarathustra as “stone of wisdom [Stein der
Weisheit]”, and adds: “You have thrown yourself thus high, but every stone that is thrown must –
fall! Condemned by yourself and to your own stone-throwing. O Zarathustra, far indeed have you
thrown your stone, but it will fall back upon you!”43. The whole passage is accompanied by a couple
of vertical lines in Jung's own copy. Furthermore, since Wagner represents an important model for
Nietzsche – besides occurring a couple of time in Liber Novus as well –,44 among the sources for
Nietzsche's allusion, The Ring of the Nibelungs has not to be excluded categorically.
Returning to Liber Novus, in his comment on the Elijah vision, Jung compares the risk of
becoming one-sided to an “ugly dwarf who lives in a dark cave like an unborn in the womb”, and
forethinking to “a dwarfish cleverness, false and of the night”.45 Again, Zarathustra dwarf says:
“All truth is crooked, time itself is a circle”.46 Once more, the first part is underlined by Jung. More
generally, a couple of further similarities with Nietzsche's episode are also present in the contents of
Jung's fantasy. Jung's “I” tells Elijah: “You pose dreadful riddles” [du gibst mir grausame Rätsel
auf], while the atmosphere becomes “gloomy and doubtful” [düster und zweifelhaft].47 This seems
to remind of the beginning of “Of the Vision and the Riddle” [Vom Gesicht und Räthsel], where the
vision is introduced through a “deadly-grey twilight” [leichenfarbne Dämmerung], in which the
42 Ibid.
43 Za III, 2, KSA 4.198.
44 Another reference to Wagner in Liber Novus is given by the unusual representation of Parsifal after the asylum
episode in “Liber Secundus” (RB II, 17, “Nox quarta”, pp. 302-303). Besides, the sacrifice of Siegfried in “Liber
Primus” might be also linked to Wagner and his Ring (RB I, 7, “Murder of the Hero”, pp. 241-242).
45 RB I, 11, p. 253.
46 KSA 4, 200.
47 RB I, 9, “Mysterium Encounter”, p. 246.
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protagonist walks “gloomily and sternly with compressed lips” [düster und hart, mit gepressten
Lippen].48 Jung's immediately following vision starts, then, with an allusion to a “crater” [Krater].49
Again, the “Blissful Islands” from where Zarathustra is leaving on board of a ship – a place which
has been certainly well-known to Jung since the time of his doctoral thesis – are characterised by
the presence of a “volcano” [Feuerberg].50
Besides the similar tone of these two episodes, as pointed out at the beginning of this section,
what seems to really link Nietzsche with the serpent symbol in Liber Novus, is its poisoning aspect.
Towards the end of Zarathustra's vision in “Of the Vision and the Riddle”, a serpent represents the
crucial element indeed, to express the eternal return and its necessity to be accepted. An example for
Jung's interest in grasping the poisoning aspect of Nietzsche's serpent symbology can be taken by
confronting the dialogue with Izdubar with the same Zarathustra chapter as above, as well as with
an aphorism from The Gay Science. Izdubar compares science to a poison and adds: “You call
poison truth? Is poison truth? Or is truth poison? Do not our astrologers and priests also speak the
truth? And yet theirs does not act like poison”.51 In The Gay Science 113, “On the doctrine of
poisons” [Zu Lehre von den Giften], Nietzsche expresses the same analogy between scientific
thinking and poison. According to him, the former is originated by the union of different impulses
which, each of them being unilateral, act exactly like poisons on the whole organism of life. In fact,
they prevent the organism from realising how important it wold be a cooperation of science with
“artistic energies” and “practical wisdom of life”.52 Furthermore, again during the same Liber
Novus dialogue, Jung explains that because of the importance given to science in Western culture,
Western man remains “dwarfish” [zwerghaft]. Lastly, the same reference becomes clearer through
another couple of passages. The first one is this:
I: 'Now you perhaps see that we had no choice. We had to swallow the poison of science.
Otherwise we would have met the same fate as you have: we'd be completely lamed, if we
encountered it unsuspecting and unprepared. This poison is so insurmountably strong that
everyone, even the strongest, and even the eternal Gods, perish because of it. If our life is dear
to us, we prefer to sacrifice a piece of our life force rather than abandon ourselves to certain
death'.53
48 Za III, 2, KSA 4, 198.
49 RB I, 10, “Instruction”, p. 248.
50 Za II, 18, “Of Great Events” KSA 4,167. As anticipated, Jung had mentioned that chapter in his doctoral thesis by
indicating it as an example of cryptomnesia (CW 1, §§ 140-142 and 180-184). In his own copy, the chapter presents
some reading marks and annotations.
51 RB II, 8, “First Day” (8 January 1914), p. 278.
52 FW III, 113, KSA 3.473-74 (cfr. S. Shamdasani, footnote 100, RB II, 8, p. 278).
53 RB II, 8, p. 279.
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Science is not only poisoning but also to be swallowed; similarly – as it will be shown quite
soon –, the serpent in the shepherd's mouth described by Nietzsche in “Of the Vision and the
Riddle” has to be bitten. Moreover, the capacity of killing “the eternal Gods” through the poison of
science can be taken as a possible example for another allusion to Nietzsche which could endorse
this hypothesis. The other passage to be noticed appears in Jung's retrospective reflection on the
same vision:
So the path [Pfad] of my life led me beyond the rejected opposites, united in smooth and –
alas! – extremely painful sides of the way which lay before me. I stepped on them but they
burned and froze my soles. And thus I reached the other side. But the poison of the serpent,
whose head you crush, enters you through the wound in your heel; and thus the serpent
becomes more dangerous than it was before. Since whatever I reject is nevertheless in my
nature. I thought it was without, and so I believed that I could destroy it. But it resides in me
and has only assumed a passing outer form and stepped toward me. I destroyed its form and
believed that I was a conqueror. But I have not yet overcome myself.54
The meeting with the dwarf happens to Zarathustra on a mountain “path” [Pfad]. The same path
will then be used to exemplify the traditional view of time, and to introduce the idea of the eternal
return: a gateway [Thorweg], which represents the present “moment” [Augenblick], divides the
“long lane” [lange Gasse] into two paths, symbolising both sides of eternity, namely past and future.
Recognising the eternal return, means to stop considering time as a continuative line, and giving
value and responsibility to the moment. For what is happening right now, not only has already
happened infinite times in the past, but has still to be eternally repeated. In order not only to admit
that possibility, but also to accept it, Zarathustra's vision goes on with another scene, in which a
shepherd has “a heavy, black serpent” hanging from his mouth, causing him convulsions and
torment. As anticipated, the only solution for him to be safe is to bite the serpent's head and tear it
off. The serpent symbolises the heaviest and darkest side of Nietzsche's “abysmal though”, i.e. the
“disgust” [Ekel] to life, but once accepted, it offers a different and lighter perspective. In exactly
this sense, the shepherd turns himself into “a transformed being, surrounded with light, laughing”
[ein Verwandelter, ein Umleuchterer, welcher lachte].55
54 Ibid. A similar phrase also appears in another comment by Jung, written in chapter “The Magician”: “I continue on
my way; accompanied by a finely polished piece of steel, hardened in ten fires, stowed safely in my robe. Secretly;
I wear chain mail under my coat. Overnight I became fond of serpents, and I solved their riddle. I sit down next to
them on the hot stones lying by the wayside. I know how to catch them cunningly and cruelly; those cold devils that
prick the heel of the unsuspecting” (RB II, 21, p. 317).
55 Za III, 2, KSA 4.199-202 (translation modified).
74
In 1952, Jung comments on this Zarathustra episode with these words:
the snake represents the unconscious psyche which, like the snake god in the Sabazios
mysteries, crawls into the mouth of the celebrant, i.e., Nietzsche himself as the ποιµήν or
ποιµάνδρης, the shepherd of souls and preacher, firstly to stop him from talking too much, and
secondly to make him ἒνθεος –' “enthused”, filled with God'. The snake had already bitten
fast, but fear was swifter and more violent: it bit off the snake's head and spat it out. If you
want the snake to bruise your heel you have only to tread on its head. The shepherd laughed
on getting rid of the snake – a wild hysterical laughter, because he had dished the
compensation from the unconscious. He could now reckon without his host, and with the
well-known consequences: one has only to read the passages in Zarathustra where Nietzsche
speaks of laughing and laughter. Unfortunately, everything happened afterwards just as if the
whole German nation had paid heed to Nietzsche's sermon.
The unconscious insinuates itself in the form of a snake if the conscious mind is afraid of the
compensating tendency of the unconscious, as is generally the case in regression. But if the
compensation is accepted in principle, there is no regression, and the unconscious can be met
half-way through introversion. It must be admitted, however, that the problem as it presented
itself to Nietzsche was insoluble, for nobody could expect the shepherd to swallow down a
snake under such circumstances. We are confronted here with one of those fatal cases, by no
means uncommon, where the compensation appears in a form that cannot be accepted and
could only be overcome by something that is equally impossible for the patient.56
 
In the first edition of Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido, which preceded the Izdubar fantasy
of a couple of years, the reference to Nietzsche's chapter was already present, but Jung's analysis
stopped at the stage of introversion: the serpent represented the libido's process of introverting
within itself, and through that, it was a symbol for rebirth.57 Thus it can be stated that the reference
56 CW 5, §§ 586-587 (italics ours). It might be of interest to notice that he also connects this scene with Nietzsche's
toad dream (§ 585).
57 Cfr. WSL, pp. 355-356: “Die Schlange repräsentiert die sich introvertierende Libido. Durch die Introversion wird
man vom Gotte befruchtet, begeistert, wieder erzeugt und wieder geboren”. Furthermore, both in 1912 and in 1952,
Jung stresses the “serpent's poison” [Schlangengift] from Nietzsche's poem “Amidst birds of Prey” (KSA 6, 391) in
relation to the separation from the “mother” and the the process of creation. In 1912, the motif of the “birth out of
oneself” [Geburt aus sich selber] was Jung's main concern (WSL, p. 290), while in 1952, the issue is understood in
terms of “individuation process”. Before introducing the quotation, Jung states: “At this stage the mother-symbol no
longer connects back to the beginnings, but points towards the unconscious as the creative matrix of the future.
'Entry into the mother' then means establishing a relationship between the ego and the unconscious […]” (CW 5, §
459). Then these following lines by Nietzsche are cited: “Why hast thou enticed thyself / Into the old serpent's
Paradise? / Why hast thou stolen / Into thyself, thyself? // A sick man now, / Sick of the serpent's poison; / A captive
now / Who drew the hardest lot: / Bent double / Working in thine own pit, / Encaved within thyself, / Burrowing into
thyself, / Heavy-handed, / Stiff, / A corpse – / Piled with a hundred burdens, / Loaded to death with thyself, / A
knower! / Self-knower! / The wise Zarathustra!/ Thou sought the heaviest burden / And found yourself” (CW 5, §
459; WSL, p. 290). Jung's overall understanding of the poem, however, remains the same in both editions: “Sunk in
his own depths, he is like one buried in the earth; a dead man who has crawled back into the mother” (CW 5, § 460;
WSL, p. 291). This topic will be also discussed below (see infra, 3.3.1, footnote 117).
75
to the heel creates a strong link between this passage and the comment on Izdubar scene, since no
heels are mentioned by Nietzsche in his chapter. As it will be shown in the next chapter, on 11
December 1935, Jung makes use of a similar phrase in his analysis of Zarathustra section “Of the
Adder's Bite”: “To be caught by the heel is the usual fate of a man. Crush the head of the serpent
and it will bite you in the heel”. He also points out that “the same motif comes again later”,
referring to “Of the Vision and the Riddle”, indeed.58
Focusing back on the encounter with Elijah and Salome, something more must be added. If a
link is to be found between Jung's and Nietzsche's stress on the poisoning aspect of serpents', the
importance of its acceptance deserves to be equally remarked, as the precondition for personal
development. Also in this case, the analogy with Nietzsche and Zarathustra appears to be helpful.
Exactly as Zarathustra shepherd was surrounded by light and laughed as “no human” had ever done
before, after that Jung has realised and accepted the double nature of serpents – that is after the
reconciliation of forethinking and feeling (as Jung retrospectively comments) –, “Elijah transforms
into a huge flame of white light”.59 Quite surprisingly, the Corrected Draft version reads: “the
forethinking in me had the form of an old prophet, which showed that it was pre-Christian, and
transformed itself into a principle that no longer appeared in a human form, but in the absolute
form of a pure white light”.60 If the lion was interpreted by Jung as a resistance against human
instincts, the serpent represents its counterpart, that is the instincts indeed, and if it is necessary to
face the roaring lion of moral, it is also essential to “swallow down” the serpent, without biting off
its head: “In the mystery man himself becomes the two principles, the lion and the serpent”.61 Only
if this two aspects are combined, the instincts can actually be integrated within oneself and lead to a
more complete awareness of one's own (human) nature.
2.2.3 SUN, SUNSET AND EASTERN WISDOM
In “Descent into Hell in the Future”, Jung's “I” decides to give up what was defined as a “heavy
knowledge”, and to “be stunned” again. He makes his decision by pronouncing these words: “I
want to go down cleansed into your depths [Ich möchte als Reiner in deine Tiefe steigen] with white
garments and not rush in like some thief, seizing whatever I can and fleeing breathlessly”.62 In quite
58 SNZ I, pp. 755-756. See below, 3.3.1.
59 RB I, 11, “Resolution”, p. 252.
60 Ibid., p. 255, footnote 240 (italics ours).
61 Ibid., p. 254. See also CW 5, § 425: “In the Mithraic mysteries the snake is often shown as the antagonist of the lion,
in accordance with the myth of the sun's fight with the dragon”. Again with the same meaning, it is important to
remember that Atmavictu as well is said to be a serpent (See RB II, 17, “Nox Quarta”, p. 303, footnote 222).
62 RB I, 5, p. 238.
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a similar way, Zarathustra expresses the necessity of his sunset [Untergang]: “To that end I must
descend into the depths [Dazu muss ich in die Tiefe steigen]: as you do at Evening, when you go
behind the sea and bring light to the underworld, you overaboundant star! Like you [the sun] I must
go down [untergehen]”.63 Referring to his soul, just compared to the sun, Jung's “I” wonders: “How
shall I ever walk under your sun if I do not drink the bitter draught of slumber to the lees? [wenn ich
nicht den bitteren Schlummertrank trinke, und bis zur Neige leere]”.64 And so Zarathustra to the sun:
“Bless the cup that wants to overflow, that the waters may flow golden from him and bear the
reflection of the joy over all the world! Behold! This cup wants to be empty again, and Zarathustra
wants to be man again” [Segne den Becher, welcher überfliessen will, dass das Wasser golden aus
ihm fliesse und überallhin den Abglanz deiner Wonne trage! Siehe! Dieser Becher will wieder leer
werden, und Zarathustra will wieder Mensch werden].65
The sun, often together with images such as the ripening or the vessel, is one of the most
recurrent symbols in both works. From a broader point of view, the sun is a predominant symbol in
mythological literature, especially in ancient Greece and Egypt, where the link between its path and
seasons, also in terms of zodiac, was majorly stressed.66 It is thus arguable that Nietzsche and Jung
might have obtained their images from similar sources. The first encounter with the “anchorite”
Ammonius takes place in the desert, far from men and society, where the old man has been living
for ten years, precisely like Zarathustra on his mountain top. Both Zarathustra and Ammonius, in
their characterisation, are strongly associated with the sun and its path. Ammonius tells Jung's “I”
indeed: “You found the tracks of my daily walks at daybreak and sunset.”67 As already pointed out,
Zarathustra identifies himself with the sun at the very beginning of the “Prologue”, and in several
other passages the same phenomenon comes about quite clearly. Furthermore, not only does he
want to donate himself to men like the sun at sunset, but he also wakes up at or just before
daybreak, and manifests his deepest sadness at night, i.e. in all those moments of sun absence.68 In a
63 Za I, “Prologue” 1, KSA 4.11 (translation modified). “To that end I must descend into the depth”, “light to the
underworld”, “go down” are underlined in Jung's personal copy.
64 RB I, 5, p. 238.
65 KSA 4.11. In Jung's personal copy the last sentence is underlined.
66 Cfr. F. Creuzer, Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker, cit., I, p. 297. The accent on the sun path in relation to
seasons is an important element in Zarathustra. In chapter “On the Mount of Olives” (Za III, 6, KSA 4, 218-21), for
instance, Winter is personified as an “ill guest”. Explicit references to the mythological tradition are easy to be found
in Liber Novus too, as well as in several texts of Jung's, where he explicitly refers to myths in order to show the
connection sun-zodiac. In particular, the mythological connotation of the sun is one of the most important and
recurrent elements in Symbols of Transformation.
67 RB II, 4, “The Anchorite”, p. 268.
68 As brought out by Benedetta Zavatta, Zarathustra not only comes from the East, like a rising sun, but also moves to
the West, where his Untergang is going to happen through his confrontation with Europeans, and through his
attempt to give them the gifts of his wisdom (B. Zavatta, La potenza dell'immagine. Metafora e simbolo in Così
parlò Zarathustra, AIEP, Republic of S. Marino 2001, p. 130). On these themes, see also A. Menduni, I simboli del
Superuomo, in Elémire Zolla (edited by), Il superuomo e i suoi simboli (vol. 1-5), Florence 1972-1977, p. 1: 105-
125, 2: 142-172, 3: 186-227, 4: 231-281, 5: 251-309. The sunset metaphor has also been analysed by V. Vivarelli in
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similar way, Jung's “anchorite” exclaims:
But I see that the sun has gone down. Soon it will be completely dark. Night is the time of
silence. I want to show you your place for the night. I need the morning for my work, but after
midday you can come to me again if you like. Then we will continue our conversation.69
The analogy with the sun does not concern only Zarathustra, but can be extended to all those
figures in Nietzsche's text presenting traditional wisdom features. Still in “Prologue”, immediately
after making the decision to go to men, Zarathustra comes across an old Christian hermit, an “old
man, who has left his holy hut to look for roots in the forest”. He abandoned his old life because he
“loved mankind all too much”. Now he is living in the “desert” [Einöde], where he can “make
songs and sing them”, in order to “praise God”. Differently from the protagonist, he does not in fact
love men anymore.70 In similar manner, Jung comments on his meeting with the anchorite by saying
that “the solitary lives in endless desert full of awesome beauty” and “loves the desert above all”:
“no cloudiness of the sky, no haze or mist is allowed to be around him, otherwise he cannot look at
the distant manifold in the whole”.71 Another significant Zarathustrian character with qualities that
recall Ammonius is the other “old man” in the woods, whom the protagonist asks for help while
carrying the ropedancer's corpse on his shoulders and moving away from the town. Zarathustra
realises to be hungry and this new host offers him “bread and wine”. He lives far from men as well,
and willingly provides food and drinks for “whoever knocks” at his door, including animals or, as in
this case, “corpses”.72 In a way that recalls the same hospitality, Ammonius gently tells Jung's “I”:
“Here is your place and your supper. Sleep well, and do not forget your morning prayer, when the
sun rises.”73
What happens the day after is narrated by Jung in the following chapter, “Dies II” (1 January
1914). The story begins with an allusion to the sun, that “reddens the East”, and continues with the
description of a dream:
It seems to me as if I had seen this white horse on the Eastern sky over the rising sun. The
comparison to Hölderlin's utilisation in his Empedocles (in particular regarding The Gay Science, 337); see. V.
Vivarelli, L'immagine rovesciata. Le letture di Nietzsche, Marietti, Genova 1992, p. 48. To have a speculative but
deep reflection on the connection between the symbol of the sun and its multilayered utilisation in Zarathustra, see
B. Pautrat, Versions du Soleil, Éditions du Seuil, Paris 1971.
69 RB II, 4, p. 269.
70 Za I, “Prologue” 2, KSA 4, 12-13. In Jung's Zarathustra this chapter presents several underlinings and marks.
71 RB II, 4, p. 269.
72 Za I, “Prologue” 8, KSA 4, 24-25. Jung drew several underlinings, marks and annotations in his copy; both in the
previous and in this chapter, the words “old man” are underlined.
73 RB II, 4, p. 269. In addition to that, such an attention to morning prayers and sunrise reminds again of Zarathustra
and his identification with the sun.
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horse spoke to me: What did it say? It said: 'Hail him who is in darkness since the day is over
him.' There were four white horses, each with golden wings. They led the carriage of the sun,
on which Helios stood with flaring mane. I stood down in the gorge, astonished and
frightened. A thousand black serpents crawled swiftly into their holes. Helios ascended,
rolling upward toward the wide paths of the sky: I knelt down, raised my hands suppliantly,
and called: 'Give us your light, you are flame-curled, entwined, crucified and revived; give us
your light, your light!' This cry woke me. Didn't Ammonius say yesterday evening: 'Do not
forget to say your morning prayer when the sun rises.' I thought that perhaps he secretly
worships the sun.74
Taking Ammonius' advice, Jung's “I” tries to pray the sun. Thereby, he suddenly realises his lack
of proper words, and truly experiences the desert; this means, Jung's “I” grasps the meaning of
being in the desert: in a state of solitude and aridity, the boundaries between oneself and objects fail
to be clearly defined. On the one hand, things and animals “appear animated”, but, on the other
hand, the desert, in its desolation, “seems absolutely to demand prayers”, and Jung's “I” is himself
tempted to pray a black scarab, as well as the earth. The desert makes one lose the sense of time,
too. In fact, after formulating all these considerations, Jung's “I” realises that it is already noontime,
and the sun is shining high in the sky.75 At the same time, and as a consequence, he also
comprehends Ammonius' nature, as well as his necessity of escaping men, which the anchorite can
figure out only in terms of devil temptations. This is all about Ammonius' personal story: he used to
be an Egyptian scholar, then converted to Christianity and involved in interpreting gospels from the
standpoint of their future meaning, that is to say, from what “is yet to come”. Because of his
isolation, he has been stuck for quite a long time though, and no new interpretation seems to come
to his mind. He would in fact need more of human contacts, but when Jung tries to make him aware
of it, Ammonius, seized by uncontrollable rage, takes him for the devil. In the desert, one could
argue, the anchorite is seeking absolute certainty, eternal truth and divine essence, and by so doing,
he is avoiding humanity and instincts. However, these cannot be avoided, and a certain form of
paganism, hidden behind such a devotion to the sun, reveals such impossibility.76
In his retrospective interpretation of the episode, Jung states:
How can I pray to the sun, that rises far in the East over the desert? Why should I pray to it? I
74 RB II, 5, “Dies II”, p. 270.
75 Ibid., p. 271.
76 Ibid., p. 272. Ammonius expresses his anger with these words, which betray his temptation to get involved in
paganism: “I love the desert, do you understand? This yellow, sun-glowing desert. Here you can see the countenance
of the sun every day; you are alone, you can see glorious Helios-no, that is – pagan-what's wrong with me? I'm
confused – you are Satan – I recognize you – give way; adversary!”.
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drink the sun within me, so why should I pray to it? But the desert, the desert in me demands
prayers, since the desert wants to satisfy itself with what is alive. I want to beg God for it, the
sun, or one of the other immortals. 
I beg because I am empty and am a beggar. In the day of this world, I forget that I drank the
sun and am drunk from its active light and singeing power. But I stepped into the shadows of
the earth, and saw that I am naked and have nothing to cover my poverty. No sooner do you
touch the earth than your inner life is over; it flees from you into things.77
The stylistic choice of phrases such as “drunk fire” [Feuer getrunken], “drunk from its active
light and singeing power” [trunken bin von wirkendem Lichte und sengender Kraft], “I drank the
sun within me” [Ich trank ja die Sonne in mich], or “suckle from the sun” [an der Sonne saugt],78
inevitably evokes a very frequent motif in Nietzsche's “The Night Song”, chapter also recalled
through the emptiness-fullness paradox. Nietzsche writes:
Light were I: ah, that I were night! But this is my solitude, that I am girded round with light.
I, that I were dark and obscure! How would I suck at the breast of light!
And I should bless you, little sparkling stars and glow-worms above! – and be happy in your
gifts of light.
But I live in my own light, I drink back into myself the flames that break from me.
I do not know the joy of the receiver; and I have often dreamed that stealing must be more
blessed than receiving.79
At the end of the Liber Novus chapter here considered, Jung seems to answer the desert question
raised at the beginning of his adventure with his fantasies. He describes and interprets what is
happening to Ammonius with these words:
The solitary fled the world; he closed his eyes, plugged his ears and buried himself in a cave
within himself but it was no use. The desert sucked him dry, the stones spoke his thoughts, the
cave echoed his feelings, and so he himself became desert, stone, and cave. And it was all
emptiness and desert, and helplessness and barrenness, since he did not shine and remained a
77 Ibid.
78 Similar expressions occur several time in the whole chapter. Among them, to be mentioned is the phrase: “He who
comprehends the darkness in himself, to him the light is near. He who climbs down into his darkness reaches the
staircase of the working light” (ibid.).
79 Za II, 9, KSA 4.136. In German: “Licht bin ich: ach, dass ich Nacht wäre! Aber diess ist meine Einsamkeit, dass ich
von Licht umgürtet bin. Ach, dass ich dunkel wäre und nächtig! Wie wollte ich an den Brüsten des Lichts saugen!
Und euch selber wollte ich noch segnen, ihr kleinen Funkelsterne und Leuchtwürmer droben! – und selig sein ob
eurer Licht-Geschenke. Aber ich lebe in meinem eignen Lichte, ich trinke die Flammen in mich zurück, die aus mir
brechen. Ich kenne das Glück des Nehmenden nicht; und oft träumte mir davon, dass Stehlen noch seliger sein
müsse, als Nehmen”.
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son of the earth who sucked a book dry and was sucked empty by the desert. He was desire
and not splendor, completely earth and not sun.
Consequently he was in the desert as a clever saint who very well knew that otherwise he was
no different from the other sons of the earth. If he would have drunk of himself he would have
drunk fire.80
Once again, Nietzsche's phrases “the desert is within you” and “the desert gulps and strangles”
can be compared with the image of the desert that “sucked [the anchorite] dry”. Moreover, when
evoking the cave, Zarathustra himself appears to be almost recalled, and the allusion to drinking fire
from oneself seems to disclose the same “Night Song” motif just mentioned. At the very end of the
chapter, Jung comments:
And therefore what happened to every desirous solitary also happened to him: the devil came
to him with smooth tongue and clear reasoning and knew the right word at the right moment.
He lured him to his desire. I had to appear to him as the devil, since I had accepted my
darkness. I ate the earth and I drank the sun, and I became a greening tree that stands alone
and grows.81
He seems here to distance himself not only from the anchorite, but also from any “solitary”
prisoner in their own desert. By admitting to have “accepted the darkness”, he moves away from
Zarathustra's impossibility of receiving outside himself, and, therefore, he also seems to distantiate
from Nietzsche. Jung's response to the desert issue lies in his acceptance of both “earth” and “sun”,
that is human and divine, devil and anchorite. Returning to the literal question, “Is it solitude to be
with one self?”, one could now argue that Jung interpreted his experience in retrospect, as if his self
was no longer a desert, and therefore there was no longer solitude in remaining alone.
The last point emerging from the encounter with Ammonius is the reference to the East,
regarded as both the source of daylight and a symbol for a different kind of wisdom. Such
alternative wisdom represents the counterpart to Western tradition: coming from the East, the sun
brings light to the West. Even if maybe trivial, it is not to forget that the historical figure of
Zarathustra comes from the East too, and is the well known founder of a religion based on a
distinction between good and evil, represented by light and darkness, which implies a consequent
sun worship. The relationship between East and West is further brought out in Liber Novus during
the Izdubar episode. As already seen, this figure comes from the East and ignores Western culture.
80 Ibid., p. 273.
81 Ibid.
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Jung's “I” claims to have “set out to the East, to the land of the rising sun, to seek the light that we
lack”. Western light is in fact unsatisfying, it is helpful to “measure how fruitful this light is. But if
you come from such a dark land, then beware of such an overpowering light. You could go blind
just as we all are somewhat blind”. Jung explains, reflecting on this fantasy:
I wandered toward the South and found the unbearable heat of solitude with myself. I
wandered toward the North and found the cold death from which all the world dies. I
withdrew to my Western land, where the men are rich in knowing and doing, and I began to
suffer from the sun's empty darkness. And I threw everything from me and wandered toward
the East, where the light rises daily. I went to the East like a child. I did not ask, I simply
waited.82
The East appears as a symbol for the possibility of a new – and yet unknown – condition, in
which the old “poisoning” Western knowledge can be finally overcome, as well as the aridity of
solitude with oneself, and the deadly coldness of war.83 All the “saint” figures just seen share a state
of solitude and isolation from mankind, as well as a certain feeling of discomfort towards the
solidity of Western knowledge and tradition. Lastly, drawing further similarities with Zarathustra
characters, as the saint in the forest does not know that God is dead, so Izdubar has been told that in
Western world “even the Gods die”84, but he cannot understand what this really means. Henceforth
Nietzsche's presence will be central until the end of Liber Novus experience, in both visions and
style. In chapter “Death” – which separates the two encounters with Ammonius  – the already seen
references to the Zarathustrian idea of a “brotherhood” between vices and virtues appears again.85 In
the next chapter, “On the Remains of Earlier Temples”, as already argued, several and meaningful
allusions to Zarathustra will take place. Ultimately, it might be of interest to bring out that even the
last step towards wisdom and a new birth, required by the Dead in Septem Sermones, is pronounced
by someone coming from the East. In particular, these following words deserved to be stressed:
“You will go to men as one veiled. Your light shines at night. Your solar nature departs from you
and your stellar nature begins”.86 The allusion to a “solar nature”, as well as to a “will to go to
82 RB II, 8, “First Day”, p. 279.
83 In chapter “Death”, which has not been analysed here, Jung experiences unindifferentiation and values overturn. He
will later understand these in regard to the approaching of the First World War and the North-European situation in
general. It is also interesting to notice, to this end, that after accepting “death” as a condition of life, the “red sun”
rises again (RB II, 6, p. 273-275).
84 RB II, 8, p. 279.
85 RB II, 6, “Death”, p. 274: “You are completely alone in this struggle, since your Gods have become deaf. You do
not know which devils are greater, your vices, or your virtues. But of one thing you are certain, that virtues and
vices are brothers”.
86 RB Scrutinies, 13, p. 355. The sentence is preceded by this dialogue: “And as ΦIΛHMΩN spoke these words, a dark
form with golden eyes approached me from the shadows of the night. I was startled and cried, 'Are you an enemy?
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men”, might be read again in relation to Zarathustra.
2.3 NIETZSCHE'S EXPLICIT PRESENCE: OVERCOMING RATIONALISM
2.3.1 FOLLY AS THE OTHER SIDE OF LIFE
In the first dialogue with Ammonius, the idea of God as a god “of words” and logos, attributed
to the Greek-speaking Jewish philosopher Philo of Alexandria, is discussed.87 The anchorite has
“unlearned” it and now he is living in the desert in order to achieve a different view. At the time he
was still “rhetorician and philosopher” in Alexandria and taught his students, he “even believed” in
the “reality” of words, as well as “that we possessed the divine and had committed it to words”.
Influenced both by Jewish and Greek philosophy, he used to confer words “divine potency”. As
already said, at the time of his encounter with Jung, he is trying to give gospels a symbolic reading
indeed, connected to the future and the meaning of “what is to come”. Through Ammonius, Jung
seems to experience for the first time the necessity to go beyond rationality in order to give religion
a new comprehension, that is to say to “comprehend the darkness”. Logos represents indeed reason,
but what Jung realises here is the necessity of divinising man. This is brought out quite clearly by
Ammonius, in his re-interpretation of John's gospel, against Philo of Alexandria's predominant
reading:
A: 'I ask you, was this ΛΟΓΟΣ [Logos] a concept, a word? It was a light, indeed a man, and
lived among men. You see, Philo only lent John the word so that John would have at his
disposal the word 'ΛΟΓΟΣ' alongside the word 'light' to describe the son of man. John gave to
Who are you? Where do you come from? I have never seen you before! Speak, what do you want?' The dark one
answered, saying, 'I come from afar. I come from the east and follow the shining fire that precedes me, ΦIΛHMΩN.
I am not your enemy, I am a stranger to you. My skin is dark and my eyes shine golden.' 'What do you bring?' I
asked fearfully. 'I bring abstinence-abstinence from human joy and suffering. Compassion leads to alienation. Pity,
but no compassion-pity for the world and a will held in check toward the other. Pity remains misunderstood,
therefore it works. Far from longing, know no fear. Far from love, love the whole. 'I looked at him fearfully and
said, 'Why are you as dark as the earth of the fields and as black as iron? I'm afraid of you; such pain, what have you
done to me?' 'You may call me death-death that rose with the sun. I come with quiet pain and long peace. I lay the
cover of protection on you. In the midst of life begins death. I lay cover upon cover upon you so that your warmth
will never cease.' 'You bring grief and despair, I answered, 'I wanted to be among men'” (ibid., p. 354-355).
87 Philo of Alexandria (also called Philo Judaeus) brought Jewish elements into Greek philosophy. In particular, Jung
referred to him in a letter to James Kirsch: “The gnosis from which John the Evangelist emanated, is definitely
Jewish, but its essence is Hellenistic, in the style of Philo Judaeus, the founder of the teachings of the Logos” (Jung
Archives). Regarding the character of Ammonius, Jung wrote that he came from the third century (letter of 31
December 1913; Jung Family Archives). As pointed out by Sonu Shamdasani, “there are three historical figures
named Ammonius in Alexandria from this period: Ammonius, a Christian philosopher in the third century, once
thought to have been responsible for the medieval divisions of the gospels; Ammonius Cetus, who was born a
Christian but turned to Greek philosophy and whose work presents a transition from Platonism to Neoplatonism; a
Neoplatonic Ammonius in the fifth century, who tried to reconcile Aristotle and the Bible. At Alexandria, there was
accommodation between Neoplatonism and Christianity, and some of the pupils of the latter Ammonius converted to
Christianity”  (RB II, 4, footnote 45, p. 267).
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living men the meaning of the ΛΟΓΟΣ, but Philo gave ΛΟΓΟΣ as the dead concept that
usurped life, even the divine life. Through this the dead does not gain life, and the living is
killed. And this was also my atrocious error.'
I: 'I see what you mean. This thought is new to me and seems worth consideration. Until now
it always seemed to me / as if it were exactly that which was meaningful in John, namely that
the son of man is the ΛΟΓΟΣ, in that he thus elevates the lower to the higher spirit, to the
world of the ΛΟΓΟΣ. But you lead me to see the matter conversely; namely that John brings
the meaning of the ΛΟΓΟΣ down to man.'
A: 'I learned to see that John has in fact even done the great service of having brought the
meaning of the ΛΟΓΟΣ up to man.'
I: 'You have peculiar insights that stretch my curiosity to the utmost. How is that? Do you
think that the human stands higher than the ΛΟΓΟΣ?'
A: 'I want to answer this question within the scope of your understanding: if the human God
had not become important above everything, he would not have appeared as the son in the
flesh, but in the ΛΟΓΟΣ [...]'.”88
To “comprehend the darkness” means to accept human being as a totality, that is to say to
recognise one's 'evil' side as a normal and necessary part of one's nature. After the rebirth of the god
– that Jung retrospectively identifies with Izdubar – this process of acceptance begins to happen,
according to Jung's later understanding of his fantasies. In this new state, Jung's “I” undergoes a few
peculiar experiences: first he goes to Hell,89 then he is forced to commit a dreadful sacrifice by
eating the liver of a dead young girl.90 The next step towards a full confrontation with what could be
defined as the 'shadow' of the traditional idea of divinity, is represented by the encounter with folly.
Again, Nietzsche plays a crucial role in this context. This time he is not hidden behind implicit
allusions; on the contrary, not only is he now explicitly mentioned, but he even appears as a proper
character. In chapter “Divine Folly”, Jung describes a vision in which he enters a library and asks
for Thomas à Kempis's The Imitation of Christ (Imitatio Christi), which sounds to the librarian like
an unusual request, Jung's “I” being neither theologist nor religious. He justifies his choice: “there
are actually moments in life where science also leaves us empty and sick. In such moments a book
like Thomas's means very much to me since it is written from the soul”. There seems to be a point
88 RB II, 4, “The Anchorite”, p. 268-270. According to Ammonius, “a succession of words does not have only one
meaning. But men strive to assign only a single meaning to the sequence of words, in order to have an unambiguous
language. This striving is worldly and constricted, and belongs to the deepest layers of the divine creative plan. On
the higher levels of insight into divine thoughts, you recognize that the sequence of words has more than one valid
meaning. Only to the all-knowing is it given to know all the meanings of the sequence of words. Increasingly we try
to grasp a few more meanings” (p. 268). It is also interesting to notice that Philo himself is defined by Ammonius as
“slave of his own words” (ibid.).
89 RB II, 12, “Hell”, p. 288-290.
90 RB II, 13, “The Sacrificial Murder”, p. 290-291.
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in one's life when religion is put aside, nevertheless a certain need seems to be kept. According to
the librarian, traditional religions do not appear able to satisfy this necessity though, because of
their “lack of a true and proper sense of actuality”. So he continues:
“'[...] Incidentally, a host of substitutes now exists for the loss of opportunity for prayer
caused by the collapse of religion. Nietzsche, for example, has written a more than veritable
book of prayer not to mention Faust.'
'I [Jung] suppose that's correct in a certain sense. But especially Nietzsche's truth strikes me as
too agitated and provocative –; it's good for those who are yet to be set free. For that reason
his truth is good only for them. I believe that I've recently discovered that we also need a truth
for those who are forced into a corner. It's possible that instead they need a depressive truth,
which makes man smaller and more inward.' 
'Forgive me, but Nietzsche interiorizes man exceptionally well.' 
'Perhaps from your standpoint you're right, but I can't help feeling that Nietzsche speaks to
those who need more freedom, not to those who clash strongly with life, who bleed from
wounds, and who hold fast to actualities.'
'But Nietzsche confers a precious feeling of superiority upon such people.' 
'I can't dispute that, but I know men who need inferiority; not superiority.'
'You express yourself very paradoxically. I don't understand you. Inferiority can hardly be a
desideratum.'
'Perhaps you'll understand me better if instead of inferiority I say resignation, a word that one
used to hear a lot of, but seldom anymore.' 
'It also sounds very Christian.' 
'As I said, there seem to be all sorts of things in Christianity that maybe one would do well to
keep. Nietzsche is too oppositional. Like everything healthy and long-lasting, truth
unfortunately adheres more to the middle way, which we unjustly abhor.'
'I really had no idea that you take such a mediating position.'
'Neither did I – my position is not entirely clear to me. If I mediate, I certainly mediate in a
very peculiar manner.'91
Here the reference to Nietzsche must be contextualised in a wider perspective concerning the
deeper confrontation with “Christ” as a model. He still appears as “our natural model”, even when
we fight against him or try to deny his power. If one imitates, instead of truly living, then it is no
longer possible for the divine to live within oneself. Imitating “Christ” dos not mean emulating, but
rather comprehending his life and following his example, becoming – in this sense – “Christ”
oneself. He was independent, and to learn from him means to gain a similar independence. But
91 RB II, 14, “Divine Folly”, p. 293.
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sometimes one confuses Christianity with emulation, and, therefore, does not “succeed in uniting
Christ with prophets of this time. The one demands bearing, the other discarding; the one
commands submission, the other the will”. Schopenhauer and Nietzsche are most likely to be those
prophets indeed, Jung is referring to.92 In order to comprehend his own life and reconcile these
voices with his Christian feeling, Jung realises his need of “acceptance of the other”, that is, “a
descent into the opposite, from seriousness into the laughable, from suffering into the cheerful, from
the beautiful into the ugly, from the pure into the impure”.93 After this reflection, Jung's vision
continues and shows him entering another room – which he soon discovers being a kitchen –,
starting reading and falling asleep after a while.
What happens now is quite an impressive dream, in which the protagonist finds himself in an
asylum, where two doctors are diagnosing his situation as a case of “religious paranoia”:
“nowadays, the imitation of Christ leads to the madhouse”. He is now ready to discover and accept
madness in himself. This is important not only at the level of a personal development, but also for
the possibility of an improvement in society. For this side of life seems to be forgotten or ignored
and no longer integrated; but in fact it still keeps a divine aspect, which not only cannot be
disregarded, but can be even considered as its strongest element:
The problem of madness is profound. Divine madness – a higher form of the irrationality of
the life streaming through us – at any rate a madness that cannot be integrated into present-
day society – but how? What if the form of society were integrated into madness? At this
point things grow dark, and there is no end in sight.94
To Jung this means accepting the other side of religion, i.e. what is refused and condemned by
modern Christianity, in opposition to its origins. By so doing – so Jung interprets his vision – all the
dead, namely all those who cannot find their place in a Christian living, could be finally redeemed.
The amount of dead has now become higher than that of living, i.e. of those who can be considered
saved by Christ and his teaching. It is very much significant that, in the Draft version, Jung
implicitly refers to Nietzsche as a “prophet” who on the one hand has tried to defend and revalue
the dead's rights, and on the other hand has been driven mad by being “their blind spokesman”.95
92 Ibid. See S. Shamdasani, footnote 165.
93 Ibid.
94 RB II, 15, “Nox Secunda”, p. 295.
95 So in the Draft version: “We were led by a prophet, whose proximity to God had driven him insane. He raged
blindly against Christianity in his sermon, but he was the champion of the dead who had appointed him their
spokesman and resounding trumpet. He shouted in a deafening voice so that many would hear him, and the power of
his language also burned those who resisted death. He preached the struggle against Christianity. This was good,
too” (ibid., footnote 183, p. 297) And: “like that raving prophet who did not know whose cause he was promoting,
but instead believed himself to be speaking on his own behalf and thought he was the will of destruction” (ibid.,
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But the dead are also part of Jung himself, therefore he realises that he needs to be “alone with the
dead”, in order to accept the lowest and “the chaos”, thus his own madness.96 Jung's vision
culminates with the encounter with a fool who believes to be Nietzsche, dated 18 January 1914.
Jung's “I” is still in the madhouse, and the patient who is sleeping in a bed near his own suddenly
stands up, stares at him and cries out:
'Something worse happened to me, it's five years now that I've been here. [...]
But I am Nietzsche, only rebaptized, I am also Christ, the Savior, and appointed to save the
world, but they won't let me.'
I: 'Who won't let you?'
The fool: 'The devil. We are in Hell. But of course, you haven't noticed it yet. I didn't realize
until the second year of my time here that the director is the devil.'
I: 'You mean the professor? That sounds incredible.'
The fool: 'You're an ignoramus. I was supposed to marry the mother of God long ago. But the
professor, that devil, has her in his power. Every evening when the sun goes down he gets her
with child. In the morning before sunrise she gives birth to it. Then all the devils come
together and kill the child in a gruesome manner. I distinctly hear his cries.'
1: 'But what you have told me is pure mythology.'
The fool: 'You're crazy and understand nothing of it. You belong in the madhouse. My God,
why does my family always shut me in with crazy people? I'm supposed to save the world,
I'm the Savior!'.97
It can be helpful to notice what Nietzsche has written at the beginning of Zarathustra, in the
fifth paragraph of “Prologue”, and Jung has marked in his own copy: “No herdsman and no one
herd. Everyone wants the same thing, everyone is the same: whoever thinks otherwise goes
voluntarily into the madhouse [Irrenhaus]”.98 Getting back to Liber Novus, After saying these
words, the fool returns to his usual apathetic state, leaving Jung's “I” alone and with a new vision.
Now he sees a red sun rising above the horizon line, with a cross from which an undefinable
animal-shaped figure (serpent, bull or an ass) is hanging. Looking at the symbol more carefully,
Jung's “I” wonders if that may not represent himself, as Christ crucified, who is actually hanging
down from the cross and wearing a crown of thorns: “The sun of martyrdom has arisen and is
pouring bloody rays over the sea”. The higher the sun rises, the hotter it “burns down white on a
footnote 185).
96 Ibid., p. 297-298.
97 RB II, 16, “Nox Tertia”, p. 298. It might be interesting to notice that before this dialogue, this character has told
Jung, who was complaining about his becoming mad: “Well now; [...], life is returning” (italics ours).
98 Za I, KSA 4, 20.
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blue sea” [blaues Meere], whose “salty smell” reminds Jung's “I” of a “charitable and quiet
summer”. Suddenly a wave “breaks on the sand with a dull thunder and returns incessantly [immer
erneut kehrt sie wieder], twelve times, the strokes of the world clock [die Glockenschlägen der
Weltuhr] – the twelfth hour is complete. And now silence enters. No noise, no breeze. Everything is
rigid [starr] and deathly still [totenstill]”.99
Nietzsche as a character has already gone, but in this scene at least a couple of elements can be
recalled, which are quite likely to be linked with Zarathustra. For example, “The Intoxicated Song”
reads this way: 
Zarathustra […] stood there like one intoxicated: his eyes grew dim, his tongue stammered,
his feet tottered. And who could divine what thoughts passed over Zarathustra's soul?
But it seemed that his soul fell back and fled before him, and was in remote distances and as if
'upon a high ridge', as it is written, 'wandering like a heavy cloud between past and future'
[Ersichtlich aber wich sein Geist zurück und floh voraus und war in weiten Fernen und
gleichsam 'auf hohem Joche', wie geschrieben steht, zwischen zwei Meeren, — zwischen
Vergangenem und Zukünftigem als schwere Wolke wandelnd] […].
And at once it grew still and mysterious all around; from the depths, however, there slowly
arose the sound of a bell [der Klang einer Glocke]. Zarathustra listened to it, as the Higher
Man did; then he laid a finger to his lips a second time and said again 'Come! Come! Midnight
is coming on!' and his voice had altered. But still he did not move from his place: then he
grew yet more still and mysterious, and everything listened, even the ass and Zarathustra's
animals of honour, the eagle and the serpent, likewise Zarathustra's cave and the great, cool
moon and the night itself. Zarathustra, however, laid his hands to his lips for the third time
and said:
Come! Come! Come! Let us walk now! The hour has come! Let us walk into the night!
[…]
You Higher Man, midnight is coming on: so I will say something in your ear, as secretly, as
fearfully, as warmly as that midnight-bell [Mitternachts-Glocke] tells it to me, which has
experienced more than man: which has already counted your fathers' painful heartbeats – ah!
ah! how it sights! How in dreams it laughs! the ancient deep, deep midnight!100
 
The midnight-bell motif continues till the end of the chapter, but whereas the symbol of the sun
seems to guide Jung's vision, here it is the moon, together with the depth which it represents, the
most significant image. Nevertheless it is actually said that “Midnight is also noonday”, and almost
at the end:
99 RB II, 16., p. 299.
100Za IV, 19, “The Intoxicated Song”, KSA 4, 397-98.
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All joy wants eternity of all things, wants honey, wants dregs, wants intoxicated midnight,
wants graves, wants the consolation of graveside tears, wants gilded sunsets,
what does joy not want! It is thirstier, warmer, hungrier, more fearful, more secret than all
woe, it wants itself; it bites into itself, the will of the ring wrestles within it,
it wants love, it wants hatred, it is superabundant, it gives, throws away, begs for someone to
take it, thanks him who takes, it would like to be hated.101
 Jung puts this passage in brackets and annotates at the end of the page: “he discovered joy in
himself through the union with his underworld” [er hat die Lust in sich entdeckt durch die
Vereinigung mit seiner Unterwelt].
Another Zarathustra chapter to be recalled in relation to this vision is “At Noontide”, where the
same motif of death rigidity occurs. Zarathustra is going through a vine and finds himself attracted
by the “golden grapes”, therefore he stops. But even stronger than this attraction, it seems to be his
“desire […] to lie down beside the tree at the hour of perfect noon and sleep”. While falling asleep,
he says to himself:
Soft! Soft! Has the world not become perfect? What has happened to me?
As a delicate breeze, unseen, dances upon the smooth sea [getäfeltem Meere], light, light as a
feather: thus – does sleep dance upon me.
My eyes it does not close, my soul it leaves awake. It is light, truly as light as a feather.102
Then he compares his soul to a “ship” which “leans against the earth, weary of long voyages
and uncertain seas”. In such state of blissfulness he wonders, just before waking up: “has the world
not become perfect?”.103 In the entire chapter the same motif of eternity and perfection returns
overwhelmingly, as well as a certain correspondence between noontide and midnight. Furthermore,
somewhere else among Nietzsche's texts, it is possible to find not only the same theme of noontide
but also the bell strokes. In fact, at the end of aphorism 638 of Human, all too Human, the last of
the book, Nietzsche compares the purity of new, future, philosophers, to “the day between the tenth
and the twelfth bell-stroke” [der Tag zwischen dem zehnten und zwölften Glockenschlage].104 And
in aphorism 308 of Human, all too Human, II, actually entitled “At Noontide” [Am Mittag],
101Ibid., KSA 4, 402-4, 403.
102Za IV, 10, “At Noontide”, KSA 4, 342-343. In Jung's copy this chapter presents some underlinings and several
markings, one of which is along the passage referring to the ship and the sea indeed.
103KSA 4.344.
104MA I, 638, KSA 2.363 (translation modified). The entire passage in German is: “Geboren aus den Geheimnissen der
Frühe, sinnen sie darüber nach, wie der Tag zwischen dem zehnten und zwölften Glockenschlage ein so reines,
durchleuchtetes, verklärt-heiteres Gesicht haben könne: — sie suchen die Philosophie des Vormittages”.
89
Nietzsche seems to anticipate several of the motifs which will characterise Zarathustra chapter of
the same name. Among these, while referring to a “sleeping Pan”, he speaks of a “death with
waking eyes” [Tod mit wachen Augen]: in the state of eternity and perfection, the god is one and the
same with nature and does not seem to want anything more.105
Other Nietzschean themes can be found again in the same Liber Novus chapter, through phrases
such as “to accept the lowest in you”, as well as a reference to chaos, all belonging to Jung's
retrospective interpretation of what happened to him. In particular, the following sentence deserves
to be remarked: “But the lowest in you is also the eye of the evil that stares at you and looks at you
coldly and sucks your light down into the dark abyss” [Das Geringste in dir ist aber auch das Augen
des Bösen, das dich starr und kalt anblickt und dein Licht in den finstren Abgrund hinuntersaugt].106
Not only does it here reappear the main theme of “The Night Song”, but a similar expression also
occurs again at the end of “At Noontides”, where Nietzsche makes Zarathustra pronounce these
words:
Oh sky above me […] are you watching me? Are you listening to my strange soul?
When will you drink this drop of dew that has fallen upon on earthy things – when will you
drink this strange soul
– when, well of eternity! Serene and terribly noontide abyss [Mittags-Abgrund]! When will
you drink my soul back into yourself? [wann trinkst du meine Seele in dich zurück?].107
In this chapter, Zarathustra is also said to be “as from a strange intoxication” [wie aus einer
fremden Trunkenheit], thus it can be linked to the other chapter mentioned above, as well as to the
Dionysos motif in general. The reference to “the lowest” seems to be again addressed to Nietzsche,
and can be regarded as a proper response to his philosophy. In particular, this passage can be linked
with Jung's annotation on “The Intoxicated Song” cited above. What is written before the quoted
passage in Liber Novus is:
The lowest in you is the source of mercy: We take this sickness upon ourselves, the inability
to find peace, the baseness, and the contemptibility so that the God can be healed and
radiantly ascend, purged of the decomposition of death and the mud of the underworld
[Unterwelt]. The despicable prisoner will ascend to his salvation shining and wholly healed.108
105MA II, 308, KSA 2, 690.
106RB II, 16, p. 300.
107Za IV, 10, KSA 4, 345.
108RB II, 16, p. 300.
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As already written, Jung reads Nietzsche's chapter in relation to his unification with his
“underworld”. The entire episode ends at the beginning of next chapter, “Nox Quarta”, when Jung's
“I” wakes up and decides to return the book to the librarian. During the awakening, a few further
references to Zarathustra can be mentioned. First of all Jung's “I” hears “the roaring [Brausen] of
the morning wind”. Then his soul cries out: 
The door should be lifted off its hinges to provide a free passage between here and there
[zwischen hier und dort], between yes and no [zwischen Ja und Nein], between above and
below [zwischen oben und unten], between left and right [zwischen rechts und links]. Airy
passages should be built between all opposed things, light smooth streets should lead from
one pole to the other. Scales should be set up, whose pointer sways gently. A flame should
burn that cannot be blown out by the wind. A stream should flow to its deepest goal. The
herds of wild animals should move to their feeding grounds along their old game paths. Life
should proceed, from birth to death, from death to birth, unbroken like the path of the sun.
Everything should proceed on this path.109
Even though the contexts can no way be compared, these lines seem to evoke the very well-
known aphorism 125 of The Gay Science, “The Madman”, precisely when the protagonist, while
announcing the death of God, says: “How were we able to drink up the sea? Who gave us the
sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? [...] Are we not continually falling? And backwards,
sidewards, forwards, in all directions? Is there still an up and a down left? [Und rückwärts,
seitwärts, vorwärts, nach allen Seiten? Giebt es noch ein Oben und ein Unten?]”.110 However, the
entire description, supported by what comes immediately after, presents other elements which can
be read in relation to Nietzsche and, in particular, to Zarathustra. Jung's vision continues:
Blind darkness besieges me – a great wall – a gray worm of twilight [Dämmerungswurm]
crawls [kriecht] along it. It has a round face and laughs. The laughter is convulsive and
actually relieving. I open my eyes: the fat cook is standing before me: 'You're a sound sleeper,
I must say. You've slept for more than an hour'.111
The passage can be associated with Zarathustra chapter “The Prophet”, in which the
protagonist, likewise Jung, has fallen asleep and had a nightmare, after having listened to a
pessimistic prophet who spoke to his disciples of an approaching “long twilight” [lange
109RB II, 17, “Nox Quarta”, p. 302.
110FW 125, KSA 3, 480.
111RB II, 17, p. 302.
91
Dämmerung]. As Zarathustra has just waken up, he tells his animals about his dream and ask them
for help to resolve its meaning:
I dreamed I had renounced all life. I had become a night-watchman and grave-watchman
yonder upon the lonely hill-fortress of death.
Up there I guarded death's coffins: the musty vaults stood full of these symbols of death's
victory. Life overcome regarded me from glass coffins. […]
Brightness of midnight was all around me, solitude crouched beside it; and, as a third, the
rasping silence of death [Todenstille], the worst of my companions.
I carried keys, the rustiest of all keys; and I could open with them the most creacking of all
doors.
When the wings of this corridor were open, the sound rang through the long corridors like an
evil croaking [bitterbösen Gekrächze]; this bird cried out ill-temperedly, it did not want to be
awakened. […]
Tree blows were struck on the door like thunderbolts, the vault resounded and roared
[heulten] three times again, then I went to the door.
Alpa! I cried, who is bearing his ashes to the mountain? […]
And I turned the key and tugged at the door and exerted myself. But it did not open by so
much as a finger's breadth:
Then a raging wind [ein brausender Wind] tore the door asunder: whistling, shrilling and
piercing it threw to me a black coffin:
and in the roaring [Brausen], the whistling and shrilling, the coffin burst asunder and vomited
forth a thousand peals of laughter.
And from a thousand masks of children, angels, owls, fools, and child-size butterflies it
laughed [lachte] and sneered [höhnte] and roared [brauste] at me.112
 The reference to the “silence of death” allows to link this section to the previous ones.
Ultimately, Jung's stylistic choice in his comment on the vision should not be overlooked: the
phrase “Thus speaks my soul” [Also spricht meine Seele] seems somehow to remind of Nietzsche's
title.
2.3.2 MOCKING, TEACHING AND IMITATING
Not only does Jung refer to Nietzsche in order to promote the need for accepting inferiority in
112Za II, 19, “The Prophet”, KSA 4.173-74, translation ours. Similar symbology can also be found in chapter “The
Funeral Song” (Za II, 11, KSA 4.142-45). Both chapters present several markings and underlinings in Jung's copy,
and alongside the part of text just quoted, Jung has traced a vertical sign and written “Buffon” [Possenreisser]. Thist
seems to indicate a link between this chapter and Jung's need for reconciling with “the lowest” in himself. All
references to the wind will be later read by Jung as expression of the Wotan archetype. See M. Liebscher, “'Wotan'
und 'Puer Aeternus'. Die Zeithistorische Verstrickung von C. G. Jungs Zarathustrainterpretation”, cit.
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oneself, but, by highlighting the similarity between the beginning of “Nox Quarta” and “The
Prophet”, another significant theme of Zarathustra is also introduced, i.e. mockery. As partially
seen, it had been anticipated in chapters “Divine Folly” and “Nox Secunda”; now this topic seems
to gain strength, becoming one of the key themes of the entire book. Again, while arguing for the
necessity of mockery and self-mockery, Jung's text presents Zarathustrian echoes. So, in his
reflection on “Nox Quarta”, Jung states:
If others mock [verspotten] me, it is nevertheless them doing this, and I can attribute guilt to
them for this, and forget to mock myself. But he who cannot mock himself will be mocked by
others. So accept your self-mockery [Selbstverspottung] so that everything divine and heroic
falls from you and you become completely human. What is divine and heroic in you is a
mockery [Spott] to the other in you. For the sake of the other in you, set off your admired role
which you previously performed for your own self and become who you are [werde der, der
du bist]”.113
The last sentence definitely recalls Nietzsche's Ecce Homo motto. The same phrase “Ecce
Homo” derives from the Bible and refers to mockery. In fact, these are the words pronounced by
Pilate during Jesus' trial. In that circumstance, Jesus wears a crown of thorns and a purple robe –
mock-version of royal cloths –, in order to be spotted by the crowd (Jn 19:5).114 Moreover, the
passage can also be read in relation to “The Stillest Hour”, where Zarathustra complains to his soul
through these words:
'They mocked [verspotteten] me when I found and walked my own way; and in truth my feet
trembled then.
'And they spoke thus to me: You have forgotten the way, now you will also forget how to
walk!'
Then again something said to me voicelessly: 'Of what consequence is their mockery
[Spott(e)]? You are one who has unlearned how to obey: now you shall command! […]'.115
Reading Jung's marks and annotations in his copy, one can argue that, in a later period, he
interpreted the chapter as a dialogue between Nietzsche and his Anima (only two paragraphs before
113RB II, 17, “Nox Quarta”, p. 303.
114The mockery episode is also narrated in Mt 27:29. On Nietzsche's “genealogical” approach to Christianity, see J.
Salaquarda, “Nietzsche and the Judaeo-Christian tradition”, in: B. Magnus and K. Higgins (eds.), The Cambridge
Companion to Nietzsche, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge / New York 1996, pp. 90-118. The phrase
“become who you are” has very likely been borrowed by Nietzsche from Pindar's second Pythian Ode (see J.
Hamilton, Ecce Philologus: “Nietzsche and Pindar's second Pythian Ode”, in: P. Bishop (ed.), Nietzsche and the
Antiquity, cit., pp. 54-69; p. 57). Pindar was known to Jung as well.
115Za II, 22, “The Stillest Hour”, KSA 4, 188-89.
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the text cited, he wrote down “an seine Anima”). In this sense, it is not to exclude a link between
this text and Jung's vision; so this “Nox Quarta” part can be read as another response to Nietzsche.
Immediately below the cited section it is written, indeed:
He who has the luck and misfortune of a particular talent falls prey to believing that he is this
gift. Hence he is also often its fool [Narr]. A special gift is something outside of me. I am not
the same as it. The nature of the gift has nothing to do with the nature of the man who carries
it. It often even lives at the expense of the bearer's character. His character is marked by the
disadvantage of his gift, indeed even through its opposite. Consequently he is never at the
height of his gift but always beneath it. If he accepts his other he becomes capable of bearing
his gift without disadvantage. But if he only wants to live in his gift and consequently rejects
his other, he oversteps the mark, since the essence of his gift is extrahuman [außermenschlich]
and a natural phenomenon, which he in reality is not. All the world sees his error, and he
becomes the victim of its mockery [Spott(e)]. Then he says that others mock [verspotten] him,
while it is only the disregard of his other that makes him ridiculous.116
By evoking again the ropedancer episode, Jung refers here to Nietzsche and his destiny.
Zarathustra, indeed, is mocked by the gravediggers at the town gate, while carrying the ropedancer's
corpse,117 as it happened just a few minutes earlier, when he was mocked by the market crowd while
trying to teach them the Übermensch.118 The same reference to the ropedancer in relation to
Nietzsche's failure in “The Way of the Cross” has already been highlighted; what must be added is
the explicit accusation to Nietzsche's inadequacy to stand mockery: “He raged against the man of
mockery [Man des Spottes] [...]. Ultimately the lowest in him got to him, his incapacity; and this
crucified his spirit, so that, as he himself had predicted, his soul died before his body [seine Seele
eher starb als sein Körper]”.119 Furthermore, Nietzsche writes in “Of Redemption”:
Willing liberates: What does willing itself devise to free itself from its affliction and to mock
[spotte] at its dungeon?
Alas, every prisoner becomes a fool [Narr]! The imprisoned will, too, releases itself in a
foolish way [Närrisch]. […]
Truly, a great foolishness dwells in our will; and that this foolishness [Narrheit] acquired spirit
has become a curse to all human kind.120
116RB II, 17, p. 303
117Za I, Prologue, KSA 4, 24.
118 KSA 4. 20-21, see also Za II, 3, “On the Compassionate”, KSA 4, 113.
119RB II, 20, p. 310. This passage has been previously cited and discussed (see 2.2.1). Nietzsche is not openly
mentioned, though the allusions present in Jung's chapter are all too numerous and direct to deny the philosopher as
the actual aim of Jung's criticisms.
120Za II, 20, “Of Redemption”, KSA 4, 180.
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 The second sentence is accompanied by a vertical mark in Jung's copy. This can be reckoned
significant, if one thinks that this is the only part of the whole chapter presenting reading marks.
Other text sections from Zarathustra where mockery is stressed are often underlined or marked by
Jung in his personal copy, if not even annotated.121 The mockery theme in Liber Novus can be thus
arguably regarded as another dialogue between Jung and Nietzsche. In particular, this time it seems
to concern the philosopher's difficulty with self-mockery.
Before taking on this point, it is important to spend a few more words about Jung's idea of
'becoming who one is' emerging from Liber Novus; for this seems to be the key-element of the
whole issue. The first point to notice is that in order to find one's own way, one has to accept
mockery and self-mockery, that is to recognise and admit one's own inferiority.122 Only he who has
accepted the possibility of being ridiculed can “become who he is”. This leads directly to another
important matter, concerning the role and the task a teacher must posses. In fact, if one is said to
“become who he is” by stopping imitating and starting living within himself, a valid teacher must
teach his disciples how to take this step, that is to say, he must stop appearing to them as a model to
emulate. But – and this is the essential point –, because of that, the teacher first needs to gain such
independence himself. Both this points are going to be treated in the next lines, and further elements
concerning the topic, presumably inspired by Zarathustra, will be brought out accordingly. This all
will lead to dealing with the issue of Nietzsche's self-mockery according to Jung.
In order to investigate the matter, it is important to first notice that mockery has also another
meaning, which recurs in both works and with a similar sense. Mocking, in fact, means not to take
something seriously, which is important to the person who is being mocked. This may also reflect
difficulty, if not impossibility, to understand the other's deep motivations. So, if on the one hand
mockery and self-mockery are necessary in order to accept one's own inferiority, on the other hand
mockery can also mean to grasp only the external aspect of someone else's acting, ignoring their
121For instance: “'[…] To whom did I intend to go if not to you? Stay, sit down! But don't look at me! Honour thus –
my ugliness! 'They persecute me: now you are my last refuge. Not with their hatred [Hasse], not with their
henchmen [Häschern] – oh, I would mock [spotten] such persecution, I would be proud and glad of it! 'Has not all
success hitherto been with the well-persecuted? And he who persecutes well easily learns to follow – for he is
already – at the heels of others. But it is their pity,'it is their pity from which I flee and flee to you” (Za IV, 7, “The
Ugliest Man” KSA 4, 329). The whole chapter is underlined and annotated by Jung. In particular, the sentences “To
whom did I intend to go if not to you?”, “But don't look at me! Honour thus – my ugliness!” are underlined and
display a vertical mark alongside.
122Jung writes: “What would mockery be, if it were not true mockery? What would doubt be, if it were not true doubt?
What would opposition be, it if were not true opposition? He who wants to accept himself must also really accept
his other. But in the yes not every no is true, and in the no every yes is a lie. But since I can be in the yes today and
in the no tomorrow, yes and no are both true and untrue. Whereas yes and no cannot yield because they exist, our
concepts of truth and error can. […] One cannot be enough for us since the other is in us. And if we were content
with one, the other would suffer great need and afflict us with its hunger. But we misunderstand this hunger and still
believe that we are hungry for the one and strive for it even more adamantly” (RB II, 17, p. 303).
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reasons or meaning, and stopping at a very superficial level. In this sense, mockery leads directly to
the question of imitation. Mankind itself seems incapable not to imitate: “A new word is a new God
for old men. Man remains the same, even if you create a new model of God for him. He remains an
imitator”.123
As partially seen, one of the main topics of Liber Novus concerns imitation in relation to
Christianity which, as a model, does not permit his followers to find their own way but force them
to copy “Christ”. The truest way to imitate “Christ” would be to be like him, that is, being oneself,
seeking within oneself and not outside [Außer-uns]. According to apocryphal gospels which Jung
implicitly refers to, “Christ” himself had to go to Hell; who goes to Hell “becomes Hell himself”
though, so “Christ” became the “Antichrist” before being allowed to “go to Heaven”. Among its
many meanings and interpretative nuances, going to “Hell” also means accepting the 'natural' part in
human being; in this sense, it does not differ from Nietzsche's idea.124 Becoming one's own contrary
seems a necessary step towards the reaching of the “new God”, namely becoming “Hell” oneself is
the only way to be like “Christ” and become godlike oneself. This implies, as its first condition, to
be able to self-mock, that is to recognise and accept one's own inferiority. But remaining stuck in
the perspective of mockery means to look at oneself only from outside, and in relation to the others.
Furthermore, if applied to the relationship between oneself and the others, it signifies not trying to
identify with them, to understand them; rather, it means to simply imitate them:
It was folly [Narrheit] and monkey business [Affenspiel], an atrocious Hell's masquerade of
123RB II, 4, “The Anchorite”, p. 270. It can be added that the extreme form of self-mockery is represented by the
attitude of Cynics. Interestingly, Nietzsche takes a similar position in Beyond Good and Evil, § 26, by stating that
“Cynicism is the only form in which base souls approach honesty” [Cynismus ist die einzige Form, in welcher
gemeine Seelen an Das streifen, was Redlichkeit ist] (JGB I, 26, KSA 5, 44).
124The Anti-Christ is probably the main example of how significant this concept was to Nietzsche: “Contact between
imaginary entities ('Gods', 'spirits', 'souls'); an imaginary natural science (anthropocentric; total absence of any
concept of natural cause); an imaginary psychology (complete failure to understand oneself, interpretation of the
pleasant or unpleasant general sensation – for instance, the states of nervus sympathicus – using the sign language of
religious-moral idiosyncrasy, - 'repentance', 'the pangs of conscience', 'temptation', 'the presence of God'); an
imaginary teleology ('the kingdom of God', 'the Last Judgement', 'eternal life'). – This entirely fictitious world can be
distinguished from the world of dreams (to the detriment of the former) in that dream reflects reality while
Christianity falsifies, devalues, and negates reality. Once the concept of 'nature' had been invented as a counter to the
idea of 'God', 'natural' had to mean 'reprehensible', – that whole fictitious world is rooted in a hatred of the natural (–
of reality! –), it is the expression of a profound sense of unease concerning reality … But this explains everything.
Who are the only people motivated to lie their way out of reality? People who suffer from it. But to suffer from
reality means that you are a piece of reality that has gone wrong … the preponderance of feelings of displeasure
over feelings of pleasure is the cause of that fictitious morality and religion: but a preponderance like this provides
the formula for decadence …” (AC, § 15, KSA 6, 181-182). Furthermore, the separation between a “true” and an
“apparent” world is the core of Twilights of the Idols (we will discuss it in the next section; see below: 2.3.3).
Schopenhauer had already brought out the same issue in his essay “On Religion”, by affirming that “through
Christianity Europe acquired a tendency which had hitherto been foreign to her, by virtue of a knowledge of the
fundamental truth that life cannot be an end in itself, but that the true purpose of our existence lies beyond it” (A.
Schopenhauer, Parerga und Paralipomena, 1851, English translation: Parerga and Paralipomena. Short
philosophical essays by Arthur Schopenhauer, translated from the German by E. F. J. Payne, Caledonian Press,
Oxford 1974 (2 Vols.); Vol. II, §§ 174-181; quote from § 178).
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the holiest mysteries. How else could Christ have saved his Antichrist? Read the unknown
books of the ancients, and you will learn much from them. Notice that Christ did not remain
in Hell, but rose to the heights in the beyond.125 
What emerges from this side of the problem, is another key-element doubtless relevant to
comprehend and complete the process of imitating in relation to mockery, i.e. the monkey. This
figure is taken as an example in order to show the consequence of the risk indicated above:
Imitation [Nachahmung] was a way of life when men still needed the heroic prototype. The
monkey's manner [Des Affen Art und Weise] is a way of life for monkeys, and for man as
long as he is like a monkey [äffisch]. Human apishness [Äffische] has lasted a terribly long
time, but the time will come when a piece of that apishness will fall away from men. 
That will be a time of salvation and the dove, and the eternal fire, and redemption will
descend.126 
To abandon such a monkey standpoint seems quite a hard step to take, “since we cannot desist
from imitation”, and it is easy to end up with confusing oneself with what one just sees, namely to
identify with the experience one is living.127 Moreover, monkeys not only imitate and deprive
gestures of their meaning, but also ridicule, thus highlighting the lower and negative side of
mockery. References to the city, as well as of the scorn it may inspire, are well connected to the
monkey symbol in Zarathustra chapter “Of Passing By”:
He [Zarathustra] came unawares to the gate of the great city [die grosse Stadt]; here, however,
a frothing fool [schäumender Narr] with hands outstretched sprang at him and blocked his
path. But this was the fool the people called 'Zarathustra's ape': for he had learned from him
something of the composition and syntax of language and perhaps also liked to borrow from
his store of wisdom. The fool, however, spoke thus to Zarathustra:
'Oh Zarathustra, here is the great city: here you have nothing to seek and everything to loose.
'Why do you want to wade through this muck? Take pity on your feet! Rather spit upon the
gate and – turn back!
125RB I, 8, “The Conception of the God”, p. 243.
126Ibid., p. 245. In this same sense, other passages are to be read. For example: “You donned the mask of a God, and I
worshiped you. Now you wear the mask of a devil, a frightful one, the mask of the banal, of eternal mediocrity!
Only one favor! Give me a moment to step back and consider! Is the struggle with this mask worthwhile? Was the
mask of God worth worshiping? I cannot do it, the lust for battle burns in my limbs. No, I cannot leave the
battlefield defeated. I want to seize you, crush you, monkey, buffoon. Woe if the struggle is unequal, my hands grab
at air. But your blows are also air, and I perceive trickery (RB I, 6,“Splitting of the Spirit”,  p. 241)”.
127RB I, 10, “Instruction”, p. 251. The entire passage reads: “it stands too close to reason for me to set myself on a par
with my visions, and for me to take pleasure in seeing. I am in danger of believing that I myself am significant since
I see the significant. This will always drive us crazy; and we transform the vision into foolishness and monkey
business, since we cannot desist from imitation”.
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'Here is the hell for hermits' thoughts: here great thoughts are boiled alive and cooked
[gekocht] small.
'Here all great emotions decay: here only little, dry emotions may rattle!
'Do you not smell [riechst] already the slaughter-houses and cook-shops of the spirit?
'Do you not see the souls hanging like dirty, limp rags? Does this city not reek of the fumes of
slaughtered spirit? [Dampft nicht diese Stadt vom Dunst geschlachteten Geistes?] [...]
'Here all blood flows foul and tepid and frothy through all veins: spit upon the great city that
is the great rubbish pile where all the scum froths together!'128
Very similar phrases are used by Jung in “Second Day”, when he describes his “I”'s going
through a town accompanied by Izdubar:
Iz: 'What a wondrous country! But look, isn't that a town [Stadt]? Don't you want to go there?'
1: 'No, God forbid. I don't want a crowd to gather, since the enlightened live there. Can't you
smell them  [Riechst du sie nicht]? They're actually dangerous, since they cook [Kochen] the
strongest poisons from which even I must protect myself. The people there are totally
paralyzed, wrapped in a brown poisonous vapor [Giftdampf] and can only move with artificial
means [...]'.129 
In comparison with the Zarathustra scene, here the situation is reversed: Jung's “I”, rather than
his accompanier, seems in fact to exhibit disgust toward modern civilisation. In a certain way, he
sounds like 'Izdubar's ape'. This does not contrast with the similarity between the two episodes:
exactly as Zarathustra's ape, Jung's “I” is here the product of Western civilisation, struggling to
accept it. Izdubar and Zarathustra represent the opposite attitude; both coming from the East and not
belonging to the European world. This section deals with the question of Zarathustra's skills as a
teacher and his possibility to succeed in teaching his “doctrine”, indeed: his disciples do not seem
yet able to comprehend such a profound wisdom, preferring to just imitate their teacher at a very
superficial level.
If, according to Jung, a good teacher has to show his disciples how to become who they are,
128Za III, 7, KSA 4, 222-224. The first part of the chapter presents severals marks and some underlinings in Jung's
copy, amongst which “a frothing fool” [ein schäumender Narr] and “Zarathustra's ape” [den Affen Zarathustra's].
The same scorn theme toward the city is also present in “Conversation with the kings”, and Jung's version shows a
vertical mark alongside that part of the text. See also Za III, 6,“On the Mount of Olives”, KSA 4, 221: “Let me pity
me and sigh with me over my chilblains: 'He will yet freeze to death on the ice of knowledge!' – so they wail. In the
meanwhile, I run with warm feet hither and thither upon my mount of olives: in the sunny corner of my mount of
olives, do I sing and mock all pity. Thus sang Zarathustra”. Jung underlined “He will yet freeze to death on the ice of
knowledge!” [am Eis der Erkenntniss erfriert er uns noch], “sing” [singe] and “I […] all pity” [ich alles Mitleids].
Alongside the text, referred to “He will yet freeze to death on the ice of knowledge!”, he wrote: “though against
himself!” [trotz gegen sich selber!].
129RB II, 9, “Second Day”, pp. 282-283.
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then the path of teaching can be schematised as presenting following steps: to learn self-mockery;
not to stop at the state of mockery, in order not to imitate, but proceed further and reach a new state
of independence. In such new state, however, the tension given by self-mockery has to be kept, in
order to preserve otherness. Again, whenever teaching appears in Liber Novus, several similarities
with Zarathustra and in particular with chapter “On the Bestowing Virtue” – where this topic is
mainly thematised – can be brought out. In “The Gift of Magic” (23 January 1914), Jung is given a
black rod [Stab], “formed like a serpent”.130 Zarathustra is also given a staff [Stab], “upon the
golden haft of which a serpent was coiled about a sun”.131 Furthermore, the main figure responsible
for teaching is Philemon, who appears in chapter “The Magician” (27 January 1914) and in
“Scrutinies”, and shares important features with Zarathustra.
Some very general characteristics belonging to both Zarathustra and Philemon which cannot be
disregarded are: their solitude; their “slowness of life”; their not being understood by men; the
possession of a nonconventional wisdom, far from traditional values and ideas. Furthermore, more
specific allusions to Nietzsche can be found in the same sections just cited. First of all the Philemon
is compared to a “serpent that coils around itself” and lies in the sun; his wisdom is indeed
“serpentlike”. Then he is said to be “hospitable”: “you took the dirty wanderers unsuspectingly into
your hut. Your house then became a golden temple, and did I really leave your table unsatisfied?
What did you give me? Did you invite me for a meal?”. As already written, Zarathustra's cave
becomes the place where all the “Higher Men” of the fourth book – generally symbolised through
the figure of the wanderer in Nietzsche's works – are invited and offered a meal. Quoting the same
Bible-Zarathustra scene, Philemon will prepare a “Last Supper” a bit later. Philemon is then said to
be “no light that shines in the darkness, no savior who establishes an eternal truth and thus
extinguishes the nocturnal light of human understanding”. It is undeniable that the reference here is
to the Bible and John's Gospel (I:5), but the image of the contrast light-darkness is also recurrent in
Zarathustra.132
Finally, some peculiarities attributed to a new conception of virtue in “Scrutinies” can be linked
to the similar idea introduced by Nietzsche in the same Zarathustra chapter mentioned above. Here,
Jung speaks to himself with these words:
130RB II, 19, “The Gift of Magic”, p. 307.
131Za I, 22, KSA 4, 97; “a serpent was coiled about a sun” is underlined in Jung's copy.
132RB II, 21, “The Magician”, p. 314-317. Regarding John's Gospel, see S. Shamdasani, footnote 279, p. 316. A similar
image also appear in aphorism 125 of The Gay Science, where last words pronounced by the madman sound like:
“Lightning and thunder need time, deeds need time after they have been done before they can be seen and heard.
This deed is still more distant from them than the most distant stars — and yet we have done it ourselves” (FW 125,
KSA 3, 482). Moreover, in the same Red Book scene, there is even an allusion to playing flute, which, as stressed by
Nietzsche in The Birth of Tragedy, is Dionysos' favourite instrument.
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I want you to speak about your shame, and that instead of speaking great words, you utter a
discordant clamor before those whose respect you wanted to exact. You deserve mockery; not
respect. 
I will burn out of you the contents of which you were proud, so that you will become empty
like a poured-out vessel [ausgeschüttetes Gefäß]. You should be proud of nothing more than
your emptiness and wretchedness. You should be a vessel of life, so kill your idols [schlachte
deine Abgötter].
Freedom does not belong to you, but form; not power, but suffering and conceiving. 
You should make a virtue out of your self-contempt [Du sollst aus der Geringschätzung deiner
selbst eine Tugend machen], which I will spread out before men like a carpet. They should
wall over it with dirty [schmutzigen] feet and you should see to it that you are dirtier than all
the feet that step on you.133
Motifs such as the “empty vessel”, or the transformation of a vice – in this case one's self-
contempt – into virtue have already been discussed. what has just to be added is the stress on killing
“your idols”, doubtless one of the most popular Nietzsche's leitmotifs. Moreover, only a few lines
below, Jung mentions “taming” [die Zähmung] and the necessity to “whip” [peitschen]. Both these
verbs seem to recall Nietzsche's idea of morality, particularly expressed not only in Zarathustra but
also in Genealogy of Morals.134 When Philemon reappears to Jung, in Autumn 1915, he discusses
133RB Scrutinies, § 1, p. 334 (19 April 1914).
134Nietzsche describes “bad conscience” [Schlechtes Gewissen] in terms of a moral conduct which judges as wrong –
and therefore represses – every human attempt to follow natural instincts. According to this definition, “slave
morality” would be born together with the necessity of suppressing instincts from the outer world and addressing
them towards interiority. In this sense, men are seen as in need of being tamed: “that will to self-torment, that
repressed cruelty of animal man pushed inward and forced back into himself, imprisoned in the 'state' to make him
tame, who invented bad conscience in order to lacerate himself, after the more natural discharge of this will to inflict
pain had been blocked – this man of bad conscience seized upon religious assumptions to drive his self-torment to
its most horrifying hardship and ferocity” [jener Wille zur Selbstpeinigung, jene zurückgetretene Grausamkeit des
innerlich gemachten, in sich selbst zurückgescheuchten Thiermenschen, des zum Zweck der Zähmung in den
„Staat“ Eingesperrten, der das schlechte Gewissen erfunden hat, um sich wehe zu thun, nachdem der natürlichere
Ausweg dieses Wehe-thun-wollens verstopft war, — dieser Mensch des schlechten Gewissens hat sich der religiösen
Voraussetzung bemächtigt, um seine Selbstmarterung bis zu ihrer schauerlichsten Härte und Schärfe zu treiben]
(GM II, §§ 16-25; in particular 22, KSA 5, 331-332; “Zähmung” appears also, with the same meaning, in GM III,
13, KSA 5, 365). The reference to this text occurs again twice in the same section. Once, still referring to himself,
Jung uses the word “slaves” [Sklaven]. The entire passage is: “You want to be understood? That's all we needed!
Understand yourself and you will be sufficiently understood. You will have quite enough work in hand with that.
Mothers' little dears want to be understood. Understand yourself that is the best protection against sensitivity and
satisfies your childish longing to be understood. I suppose you want to turn others into slaves of your desirousness
again? But you know that I must live with you and that I will no longer tolerate such abject plaintiveness” (RB
Scrutinies, 1, p. 334). Just a few pages further on, Christian morality is said to be “for burden” (p. 337), recalling
again not only the same distinction between slaves' and masters' moral, but also Zarathustra – with particular regard
to “The Three Metamorphoses” and the camel. Other phrases with Zarathustrian echoes present in the same chapter
are: “your compassion is sick” and “I know that I doubt, because of my love for men” (p. 335). At the very
beginning of “Scrutinies”, another allusion seems to recall Nietzsche, namely the words: “Perhaps the whip will
help? ” (§ 1, p. 333). The whip-motif is quite recurrent in Zarathustra (KSA 4, 86; 4, 107; 4, 121; 4, 284; 4, 298), as
well as in all traditional imagery about Nietzsche (one can think, for instance, of the well known picture of
Nietzsche, Paul Ree and Lou von Salomé, taken in 1882 in Lucerne, in which the three of them are on a carriage and
Lou is holding a whip, pretending to hit her friends). Among these references in Zarathustra, in the sentence “But
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his idea of teaching with words that recall again “On the Bestowing Virtue”. First, the same gold
metaphor used by Nietzsche to describe Zarathustra's virtue and wisdom is here invoked to bring
out the mechanism of dependence implied in such a construct. Philemon explains: “Gold is no
master out of its own will and yet it rules the whole, despised and greedily demanded, an inexorable
ruler: it lies and waits”. He describes it as “self-sufficient, a king that needs no proof of its power
[…] it neither gives nor squanders itself [es gibt sich nicht, es verschwendet sich nicht]. […]
Everyone denies that he depends on it, and yet he secretly stretches out his hand longingly toward
it. Must gold prove its necessity? It is proven through the longing of men”. Gold brilliance, in fact,
“confuses the senses”, and exactly through that keeps men under control. As the value of gold is
determined by his seekers exclusively, and would be of no importance per se, so the value of a
teacher is established by his disciples. Then he adds:
Not only to teach, but also to disavow [verleugnen], or why then did I teach? If I do not teach,
I do not have to disavow [verleugnen]. But if I have taught, I must disavow [verleugnen]
thereafter. For if I teach, I must give others what they should have taken. What he acquires is
good, but the gift that was not acquired is bad. To waste oneself means: to want to suppress
many. Deceitfulness surrounds the giver because his own enterprise is deceitful. He is forced
to revoke his gift and to deny [verleugnen] his virtue.135
And some paragraphs below:
How could I teach what I believe? Who would give me the right to such belief? It is what I
know how to say; not because I believe it, but because I know it. If I knew better, I would
teach better. But it would be easy for me to believe more. Yet should I teach a belief to those
who have discarded belief? And, I ask you, is it good to believe something even more, if one
does not know better?136
In a similar way Zarathustra expresses his scepticism towards teaching:
I now go away alone, my disciples! You too now go away and be alone! So I will have it.
Truly, I advise you: go away from me and guard yourselves against Zarathustra! And better
there are indeed those to whom virtue is a writhing under the whip”, the phrase “writhing under the whip” [Kampf
unter einer Peitsche] is underlined by Jung in his own copy (Za II, 5, “Of the Virtuous”, KSA 4, 121), whilst
alongside the passage “To the rhythm of my whip shalt thou dance and cry! I forgot not my whip? – Not I!” Jung
wrote: “survive” [weiterleben] (Za III, 15, “The Second Dance Song”, KSA 4, 284). The first of these references
seems however to directly recall the meaning given by Jung in Liber Novus.
135RB Scrutinies, § 3, p. 337.
136RB Scrutinies, § 6, p. 348.
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still: be ashamed of him! Perhaps he has deceived you.
The man of knowledge must be able not only to love his enemies but also to hate his friends.
One repays a teacher badly if one always remains only a pupil. And why, then, should you not
pluck at my laurels?
You respect [verehrt] me; but what if one day your respect [Verehrung] should tumble? Take
care that a statue does not strike you dead!
You say you believe in Zarathustra? But of what importance is Zarathustra? You are my
believers: but of what importance are all believers?
You had not yet sought yourselves: then you found me. Thus do all believers; therefore all
belief [Glauben] is of so little account.
Now I bid you lose me and find yourselves; and only when you have all denied [verleugnet] 
me will I return to you.137
At the beginning of the chapter, Zarathustra had compared his virtue to gold and its value, by
telling his disciples:
Tell me, how did gold come to have its highest value? Because it is uncommon and useless
and shining and mellow in lustre; it always bestows itself. Only as an image of the highest
virtue did gold come to have the highest value. Gold-like gleams the glance of the giver.
Gold-lustre makes peace between moon and sun. The highest virtue is uncommon and useless,
it is shining and mellow in lustre: the highest virtue is the bestowing virtue. Truly, I divine
you well, my disciples, you aspire to the bestowing virtue, as I do. 138
Whereas Zarathustra puts the main stress on gold wholeness, meant as the characteristic which
allows it to “bestow itself”, Philemon seems to respond by highlighting the meaninglessness of its
value, if nobody were there for it to be given. As a last remark, one of the very last dialogues
between Philemon and Jung in Liber Novus (February 1916) has to be mentioned, as representing a
valid resume of what seen so far:
But ΦIΛHMΩN smiled and replied, 'You poor souls, poor in flesh and rich in spirit, the meat
was fat and the spirit thin. But how do you reach the eternal light? You mock my stupidity,
137Za I, 22, KSA 4, 101. The passage comprehending the lines “The man of knowledge must not only love his enemies,
he must also be able to hate his friends. One repays a teacher badly if one always remains only a pupil” is
accompanied by a vertical mark in Jung's text, while the sentence “you had not yet sought yourselves when you
found me” is underlined. Jung made use of the sentence “One repays a teacher badly if one always remains only a
pupil” also in his letter to Freud, dating 3 March 1912, with which Jung externalised his estrangement from him for
the first time (S. Freud/C. G. Jung, Briefwechsel, ed. William McGuire and Wolfgang Sauerländer, Frankfurt/Main,
Fischer 1974, letter 303j, p. 544).
138Za I, 22, KSA 4, 97. References to a kind of virtue that enlightens similarly to stars is to be found in chapter “On the
Virtuous”, too, precisely in relation to the sentence “your virtue is your dearest friend” (KSA 4, 121).
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which you too possess: you mock yourselves. Knowledge frees one from danger. But mockery
is the other side of your belief is black less than white? You rejected faith and retained
mockery: Are you thus saved from faith? No, you bound yourselves to mockery and hence
again to faith. And therefore you are miserable.'
But the dead were outraged and cried, 'We are not miserable, we are clever; our thinking and 
feeling is as pure as clear water. We praise our reason. We mock superstition. Do you believe 
that your old folly reaches us? A childish delusion has overcome you, old one, what good is it 
to us?'
ΦIΛHMΩN replied: 'What can do you any good? I free you from what still holds you to the
shadow of life. Take this wisdom [Wissen] with you, add this folly [Torheit] to your
cleverness [Klugheit], this unreason to your reason, and you will find yourselves. If you were
men, you would then begin your life and your life's way between reason and unreason and
live onward to the eternal light, whose shadow you lived in advance. But since you are dead,
this knowledge frees you from life and strips you of your greed for men and it also frees your
self from the shrouds that the light and the shadow lay on you, compassion with men will
overcome you and from the stream you will reach solid ground, you will step forth from the
eternal whirl onto the unmoving stone of rest, the circle that breaks flowing duration, and the
flame will die down. 
'I have fanned a' glowing fire, I have given the murderer a knife, I have torn open healed-over
wounds, I have quickened all movement, I have given the madman [Wahnsinnigen] more
intoxicating [Rauschtrank] drink, I have made the cold colder, the heat hotter, falseness even
falser, goodness even better, weakness even weaker. 
'This knowledge is the axe of the sacrificer.'
But the dead cried, 'Your wisdom is foolishness and a curse. You want to turn the wheel back?
It will tear you apart, blinded one!'”.139
Phrases concerning madness, as well as the need of adding “folly to […] cleverness” in order to
find oneself, remind of Zarathustra chapter “The Intoxicated Song”, and therefore deal with the
specific task of a teacher. In Nietzsche's chapter, Zarathustra expresses again his reluctance to be
considered a model to imitate and stresses the importance of integrating folly in one's own wisdom,
in order to become a real “wise man”. He cries out:
What do you think, you Higher Men? Am I a prophet? A dreamer? An intoxicated
[Trunkener]? An interpreter of dreams? A midnight bell [Mitternachts-Glocke]?
A drop of dew? An odour or scent of eternity? Do you not hear it? Do you not smell it? My
world has just become perfect, midnight is also noonday, pain is also joy, a curse is also a
139RB Scrutinies, 11, p. 353.
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blessing, the night is also a sun, – be gone, or you will learn: a wise man is also a fool [ein
Weiser ist auch ein Narr].140
By chasing his disciples away, Zarathustra refuses again the traditional role expected from a
teacher and, in this sense, he seems to anticipate Philemon's role in “Scrutinies”. Nietzsche writes in
“On the Three Metamorphoses”: “Is it not this: to debase yourself in order to injure your pride? To
let your folly shine out in order to mock [spotten] your wisdom?”,141 and “The Dance Song” is said
to be also a “mocking-song [Spottlied]”.142 Moreover, not only does the “teacher” Zarathustra stress
the importance of playing and mocking recurrently,143 but he also plays the role of a mocker himself
in a few occasions. He cannot reach his contemporaries, therefore he says: “The men of the present
[…] are strange to me and a mockery [Spott]”.144 In the final part of the text, the two kings describe
the wrong impression that Zarathustra's enemies got of him, as one who “gazed the grimace of a
devil, and with mocking laughter [hohnlachend]”.145
Getting back to the initial question raised regarding the relation between mockery and becoming
“who one is” in Liber Novus with particular focus on Nietzsche, a few significant points deserve to
be stressed. First of all, mockery is the presupposition of any healthy self-development. It can be
regarded from two different perspectives: as the capacity of self-ironising, or as the apish attitude of
ridiculing the other by stopping at a superficial level. Only the first of these meanings promotes
psychological growth, but it is also strongly linked to the latter, from which it derives: self-irony
means indeed to act as a monkey towards oneself. Therefore, the monkey-like behaviour appears as
the first step to take; it is not easy to overcome this layer though, for the further stage requires
introspection. Thus a monkey-like attitude leads to imitation; sometime it can be extended to an
140Za IV, 19, “The Intoxicated Song”, KSA 4, 402 (translation modified).
141Za I, 1, KSA 4, 29.
142Za II, 10, KSA 4, 140.
143Nietzsche writes in “The Higher Man”: “Timid, ashamed, awkward, like a tiger whose leap has failed: this is how I
have often seen you slink aside, you Higher Men. A throw you made has failed. But what of that you dice-throwers!
You have not learned to play [spielen] and mock [spotten] as a man ought to play and mock! Are we not always
seated at a great table for play and mockery [Sitzen wir nicht immer an einem grossen Spott- und Spieltische]? And
if great things you attempted have turned out failures, does that mean you yourselves are – failures? And if you
yourselves have turned out failure, does that mean – man is a failure? If man has turned out a failure, however: very
well! come on!” (Za IV, 13, “The Higher Man”, KSA 4, 363-64). Despite several marks and annotations occurring in
the whole chapter, these lines do not seem to interest Jung at all.
144Za II, 14, “Of the Land of Culture”, KSA 4. 155. Other parts dealing with the same topic can be found in chapters:
“Of the Three Evil Things”, where Zarathustra is mocked by a personification of his wisdom (Za III, 10, KSA 4,
235), and Jung annotates near the phrase “divine nutcrackers”: “hier ist der vermisste Gott”; “The Second Dance
Song”, in which a personification of life mocks Zarathustra (Za III, 15, KSA 4, 283); and “The Honey Offering”,
where mocking belong to Zarathustra's wickedness (Za IV, 1, KSA 4, 298).
145Za IV, 3, “Conversation with the Kings” KSA 4, 307. It can be interesting to notice that during this dialogue
Zarathustra almost cannot help but mock the king's eagerly: “As the kings thus eagerly talked and babbled of the
happiness of their fathers, Zarathustra was overcome by no small desire to mock [spotten] their eagerness: for they
were apparently very peaceable kings that he saw before him, with aged, refined faces” (KSA 4, 308.).
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entire collective acting or religion, such as Christianity, which seems to have forgotten its premises
of originality and independence. Autonomy, in fact, is something that can be achieved only through
deep introspection and self-confrontation. “Christ”, therefore, cannot be considered by Jung as a
good example for a teacher, having become an empty model to emulate, instead of teaching how to
gain self-knowledge and independence, i.e. how to become “who one is”. Philemon, on the
contrary, is presented as a valid symbol to express a new and different kind of teacher, who teaches
how to find and develop one's own originality.
What emerges most loudly from the Liber Novus excerpts just analysed, is Jung's questioning
the role of Zarathustra as a teacher. Indeed, incapable to bear his being mocked, he would not be
able to recognise the inferior in himself despite his teaching. For this reason, he would be simply
imitated by his disciples, without being understood. Furthermore, through the quite explicit allusion
to the ropedancer episode, it is possible to extend such a consideration to Nietzsche himself, and his
personal rejection of inferiority. As already said in relation to the process of transformation, the
ropedancer's death is one of the most recurrent examples used by Jung, in order to show Nietzsche's
obstinacy to deny the unconscious. Jung's question seems now to address Nietzsche's role as a
teacher. 
2.3.3 DEATH AND REBIRTH OF GOD
If one follows the path just shown, the result will be a “new God”. Jung writes: “The new God
laughs at imitation and discipleship. He needs no imitators and no pupils. He forces men through
himself. The God is his own follower in man. He imitates himself”.146 Whereas Nietzsche spoke of
“death of God” as a primary condition for being independent, and so for arguing exactly the same
possibility, Jung seems to express the new condition of mankind through a divine symbol again; for
divinity appears to him as a necessity in human psychology. Nevertheless, while facing this aspect,
he once more seems to evoke Nietzsche and his symbols. Due to Western rational attitude, godliness
is bound to disappear, because it is perceived only as an idea, or a concept, rather than being
accepted in the irrational possibility of its independence from reason. Therefore, God is said to be
“sick”, or even believed dead:
Something always happens, but we do not happen, since our God is sick. We have seen him
dead with the venomous gaze of the Basilisk [giftigem Basiliskenbick] on his face, and we
have understood that he is dead. We must think of his healing. And yet again I feel it quite
146RB I, 8, “The Conception of the God”, p. 245.
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clearly that my life would have broken in half had I failed to heal my God. Hence I abided
with him in the long cold night.147
The only way for God to be healed is to be reborn again in the Western civilised world. The
birth of a new God is symbolised through Izdubar's episode. As already seen, this character
represents the East, along with its non scientific thinking. As Jung's “I” makes him conscious about
his own land and culture, these poisoning truths make him ill and fragile, since he is as innocent and
naive as “a child, a primordial grown child that required human Logos”.148 So, Jung's “I” decides to
reduce his companion's weight in order to carry him to the “Western land”. Izdubar, in fact, is
perceived as a fantasy and his size can change depending on Jung's will. Once the God has become
“lighter than a feather”, the protagonist is able to carry him to his own land. There Jung's idea is to
spend the night in the house of someone he knows, but the door seems to be too small for the giant
Izdubar, so he uses his fantasy again in order to “squeeze” him “into the size of an egg” and put him
in his pocket. At this point, the God can be considered safe and ready to come back to life in a new
shape. While commenting on this episode, Jung presumably refers to Nietzsche. The first thing he
notices is: “How often has it been assumed that the Gods have been brought to their end in this way.
This was obviously a serious mistake, since this was precisely what saved the God. He did not pass
away, but became a living fantasy, whose workings I could feel on my own body”. Then he argues:
“One used to believe that one could murder a God”. And again:
This tangible and apparent world is one reality, but fantasy is the other reality: So long as we
leave the God outside us apparent and tangible, he is unbearable and hopeless. But if we turn
the God into fantasy, he is in us and is easy to bear. The God outside us increases the weight
of everything heavy, while the God within us lightens everything heavy.149
147RB II, 8, “First Day”, p. 281. “Basilisk eggs” [Basilisken-Eier] appear also at the very end of Nietzsche's Anti-
Christ: “Third proposition. – The execrable location where Christianity brooded over its basilisk eggs should be
razed to the ground and, being the depraved spot on earth, it should be the horror of all posterity. Poisonous snakes
should be bred on top of it” (AC Epilogue, 1, “Law against Christianity”, KSA 6, 254). What must also be remarked
here is the link to “poisonous snakes” [giftige Schlangen], which reminds directly of Jung's phrase and justifies the
possibility of a real allusion to Nietzsche in this Liber Novus chapter. Again, in dithyramb “Fame and Eternity”
[Ruhm und Ewigkeit], Nietzsche writes: “How long have you already been sitting / On your misfortune for? / Watch
out! You brood me yet / Another egg / A basilisk-egg / Out of your long misery” [Wie lange sitzest du schon auf
deinem Missgeschick? / Gieb Acht! du brütest mir noch ein Ei, / ein Basilisken-Ei aus deinem langen Jammer aus]
(DD, 8, KSA 6, 402).
148Ibid. Just to be recalled, the child – determined indeed by his innocence – corresponds also to the final state of
Zarathustra “Three Metamorphoses”, and symbolises the Übermensch.
149RB II, 9, “Second Day”, p. 282-283. When the “new God” will be born again, in chapter (“The Opening of the
Egg”), he will be compared to“the sun, the eternal light”, evoking again Zarathustra tones (RB II, 11, p. 286). Such
understanding of divine might be also read in opposition to Karl Barth's theology. Although never openly exhibited,
Jung and Barth showed their mutual disagreements in a few occasions (see M. Jehle-Wildberger's introduction in:
M. Jehle-Wildberger (ed.), C. G. Jung Und Adolf Keller: Uber Theologie Und Psychologie: Briefe Und Gesprache ,
Theologischer Verlag, Zurich 2014).
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The assumption of a sort of natural self-destruction in the gods, as well as the difference
between a “tangible and apparent world” and a different “reality”, can be read as referred to
Nietzsche's Twilight of the Idols. Similarly, the idea of self-suppression of morality is also brilliantly
exposed in one of Nietzsche's most famous unpublished texts, written in Lenzerheide in 1887, and
bearing the title “European Nihilism”. In Twilight of the Idols chapter “How the 'True' World finally
became a Fable” (under-title “The history of an error”), Nietzsche proposes, shortly and
metaphorically, his theory on history of metaphysics. From the Platonic distinction between a “true”
and an “apparent” world, according to which the “true world” can be reached only through
knowledge, metaphysics would have been transposed to a religious layer throughout Christianity
development, by promising the truth through devotion. Then it would have finally reached the point
of the Kantian noumenic unattainability of such a truth, which should have therefore remained
“unknown”. From there, Positivism would have then developed by eliminating Plato's distinction
and permitted Nihilism to evolve. Now it would seem to be time for Zarathustra to announce his
doctrine: “The true world is gone: which world is left? The illusory one, perhaps? … But no! we got
rid of the illusory world along with the true one! (Noon; moment of shortest shadow; end of longest
error; high point of humanity; INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA)”.150 Still in Nietzsche's Twilight, the next
chapter is entitled “Morality as Anti-nature” [Moral als Widernatur] and describes the contradictory
aspect of morality towards nature, that is to say, “all passions go through a phase where they are just
a disaster […] and a later, much later phase […] where they 'spiritualise' themselves”. In this second
phase instincts are suppressed (Nietzsche speaks indeed of “castration” [Castratismus]) and become
“enemies” of oneself, but this actually means to fight against life itself. “Every naturalism in
morality [...] is governed by an instinct of life”, but “anti-natural morality [...] condemns these
instincts, sometimes in secret, sometimes in loud and impudent tones” and, as Nietzsche concludes,
“by saying 'God sees into the heart', it says no to both the lowest and the highest desires of life, and
treats God as the enemy of life”. Therefore morality appears as the “negation of the
[Schopenhauer's] will to life”, as an “instinct of the decadence” and, consequently, as a form of,
again, self-destroying life. Furthermore, this kind of morality tends to change individuals' inner
attitude, according to a merely exterior ideal, originated by “an idiosyncrasy of degenerates” which
simply condemns life.151
In 1887, in Lenzerheide (Switzerland), Nietzsche reflected on Nihilism systematically for the
first time. Once more, what emerges from these very personal annotations, is the self-contradictory
150GD IV, 1, KSA 6, 80-6, 81.
151GD V, 1-6, KSA 6, 82-87.
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aspect of Christian morality, which contains in itself the germ of self-destruction and leads to the
final crisis of values.152 This quite long fragment was unfortunately split in several sections by
Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche, together with Peter Gast. At the time of Liber Novus, therefore, its
contents were still available, but parted within other texts of Nietzsche's.
To “murder God” recalls, instead, Zarathustra “last men”, as well as “the ugliest man”. Many
times it is written by Nietzsche that we are all responsible for the death of God, that is to say, we, as
human beings, did kill him. Last men correspond to those who do realise their guilt but do not suffer
from it and carry on with their own lives as if nothing had happened. “The ugliest man” represents
the counterpart of this attitude, i.e. that kind of man who is more than aware about his own guilt, but
he is far too weak to bear the situation and overcome his nature.153 In Jung's Zarathustra copy, the
chapter “The Ugliest Man” [Der hässlichste Mann] presents several underlinings, marks and three
meaningful annotations. The first of these appears at the beginning of the chapter, where Zarathustra
manifests happiness for the characters he has just encountered (the two kings, the leech, the sorcerer
and the retired Pope) and bears the inscription: “Last Supper motif” [Abendmahls Motiv], which, as
we have already shown, is definitely a recurrent and important image also in Liber Novus. Only a
few lines below, near the sentences “For it was a valley which all beasts avoided, even the beasts of
prey; except that kind of ugly, thick, green serpent, when it grew old, came here to die. Therefore
the shepherds called this valley 'Serpent's Death'” (where “Serpent's Death” [Schlagen-Tod] is
underlined), Jung annotates: “Death of life” [Lebenstod]. Finally, the most significant inscription
appears precisely alongside the underlined sentence “you are the murderer of God! […] You could
not endure him who saw you”, recalling Liber Novus topic we are considering. Jung comments the
text with these words: “You murderer, Zarathustra! he could not endure ugliness” [Du Mörder,
Zarathustra! er ertrug den Hässlichen nicht].154
Putting all these things together, the words expressed by Jung in his encounter with Izdubar
seem to allude to Nietzsche's mistake of believing that God is actually death and that it could not be
differently, since God is nothing but the product of the wrong distinction between a “true” and an
“illusory” world. Refusing this difference, there would not be no room any longer for a fantasy like
God. According to Jung, instead, it is such not belonging to the 'real' world indeed, that makes
God's power stronger and more effective on our “tangible” reality. Nietzsche's error would therefore
152NF 5[71], June 1887, KSA 12, 211-217. In fact, Nietzsche's reflection on Nihilism began earlier, as well as his
utilisation of the word. Interestingly, in 1879, after that Human, All-too Human was published, the Wagnerian
Schuré accused Nietzsche of “nihilisme écoeurant” (On Nietzsche's understanding and development of Nihilism, see
G. Campioni, “Il 'sentimento del deserto'. Dalle pianure slave al vecchio occidente”, in: F. W. Nietzsche, Il
nichilismo europeo. Frammento di Lenzerheide, a cura di Giuliano Campioni, Adelphi, Milan 2006, pp. 47-60).
153On this topic, see G. Campioni, Les lectures françaises de Nietzsche, PUF, Paris 2001, pp. 189-190.
154Za IV, 7, “The Ugliest Man”, KSA 4, 327-332 (in particular 327-328).
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consist in refusing fantasy as such, instead of really realising its potentiality and efficacy in our
everyday life.
Ultimately, the sentence “Bring your God down to the haze pregnant with poison, but not like
those blinded ones who try to illuminate the darkness with lanterns which it does not
comprehend”155 recalls again The Gay Science, 125; precisely when “the madman” is presented as
bringing a lantern in the daylight, reminding of the cynic Diogenes and the attitude of men of
knowledge that he symbolises. Holding a source of light during the day, in fact, means not to arrest
before appearance, but trying to investigate further and further, putting one's own trust only in one's
own rational skills. If linked to Liber Novus, this can be read as a criticism to Nietzsche's
presumably still too rational attitude towards religion. If Jung recognises in Nietzsche's philosophy
a certain attempt to overcome rationalism – as pointed out regarding folly – on the one hand, he
denies the actual capability to put that into practice at a personal, psychological level on the other.
Jung's reading of Nietzsche's death of God is one of the most significant patterns of such view
indeed. Again, this will emerge quite clearly during the thirties seminar on Zarathustra.
Not only has Izdubar become of the same size of an egg, but he has even been transformed into
an egg himself, or, to better express it, his divine nature has been enclosed in it. In order that the egg
may open, Jung chants a series of incantations until it discloses and the new “God” comes to life.
Although in this part of the text there seems to be no apparent evidence of Nietzsche's inspiration,
the way Jung comments on Zarathustra chapter “Before Sunrise” in his own copy makes evident a
connection between these two texts: precisely underneath the title of the chapter, Jung wrote
“Incantation des Eies” (Incantation of the egg). Moreover, the first part of this Zarathustra chapter
presents a couple of marks, likely indicating beginning and end of the reference to Liber Novus
according to Jung. The text between the two markings is: 
O Sky above me, o pure sky! You abyss of light! Gazing into you, I tremble with divine
desire. To cast myself into your height – that is my depth! To hide myself in your purity – that
is my innocence! The god is veiled by his beauty: thus you hide your stars. You do not speak:
thus you proclaim to me your wisdom. You have risen for me today, mute over the raging sea;
your love and your modesty speak a revelation to my raging soul. That you have come to me,
beautiful, veiled in your beauty; that you have spoken to me mutely, manifest in your wisdom:
Oh how should I not divine all that is modest in your soul! You came to me before the sun, to
155RB II, 9, p. 283. We have already discussed the many references to Nietzsche present in this chapter: “Many have
wanted to get help for their sick God and were then devoured by the serpents and dragons lurking on the way to the
land of the sun. They perished in the overbright day and have become dark men, since their eyes have been blinded”
(2.2.1).We can also anticipate that interpreting Nietzsche's psychology in terms of an “overbright day” will be one of
the main guidelines of Jung's seminar on Zarathustra.
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me the most solitary man. We have been friends from the beginning: we have grief and terror
and world in common; we have even the sun in common. We do not speak to one another,
because we know too much: we are silent together, we smile our knowledge to one another.
Are you not the light of my fire? Do you not have the sister-soul of my insight? Together we
learned everything; together we learned to mount above ourselves and to smile uncloudedly –
to smile uncloudedly down from bright eyes and from miles away when under us compulsion
and purpose and guilt stream like rain. And when I wandered alone, what did my soul hunger
after by night and on treacherous paths? And when I climbed mountains, whom did I always
seek, if not you, upon mountains? And all my wandering and mountain-climbing: it was
merely a necessity and an expedient of clumsiness: my whole will desires only to fly, to fly
into you.156
Phrases such as “divine desire” [göttlichen Begierden], “The god is veiled by his beauty” [Den
Gott verhüllt seine Schönheit], as well as the description of lonely journeys and their “treacherous
paths” [Irr-Pfaden] while seeking for the god, or of a certain friendship “from the beginning” [von
Anbeginn], let guess a similarity with the Izdubar episode. In particular, presenting the sun as the
common element to both Zarathustra and this craved god, the already mentioned Eastern wisdom
seems to come up again. As already discussed, Liber Novus chapters “First Day”, “Second Day”
and “The Incantations” represent the core of Jung's confrontation with European culture, as well as
the will to integrate it with a different and wider perspective, symbolised by the East. The sun plays
a meaningful role in this process, and the fact that Jung reads “Before Sunrise” in connection with
his own need for a god validates such hypothesis even more. In “The Incantations” he writes:
Christmas has come. The God is in the egg. I have prepared a rug for my God, an expensive
red rug from the land 
of morning. He shall be surrounded by the shimmer of magnificence of his
156Za III, 4, KSA 4,207-208 (the word “Wisdom” [Weisheit] is underlined by Jung). It is important to cite the entire
German text here: “Oh Himmel über mir, du Reiner! Tiefer! Du Licht-Abgrund! Dich schauend schaudere ich vor
göttlichen Begierden. In deine Höhe mich zu werfen — das ist meine Tiefe! In deine Reinheit mich zu bergen — das
ist meine Unschuld! Den Gott verhüllt seine Schönheit: so verbirgst du deine Sterne. Du redest nicht: so kündest du
mir deine Weisheit. Stumm über brausendem Meere bist du heut mir aufgegangen, deine Liebe und deine Scham
redet Offenbarung zu meiner brausenden Seele. Dass du schön zu mir kamst, verhüllt in deine Schönheit, dass du
stumm zu mir sprichst, offenbar in deiner Weisheit: Oh wie erriethe ich nicht alles Schamhafte deiner Seele! Vor der
Sonne kamst du zu mir, dem Einsamsten. Wir sind Freunde von Anbeginn: uns ist Gram und Grauen und Grund
gemeinsam; noch die Sonne ist uns gemeinsam. Wir reden nicht zu einander, weil wir zu Vieles wissen —: wir
schweigen uns an, wir lächeln uns unser Wissen zu. Bist du nicht das Licht zu meinem Feuer? Hast du nicht die
Schwester-Seele zu meiner Einsicht? Zusammen lernten wir Alles; zusammen lernten wir über uns zu uns selber
aufsteigen und wolkenlos lächeln: — — wolkenlos hinab lächeln aus lichten Augen und aus meilenweiter Ferne,
wenn unter uns Zwang und Zweck und Schuld wie Regen dampfen. Und wanderte ich allein: wes hungerte meine
Seele in Nächten und Irr-Pfaden? Und stieg ich Berge, wen suchte ich je, wenn nicht dich, auf Bergen? Und all mein
Wandern und Bergsteigen: eine Noth war's nur und ein Behelf des Unbeholfenen: — fliegen allein will mein ganzer
Wille, in dich hinein fliegen!“. The same idea of “the egg of the Gods” comes back later in Liber Novus, in “The
Magician” (RB II, 21, §§ 164-189, pp. 320-327).
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Eastern land. I am the mother, the simple maiden, who gave birth and did not 
know how. I am the careful father, who protected the maiden. I am the shepherd, who
received the message as he guarded his herd at 
night on the dark fields.
I am the holy animal that stood astonished and cannot grasp the becoming of the God...
I am the wise man who came from the East, suspecting the miracle from afar.
And I am the egg that surrounds and nurtures the seed of the God in me.
The solemn hours lengthen.
And my humanity is wretched and suffers torment. Since I am a giver of birth. Whence do
you delight me, Oh God!' He is the eternal emptiness and the eternal fullness. Nothing
resembles him and he resembles everything. Eternal darkness and eternal brightness. Eternal
below and eternal above. Double nature in one. [...]
Oh light oft he middle way,
enclosed in the egg,
embryonic, 
full or ardor, oppressed. 
Fully expectant,
dreamlike, awaiting lost memories.
As heavy as stone, hardened.
Molten, transparent.
Streaming bright, coiled on itself.157
References to East and Eastern wisdom (especially “I am the wise man who came from the
East”) offer a deeper connection between this chapter and Nietzsche's. Furthermore, “the eternal
emptiness and the eternal fullness”, as well as “eternal darkness and eternal brightness”, “eternal
below and eternal above” not only anticipate Abraxas' features,158 but also present some elements
which strongly occur in Nietzsche's “The Night-Song” and characterise Zarathustra's wisdom. It can
be noticed, at this point, that these expressions sound quite close to Taoism, letting emerge again a
strong Eastern influence in both texts. Even though there seem to be no direct evidence to prove
Nietzsche's knowledge of old Chinese scriptures, as it has been shown in some studies, there are
several elements in Zarathustra and its imagery which remind of Lao-tsu and Chuang-tsu.159
157RB II, 10, “The Incantations”, p. 284.
158See ibid., S. Shamdasani, footnote 125.
159See G. Parkes, “Human/Nature in Nietzsche and Taoism”, in B. Callicot and R. T. Ames (editors), Nature in Asian
Traditions of Thought. Essays in Environmental Philosophy, SRI Satguru Publications, Delhi 1991 (copyright of
State University of New York, 1989), p. 79-97. Already the general Zarathustra purpose of abandoning an
anthropocentric perspective belongs, according to the author, to a Taoist view. This accompanies another Taoist
element present in Nietzsche's text, that is “self-cultivation”. Ultimately, a huge part of Zarathustrian symbology –
where animals and natural elements play doubtless one of the main roles – could be interpreted as perfectly coherent
with Taoist imagery. Other studies have tried to read Nietzsche's nihilism as an European expression of Taoism (see
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Ultimately, phrases such as “Star of the East”, “fire of old night”, or “We filled your cup with red
wine. We set out fragrant fruit on golden dishes” present quite clear Zarathustrian echoes, as well as
an indisputable religious tone.160 After these incantations, Jung comments on what is taking place
with these words:
You force the gates of Hell: the sound of cackling masks [Maskengekicher] and the music of
fools [Narrenmusik] approaches you. You storm Heaven: stage scenery totters and the
prompter in the box falls into a swoon. You notice: you are not true, it is not true above, it is
not true below, left and right are deceptions. Wherever you grasp is air, air, air.161
Zarathustra's dream described in chapter “The Prophet”, where similar images are present, has
been already recalled.162 Ultimately, the connection between the new god in the egg and the sun will
return again towards the end of “Liber Secundus”. After that Jung's “I” has accepted and recognised
this new born as his own child, he speaks to him:
I: 'Where is your country?'
He: 'In the light, in the egg, in the sun, in what is innermost and compressed, in the eternal 
longing embers. So rises the sun in your heart and streams out into the cold world.'
for example P. Sloterdijk, Eurotaoismus. Zur Kritik der politischen Kinetik, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main
1989, p. 161-210). Another common feature is the importance given to the relation between weakness and strength,
in which to be really strong means to look softer, while all that appears strong and rigid hides within itself the true
weakness. This represents one of the key-elements of Nietzsche's philosophy, as well as one of the most important
statements of Lao-tsu's teaching.
160RB II, 10, p. 284-285. See S. Shamdasani, footnotes 123-124 (regarding biblical references) and 127, 130 (about
Indian religious inspiration). In particular, a passage might be recalled: “I have overthrown all the Gods, broken the
laws, eaten the impure. I have thrown down my sword and dressed in women's clothing. I shattered my firm castle
and played like a child in the sand. I saw warriors form into line of battle and I destroyed my suit of armor with a
hammer” (p. 285). The image of the child playing in the sand reminds of Zarathustra and, at an even deeper level,
evokes at the same time also some metaphors used by Heraclitus to describe existence fugacity (“Time is a child
playing draughts; the kingly power is a child's”, “Fragment 52”,tr. John Burnet,quoted in: Hippolytus, Refutation of
All Heresies (Refutatio omnium haeresium), 1912, § 9.4). Nietzsche writes in fact: “They were playing on the sea-
shore [am Meere] – then came a wave and swept their playthings into the deep: now thy cry. But the same wave
shall bring them new playthings and pour out new coloured sea-shells before them! Thus they will be consoled; and
you too, my friends, shall, like them, have your consolation – and new coloured sea-shells!” (Za II, 5, “Of the
Virtuous”, KSA 4.123). Still referred to the quoted Red Book paragraph, it is ultimately to be highlighted the
hammer element: Nietzsche's Twilight of the Idols has as an under-title “How to philosophise with a Hammer”, and
he defines that text as a “declaration of war”. Though Nietzsche's idea of war must not been confused with violence
and aggression, as well as his “hammer” has nothing to do with a destructive tool. What he actually refers to is the
instrument used by practitioners to let cavities resound: old idols are in fact nothing but empty residuums of the past,
without any real content. He writes: “will new idols be sounded out?... This little work is a great declaration of war;
and as far as sounding out idols is concerned, this time they are not just idols of our age but eternal idols, and they
will be touched here with a hammer as with a tuning fork, – these are the oldest, most convinced, puffed-up and fat-
headed idols you will ever find... and also the most hollow... but that does not stop them from being the most
fervently believed. And even in the noblest of cases they are never, ever called idols” (GD “Vorrede”, KSA 6, 57-58).
It is not to forget, that in this very text Nietzsche calls himself “old psychologist”.
161RB II, 10, p. 285.
162Also in “The Funeral Song” occurs a “gruesome, gloomy melody” [schaurige dumpfe Weise].
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I: 'How you transfigure yourself!'
He: 'I want to vanish from your sight. You ought to live in darkest solitude, men-not Gods-
should illumine your darkness.'163
 If Liber Novus really represents Jung's confrontation with his old 'idols', and if Nietzsche is one
of those, then his idea of Abraxas can represent an attempt to react to Nietzsche's death of God. Still
while discussing with himself, Jung seems to doubt about his situation and paraphrases Nietzsche:
“You call on God for help? The dear old God has died, and it is good that way; otherwise he would
have had pity on your repentant sinfulness and spared me the execution by granting mercy”.164 But
Jung's God is actually alive, as argued by Philemon in the second sermon:
God is not dead. He is as alive as ever. God is creation, for he is something definite, and
therefore differentiated from the Pleroma. God is a quality of the Pleroma, and everything I
have said about creation also applies to him.165
Although here the main reference is to the Gnostic representation of Abraxas, Jung's endeavour
to develop a concept of godliness that counterbalances the nihilist void he could easily go through,
can be really read as a possible response to Nietzsche. As already remarked, “pity” is also
Zarathustra's “last sin”.166
163RB II, 21, “The Magician”, p. 329.
164RB Scrutinies, 1, p. 333 (italic ours).
165RB Scrutinies, 7, p. 348.
166Abraxas is even compared to Pan (RB Scriptures, 8, p. 350).
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CHAPTER 3
LIBER NOVUS IN NIETZSCHE: JUNG'S SEMINAR ON ZARATHUSTRA
The solitary went into the desert to find himself
But he did not want to find himself but rather the
manifold meaning of holy scripture. You can
suck the immensity of the small and the great
into yourself and you will become emptier and
emptier, since immense fullness and immense
emptiness are one and the same (RB II, 4, “The
Anchorite”, p. 275)
3.1 JUNG'S INTERPRETATION OF ZARATHUSTRA
As anticipated, Jung was asked to dedicate one of his Psychologischer Club Zürich seminars to
Zarathustra. This took place in Zurich, on Wednesday mornings, from 2 May 1934 to 15 February
1939. Until Spring 1936, three terms per year were held (Spring, Autumn, Winter), each of them
lasting two months (eight-ten sessions). In Autumn and Winter 1936, no session took place; in
1937, the seminar only met during the Spring term, then again in Spring and Autumn 1938, lastly in
Winter 1939. This was the last term, suddenly interrupted after the fifth session, and never
continued, probably due to the beginning of the Second World War a few months later. For this
reason, the last four chapters of the third part and the whole forth book of Zarathustra were left
aside. The seminar notes remained unpublished until 1989, when they were posthumously edited by
J. Jarret in two volumes and entitled “Nietzsche's Zarathustra. Notes of the seminar given in 1934-
1939”. During his life, Jung never gave permission for them to be distributed until 1957. Between
then and their publication, a few short excerpts appeared, as well as the already mentioned article by
Peggy Nill.1 The most relevant consequence of this is that, as for Liber Novus, the material available
was neither directly edited by Jung, nor meant by him to be published. Moreover, differently from
1 See P. Bishop, The Dionysian Self, cit., pp. 266-270. Three excerpts were published before 1989: “Answer by Dr.
Jung to a Question Concerning the Archaic element in the Self. Zurich Seminar June 3, 1936”, in: Bulletin of the
Analytical Psychology Club, 30:5 (May), pp. 14-19, and “Comments on a Passage from Nietzsche's Zarathustra
(1936)”, in: Spring 1972, pp. 149-161 (both texts above cited in ibid., p. 267, footnote 3); “Zurich: Analytical
Psychology Club of New York. Excerpted from the seminar notes, Pt. 7, Lecture 2 (13 May 1936)”, pp. 18-29 (see
“Seminar Notes”, CW 19). It might be of interest to notice that Peggy Nill's permission was restricted to consult but
not quote from the unedited material, even if the text would come out one year later (P. Nill, “Die Versuchung der
Psyche”, cit., p. 258, footnote 31; mentioned also in P. Bishop, The Dionysian Self, cit. p. 267, footnote 2). See also
J. L. Jarret, “Introduction”, in: SNZ I, pp. ix-xxi. A complete list of the participants is given in J. L. Jarret,
“Members of the Seminar”, in: SNZ I, pp. Xxiv-xxv; on a more detailed depiction, see P. Bishop, “The Members of
Jung's Seminar on Zarathustra”, in: Spring 56 (1994), pp. 92-122.
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Liber Novus, the 1544 pages which form the text were not directly written by him, but collected
from the notes written down by various participants to the seminar. However, the overall
interpretation does not come across as different from Jung's understanding of Zarathustra at that
time, coming up from his voluntarily published texts.
The apparent misreading emerging from this seminar has already been mentioned. In particular,
Zarathustra is read by Jung as an example of Nietzsche's failed individuation, caused by both his
being incapable of accepting the unconscious as something independent from his consciousness,
and his being “inflated” with the Old Wise Man archetype. Not only might this interpretation sound
a bit 'ambitious' for a valid and complete comprehension of such a complex work, but, at some
specific points, it also appears completely outside the context of Nietzsche's philosophy. These
peculiarities in Jung's reading can be justified though, if compared with Liber Novus. Some
elements of his Zarathustra seminar can be correctly re-contextualised within the framework of
Jung's thinking development by keeping in mind some of the episodes narrated in Liber Novus. In
particular, as pointed out at the end of last chapter, the last sections of “Liber Secundus” and
“Scrutinies” can be read as Jung's response to Zarathustra through his dialogue with Philemon;
several are the elements, indeed, which remind of Zarathustra, both stylistically and in terms of
contents. What can endorse such a hypothesis, is the fact that those visions happened to Jung a few
months before, during, and shortly after having engaged with Zarathustra for the second time
(November 1914).  In “The Magician” and in “Scrutinies”, all the main accusations that Jung will
make to Nietzsche in the 30's are already present; this is going to be the starting point of this
chapter. Beginning with Jung's apparent 'misreading' in his seminar, parallels in the last chapters of
“Liber Secundus” and in “Scrutinies” will be found first; then in other passages from “Liber
Primus” and “Liber Secundus”, where similar elements occur in layer 2. Remarkably, another
significant element in the development of Jung's interpretation of Zarathustra is given by alchemy,
which contributed to enrich the evolving of many motifs present in Liber Novus and anticipating the
seminar.
In the following sections, two different aspects characterising Jung's seminar interpretation will
be investigated: Zarathustra as a representation of Nietzsche's failed individuation process;
Zarathustra animals. Regarding the first point, Jung's opinion on Zarathustra as a representation of
the Old Wise Man will be firstly considered, by showing the problematic elements of Jung's thesis,
and confronting his interpretation of Zarathustra with his characterisation of Philemon. Then the
most relevant points of Nietzsche's “inflation” will be investigated by comparing them with Jung's
“intoxication” – such as Nietzsche's Übermensch and Jung's Übersinn. Lastly, Jung's opinion on
Nietzsche's solitude will be brought out, and, again, a comparison with scenes from Liber Novus,
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where Jung expresses himself in similar manner, will be furnished. In this first part, Jung's
understanding of concepts such as “will to power”, “death of God” and “eternal return” will also
emerge. In the last part of this chapter, the focus is going to be on Jung's peculiar interpretation of
Zarathustra animals, in relation to the same symbols occurring in Liber Novus. First, serpents will
be considered again, this time in connection with other animals, namely birds, spiders and scarabs.
Secondly, the relation between frogs, toads and swamp in Jung's reading of Zarathustra will be
compared with Jung's corresponding understanding in Liber Novus. Lastly, Jung's opinion about
Nietzsche's missing acknowledgement of the Anima in Zarathustra emerging through the doves
symbol will be confronted with his idea of a feminine soul, represented in Liber Novus by the same
symbol.
3.2 ZARATHUSTRA AS NIETZSCHE'S FAILED INDIVIDUATION
3.2.1 THE OLD WISE MAN: ZARATHUSTRA AND PHILEMON
In Jung's personal Zarathustra German copy, the phrase “old man” is underlined in both
sections 2 and 8 of “Prologue”, that is, referring to both the saint in the forest and the hermit in the
woods. During the 1934-1939 seminar, these two characters will be analysed as manifestations of
the “old wise man” archetype indeed. Precisely, they both seem to represent, to Jung, the earlier
Christian attitude, and are therefore defined as “anchorite[s]”.2 The strong presence of Zarathustrian
echoes in Liber Novus descriptions of Jung's encounter with Ammonious has already been
discussed. What is still to be recalled, while referring to the first of these figures in the seminar,
Jung mentions “Philo Judaeus, a Jew, also called Philo of Alexandria”, in order to stress the impact
of the “Logos philosophy” – as well as of its connection with John's Gospel – on early Christianity;
which reminds of the “The Anchorite” episode in Liber Novus.3 The Old Wise Man (sometimes
translated as “wise old man”) [Alter Weiser] represents a manifestation of the wider archetype of
the spirit. In 1948, Jung means by “spirit” “the principle that stands in opposition to matter”, that is
“an immaterial substance or form of existence which on the highest and most universal level is
called 'God'”.4 According to his view, “the psychic manifestations of the spirit indicate at once that
they are of an archetypal nature – in other words, the phenomenon we call spirit depends on the
existence of an autonomous primordial image which is universally present in the preconscious
makeup of human psyche”.5 This means it can manifest in dreams, as well as in fairytales or in
2 SNZ I, pp. 33-47 (9-16 May, 1934) and 173-175 (17 October 1934), respectively.
3 Ibid., p. 41 (cfr. RB II, 4, p. 268; we discussed the relationship between Ammonious, Philo of Alexandria and logos 
in 2.3.1).
4 “The Phenomenology of the Spirit in Fairytales” (1945-1948), CW 9,1, § 385.
5 Ibid., § 396.
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myths. In all these categories, in fact, “the psyche tells its own story”, and through an uninterrupted
game of formation and transformation, the “interplay of the archetypes is revealed in its natural
settings”. The first personification of this archetype introduced by Jung is “the old man” indeed.
When the “hero” finds himself in a “hopeless and desperate situation from which only profound
reflection or a lucky idea – in other words, a spiritual function or an endopsychic automatism of
some kind – can extricate him”, the “old man” appears to help him, with the same frequency “in
fairytales as in dreams”. This figure usually forces the “hero” “to face the issue”, thus saving him
“the trouble of making up his mind”. “Indeed the old man is himself this purposeful reflection and
concentration of moral and physical forces that comes about spontaneously in the psychic space
outside consciousness when conscious thought is not yet – or is no longer – possible”; such a
strength of “psychic forces” brings behind elements that “always look like magic”. The “old man”
does not reveal anything new to the “hero”; nevertheless, by obliging him to reflect, he solves a
situation of tension. In traditional imaginary/imagery, the “old man” shows himself as a “very
critical old man”, a magician, a dwarf. He “represents knowledge, reflection, insight, wisdom,
cleverness, and intuition on the one hand, and on the other, moral qualities such as goodwill and
readiness to help, which make his 'spiritual' character sufficiently plain”. In some primitive stories,
this archetype appears as the sun; in a legend popular among North American Indians, the “old
man” is “a witch-doctor who owns the fire”. The “old man” being an archetype, he presents a
downside as well, which occurs when the “hero” has to face characters such as wicked magicians,
elves, etc.6 Other representations of the “spirit” can take place through theriomorphic figures, such
as “helpful animals”, capable of speaking, acting like humans, and gifted with superior “sagacity”
and “knowledge”.7
According to Jung's Zarathustra interpretation, the “spirit” would be the only unconscious
phenomenon accessible to Nietzsche. His intuition and thinking functions, indeed, would prevent
him from accepting any possible contact with feeling or sensation, without rejecting and projecting.
His only way towards a possible individuation has thus to get through his preference for rationality,
daylight, masculine, and spiritual aspects, before integrating their opposites. In the seminar, the
“Old Wise Man” par excellence is said to be Zarathustra, with whom Nietzsche appears to Jung as
identified and, therefore, inflated. In the session held on 12 December 1934, Prof. Tadeus
Reichstein gave a brief lecture on “the archetype of the Old Wise Man”. The topic is carried out by
6 Ibid., §§ 400-418. It might be of interest to notice that Jung puts the Pentecostal miracle, as well as “the language of
the Old Testament” on the same level of “primitive fairytales” in which the spirit was associated with the fire (§
409).
7 Ibid., §§ 419-455 (§ 421). In this particular case, Jung analyses the specific manifestation of the Spirit archetype
through its personification as an “old man”. As it will be better argued below, the “wise old man” referred to in
Jung's seminar on Zarathustra does not differ at all from this later characterisation of the “old man”.
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focusing on two aspects, namely “the function of the old man in human society” and “the Gods or
superhuman beings in whom this function is expressed, according to myth and tradition”. Regarding
the first point, Prof. Reichstein highlights characteristics from the “extraverted side” of the “old
wise man” archetype, as well as from his “introverted side”. These do not really differ from Jung's
later definition of the Old Man mentioned above. In fact, regarding his introverted side, the “old
wise man” is characterised by “experiences accumulated over a long period of time”, which give
him a certain steadiness towards situations of change. Socially, he tends to play the role of guardian,
teacher, “regulators generally”. From the point of view of introversion, the “old wise man”
possesses “the secret knowledge”, and is in contact with “the secret side of the world, the invisible”.
Therefore, he is usually a sorcerer, a medicine man, a priest, etc. Due to this close link with the
other side of the world, he is also viewed as the “embodiment of the supernatural or the deputy of a
God or Demon”. Usually, the introverted and the extraverted sides of this archetype are both to be
found in a single individual, who is given “the necessary mana (like an electric charge), by a special
ordination and is thus set apart from ordinary people”. On the second point brought out by
Reichstein, namely “The old wise man in Religion and Myth”, a historical excursus is exposed,
which starts from primitives, gets through Egypt, Iran, Poimandres, and arrives to alchemy.
Reichsteins points out that among the primitives, the main role played by “the old wise man” was
related to his “mana”; therefore his strongest attribution was his magical power, usually with
immediate effect. Moreover, this archetype was normally represented “in personal form”, material
but invisible. In ancient Egypt, Thoth, the main expression of “the old wise man” at that time, was
considered a “doctor among the Gods”; he was in charge of keeping equilibrium between the
opposites, as well as of judging. Later on, this figured seemed to be identified with Hermes
Trismegistos, closely entwined with the Iranian development of the same archetype. In fact,
according to Reichstein, in Persia “the old wise man” was incarnated by “God Ormuzd (Primal
Man, Anthropos)”, who “at least from the fragments of the syncretistic era is identified with the
'psyche'”, meant as “essence”, or “self”. From there to Christianity, he represented the chance that
the “World of Light” defeated the darkness. Ormuzd needs to “return home”, that is “the soul or the
self of man” has to reach back the “World of Light”. Ormuzd is sometimes represented as a “divine
messenger” who leads the souls; therefore this myth is often applied in the form of “Cult of the
Dead” and linked to the experience of resurrection. Analogies are also found in Indian and Chinese
Myths, regarded by Reichstein as possible sources. About Poimandres, Reichstein notices that the
major attribution of “the old wise man” was to be “shepherd of men”. Again in this Gnostic sect,
which is said to have had “a great influence on Early Christianity”, the stress is on the separation
between two worlds and their consequent necessity to be reunited. The “process of transformation
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consists in having to repeat the work of creation of the world”, where a correspondence between
“the micro- and the macro-cosmos” must be achieved. Again, a “primal man” is postulated by
Poimandres' conception, and this time this is very much related with the “Logos”, that “consists of
light” and “is the son of god. Know what sees in thee and hears in thee is the Lord's Word”.
According to a myth on world creation, Reichstein reports that “Male-female primal god created the
demiurgos and he created the seven planets, the visible world and fate. Out of the lower elements
rose the Logos and united with the demiurgos his brother, so the lower elements are abandoned by
the Logos and are purely material. Out of them came the dumb animals”. Therefore, “nature and
primal man were longing for each other in love and primal man took his home in the unintelligent
form, in the body”. For this reason men are said to have a “double nature”: mortal in their body;
immortal in their essence, and, also in this case, their purpose is to let their immortal essence
reconnect to its own world. In order to investigate the evolving of “the old wise man” archetype in
alchemy, Reichstein cites from two books from the 17th century. An “old man” actually appears in a
vision narrated by Franz Kieser in the first of the two books, Cabala Chymica (Mühlhausen, 1606),
where a pupil sees this figure “with a long, snow-white beard, in a black robe, with a compass and
square”. He “draws the lines and calls a magic number spell with a horrible voice. On the top of the
quadrangle appears a dove. This he calls the spirit of conjunction and vivification”. Then a star
symbol appears, representing the “philosopher's stone which illuminates everything”, and the “old
man” prays God that “for once evil is put down and the truth revealed”, thus putting an end to the
darkness. The “eternal rotation” of the world stops, or a new world, immune to it, is created. In the
other story, instead, “the old wise man” appears as a “divine messenger” (Johann Valentin Andreä,
The Chymical Marriage of Christian Rosenkreutz in the Year 1459, Strasbourg 1602/1616). As a
remark at the end of Reichstein's exposition, Jung describes this archetype as “the medicine man
simply, who is called when something is wrong”, arises in a period of great difficulty and helps
solve the situation.8
Martin Liebscher has exhaustively discussed the elements brought out by Reichstein's in
relation to the character of Zarathustra. First, he notices that Zarathustra has slowly accumulated
wisdom; in this sense he carries knowledge behind, as in the primitives' representation of the Old
Wise Man as a “medicine man”. Differently from this figure though, Zarathustra reckons that his
disciples are not ready for his wisdom yet, despite his strong will to share his knowledge with them.
Second, Zarathustra rejects the possibility of being considered a “medicine man” [Artz] in the
traditional sense. He does not offer cure or healing, but he is more like a “prophet”, a visionary
man. The main difference with the Egyptian Thoth, as well as with Hermes Trismegistos –
8 SNZ I, pp. 300-313.
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Liebscher points out – is that “Zarathustra cannot keep his knowledge on future happenings for
himself”, but he constantly feels the need of sharing it as a gift. Differently from Iranian mythology,
then, it is observed that Zarathustra is no leader; since his recurrent failures with the crowd from the
marketplace reveal his inability to be taken seriously and to be followed. Furthermore, Zarathustra
speaks against writing, and expresses his teaching through speeches exclusively. In comparison with
Poimandres, Zarathustra explicitly claims that he does not intend to be a shepherd to men, and the
frequent biblical parodies make clear his position against such a concept. Lastly, in relation to
alchemy, Liebscher explains that the strength of Zarathustra's teaching lies in his eternally repeating
failure indeed, which prevents him from being considered a “teacher” who suddenly appears and
proposes the solution for a complex situation, as recurrently narrated in alchemical texts.
Nevertheless, Zarathustra is a teacher, and his “doctrine” on the eternal return can be read – as Jung
does – in terms of solution against the emptiness of nihilism.9 As anticipated, another significant
criticism that Jung's reading might lead to has been highlighted by Peggy Nill. It concerns the issue
of temporality in Zarathustra, that is to say, by interpreting the character of Zarathustra
archetypically, the crucial role of temporality to his characterisation is overlooked. In fact, the
whole narration is focused on the fact that Zarathustra gets old, and from his ageing he gains
strength and experience. If this aspect is neglected, one of the main aims of Nietzsche's loses
importance, namely his fight against Schopenhauer and the “Priester-Ideal”.10 In addition to Nill's
and Liebscher's questioning on Zarathustra's actual archetypical nature, and if considering Jung's
definition of “The Old Man” published in 1948, it can be stated that Zarathustra does not possess
“moral qualities” – meant neither in a positive, nor in a negative sense –, as his goal is to actually
overcome any kind of morals. Furthermore, whereas the “old man” does not reveal any new truth,
but just makes the “hero” aware of his situation and lets him think on his own, Zarathustra has
proper revelations in his dreams, which characterise his own wisdom, that is a particular
knowledge, belonging to him only. Moreover, he intends to teach a precise “doctrine” whose
specific contents, e.g. the Übermensch, have nothing to do with other ideas, expressed by Nietzsche
elsewhere. In this sense, it is not easy to regard his teachings in terms of solutions to Nietzsche's
personal psychological troubles. However, it is quite arguable to consider the character of
Zarathustra as an example for “the old man”, while dealing with other figures in the evolving of the
plot. Zarathustra's “doctrine” can be indeed read in terms of an 'empty' “doctrine” in which he does
not provide his disciples with contents, but rather allows them to find solutions themselves.
The amount of problems with the interpretation of Zarathustra as the Old Wise Man is high
9 M. Liebscher, Libido und Wille zur Macht, cit., pp. 68-83.
10 P. Nill, “Die Versuchung der Psyche”, cit, pp. 263-264. Such issues have been also discussed in “Introduction”, § 
2.1.
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enough to wonder whether Jung's idea could not be better contextualised by confronting it with
figures from Liber Novus, which will later contribute to delineate this archetype features, in
particular Philemon. First of all, it must be noticed that, according to what reported in Memories,
Dreams, Reflexions, Philemon is described as “a pagan and brought with him an Egypto-Hellenistic
atmosphere with a Gnostic coloration”. He appeared for the first time in a dream about a kingfisher
which Jung could not interpret, so he decided to paint the character. To Jung, he “represented a
force which was not” himself; in his “fantasies [he] held conversations with him, and he said things
which [Jung] had not consciously thought”. He “represented superior insight”, a “guru”.11 Still in
Memories, Dreams Reflexions, it is written:
At Bollingen I am in the midst of my true life, I am most deeply myself. Here I am, as it were,
the 'age-old son of the mother.' That is how alchemy puts it, very wisely, for the 'old man,' the
'ancient,' whom I had already experienced as a child, is personality No. 2, who has always
been and always will be. He exists outside time and is the son of the maternal un- conscious.
In my fantasies he took the form of Philemon, and he comes to life again at Bollingen.12
The dialogue between Jung's “I” and Philemon in the latest part of “Liber Secundus” evokes
several elements recalling Zarathustra and his role as a teacher. As already anticipated, Philemon
and Zarathustra are depicted with similar features, and in Jung's description of his final meeting
with Philemon there are elements which remind of Nietzsche's text. Besides, a few characteristics
belonging to Philemon will be attributed to Zarathustra in the 30's. At the beginning of his seminar,
Jung reads Zarathustra as a “Saoshyant”, namely “a mediator between god and man”, “a reaper, a
saviour”, that appears “every thousand years – […] about half of a month of the great platonic
year”, and “teaches people a new revelation, a new truth, or renews old truths”. This is a
“Zoroastrian teaching”, indeed, and, according to Jung, it would have evolved through Christianity,
11 MDR, pp. 182-184. According to this description, Philemon would be also developed out of the character of Elijah.
Jung's narration adds another interesting element: “Later, Philemon became relativized by the emergence of yet
another figure, whom I called Ka. In ancient Egypt the 'king's ka' was his earthly form, the embodied soul. In my
fantasy the ka-soul came from below, out of the earth as if out of a deep shaft. I did a painting of him, showing him
in his earth-bound form, as a herm with base of stone and upper part of bronze. High up in the painting appears a
kingfisher's wing, and between it and the head of Ka floats a round, glowing nebula of stars. Ka's expression has
something demonic about it one might also say, Mephistophelian. In one hand he holds something like a colored
pagoda, or a reliquary, and in the other a stylus with which he is working on the reliquary. He is saying, 'I am he who
buries the gods in gold and gems'. Philemon had a lame foot, but was a winged spirit, whereas Ka represented a kind
of earth demon or metal demon. Philemon was the spiritual aspect, or 'meaning'. Ka, on the other hand, was a spirit
of nature like the Anthroparion of Greek alchemy with which at the time I was still unfamiliar. Ka was he who made
everything real, but who also obscured the halcyon spirit, Meaning, or replaced it by beauty, the 'eternal reflection'.
In time I was able to integrate both figures through the study of alchemy.”
12 Ibid., p. 225 (italics ours). On an accurate analysis of all the historical interpretations of Philemon in relation to his
meaning to Jung's personal psychology, see S. Shamdasani, Jung Stripped Bare: By His Biographers, Even, Karnac,
London 2005, pp. 62-86.
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turning into the enantiodromia of an alternation of positive and “negative Saoshyant[s]”. He then
finds coherency with historical facts: the coming of Christ (after Zoroaster), and that one of the
Antichrist, that is to say of the widespread angst for the world end (happening around the year
1000); after that, finally, the Church took his power back again, until the final schism of
Protestantism. Despite the historical inaccuracy of such happenings if compared with their expected
dates, Jung seems to firmly believe in the possibility that Nietzsche's need for destroying old values
could be read in the sense that “he feels himself […] as a positive Saoshyant, in spite of the fact that
he accepts the title of 'immoralist' and 'Antichrist'”. Due to the archetypical essence of Zarathustra,
“a feeling of remote times, as if time were at a complete standstill” would characterise Nietzsche's
meeting with him, and complete his sense of having a timeless task to take on.13 With these words,
Jung retrospectively comments on his encounter with Philemon, at the end of “Liber Secundus”:
When the month of the Twins had ended, the men said to their shadows: 'You are I', since they
had previously had their spirit around them as a second person. Thus the two became one, and
through this collision the formidable broke out, precisely that spring of consciousness that one
calls culture and which lasted until the time of Christ. But the fish indicated the moment when
what was united split, according to the eternal law of contrasts, into an underworld and
upperworld. If the power of growth begins to cease, then the united falls into its opposites.
Christ sent what is beneath to Hell, since it strives toward the good. That had to be. But the
separated cannot remain separated forever. It will be united again and the month of the fish
will soon be over. We suspect and understand that growth needs both, and hence we keep
good and evil close together. Because we know that too far into the good means the same as
too far into evil, we keep them both together.14
The phrase “the two became one” [die zwei wurden eins] can be worthily remarked, as
reminding of Nietzsche's poem “Sils Maria”, in which the famous sentence “the one became two”
[wurde eins zu zwei] appears, in order to describe his first 'meeting' with Zarathustra. Still in his
first seminar sessions, Jung utilises this phrase to describe Nietzsche's experience as an archetypical
one: “Zarathustra […] became manifest as a second personality in himself”. Because of the lack of
convincing psychological theories on a non materialistic nature of the unconscious at his time,
Nietzsche's only choice to accept that event, was identifying with the Old Wise Man archetype, i.e.
Zarathustra. By experiencing the unconscious and its independence, Nietzsche would go through “a
peculiar sense of destiny”, or better “the Dionysian experience par excellence”.15 Back to Liber
13 SNZ I, pp. 12-13 (2 May 1934). As Jung shows exhaustively, the same idea of a saviour is present in India and Japan
too.
14 RB II, 21, “The Magician”, p. 314.
15 SNZ I, p. 10.
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Novus, Jung's “I” addresses Philemon this way:
You are legendary and unreachable. You were and will be, returning periodically: Your
wisdom is invisible, your truth is unknowable, entirely untrue in any given age, and yet true in
all eternity; but you pour out living water, from which the flowers of your garden bloom, a
starry water, a dew of the night.16
Similarities between this Liber Novus chapter and Zarathustra chapter “On the Bestowing
Virtue” have been previously investigated, particularly referring to Zarathustra and Philemon as
teachers. If these two characters share some features, there are also differences to be noticed. When
analysing these in the light of Jung's later Zarathustra interpretation, it is remarkable that the same
way of regarding Zarathustra's wisdom can be already found in his dialogue with Philemon. In fact,
Philemon cries out: “Giving is as childish as power. He who gives presumes himself powerful. The
virtue of giving is the sky-blue mantle of the tyrant”, therefore he is said to be “wise”, for he does
not give. He wants his “garden to bloom, and for everything to grow from itself”.17 Giving is one of
the leitmotifs in Zarathustra, as well as the millstone of Zarathustra's “virtue”, which is also his
“wisdom” and, as it has been previously pointed out, is meant as an unconventional one.18 In a few
seminar comments, Jung criticises Nietzsche's attitude in terms of power and “feeling of
inferiority”. On 4 May 1938, by analysing chapter “Self-surpassing”, Jung argues that Nietzsche
“produced the psychological power theory first, anticipating, thus, Adlerian psychology, the so
called individual psychology, though it is not individual at all, but is very collective, as one sees
from the way Nietzsche states the case”. He then declares: “People with a power attitude are always
inclined to accuse, either to accuse in themselves a gesture of power, or anything suggesting such
an attitude in anybody else. You see, that so-called power attitude is always expressed on the other
side by feelings of inferiority; otherwise power makes no sense”.19 Nietzsche represents to Jung
such a case, as made clear by the description of his personality:
Now when Nietzsche sees the power aspect of things – and that aspect cannot be denied – he
is quite right inasmuch as there is a misuse of power. But if he sees it everywhere, at the core
of everything, it has crept in as the secret of life even, if he sees it as the will to be and to
16 RB II, 21, p. 316.
17 Ibid.
18 To this respect, it might be remarked that “virtue” [Tugend] and “wisdom” [Weisheit] are used by Nietzsche as
synonyms in Zarathustra. See my essay: G. Domenici, “Springende Brunnen und tanzende Mädchen. Tugend,
Weisheit, Leben und Liebe in der Lehre vom Nacht- und Tanzlied“, in: M. Ates (ed.), Nietzsches Zarathustra
Auslegen. Thesen, Positionen und Entfaltungen zu »Also sprach Zarathustra« von Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, cit.,
pp. 113-127.
19 SNZ II, p. 1211.
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create, then he makes a great mistake. Then he is blindfolded by his own complex, for he is
the man who, on the one side, has feelings of inferiority, and on the other, a tremendous
power complex. What was the man Nietzsche in reality? A neurotic, a poor devil who suffered
from migraine and a bad digestion, and had such bad eyes that he could read very little and
was forced to give up his academic career. And he couldn't marry because an early syphilitic
infection blighted his whole Eros side. Of course, all that contributed to the most beautiful
inferiority complex you can imagine; such a fellow is made for an inferiority complex, and
will therefore build up an immense power attitude on the other side. […] If you know your
one passion is power and assume that other people have such a passion too, you are not far
from the mark. But there are people who have power, who have good eyes and no migraine
and can swing things, and to accuse people of 'power' is perfectly ridiculous, for they create
something, they are positive. Then the devil gets them naturally by another corner and that is
what the power psychologist does not see.
Now of course, Nietzsche is very much on the side on the inferiority, where the only passion,
the only ambition, is: how can I get to the top?20
On 19 October 1938, while commenting on Zarathustra chapter “The Bedwarfing Virtue”, Jung
associates Nietzsche's “feelings of inferiority” to a “psychology […] born out of […] resentment”
against the others. He warns his participants: “Nietzsche is the author of the Will-to-Power, don't
forget.”21 Although Adler openly refers to Nietzsche while introducing his concept of “will to
power” [Wille zur Macht] for the very first time, in 1912, his understanding of the phrase appears
far away from Nietzsche's original conception. Similarly to Jung, Adler understands Nietzsche's
personality in terms of inferiority feeling, and the concept of “power” [Macht] is considered a form
of “compensation” [Kompensation] or “overcompensation” [Überkompensation] for such an
inferiority feeling. He writes: “Die Ausdrucksform selbst und die Vertiefung dieses Leitgedankens,
den man auch als Wille zur Macht (Nietzsche) bezeichnen könnte, belehrt uns, dass sich eine
besondere Kraft kompensatorisch im Spiel befindet, die der inneren Unsicherheit ein Ende machen
will. Durch die starre Formulierung, die meist an die Oberfläche des Bewusstseins dringt, sucht der
Neurotiker den festen Punkt zu gewinnen, um die Welt aus den Angeln zu heben.”.22 About twenty
20 Ibid., pp. 1213-1214.
21 Ibid., pp. 1353-1354. If in the above case Nietzsche's “psychology of power” was associated with Adler's, now his
“resentment” against society is linked to Freud: “Nietzsche, not being a doctor, did the social part of the critique as it
were; and Freud, being a doctor, saw behind the screen and showed the intricacies of the individual” (p. 1354). See
also SNZ I, p. 672 (6 November 1935): “If you go on through the text ['The Thousand and one Goals'] or if you read
his Genealogy of Morals, it is perfectly plain that he derives morality entirely from the instinct of power, no matter
whether the instinct is love or not”.
22 A. Adler, Über den nervösen Charakter, J. F. Bergmann, Wiesbaden 1912, p. 19. It might be of interest to quote
Adler's opinion on the eternal return, too: “Die 'Wiederkehr des Gleichen' (Nietzsche) ist nirgends so gut wie beim
Nervösen zu verstehen. Sein Minderwertigkeitsgefühl den Personen und Dingen gegenüber, seine Unsicherheit in
der Welt drängen ihn zur Verstärkung der Leitlinien” (ibid., p. 15). On Adler's reception of Nietzsche, see A. Bruder-
Bezzel, “Alfred Adlers Nietzsche-Bezug und die schöpferische Kraft”, in: R. Lesmeister, E. Metzner (eds.),
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years later, still dealing with the question of “overcompensation” but in relation to society, he will
take Nietzsche's Übermensch as an example for an unnatural attempt to compensate his inferiority
feeling: such an “elitist” superhuman being would represent the opposite of human natural strivings,
normally orientated towards “community feelings”.23 Returning to Jung, the same way of
understanding Nietzsche's idea of “will to power” was already present at the time of Liber Novus. In
“On the Psychology of the Unconscious” (1917-1943), after having depicted Nietzsche as someone
who “with a rare passion [...] sacrificed himself, his whole life, to the idea of the Superman – to the
idea of the man who through obedience to instincts transcends himself”, Jung calls Nietzsche's
personality a “pathological” one, and writes: “It is of this last instinct, the will to power, that
Nietzsche obviously speaks. Whatever else is instinctual only follows, for him, in the train of the
will to power”.24 The aim of Jung's criticism is Adler's individual psychology. Already in the
“Preface to the first edition (1917)”, referring to the changes that had been made since the first
publication of the essay in 1912, Jung made clear that “Adler's psychology was taken into account”,
whereas “a number of passages on Freud were shortened”.25
Associating Nietzsche to the concept of “will to power” was a common attitude in those years.
Although Nietzsche gave up the publication of a work called “The Will to Power” (started in 1885),
and preferred to publish smaller volumes separately in 1888,26 his sister decided to involve his
collaborator Heinrich Köselitz (Peter Gast) and carry on her late brother's project. The main reason
why Nietzsche gave up his idea, was the inadequacy of a single, ambitious volume in order to
contrast and 'trans-valuate' the notion of systematisation present in any metaphysical conception;
rather, he would attack his philosophical 'arch-enemies' from various different angles, or, to put it
with Nietzsche, “perspectives”. Nietzsche's understandings of “power” and “will to power”, in fact,
are to be read in terms of interpretation: “What urges you on, and arouses your ardor, you wisest of
men, do you call it 'will to truth'? Will to conceivability of all being: That is what I call your will.
[…] That is your entire will, you wisest men; it is a will to power, and that is so even when you talk
Nietzsche und die Tiefenpsychologie, cit., pp. 91-106, and A. Bruder-Bezzel, “Nietzsche, Freud und Adler”, in: A.
Bruder-Bezzel and K. J. Bruder, Kreativität und Determination. Studien zu Nietzsche, Freud und Adler, Vandenhoek
& Ruprecht, Göttingen 2003, pp. 122-169.
23 A. Adler, “Über den Ursprung des Strebens nach Überlegenheit und des Gemeinschaftsgefühls” (1993), in: H. L.
Ansbacher and R. Antoch (eds.), Alfred Adler, Psychotherapie und Erziehung. Ausgewählte Aufsätze, Band III:
1933-1937, Fischer, Frankfurt/M 1983, p. 22. Elsewhere Adler relates “personal superiority” to neurosis and sadism
(A. Adler, Der Sinn des Lebens, Fischer, Frankfurt / M 1933, p. 84).
24 CW 7, §§ 36-38.
25 Ibid., “Preface to the first edition (1917)”. Jung's idea is: “The psychology of the individual is reflected in the
psychology of the nation. What the nation does is done also by each individual, and so long as the individual
continues to do it, the nation will do likewise”.
26 The Case of Wagner, The Twilight of the Idols [Die Götzen Dämmerung], Ecce Homo [Ecce Homo], The Anti-Christ
[Der Antichrist], Dithyrambs of Dionysus [Dionysos-Dithyramben], Nietzsche Contra Wagner [Nietzsche contra
Wagner] (this last two came out in 1889).
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of good and evil and of the assessment of values”.27 Will to power means nothing outside life itself,
that is no individualism, or social implications are meant in Nietzsche's conception, for such
concepts are created by life in its evaluation process and are given only as a result: “Where I found
a living creature, there I found will to power; and even in the will of the servant I found the will to
be master. […] The living creatures value many things higher than life itself; yet out of this
evaluation itself speaks – the will to power”.28 In Beyond Good and Evil the same meaning is
expressed through the famous sentence, at the end of aphorism 22, with which Nietzsche anticipates
a response to possible criticisms to his notion of will to power: “Supposing that this also is only an
interpretation – and you will be eager enough to raise that objection? – well, so much the better”
[Gesetzt, dass auch dies nur Interpretation ist – und ihr werdet eifrig genug sein, dies einzuwenden?
– nun, um so besser].29 As long as everything is subject to interpretation, in fact, the same concept
of interpretation stops making sense, if thought in terms of “truth”.
Nevertheless, due to her intense commitment to nationalism, as well as to antisemitism,
Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche struggled to insert her brother's name in the same tradition of
systematic German philosophers'. Not only did she edit The Will to Power in a completely arbitrary
order – that is by conforming to only one of the plans drawn by her brother –, but in 1894 (when the
philosopher was still alive, even if insane) she had already decided to publish all of Nietzsche's
works in a unique collection of nineteen volumes (plus an index added later on, in 1926). Until
1913, Elisabeth, Peter Gast and the editor Naumann from Leipzig edited the so-called
Großoktavausgabe; the project then switched to the editor Kröner. Several editions of The Will to
Power were printed until 1930, when the contract with Kröner expired, as well as Elisabeth's
property rights on her brother's material, as thirty years had passed since his death and she had not
been able to prolong the legal expiry. At that time, the posthumous material kept in the so-called
“Nietzsche-Archiv” in Weimar – of course created by Elisabeth herself – was available for
consultation and citation. The first questions on Nachlaß arose, even though nobody seemed to
really question the reliability of The Will to Power.30 At the end of the 50's, the idea of a critical
27 Za II, “Of Self-Overcoming”, KSA 4, 146. 
28 Ibid., KSA 4, 147-149.
29 JGB I, 22, KSA 5,37.
30 For instance, in 1931, Bäumler claimed that The Will to Power edited in 1906 was the only reliable source of
investigation on Nietzsche (A. Bäumler, Nietzsche. Der Philosph und der Politiker, Reclam, Leipzig 1931, pp 7-15).
However, in the same year, he himself edited a collection of excerpts from Nachlaß with the same Kröner Verlag
(Die Unschuld des Werdens). Similarly, Heidegger made use of Elisabeth's relation to her brother and, above all of
Gast's (disputable) “friendship” with him, as well as of his ability to decipher Nietzsche's handwriting, in order to
explain the reliability of their work (M. Heidegger, “Der Wiederkunftsgedanke in den zurückgehaltenen
Aufzeichnungen”, in: Nietzsche, Neske, Pfullingen 1961, 2 vols., vol. I, pp. 328-329). In order to show how strong a
metaphysical reading of Nietzsche's philosophy was, Jasper's interpretation might be shortly recalled too. Although
he openly recognised the impossibility of systematising Nietzsche's thinking, he made use of such an impossibility
to draw a system out of it. Precisely in the apparent unintelligibility of his aphorisms, Nietzsche's “philosophy of
life” would express itself to the best (K. Jaspers, Nietzsche. Einführung in das Verständnis seines Philosophierens,
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edition came eventually up thanks to two Italian scholars, Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari,
although scholars such as Karl Schlechta had previously questioned Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche's
criteria, especially in relation to her significant forgeries.31 As already written, Jung had a short
correspondence with Elisabeth while writing his dissertation, and the same edition
Kleinoktavausgabe of Nietzsche's Gesammelte Werke possessed by him followed her original
project, the Großoktavausgabe; it was only a smaller version.32 No wonder the general opinion on
Nietzsche at that time was strongly influenced by The Will to Power misconception.
Philemon's attributions of wisdom might sound as a criticism to Zarathustra's virtue, meant as
an expression of Nietzsche's “feeling of inferiority”. In Jung's personal copy, both chapters “Selbst-
surpassing” and “The Bedwarfing Virtue” display several underlinings. In particular, in “Selbst-
surpassing”, along the text “You first want to make all being conceivable: for, with a healthy
mistrust, you doubt wether it is in fact conceivable”, Jung wrote “introv”. The “i” being written in
small letters suggests that Jung intended to refer to Nietzsche as an introverted type; this annotation
is thus likely to belong to a different period than Liber Novus, when the categorisation introverted-
extraverted had not been established yet. It is difficult to say wether it was written in preparation for
Zarathustra seminar though, as that paragraph is omitted by Jung in his analysis. Right at the
beginning of “The Bedwarfing Virtue” in Jung's exemplar of Nietzsche's Zarathustra, instead,
another inscription reads: “Verkleinerung des Menschen” – which is the main theme of the chapter,
in fact. Underneath the phrase there is a cross-reference, in red, to p. 303, that is to chapter “The
Shadow”. Here the reference is very probably directed to his seminar, where he faces the issue in
terms of “inflation”. Although Jung did not have the time to comment on the last part of
Zarathustra in his seminar, he often mentioned sections from it, in order to make clear his
interpretation of previous chapters. In most cases, with such examples Jung intends to address to
Nietzsche's rejection of inferiority, expressed by Jung as the Shadow, indeed.
In Autumn 1915, Philemon appears to Jung again. The closeness of such an apparition to “On
The Bestowing Virtue” has been already highlighted; what is still to be pointed out, is that all of
1935/1974, de Gruyter, Berlin 1981).
31 On a detailed reconstruction of the events that led to the birth of a critical edition of Nietzsche's works, see G.
Campioni, Leggere Nietzsche. Alle origini dell’edizione critica Colli-Montinari. Con lettere e testi inediti, ETS, Pisa
1992 (especially pp. 19-67). See also G. Campioni, “Nota”, in: M. Montinari, Che cosa ha detto Nietzsche. A cura e
con una nota di Giuliano Campioni, Adelphi, Milan 2001, pp. 196-224, and G. Campioni, “Lombrichi e tesori. La
ricerca delle fonti e la 'biblioteca ideale' di Nietzsche”, in La passione della conoscenza. Volume pubblicato in onore
di Sossio Giametta, a cura del Centro interdipartimentale di ricerca Arthur Schopenhauer e la scuola dell'università
del Salento, Pensa MultiMedia Editore, Lecce 2010, pp. 85-105. On fascist, idealistic, as well as nationalistic
readings of Nietzsche, see M. Montinari, Su Nietzsche, Editori Riuniti, Rome 1981.
32 Beside the Groß- and the Kleinoktavausgabe, other editions of Nietzsche's Gesammelte Werke were published, in
both hardcover and paperback sizes. See: D. M. Hoffmann, Zur Geschichte des Nietzsche-Archivs, De Gruyter,
Berlin / New York 1991; M. Montinari, “Die neue kritische Gesamtausgabe von Nietzsches Werken”. in: Nietzsche
lesen, de Gruyter, Berlin / New York 1982, pp. 10-21.
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Philemon speeches, here, are directed towards Jung's “I”, meant as pure vanity. This seems to
somehow anticipate Jung's concept of inflation, as it will be better argued in the next section. Lastly,
to show how closely entwined Philemon and Zarathustra might be thought, it can be recalled that in
the night of 21 February 1916, Philemon appears again “wearing a long coat and a turban”, thus
evoking the historical features of Zoroaster.33
 3.2.2 INTOXICATION, INFLATION, THE ÜBERMENSCH AND THE ÜBERSINN
It has already been said that “Scrutinies” can be considered as a dialogue between Jung and
Zarathustra, supported by Philemon. All the most significant similarities between this section and
Zarathustra have already been pointed out. What is still to be noticed, is that Jung's aim is the
vanity of the “I”, namely its inability to accept a different reality from itself. This is precisely the
meaning of Jung's concept of “inflation”, and these are exactly the same criticisms that Jung makes
to Nietzsche in his seminar:
Yes, he is identical with the archetype. Of course he makes a difference between himself and
Zarathustra […] but he cannot help feeling gripped by that figure and he even is Zarathustra at
times, and that is an inflation. […] Nietzsche cannot help being partly identical with
Zarathustra, because that was the time of the culmination of materialistic science and
philosophy and nobody had a hint of psychology, nobody had thought of the possibility of
making a difference between oneself and something psychical.34
For this reason, the language is also said to be “terribly pregnant”; since it compensates “human
being feelings of inferiority which are not admitted” by an inflated individual. In the same
circumstance, Zarathustra is depicted in terms of “mana” personality, too.35 Almost contemporarily
to the seminar, in the second part of “The Relations Between the Ego and the Unconscious” [“Die
Beziehungen zwischen dem Ich und dem Unbewussten”] (1928-1935/1938), Jung describes the
“mana personality” as “on one side a being of superior wisdom, on the other a being of superior
will”. He adds:
Meister Eckhardt, Goethe in his Faust, Nietzsche in his Zarathustra have again brought this
problem somewhat closer to us. Goethe and Nietzsche try to solve it by the idea of mastery,
the former through the figure of the magician and ruthless man of will who makes a pact with
33 RB “Scrutinies”, § 13, p. 355. In Jung's Black Books, the character is said to be a “Turk” who intends to speak “of
polygamy, houris, and paradise ” (S. Shamdasani, footnote 131, in: ibid). As the dialogue involves other significant
references to Zarathustra and animal figures, it will be discussed in section 3.3.2.
34 SNZ I, p. 27.
35 Ibid., pp. 27-29.
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the devil, the latter through the masterman and supreme sage who knows neither God nor
devil. With Nietzsche man stands alone, as he himself did, neurotic, financially dependent,
godless and worldless. This is no ideal for a real man who has a family to support and taxes to
pay. Nothing can argue the reality of the world out of existence, there is no miraculous way
round it. Similarly, nothing can argue the effects of the unconscious out of existence. Or can
the neurotic philosopher prove to us that he has no neurosis? He cannot prove it even to
himself.36
The “mana personality” appears when an “autonomous complex” is not recognised as such,
therefore it keeps one's ego under its spell. This is particularly the case with the Anima/Animus,
whose fascination is initially too strong to figure out the difference between oneself and the
archetypical power. When the Anima “can no longer exercise the power of possession, since it is
depotentiated”, her function is assimilated and integrated in one's evolving personality. At this
point, “no longer is the soul to be called 'Mistress', but a psychological function of an intuitive
nature”.37  Similarly, “In differentiating the ego from the archetype of the mana-personality one is
now forced [...] to make conscious those contents which are specific of the mana-personality.
Historically, the mana-personality is always in possession of the secret name, or of the esoteric
knowledge, or has the prerogative of a special way of acting – quod licet Jovi, non licet bovi – in a
word, it has individual distinction”.38 At the very end of Zarathustra, II, Nietzsche calls his “stillest
hour”, his “terrible mistress” [furchtbare() Herrin].39 In his seminar, Jung interprets the passage as a
dialogue between Nietzsche and his Anima, and comments on the sentence “Thou knowest it,
Zarathustra” by affirming: “This allusion to a secret knowledge in him is most uncanny”. Indeed,
according to Jung, Nietzsche's Anima is trying to make clear to him his own psychological situation
and let him react – “The Anima speaks absolutely to the point, as if she were a first-rate
psychotherapist” – but Nietzsche's inflation is far too deep, so is his Anima rejection.40
Nietzsche is therefore under the spell of Zarathustra; what this means, is that this is the only
unconscious part he is able to recognise and accept. In terms of his philosophy, Jung associates such
a psychological attitude with the assumption of the “death of God”. In one of the first seminar
sessions, Jung raises the question: “What happens when he declares that God is dead?”.41 What
36 CW 7, §§ 396-397. The essay, slowly developed by Jung through years, was first published in 1916, under the title
“La structure de l'inconscient”, and in 1920, under the title “The Conception of the Unconscious” .
37 Ibid., § 374.
38 Ibid., §393. It is remarkable that Jung describes the role of this archetype in terms of “initiation”, too (§ 384).
39 Za II, 22, “The Stillest Hour”, KSA 4, 187.
40 SNZ II, pp. 1244-1246 (11 May 1938). Cfr. CW 5, § 459: “The vengeful Hera would then appear as the stern
'Mistress Soul', who imposes the most difficult labours on her hero and threatens him with destruction unless he
plucks up courage for the supreme deed and actually becomes what he always potentially was”.
41 SNZ I, p. 50 (16 May 1934). Jung also says: “If a person is conscious of it [that 'God had worked in the worth
hitherto'], his responsibility can heighten to such an extent that he will have a hellish inflation of consciousness. But
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happens, in fact, is that one becomes God oneself: “So when Nietzsche declares that God is dead,
instantly he begins to transform. […] He immediately gets into the process of that archetype of
rebirth, because those vital powers in us which we call 'God' are powers of self-renewal, powers of
eternal change”.42 Consequently, one comes to possess the most powerful creative skills, as well as
the responsibility for all good and evil in the world. In another session, Jung points out the
difference between an identification caused by inflation, and the conscious undertaking of a
Christian attitude:
If a man says he is Jesus Christ you tell him he is a fool and belongs in a clinic. But if a man
says he throws his whole load on Christ to take care of, it is considered marvellous; he
preaches it and confesses it and nobody has any doubt its being right. […] To identify with a
suffering God is no small business. Something is going to happen to you. You cannot have all
the advantages of an inflation and no disadvantages. That the god has all the human
disadvantages, and you all the advantages of a god, is not possible, and it will cost very dearly
in the end.43
A few sessions later, it is the same contradiction implicit in inflation to be brought out: “As soon
as you identify with God you needs must transcend him because God is a stream; and you are not
the air or the rushing waters, but are just a definite form called human, so you can only personify
God in yourself”.44 In another occasion, as a consequence derived from this contradiction,
Zarathustra's being “numinosum” is highlighted by Jung:
[...] when a definite image has been reduced to apparent nothingness, it is just as if the
pneuma, what we call 'spirit', were also reduced to its primeval form which is just air. You see,
when you have the experience of the deity, the numinosum, and you have an image of it, you
can say this is experience of the spirit, but when you reduce it and deny its existence, you are
simply filled with air.45
At the very beginning of “Scrutinies”, Jung talks to his “I” and accuse it to be “craving for
also if he does not realize it, if he does not know what he has done by saying that God is dead, he can have an
inflation of his whole personality. Then his unconscious will get inflated; he will be hampered by the continuous
presence of God in the unconscious, which is of course the most terrible thing. Things happen to him, and he thinks
he is responsible” (ibid., p. 51).
42 Ibid., p. 54. He also adds: “Goethe felt that: there is a beautiful verse in Faust about the kingdom of the mothers
where everything is in a continuous state of self-renewal, a continuous arrangement. And this kingdom of the
mothers is the abyss of the deity; it is the darkness of the good, the deus absconditus, the auctor rerum, the dark
father of created things. Also one can say it is the original mother”.
43 Ibid., p. 758 (11 December 1935); italics ours.
44 SNZ II, p. 860 (26 February 1936).
45 Ibid., p. 1039 (5 May 1937).
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power”. He adds: “You call on God for help? The dear old God has died”.46 Still in “Scrutinies”, on
18 September 1915, when reflecting on Philemon's discussion on virtue, Jung affirms:
We must presumably often go to ourselves to re-establish the connection with the self since it
is torn apart all too often, not only by our vices but also by our virtues. For vices as well as
virtues always want to live outside. But through constant outer life we forget the self and
through this we also become secretly selfish in our best endeavors. What we neglect in
ourselves blends itself secretly into our actions toward others.47
The assonance with Zarathustra implied by the relation vices-virtues, as well as by the necessity
of finding balance within oneself, has been previously discussed. Jung reflects on his conversation
with Philemon with these words:
But sin probably resides in enchantment. If I accept self-forgetting virtue [selbstvergessende
Tugend], I make myself the selfish tyrant of the other, and I am thus also forced to surrender
myself again in order to make another my master, which always leaves me with a bad
impression and is not to the other's advantage. Admittedly, this interplay underpins society,
but the soul of the individual becomes damaged since man thus learns always to live from the
other instead of from himself. It appears to me that, if one is capable, one should not surrender
oneself as that induces, indeed even forces, the other to do likewise. But what happens if
everyone surrenders themselves? That would be folly.
Not that it would be a beautiful or a pleasant thing to live with one's self but it serves the
redemption of the self. Incidentally, can one give oneself up? With this one becomes one's
own slave. That is the opposite of accepting oneself. If one becomes one's own slave – and
this happens to everyone who surrenders himself – one is lived by the self. One does not live
one's self; it lives itself.
The self-forgetting virtue is an unnatural alienation from one's own essence, which is thus
deprived of development. It is a sin to deliberately alienate the other from his self by means of
one's own virtuousness, for example, through saddling oneself with his burden. This sin
rebounds on us.
It is submission enough, amply enough, if we subjugate ourselves to our self. The work of
redemption is always first to be done on ourselves, if one dare utter such a great word. This
work cannot be done without love for ourselves. Must it be done at all? Certainly not, if one
can endure a given condition and does not feel in need of redemption. 
 The tiresome feeling of needing redemption can finally become too much for one. Then one
46 RB, “Scrutinies”, § 1, p. 333.
47 Ibid., § 3, pp. 337-338.
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seeks to rid oneself of it and thus enters into the work of redemption.48
This passage appears significantly close to a few lines from two chapters from Zarathustra:
“The Self also seeks with the eyes of sense, it listens too with the ears of the spirit. The Self is
always listening and seeking: it compares, subdues, conquers, destroys. It rules and is also the I's
ruler. Behind your thoughts and feelings, my brother, stands a mighty commander, an unknown
sage- he is called Self” (“Of The Despiser Of The Body”), and “You crowd together with your
neighbours and have beautiful words for it. But I tell you: Your love of your neighbour is your bad
love of yourself. You flee away from yourselves and would like to make a virtue of it: but I see
through your 'selflessness'” (“Of Love Of One's Neighbour”).49 Both passages display underlinings
and markings in Jung's personal copy. Jung's understandings of self redemption and love to oneself
seem to have precisely the same meaning as they have in Zarathustra. However, a few lines below,
Jung makes clear that “we benefit in particular from removing every sense of beauty from the
thought of redemption”. With such an assumption, he clearly distances himself from any aesthetic
justification and moves towards a moral dimension. According to him, in the union with the self,
God is experienced, whatever the nature of such an experience. In fact, he also admits:
  
But I must say that the God makes us sick. I experience the God in sickness. A living God
afflicts our reason like a sickness. He fills the soul with intoxication. He fills us with reeling
chaos. How many will the God break?
The God appears to us in a certain state of the soul. Therefore we reach the God through the
self. Not the self is God, although we reach the God through the self. The God is behind the
self above the self, the self itself, when he appears. But he appears as our sickness, from
which we must heal ourselves. We must heal ourselves from the God, since he is also our
heaviest wound.50
On the one hand, it is required not to confuse “the God” with “the self” – the latter is only a
symbol for the former –, on the other hand, God is put in connection with sickness and wounds.
Another aspect is also anticipated, which will be predominant in the seminar on Zarathustra,
namely the relation between “death of God” and what Jung will later call “inflation”. Since the
“self” is a symbol for the “God”, killing the “God” implies to suppress the independence of the
“self” and constrain it within the ego. “It is certainly possible and even quite easy for our reason to
deny the God and to speak only of sickness. Thus we accept the sick part and can also heal it. But it
48 Ibid.
49 Za I, 4, KSA 4, 39-40, and Za I, 16, KSA 4, 77 (cfr. S. Shamdasani, footnotes 29 and 30, in: RB, “Scrutinies”,  § 3,
pp. 337-338). 
50 RB “Scrutinies”, § 3, p. 338.
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will be a healing with loss. We lose a part of life. We go on living, but as ones lamed by the God”.51
This seems to be the case with Nietzsche, who frequently speaks of sickness and struggles to deal
with a godless world.52 In particular, in The Anti-Christ, § 51, the link between Christianity
(especially Catholicism), decadence and sickness (meant in terms of mental disorder, even) is
expressed quite strongly:
The fact that, under certain circumstances, faith can make blessed, that this blessedness
originated by a fix idea makes the idea itself true, that faith does not move mountains, but
rather sets mountains down where there are not any: a quick walk through a lunatic asylum
makes all this sufficiently clear. Not to a priest, of course: for he will instinctively deny that
sickness is sickness and lunatic asylums is lunatic asylums. To Christianity, sickness is
necessary, more or less like to the Greek spirit a superabundance of health was necessary –
making people ill is the actual ulterior purpose of the whole system of salvation of the Church.
And the Church itself – doesn’t it have the Catholic lunatic asylum as its ultimate ideal? – The
whole earth as a madhouse? – The sort of religious man that the church wants is a typical
décadent; the moment at which a religious crisis takes control over people is always marked
by epidemics of nervous disorder; the 'inner world' of the religious man looks so much like
the 'inner world' of over-excited and exhausted ones, that it is easy to confuse them; the
'highest' conditions, which Christianity held up before mankind as the supreme value, are
epileptoid in form […]. Nobody is free to become Christian: one is not 'converted' to
Christianity – one must first be sick enough for it. … We others, who have the courage for
health, as well as for contempt, – we may well despise a religion that taught how to
51 Ibid., p. 339. The reason is this: “I must free my self from the God, since the God I experienced is more than love;
he is also hate, he is more than beauty, he is also the abomination, he is more than wisdom, he is also
meaninglessness, he is more than power, he is also powerlessness, he is more than omnipresence, he is also my
creature”.
52 The concept of “décadence” is always expressed in terms of illness. See, in particular, WA, § 5, KSA 6, 21: “The
artist of decadence – that's the term for it. And this is where my seriousness begins. I am not going to look
helplessly on while this decadent ruins our health [Gesundheit] and our music at the same time! Is Wagner even a
person [Mensch]? Isn't he really just a sickness [Krankheit]? He makes everything he touches sick, – he has made
music sick [Er macht Alles krank, woran er rührt, – er hat die Musik krank gemacht]”; AC, § 52, KSA 6, 232: “Since
sickness belongs to the essence of Christianity, the typical Christian state of 'faith' has to be a form of sickness [Weil
die Krankheit zum Wesen des Christenthums gehört, muss auch der typisch christliche Zustand, 'der Glaube', eine
Krankheitsform sein]”. In Nachlaß, one of Nietzsche's drafts for future publications concerns “Physiology of
nihilistic religions. A typical course of an illness [Krankheit]”. In this project, “faith” itself is seen as a form of
illness, and two sections bear the titles of “Die Christlichkeit als Krankheit” and “Das Christenthum als Symptom
physiologischer décadence”, respectively (NF 14[13], KSA 13, 223-224; Spring 1888). In another fragment of the
same period, titled “Altruismus”, Nietzsche expresses himself this way: “Vor Gott werden alle 'Seelen' gleich: aber
das ist gerade die gefährlichste aller möglichen Werthschätzungen! Setzt man die Einzelnen gleich, so stellt man die
Gattung in Frage, so begünstigt man eine Praxis, welche auf den Ruin der Gattung hinausläuft: das Christenthum ist
das Gegenprincip gegen die Selektion. Wenn der Entartende und Kranke ('der Christ') so viel Werth haben soll wie
der Gesunde ('der Heide'), oder gar noch mehr, nach Pascal's Urtheil über Krankheit und Gesundheit, so ist der
natürliche Gang der Entwicklung gekreuzt und die Unnatur zum Gesetz gemacht … Diese allgemeine
Menschenliebe ist in Praxi die Bevorzugung alles Leidenden, Schlechtweggekommenen, Degenerirten: sie hat
thatsächlich die Kraft, die Verantwortlichkeit, die hohe Pflicht, Menschen zu opfern, heruntergebracht und
abgeschwächt” (NF 15[110], KSA 13, 470 Spring 1888).
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misunderstand the body! that does not intend to rid itself of the superstition about the soul!
that makes a 'merit' out of insufficient nourishment! that fights health as a sort of enemy,
devil, temptation! that persuades itself that it is possible to carry around a 'perfect soul' in a
cadaver of a body, and that, to this end, it was necessary to devise for itself a new concept of
'perfection', a pale, sickly, idiotically fanatic essence, so-called 'holiness' – a holiness that is
itself merely a series of symptoms of an impoverished, enervated and incurably spoilt body
[…].53
Jung did not certainly overlook this section, since in his version of the text, there are several
reading marks, underlinings and the meaningful inscription “Your soul died before your body.
Zarathustra” [Deine Seele starb vor Deinem Körper. Zarathustra], near the word “cadaver”
[Cadaver], almost at the end of our quotation.54
In the following night, through Philemon's voice, Jung makes use of the phrase “grave of the
God”, in order to express the necessity to “live in the God”, and not let “the God […] live in you”.
Later on, when reflecting on his experience with Philemon, Jung also realises that he was
“intoxicated” [in einem Rausche] by him, who gave him “language that was foreign to [him] and of
a different sensitivity”, and who now looks different to him. In fact, “probably the most part of
what” Jung has “written in the earlier part of this book was given to” him by Philemon.55 Jung has
come to realise the difference between himself and Philemon, and is now trying to differentiate
from him. In this sense, “intoxicated” could be arguably substituted by “inflated”, and Jung's Liber
Novus would in a certain way achieve the same meaning to him, as that of Nietzsche's Zarathustra
in the seminar. As argued in the previous section, Philemon represents the expression of a divine
power, whose characteristic are defined in terms of “spirit”.
One of the major topics of Liber Novus is surely the realisation of the “supreme meaning”
[Übersinn], namely the “birth of a new God”. What this means in the context of Zarathustra, is that
no God can actually die, without being replaced by a new symbol of independence. In terms of
individuation, such a symbol comes to represent the “self”; but if this process is not consciously
admitted, then it must happen unconsciously. Jung reads Nietzsche as if he had not reached any
“self” intuition consciously, nonetheless he appears able to project such an idea on an unconscious
level, namely onto the Übermensch. Therefore he would confuse “self” and “I”, and would tend to
53  AC, § 51, KSA 6, 230-232 (translation ours). 
54 Other phrases underlined by Jung are: “lunatic asylum” [Irrenhaus], “To Christianity, sickness is necessay” [Das
Christenthum hat die Krankheit nöthig], “the Catholic lunatic asylum as its ultimate ideal? – The whole earth as a
madhouse?” [das katholische Irrenhaus als letzetes Ideal? – Die Erde überhaupt als Irrenhaus?]. The word
„Cadaver“ [Cadaver] is also underlined (F. W. Nietzsche, Der Antichrist, Kleinoktav-Gesamtausgabe, cit., available
at Jung's personal library in Küsnacht).
55 RB “Scrutinies”, § 3, p. 339.
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confine a symbol for the wholeness of the former to the narrowness of the latter. Furthermore,
because of his inflation, Nietzsche would even identify with the Übermensch himself. The problem
with this opinion is that Nietzsche is actually aware of the possibility of the “I” being transcended
by independent principles, and the whole first part of Beyond Good and Evil – as explained in the
introduction – represents a significant piece of evidence. It can be stated that Jung interprets the
Übermensch as Nietzsche's “new God”; in fact, from Zarathustra “Prologue” to its last chapters, he
reads the Übermensch as a symbol for the “self”.56 While discussing Nietzsche's conception of the
“self”, Jung affirms:
Gemüt and Geist would be contents or qualities of consciousness. Therefore, there was the
possibility – which I saw even then in Zarathustra – of the mistake which Nietzsche actually
makes; namely, he identifies the ego with the self and therefore with the Superman, as we
have seen. That would be an incarnation of the self. But the self is much too big; you cannot
possibly identify with it without incurring the risk of a fatal inflation.57
Nietzsche's perception of the “self” appears to Jung as a distort one, due to his inflation. On 20
November 1935, Jung discusses “On the Neighbour-Love” in this sense:
Obviously, he recommends love for the furthest in order to protect oneself against that easy
dodging of oneself that one has offered to other people in the immediate vicinity. […] The
quest is the quest of the self – that is the precious thing which is difficult to attain; that is the
hero's fight and you are alone, and eve have no weapons. Anybody who is with you at that
moment would be in between; the final fight is with yourself, and everything else is – or may
be – a hindrance. It may also be that 'furthest' may be a stepping stone, a means that is to a
certain extent indispensable – but the ultimate criterion is wether you can stand yourself all
alone or not. […] From a psychological point of view it would be the shadow, because that
would be the precondition for the union with the self; without the realization if the shadow
there is no such union. But on account of the identity of Nietzsche with the archetype of
Zarathustra, he is not aware of his shadow; that is, he is aware of it, yet not in a positive,
56 In his second seminar session, 9 May 1934, Jung responds to a question from Mrs. Fierz on the “urge for
individuation” in Zarathustra by saying: “the self is in it” (SNZ I, p. 33). On Nietzsche's distinction between “self”
[Selb], “body” [Leib], and “soul” [Seele], see V. Gerhardt, Die Funken des freien Geistes. Neuere Aufsätze zu
Nietzsches Philosophie der Zukunft, De Gruyter, Berlin / New York 2011, pp. 1-49 and 50-86. He defines
Nietzsche's understanding of the “self” as “the capacity of the body to act” [die Fähigkeit des Leibes, sich selbst zu
verhalten] (p. 10); in fact it seems to have “the same ontological dignity” as the “body”. According to the scholar,
these concepts appear as differentiated from each other only on a conceptual level. The “self” would represent a sort
of “mediator between body and I” [Vermittlers zwischen Leib und Ich], which would “hold together physical body
[Körper] and soul [Seele], body [Leib] and I [Ich]”. This would permit to perceive the body as a “wholeness”
[Einheit] (p. 52).
57 Ibid., p. 391 (20 February 1935).
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conscious sense. In a later part of Zarathustra the shadow incarnates the ugliest man and he
rejects him because of his inflation. Anybody who is inflated by an archetype naturally cannot
accept the shadow because it would deflate him; yet that deflation is absolutely necessary for
individuation. In the chapter we have just dealt with, you see that he is inclined to identify that
man with the Superman: he is the foretaste of the Superman. As the Superman is most
definitely not a shadow, he is dreaming of a Superman who is friend of the self, yet without a
shadow. But if he should try to identify or reunite with the self, he would come across the
shadow and it would interfere. When the shadow does interfere later, he does not recognise it.
There is the tragedy.58
During the same session, in relation to chapter “The Way of the Creating One”, he comments:
“On account of identification with the creative self, he feels himself a creator, and you will see how
he experiences the fact of being a creator.”59 Similarly, Jung's idea of a “supreme meaning” is
introduced, in a retrospective comment, at the very beginning of “Liber Primus”: 
But the supreme meaning is the path, the way and the bridge to what is to come. That is the
God yet to come. It is not the coming God himself but his image which appears in the
supreme meaning. God is an image, and those who worship him must worship him in the
images of the supreme meaning.
The supreme meaning is not a meaning and not an absurdity, it is image and force in one,
magnificence and force together. 
The supreme meaning is the beginning and the end. It is the bridge of going across and
fulfillment.
The other Gods died of their temporality, yet the supreme meaning never dies, it turns into
meaning and then into absurdity, and out of the fire and blood of their collision the supreme
meaning rises up rejuvenated anew. 
The image of God has a shadow. The supreme meaning is real and casts a shadow. For what
can be actual and corporeal and have no shadow? 
The shadow is nonsense. It lacks force and has no continued existence through itself. But
nonsense is the inseparable and undying brother of the supreme meaning. 
Like plants, so men also grow, some in the light, others in the shadows. There are many who
need the shadows and not the light. 
The image of God throws a shadow that is just as great as itself. 
The supreme meaning is great and small it is as wide as the space o f the starry. Heaven and as
narrow as the cell of the living body.60
58 SNZ I, pp. 702-703.
59 Ibid., p. 703.
60 RB I, 1, pp. 229-230.
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A couple of strong Nietzschean echoes in this passage need to be brought out, beginning with
the bridge metaphor. To this respect, what is important to be highlighted, is the context of this
metaphor in Zarathustra. It appears in “Prologue”, and is used in order to depict the relationship
between man and Übermensch indeed: man is compared to a bridge towards the Übermensch.61 It
can be stated that both Nietzsche's Übermensch and Jung's Übersinn are associated with a bridge. In
either case, it metaphorically stands for a transitional element towards a new achievement. To Jung,
the bridge is just an image for the forthcoming God – and not the God himself –; to Nietzsche, it
represents the necessity of men being overcome by the Übermensch. However, in such a close
similarity, a crucial difference must be brought out as well. Nietzsche's Übermensch is not the
bridge, but one of its ends; Jung's Übersinn is the bridge itself, as this represents a symbol for an
otherwise incomprehensible God. Since the time of Liber Novus, Jung has conceived the process of
transformation as a path orientated towards the realisation of a divinity. In this sense, he tends to
regard any transformation process in terms of transcendence, thus he interprets the Übermensch as a
symbol for the self, a sort of Übersinn. The fact that, to Nietzsche, the Übermensch is the goal itself
might make clear Jung's reading as a symptom of inflation. A last remark concerns another
metaphor, i.e. the shadow. Again, in Zarathustra the same image is used in relation to the
Übermensch in a similar context at the very end of chapter “On the Blissful Islands”: “I will
complete it: for a shadow came to me – the most silent, the lightest of all things came to me! The
beauty of the Übermensch came to me as a shadow. Ah, my brothers! What are the gods to me
now”.62 Furthermore, in two aphorisms from The Gay Science, Nietzsche compares several
contemporary attitudes – such as the unconditioned faith in science of Positivism – to religions
without God. He defines them in terms of “shadows of God” [Schatten Gottes], meaning that
although “God is dead”, his image is still strong and effective in individuals.63 As in the previous
case, the same metaphor is used in the same way, but again, what for Nietzsche intends to express
the end of metaphysics, is used by Jung precisely in the opposite direction.
3.2.3 ISOLATED SUNS, THE ISLAND OF THE DEAD AND THE “WHEEL OF CREATION”
Another aspect of Nietzsche's negation of the unconscious, according to Jung's interpretation, is
connected to solitude. From a merely psychological point of view, Nietzsche is certainly isolated in
61 Za I, “Vorrede”, § 4, KSA 4, 16-18. Cfr. also Za I, 3, KSA 4, 42.
62 Za II, 2, KSA 4, 112 (translation modified).
63 FW 108, “Neue Kämpfe” and 109, “Hüten wir uns!”, KSA 3, 467-469. On a detailed investigation of the issue in
relation to Nietzsche's philosophy, as well as to his sources, see G. Campioni, “Le ombre di Dio”, in: Nietzsche. La
morale dell'eroe, ETS, Pisa 2009, pp. 121-148.
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his inflation; the phenomenon of solitude has also a wider meaning, though, which appears as a
consequence of the “death of God” and represents its unavoidable 'collectivisation'. While
commenting on “On the New Idol”, where Nietzsche expresses himself against the idealisation of
the “state”, Jung explains the process:
You see, what has happened there, is that the idea of the Superman, or the differentiated
individual, having not reached the surface of consciousness, remains in the dark, and therefore
it is everywhere, and everybody becomes so individualized and also so inflated in
consciousness that they needs must make a state in order to be able to live. For, when
everyone has an inflation they are no longer able to understand one another, and the human
and social organizations will disintegrate.64
Then he adds:
You see, the unconscious, activated archetype is like a rising sun, a source of energy or
warmth which warms up the ego personality from within, and then the ego personality begins
to radiate as if it were God-knows what. But it radiates its own colours, expresses the
archetype in its own personal way, and therefore it appears as if the ego were all-important.
Whereas the ego is of no importance at all in reality, but is simply urged from within, pushed
forward and made to perform as if it were important”.65
Denying the possibility of an independent element from the “ego” corresponds to a closure in
each individual, which brings them to consider themselves as a god. In this sense, the “contagion” is
the other aspect implicitly suggested by the issue of solitude. In fact, “the cause according to
Nietzsche is the all-pervading archetypal idea of the Superman, the greatness of man – and his
idealism or ambition is to attain greatness”. But to the extent that the same idea is present in anyone
– and only on an unconscious level –, the extreme consequence this problem leads to, is a wide-
spread solitude, which makes everyone incapable of communicating, and prevents them from
interaction, in order to preserve the feeling of godliness. Else, the inflation would come to an end:
Now, if Nietzsche is conscious of this idea and identical with it, it is quite to be expected that
he will become suspect, for when people meet the apparent carrier of the source of their
inflation, they naturally will immediately try to suppress that individual who sticks out, just
because he threatens that inflation. For they are no longer the only sun in heaven – there is
64 SNZ I, p. 602 (16 October 1935).
65 Ibid., p. 611.
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another sun, and that should not be.66
This idea is very much present in Jung's interpretation of chapters “The Night-Song” and “The
Grave-Song”. As already pointed out, Jung reads beginning and ending of the former in German,
because of the musicality given by the unconscious – namely “the peculiar emotion of a man who
experiences the spirit, the superhuman light and its cosmic coldness”.67 The middle section is read
in English, though, as the sentence “'And oft have I dreamt that staling must be more blessed than
receiving' […] is the point where, to [Jung's] feeling, the whole rhythm and poetry of the passage
before comes to an end. This is also the point where [Nietzsche] touches upon his own ego, and
there we can begin our critical examination of his text”. Jung comments on the text by saying:
he felt as if he were pouring out a full vessel. Zarathustra flowed out of him till he became
aware finally of the inner emptiness caused by it. First, he was pouring it out with the feeling
that he should fill the whole world, and then no echo came back, apparently nothing has
happened. He had poured out his very blood and nothing came back, and naturally he
developed a tremendous hunger, a desire to be filled up again.68
Jung describes this as “an example of the humility of the spirit: inasmuch as the spirit is shining
and hot like the sun, it is positive, but inasmuch as it is cold, it is negative, and inasmuch a man is
filled with the warmth of the spirit he will give, and inasmuch he is filled with the coldness of the
spirit, he will take, but not in a human way. It will be less than human”.69 At the moment of
commenting on the lines “Many suns circle in desert space: to all that is dark do they speak with
their light – but to me they are silent. / Oh, this is the hostility of light to the shining one: unpityngly
doth it pursue its course. / Unfair to the shining one in its innermost heart, cold to the suns: – thus
travelleth every sun”, Jung argues: “Here he identifies with the sun, the hottest thing we know of;
he is identical with Yang”. As a response to “Their [the suns'] inexorable will do they follow: that is
their coldness”, Jung affirms: “Here we see the fact that the sun or the suns, the fixed stars, etc., are
following a mechanical principle which is utterly inhuman; therefore they are cold, despite all heat.
And that is the image or the allegory of the hunger of the spirit.70
In Liber Novus, similar images are evoked in chapter “Hell”, where Jung expresses himself in
relation to his need for giving birth to his “God”, while reflecting on his fantasy in retrospect:
66 Ibid., pp. 612-613; italics ours.
67 SNZ II, p. 1144 (9 June 1937).
68 Ibid., pp. 1145-1146.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid., p. 1148.
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Because I wanted to give birth to my God, I also wanted evil. He who wants to create an
eternal fullness will also create eternal emptiness. You cannot undertake one without the other.
But if you want to escape evil, you will create no God, everything that you do is tepid and
gray. I wanted my God for the sake of grace and disgrace.
[…]
Nothing is more valuable to the evil one than his eye, since only through his eye can
emptiness seize gleaming fullness. Because the emptiness lacks fullness, it craves fullness and
its shining power. And it drinks it in by means of its eye, which is able to grasp the beauty and
unsullied radiance of fullness. The emptiness is poor, and if it lacked its eye it would be
hopeless. It sees the most beautiful and wants to devour it in order to spoil it. 71
On 23 June 1937, Jung deals with chapter “The Grave-Song”, and affirms:
Yes, it is the utter stillness and solitude of the grave. A man is completely cut off on such an
island. For who goes there? Only the dead that never return. So it is also an eternal prison, and
he himself is a sort of ghost landing there. The psychological condition that he now becomes
aware of is his absolute loneliness. Before, he was Zarathustra surrounded by imaginary
disciples, talking to crowds in the marketplaces of town. Ha had a mission, he represented
something. His heart was full to overflowing with all that he wanted to bestow on people; he
bestowed his gift upon nations. And now he is on the island of the dead. The inflation has
gone, as even the worse inflation comes to an end at times. […] He suddenly realizes his real
isolation and falls into himself, into his human existence.72
In December 1915, Jung comes across “the dead” for the first time. These are the only figures
that can intercede with God on behalf of men. In fact, “He has neither goodwill nor ill will”, whilst
“the dead hear your prayers since they are still of human nature and not free of good will and ill
will”.73 A few weeks later, on 10 December 1916, Philemon reappears and warns Jung's “I” against
them. Or, better, against keeping a divine element in his soul:
Remove, Oh man, the divine, too, from your soul, as far as you can manage. What a devilish
farce she carries on with you, as long as she still arrogates divine power over you! She's an
unruly child and a bloodthirsty daimon at the same time, a tormentor of humans without
equal, precisely because she has divinity. Why? Where from? Because you venerate her. The
71 RB II, RB II, 12, p. 288.
72 SNZ II,  p. 1183. He even speaks of “depression”.
73 RB “Scrutinies”, § 4, p. 342.
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dead too want the same thing. Why don't they stay quiet? Because they have not crossed over
to the other side. Why do they want sacrifice? So they can live. But why do they still want to
live with men? Because they want to rule. They have not come to an end with their craving
for power, since they died still lusting for power. A child, an old man, an evil woman, a spirit
of the dead, and a devil are beings who need to be humored. Fear the soul, despise her, love
her, just like the Gods. May they be far from us! But above all never lose them! Because when
lost they are as malicious as the serpent, as bloodthirsty as the tiger that pounces on the
unsuspecting from behind. A man who goes astray becomes an animal, a lost soul becomes a
devil.74
Dealing with the dead demands to understand their “craving for power”, and to act accordingly,
namely by humouring them, and by never forgetting their presence, too. Again, Jung's stress on
“craving for power” [Machtgier] and “lusting for power” [Machtlust] recalls his idea of Nietzsche's
failure to individuate, which can be expressed as his incapacity to create a new “God”. Furthermore,
a few lines above, a reference to a “Last Supper” appears, as well as to the the emptiness-fullness
paradox in relation to God.75 In a similar sense, while speaking of “the dead”, Philemon explains
that they “rejected the God of love, of the good and the beautiful; they had to reject him and so they
rejected unity and community in love, in the good and the beautiful. And thus they killed one
another and dissolved the community of men”.76 The dead's attitude does not come across as
different from Jung's interpretation of Nietzsche's “death of God” and its consequent leading to
solitude. Indeed, similarly to “The Night-Song”, in the fourth sermon to the dead, it is also said that
“Each star is a God, and each space that a star fills is a devil. But the empty fullness of the whole is
the Pleroma”.77 The concept of God as Pleroma reminds of Gnosticism, but the idea expressed by
74 Ibid., § 5, pp. 342-343.
75 Ibid: “Alas, is there nowhere a salutary deception to protect me from having the Last Supper with my carcass? The
dead want to live from me. Why did you see me as the one to drink the cess of humanity that poured out of
Christendom? Haven't you had enough of beholding the fiery fullness, my soul? Do you still want to fly entire into
the glaring white light of the Godhead? Into what shades of horror are you plunging me? Is the devil's pool so deep
that its mud sullies even your glowing robe? Where do you get the right to do me such a foul deed? Let the beaker of
disgusting filth pass from me. But if this be not your will, then climb past fiery Heaven and lodge your charges and
topple the throne of God, the dreadful, proclaim the right of men also before the Gods and take revenge on them for
the infamous deed of humanity; since only Gods are able to spur on the human worm to acts of colossal atrocity. Let
my fate suffice and let men manage human destiny. Oh my mother humanity; thrust the terrible worm of God, the
strangler of men, from you. Do not venerate him for the sake of his terrible poison – a drop suffices – and what is a
drop to him – who at the same time is all emptiness and all fullness?”. This represents the core of Philemon's “first
sermon to the dead”, which is better summarised by the formula “Nothingness is the same as the fullness. In infinity
full is as good as empty. Nothingness is empty and full” (ibid., § 6, p. 346). In the third sermon the same idea
appears again, when Philemon has to describe Abraxas, “the God who is difficult to grasp”: “He is the fullness that
seeks union with emptiness” (ibid., § 8, p. 350). As already written, a few lines above, Abraxas is compared to Pan:
“He is the great and the small Pan alike” (ibid.). In the whole episode, there are a few allusions to the vessel motif
too.
76 Ibid., § 7, p. 349.
77 Ibid., § 9, p. 351.
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the dead seems to anticipate the core of his criticisms to Nietzsche in the seminar. On 5 February
1916, it is said:
For the Gods are many, while men are few. The Gods are mighty and endure their
manifoldness. Like the stars they abide in solitude, separated by vast distances. […]
The multiplicity of the Gods corresponds to the multiplicity of men. 
Numberless Gods await the human state. Numberless Gods have been men. Man shares in the
nature of the Gods. He comes from the Gods and goes unto the God. 
Thus, just as it is no use to reflect upon the Pleroma, it is not worthwhile to worship the
multiplicity of the Gods. Least of all does it serve to worship the first God, the effective
fullness, and the summum bonum. By our prayer we can add nothing to it, and take nothing
from it; because effective emptiness gulps down everything. The bright Gods form the
heavenly world. It is manifold and extends and increases infinitely: The Sun God is the
supreme lord of the world.78
Not too far from the passage above, namely in the sixth sermon to the dead, a few further
Nietzschean allusions appear:
I was probably very confused when ΦIΛHMΩN approached me the following night, since I
called to him saying, 'What did you do, Oh ΦIΛHMΩN? What fires have you kindled? What
have you broken asunder? Does the wheel of creations stand still?' 
But he answered and said, 'Everything is running its usual course. Nothing has happened, and
yet a sweet and indescribable mystery has taken place: I stepped out of the whirling circle.' 
'What's that?' I exclaimed, 'Your words move my lips, your voice sounds from my ears, my
eyes see you from within me. Truly, you are a magician! You stepped out of the whirling
circle? What confusion! Are you I, am I you? Did I not feel as if the wheel of creation was
standing still? And yet you say that you have stepped out of the whirling circle? I am truly
bound to the wheel-I feel the rushing swaying of it-and yet the wheel of creation also stands
still for me. What did you do, father, teach me!'
Then ΦIΛHMΩN said, 'I stepped onto what is solid and took it with me and saved it from the
wave surge, from the cycle of births, and from the revolving wheel of endless happening. It
has been stilled. The dead have received the folly of the teaching, they have been blinded by
truth and see by mistake'”79
The link between the “wheel of creation” and the “cycle of births” makes possible to put the text
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid., § 11, p. 353. We have already discussed the strong presence of Nietzsche in this section, particularly regarding 
the issue of teaching, mocking and imitating (cfr. 2.3.2).
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in connection with something close to Nietzsche's eternal return. Indeed with similar expressions,
Jung interprets Nietzsche's wheel symbol in his seminar. In particular, on 28 November 1934, while
analysing “On the Three Metamorphoses”, he comments on the image of the “self-rolling wheel” by
saying: “The center of the impetus of the wheel being in itself, it is self-creative. And Nietzsche
means that the attitude of the child is self-creative”. The he adds: “[...] the child must be self-
creative, in order to put something into the place of the dragon that has been overcome; it must
create a new subjective, individual value”.80 On 20 November 1935, during a session dedicated to
“The Way of the Creating One”, Jung argues: “The rolling wheel is very clearly the symbol of the
self and the stars rolling about the self would be the Milky Way, the center of the heavens. So
Nietzsche would ask here, 'Are thou the self? If you are, then you can risk it.' He assumes that one
can only risk that way if one is the wheel – only the self could risk that way of being alone”.81 The
strongest link with the passage from “Scrutinies” appears on 22 January 1936, in regard to
Zarathustra chapter “Voluntary Dead”, when the symbol of the “golden ball” appears for the first
time:
You see, that golden ball is like the wheel which rolls out of itself […] like the dancing star. It
is a symbol of the self. This pelote game also has a peculiar connection with depreciatory
rumors about the ritual murder which was supposed to take place in Gnostic circles, as well as
among the Christians and the Jews; it was said in antiquity that they played the game of pelote
with a child they threw to one another until he was dead. The child represents the god. It was
a sacrifice of the god and a human sacrifice in order to renew the life of the god. [...] and the
ball is a symbol of the sun; it is the golden ball, an entirely round thing which expresses the
state of perfection, of the highest value, of gold. In the next chapter ['On the Bestowing
Virtue'] it already appears in that light. There is the golden top of a walking stick which
Zarathustra receives from his disciples, a sun or a globe with a snake coiled round it. And the
sun, the golden germ, the Hiranyagarbha as it is the Upanishads, is another symbol of the
self; it is also called the golden child, the precious, perfect substance that is made by man or
born out of ma; and it is of course the alchemistic gold and the all-roundness of the Platonic
being and the sphairos, the most blissful god of Empedocles. […] It is the idea that the self is
not identical with one particular individual. No individual can boast of having the self: there is
only the self that can boast of having many individuals. You see, the self is an extraneous unit
in one's existence. It is a center of personality, a center of gravity that does not coincide with
the ego; it is as if it were something outside. Also, it is not this individual, but a connection
with individuals. So one could say the self was the one thing, yet it is the many. It has a
paradoxical existence which cannot define and limit by any particular definition. It is a
80 SNZ I, p. 270.
81 Ibid., p. 708.
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metaphysical concept. But we must create such a concept in order to express the peculiar
psychological fact that one can feel as the subject and one can also feel as the object […].
Therefore, my definition of the self is a non-personal center, the center of the psychical non-
ego – of all that in the psyche which is not ego. And presumably it is to be found everywhere
in all people. […] Now, Zarathustra says here that his goal is connected to that ball. […] And
he has thrown the ball among his brethren or disciples, which means that he is bringing up or
instigating the self and setting in motion82
In Jung's cosmology, “the Sun God is the highest good, the devil the opposite”.83 Furthermore,
in the seminar, the same topic is also linked by Jung to Buddhistic literature and the symbol of the
wheel indeed: “As Zarathustra has thrown a ball, so Buddha brings a wheel among men and sets it
in motion”.84 In the “Scrutinies” section mentioned above, it is also written: “compassion with men
will overcome you and from the stream you will reach solid ground, you will step forth from the
eternal whirl onto the unmoving stone of rest, the circle that breaks flowing duration, and the flame
will die down”.85 The reference to compassion, besides Zarathustra's “last sin” and Schopenhauer,
reminds of Buddhistic tradition. When dealing with the eternal return more specifically, Jung
interprets Nietzsche's intuition very closely to the Indian conception. For instance, on 24 October
1934, while reading Zarathustra “Prologue”, he defines the eternal return as “a peculiar way of
talking of rebirth”.86 On 20 February 1935, about “The Despisers of the Body”, Jung exclaims:
“Nietzsche is far more concerned with the actual time than with the general aspect of the world that
lives and dies – after birth, death and then birth again. That is characteristic of Upanishad
philosophy and later on you find it in Nietzsche too, in his idea of the eternal return of things”.87
Again, while reading “On the Blissful Islands” on 20 May 1936, Jung explains:
In the collective unconscious you discover the identity of different times for instance, that
things have been practically always the same, they never change so why should you do
anything about it? Why invent? Or why should you translate them into the language of this
time? You can disappear into them without ever saying a word about them. But the fact is of
course that externally, to your surroundings, to your world, you are lost.88
82 SNZ II, pp. 781-783.
83 RB Scrutinies, § 9, p. 351.
84 SNZ II, p. 783. Before dealing with the “golden ball”, Jung spent a few words on the Übermensch as the goal and
result of creation: “[...] what he means by 'marriage' would be that two come together and create a superman,
perhaps in the form of a child. But of course in reality that won't do; it would be a very ordinary child to begin with,
and the superman business would come very much later, if at all” (ibid., pp. 771-772).
85 RB Scrutinies, § 11, p. 353.
86 SNZ I, p. 191.
87 Ibid., p. 399. Shortly after, he adds: “That Nietzsche identifies the self with the body is of course illogical, for you
then come necessarily to the conclusion that if the body died, therefore the self wants to die” (ibid., p. 405).
88 SNZ II, p. 933.
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Jung's understanding of Nietzsche's eternal return is always about an attempt to escape reality –
and its responsibilities – on behalf of an idea of divine eternity, which reminds of the “self”. This
emerges quite clearly during Jung's interpretation of the symbol of the “ring” in Zarathustra section
“On The Virtuous”, on 5 May 1937:
I cannot quite understand it [Nietzsche's idea of the eternal return] but that does not matter. It
belongs with this symbolism of the ring, the ring of the rings, the ring of Eternal Recurrence.
Now, this ring is the idea of totality and it is the idea of individuation naturally, an
individuation symbol. It means absolute completeness of the self, and you will see that this is
confirmed in the text.
In my edition of the English text there is a mistake. In the sentence, 'It is your dearest Self,
your virtue', self should not be written with a capital S – that is wrong. Nietzsche does not
mean here the Self, he means 'it is even your dearest'. […] You see, the fact which he tries to
express here, that virtue is the thing you love the most, means that the intensity of your love is
the virtue, and there he takes the word virtue in its antique sense. […]
[…] Thirst is the dynamic element and that is the value, or the virtue. With the ring comes in
the idea of duration, of immortality, the eternal return. This is substantiated by the fact that the
actual psychological experience of totality, which is a religious experience, always expressed
or formulated as the presence of God, has the quality of immortality, the quality of eternal
duration.89
Again, on 18 May 1938, Jung comments on “The Vision and the Riddle” by pointing out the
same concept: “It is the idea of die ewige Wiederkunft, the eternal return, his idea of immortality.
Why should one be afraid of the death since everything eternally returns? So onslaught of the dwarf
brings out in him the idea of the eternity of life”.90 On 25 May 1938, still on the same chapter, Jung
discusses the eternal return in terms of a “primitive fear of the overwhelming power of the
unconscious”. According to him, Zarathustra thinks to dominate the dwarf, but he is actually
possessed by the dwarf, as this sits on his back as someone who is riding a horse. Therefore, “he is
afraid of the spirit of gravity, afraid of the thing that possesses him. Now, in such a moment one
could expect a reaction from the side of the instincts”.91 Again: “if he takes this moment that has
been emphasized by the dwarf and himself in mutual collaboration, as a unique moment, with no
return, no repetition, then he would be forced to realize it completely. […] But if you see flatness
89 Ibid., pp. 1043-1045.
90 Ibid.,  p. 1263.
91 Ibid., pp. 1271-1273.
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only, you cease to exist – there is only an immense continuity of flatness, and that is of course not
worthwhile. Why should we continue such a string of nonentities, mere repetitions?”.92 Although
such a reading of the eternal return resembles more what Zarathustra's animals think, rather than
Nietzsche's attempt to overcome temporality, it represents a consistent element in Jung's
understanding of the issue.93 By pointing out the superficial aspect connected to repetition, that is to
say the nonsense of the moment, Jung highlights Nietzsche's justification for escaping his
confrontation with the unconscious and stopping his inflation with Zarathustra. On the other end, by
stressing the eternity element implicit in the eternal return, he also links Nietzsche's “abysmal
thought” to the same need for projecting the “self” which would appear in Nietzsche's idealisation
of the Übermensch. This is another manifestation of the immortal “God” whom Nietzsche has tried
to kill. In this sense indeed, while commenting on “On the Bedwarfing Virtue”, Jung associates a
particular meaning of the eternal return with Christianity, the Cabala and Gnosticism. In this case, it
is the aspect concerning “restoration” which is stressed, namely “the return of everything that has
been lost”.94 Both this aspects were already present in “Scrutinies”. At the end of Philemon's
sermons to the dead, Elijah and Salome appear again. Jung's “I” states that “The multiplicity of
individual things is the one multiple God from whose body many Gods arise, but the uniqueness of
the one thing is the other God, whose body is a man but whose spirit is as large as the world”, to
92 Ibid., p. 1288 (8 June 1938).
93 In section “The Convalescent”, Zarathustra becomes annoyed when his animals make a “hurdy-gurdy song” [Leier-
Lied] out of the profundity of his “abysmal thought”. In fact, they sing that “Everything rolls, everything returns; the
wheel of existence rolls for ever. […] Everything breaks, everything is joined anew; the same house of existence
builds itself for ever. Everything departs, everything meets again; the ring of existence is true to itself for ever.
Existence begins in every instant; the ball There rolls around every Here. The middle is everywhere. The path of
eternity is crooked” (Za III, 13, KSA 4, 273). This represents an extreme exemplification of the complexity of the
problem, and does not differ from the dwarf's discourse. They both correspond to a temptation from the “spirit of
gravity”, which makes everything heavy or tragic in order not to allow one to face the question and really overcome
it. This aspect describes only the first impression of Nietzsche's “abysmal thought”, that is to say the frightful
intuition that time is nonsense, and that any purpose is vane. Instead, thinking the eternal return in a deeper way
leads to a further stage, where temporality gains a new and more intense meaning, as the moment loses its link to
determinism and becomes valuable for the sake of itself. Moreover, if it is true that any decision made has already
been made countless times, it is also true that whatever is chosen is meant to be chosen forever. This should be
enough to speak against any attempt to think the question in terms of superficiality; rather, it introduces Nietzsche's
stress on responsibility.
94 SNZ II, pp. 1341-1342 (19 October 1938): “It returns to the source, thereby producing a circular movement which
brings back whatever has been. Here we can see another nice Greek term, the apokatastasis, which means the return
of everything that has been lost, a complete restoration of whatever has been. We find that idea of eternal return also
in Christianity, in the Epistles of St. Paul, where he speaks of the mystical or metaphysical significance of Christ,
and our importance in his work of redemption. He says that all creatures are sighing in fetters and expecting the
revelation of the children of God, meaning that man has an importance as the savior for the whole nature. […] The
same idea is in the cabala of which St. Paul was a connoisseur. Who was his teacher? [...] Yes, Rabbi Gamaliel the
Elder, who was a Jewish Gnostic, what was called later on a 'cabalistic'. […] There [in the cabala] you have the
same idea. Paradise was the origin of life, where the four rivers arose, and he [God] removed the origin of life into
the future and made it a goal. So those rivers which issued from paradise will flow back into paradise in the future. It
is a circle, the eternal return. […] And there is also the typical hero-myth [in German mythology], where the idea of
the restoration of all the past is very clear. When the dragon has swallowed the hero and absolutely everything
belonging to him, his brothers, his parents and grandparents, the whole tribe, herds of cattle, even the woods ad
fields, then the hero kills the dragon, and all that the dragon has devoured comes back as it was before.”
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which Elijah responds:
That is new, my son. Is the new good? What was, is good; and what was, will be. Is that not
the truth? Has there ever been anything new? And was what you call new, ever good?
Everything remains the same if you give it a new name. There is nothing new, there can be
nothing new; how could I then look ahead? I look at the past and therein I see the future, as in
a mirror. And I see that nothing new happens, everything is but mere recurrence of what has
been since time immemorial. What is your being? An appearance, a darting light; tomorrow it
is no longer true. It is gone; it is as if it never was.95
3.3 ANIMALS
3.3.1 SERPENT, BIRD AND BLACK SCARAB
Much has been already said about the serpent motif in Liber Novus, in relation to Nietzsche's
utilisation of the same image. What is still to be investigated is the proximity of Jung's
interpretation of Zarathustra serpent symbology to the meaning given to it in Liber Novus.
Throughout Nietzsche's text, Zarathustra is accompanied by two animals that live in the cave with
him: an eagle and a serpent. These two animals are introduced by Nietzsche at the very beginning of
Zarathustra. Jung's interprets them in terms of “instincts”, the serpent representing the chthonic
world – what is more connected to the earth and the body – and the eagle symbolising spirit, in all
its aspects. In this sense, he mentions Ganymede, “the messenger of Zeus”, who “is lifted up by the
eagle to Olympian heights”, and adds: “it is the genius and enthusiasm of youth that seize him and
carry him up to the heights of the gods. So one could say it was a spiritual, uplifting power”.
According to Jung's interpretation, Nietzsche would feel close to his instincts – both in their
chthonic and spiritual meaning – when he makes the decision of going under, that is to say, to
abandon the realm of “consciousness” and meet the unconscious would represent his conscious
choice.96 In Zarathustra, the eagle and the serpent appear to be good friends, and, at the end of the
“Prologue”, are said by Zarathustra to represent pride and wisdom, respectively: “The proudest
animal [Das stolzeste Thier] under the sun and the wisest animal [das klügste Thier] under the sun”.
In that occasion, the eagle “was sweeping through the air in wide circles, and from it was hanging a
95 RB “Scrutinies”, § 14, p. 358. In the same vision, the “Gods” are depicted as suffering and in need of being
reedimed.
96 SNZ I, pp. 18-19.
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serpent, not like a prey but like a friend: for it was coiled [geringelt] around the eagle's neck”97 On 7
November 1934, towards the end of his “Prologue” analysis, Jung explains:
The snake would be a symbol of the earth, for things chthonic. More psychologically, the
eagle is like thought, a messenger of the highest god; thought is also understood to be a
winged being and a product of the brain, which is on top of man, on top of the world. It is
Mount Meru where the city of light lies, the light of consciousness. While the snake, on the
other side, chiefly consists of a vertebral column, and is therefore a personification of the
lower motor centers of the body, of the spinal cord and the corresponding centers of the brain.
As a personification of the physiological instincts, it is also associated with sexuality, or with
the low instinctive cunning of the primitive or animal mind of man.
Zarathustra sees those animals together, representing pairs of opposites, because spirit is
always supposed to be the irreconcilable opponent of the chthonic, eternally fighting against
the earth according to the dogmatic idea and the idea of old philosophies in general. […] You
are probably impressed with the fact that the serpent has coiled itself round the neck of the
eagle. What is the usual presentation of this symbolism?
[Mrs. Sigg: That the eagle has the snake in its claws.]
Prof. Jung: Yes, showing that the spirit has overcome matter, or that the eagle, personifying
the light, has overcome the power of darkness or the devil. For instance, you remember
having seen the so-called lecterns in churches, sort of reading-desks on which the Bible is
supported by an eagle. The eagle is the symbol of St. John the Evangelist, whose philosophy
is the idea of the Logos, the word, the light that comes from God and shines into the darkness
of man. Antique fantasy ascribed the eagle to John because the eagle was the messenger of
Zeus, the god of the sky, the personification of the light. Therefore, the symbolism on the
lecterns, where the word of God as given to us in the Bible comes down to the earth supported
on the wings of the eagle. Now, the eagle is in a way predominating here, he carries the snake
but not in its claws; the snake is coiled round his neck.”98 
Shortly after, it is stated: “You think it is rather dangerous for the eagle to have such a necktie?
It is. I would not like it. […] Well, if he [the snake] clings to the neck of the eagle, he won't fall
down, but it is not a pleasant situation. I don't think the serpent likes such an airplane stuff”99. And,
again:
97 Za I, “Vorrede”, § 10, KSA 4, 27. In Jung's personal copy, “eagle”, “hanging a serpent”, “coiled […] neck” are
underlined, and a significant inscription – most likely written down in preparation for the seminar – reads: “[He]
would need pride and wisdom. They both broke away in animal-likeness” [(Er) bedürfte des Stolzes und der
Klugheit. Beide sind ins Thierische abgespalten].
98 SNZ I, pp. 227-228.
99 Ibid. p. 229.
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Of course, the most impressive thing in this picture is that the snake is lifted up out of her
usual abode into a medium in which it depends entirely upon the good will of the eagle. It is a
hellishly uncomfortable situation. After a while the eagle will certainly become very hungry
and eat the snake. He [Nietzsche] is just lifted out of the ground, and as a material man, as a
man of the earth, he is in the power of that enormous bird. The eagle is the archetype, you see:
the wise old man is the wise old bird.100
In fact, he explains:
To a man like Nietzsche, for instance, a dream will appear which contains this image of the
eagle and the snake. If such a case should happen in reality, I would explain it in this way: the
light of heaven, the eagle, the divine word has caught you; naturally, how could you resist? So
you gave yourself to it. But you must know that it is exceedingly dangerous; we don't know
how it will turn out in the future. I should say it was a precarious situation for that serpent –
probably less for the eagle, because the serpent is chiefly under the illusion of friendship. You
see if the eagle were under that illusion, he would have been persuaded by the serpent to stay
on the ground ant to hop about while she crept up and sat on his back. He would have to hop
along carrying the snake – or some other grotesque arrangement could be thought of. But it is
clearly the serpent that follows. It is Nietzsche who follows the insinuation or the intimation
of the archetype and is carried into the air.101
 
On 21 November 1934, Jung dwells upon the couple eagle-serpent again, and compares it with
the same image present in the Gilgamesh epic; although this is said to be “a different kind of
symbolism, yet the meaning is particularly clear”. Gilgamesh is for one third human and for two
thirds divine, “he is a sort of superhuman being with a tremendous spirit of power.” After that the
women have complained to the Gods because Gilgamesh treats everyone as a slave while building
his town (Uruk), “they [the gods,] create a peculiar counterfigure to Gilgamesh, a man of equal size
and strength, also a sort of superhuman nature, called Enkidu”. This is “half animal”, “an inferior
man, a sort of ape-man, a shadow but of equal strength. He simply personifies the inferior psyche of
man”, while Gilgamesh “represents the will, consciousness, the spiritual attitude”. “Enkidu being
overcome by Gilgamesh would mean, then, the lower mind or psyche overcome by consciousness
and will, and thus it is a representation of a problem which in those century was, of course, of the
highest importance to man”.102
100Ibid.,p. 230.
101Ibid., p. 232. The couple also is also interpreted in terms of “universal principles”, such as Yin and Yang.
102Ibid., pp. 246-247. To this respect, it might be recalled that Jung borrowed the name Izdubar from one of the first
transcriptions of the name “Gilgamesh”, indeed. In Jung's own copy of Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals (available
at Jung's personal library in Küsnacht), the words “Gegensatz Paare” and “Gilgemesch” are annotated alongside
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While focussing on chapter “On the Pale Criminal” and reading it in terms of a inflation, Jung
affirms:
Nietzsche means here that he is committing his crime on order to reach death; the lust for
murder, the greed for the blood, is simply the preparation for death. […] He is seeking to end
his existence because – as the text afterwards says – he is nothing but a mass of diseases, a
coil of wild serpents which can only wind up in its own destruction. So the Pale Criminal is in
that respect the symbol for the man who must end his existence because he is no good – in
order to make room for the Superman. […] You see, if the criminal knows in committing his
crime that he really means his own undoing, that he commits the crime in order to kill
himself, then one can only agree […]. One judges a crime differently when the murderer
immediately afterwards kills himself too: one has the feeling that he has judged himself and
sentenced himself to death. If the murderer is also put out of life it is satisfactory.103 
On 11 December 1935, in his analysis of “Of the Adder's Bite”, Jung points out that “the anima
is represented as woman above and serpent below, as the serpent in paradise is often represented
with a woman's head; the snake element is always connected with the anima problem”. Then he
adds: “It is a coldblooded animal with a non-human psychology; one can establish a sort of rapport
with almost any warmblooded animal but with snake there is no parallel feeling”. In fact, due to its
representing our sympathetic system, to fear it means having troubles with the acceptance of one's
own body:
 
And that is the secret of the anima, human on the one side and that most paradoxical and
incomprehensible thing on the other. On the one side she is an inferior woman with all the bad
qualities of a merely biological woman, an intriguing and plotting devil who always tries to
entangle a man and make a perfect fool of him; yet she winds up with the snake's tail, with
that peculiar insight and awareness. She is a psychopompos, and leads you into the
understanding of the collective unconscious just by the way of the fool. So wherever you
touch upon that anima business you will have a paradoxical picture […].104
paragraph 13 from the third essay. The first phrase is referred to the question: “this man who denies [the priest] – he
belongs precisely with all the great conserving and affirming forces of life … To what can we ascribe this
pathology?”. The second refers to Nietzsche's description of the “great experimenter with himself”: “still
unconquered, always a man of the future, who no longer gets any rest from the force of his own powers, so that his
future relentlessly burrows like a thorn into the flesh of his entire present” (GM III, § 13, KSA 5, 366-367). Both
sections are also marked by a vertical line. Gilgamesh is also recurrently mentioned throughout Transformations
and Symbols of the Libido.
103SNZ I,  p. 465 (8 May 1935).
104Ibid., pp. 748-751. Jung introduces the symbol of the serpent as a “reaction to the unconscious, to what Zarathustra
said in the chapter before” (“Of Old and Young Women”) (Ibid., p. 252). Furthermore, he interprets the heat
mentioned at the beginning of the chapter by arguing: “It means the hot blood, it is the so-called alchemical oven in
the abdomen, the kitchen, the laboratory where things are transformed, the stomach. He sinks down into his own
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Following this interpretation, Jung proposes to read the “bite” as linked to Nietzsche's inflation:
“It is a dangerous catastrophe when a man falls into a trap laid by the anima. To be caught by the
heel is the usual fate of a man. Crush the head of the serpent and it will bite you in the heel. This is
a regular occurrence and it can finish a man's career, his hopes, or even his life”. The throat is said
to represent the logos, and by getting it bitten, Zarathustra would lose his speech skills, thus
permitting Nietzsche to interrupt the inflation. “The same motif comes again later”, Jung adds, in
“On the Vision and the Riddle”, “so we must assume that the throat region is the active organ”. In
fact, “Zarathustra is very obviously the logos, and you cannot reach the logos with the feet because
it has none; you can only reach it by the throat where the words come from.”105
According to what has been just pointed out, three different aspects of Jung's dealing with the
serpent in Zarathustra are to be considered: its relationship with the bird symbol; its link with
murder and sacrifice; its close relation with the Anima.106 In particular, what majorly arises in the
first case, is the resolutive aspect of the couple serpent-bird, seen as a symbol for the unification of
opposites, in the sense of both contrasting principles and psychological functions. In the second
case, it is the ancient link between serpents and evil to be particularly highlighted. Ultimately,
regarding the serpent as a Anima representation, its chthonic side is mainly stressed, along with its
“poisonous” effect. These three perspectives are recurrent in Liber Novus as well, even though in
some cases they are expressed differently – as for the Anima, that had not been yet conceptualised
as an archetype. Regarding the first point, the most representative scene appears at the very
beginning of “The Way of the Cross” (27 January 1914). Jung describes a fantasy:
I saw the black serpent, as it wound itself upward around the wood of the cross. It crept into
the body of the crucified and emerged again transformed from his mouth. It had become
white. It wound itself around the head of the dead one like a diadem, and a light gleamed
above his head, and the sun rose shining in the east. I stood and watched and was confused
and a great weight burdened my soul. But the white bird that sat on my shoulder spoke to me:
'Let it rain, let the wind blow, let the waters flow and the fire burn. Let each thing have its
underworld and is fascinated by the archetype of sexuality. And he covered his face with his arms, in order to protect
himself” (ibid., p. 253)
105Ibid., pp. 755-756.  In “The Significance of the Father in the Destiny of the Individual” [Die Bedeutung des Vaters
fur das Schicksal des Einzelnen] (1909-1949), Jung interprets the dreams of a boy, where a black serpent bites his
face and explains: “The serpent's attack on the boy's face, the part that 'sees,' represents the danger to consciousness
(blinding)” (CW 4, § 737, translation modified).
106The serpent is also faced en passant another couple of times: on 2 November 1938, while interpreting “On the
Bedwarfing Virtue”, it is mentioned in relation to “Christ” and the zodiac (SNZ II, p. 1384), and on 30 November
1938, while discussing “On the Three Evil Things”, an analogy between some kinds of plants and snakes is
proposed, as referring to a similarity in their moving (ibid., p. 1435; Jung speaks of “serpentine movement”).
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development, let becoming have its day'.107
As already highlighted, this chapter presents several important references to Nietzsche and
Zarathustra, regarding both layers of visions and style. Assuming that, the serpent emerging from
the mouth might be linked to “The Vision and the Riddle”, even. Differently from Nietzsche's
description, however, in this case it is the serpent itself which has undergone a transformation and
has become white. Indeed, a “white bird” is sitting on a shoulder of Jung's “I”, representing the
counterbalancing element to the serpent, namely a different kind of wisdom, which in a sense
reassures Jung's “I”, and encourages him with confidence to let “becoming have its dat”. A few
years later, the “soul” appears to Jung's “I” again and explains:
If I am not conjoined through the uniting of the Below and the Above, I break down into three
parts: the serpent, and in that or some other animal form I roam, living nature daimonically,
arousing fear and longing. The human soul, living forever within you. The celestial soul, as
such dwelling with the Gods, far from you and unknown to you, appearing in the form of a
bird. Each of these three parts then is independent.108
 In the chapter following “The Way of the Cross”, i.e. “The Magician”, the same image of the
bird as a counterbalance, necessary to contrast the influence of serpentlike nature and keep a human
median position, is shown again. So Jung interprets his fantasy:  
You find all this between men but not between men and serpents, even if they are serpent
souls. But wherever there is love, the serpentlike abides also. Christ himself compared himself
to a serpent, and his hellish brother, the Antichrist, is the old dragon himself. What is beyond
the human that appears in love has the nature of the serpent and the bird, and the serpent often
enchants the bird, and more rarely the bird bears off the serpent. Man stands in-between. What
seems like a bird to you is a serpent to the other, and what seems like a serpent to you is a bird
to the other. Therefore you will meet the other only in human form. If you want to become,
then a battle between bird and serpent breaks out. And if you only want to be, you will be a
man to yourself and to others. He who is becoming belongs in the desert or in a prison, for he
is beyond the human. If men want to become, they behave like animals. No one saves us from
the evil of becoming, unless we choose to go through Hell.109
107RB II, 20, “The Way of the Cross”, pp. 309-310.
108RB “Appendix C”, p. 370 (Black Books 5, 16 January 1916; see also S. Shamdasani, footnote 252, in: RB II, 20, p.
310). In a letter dated 2 February 1913, Dr. Loÿ took the couple “serpent and bird” as an example for the hypnotic
effects of the analyst on the patient, in contrast against Freud's theory of sexual Libido (“Some Crucial Points in
Psychoanalysis. A Correspondence between Dr. Jung and Dr. Loÿ” [Psychotherapeutische Zeitfragen; Ein
Briefwechsel mit Dr. C. G. Jung, edited by Dr. R. Löy]; 1914-1920; CW 4, § 591; translation modified).
109RB II, 21, “The Magician”, p. 318. The sentence “What is beyond the human that appears in love has the nature of
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On the one hand, Jung stresses the dynamism of both symbols: “what seems like a bird to you is
a serpent to the other, and what seems like a serpent to you is a bird to the other”. On the other
hand, the same relationship present in Zarathustra is depicted, and the same perplexity about the
plausibility of such situation is expressed: “the serpent often enchants the bird, and more rarely the
bird bears off the serpent”. Furthermore, the “becoming” motif occurs again, and, also this time, it
cannot neglect a battle between opposite instincts, symbolised by different animals (in this case, the
serpent and the bird, indeed). Already in “The Castle in the Forest”, while Jung comments on a
vision dated 28 December 1913, the “white bird” is said to be “the messenger” of the “ancient
sleeper”. This can be awaken when one learns to accept their opposite nature, i.e. when women
discover their masculine soul, and men their feminine. In this way, people stop living in “arbitrary
and artificially created boundaries”, and open to a more complete and human nature. The “white
bird”, meant as “the messenger”, appears after that one has broken down “the walls that confine
your view”.110 It always represents transformation, indeed, and what follows the scene in “The
Magician”, in Jung's fantasy, is that “the serpent turned into a small white bird which soared into the
clouds where she disappeared”. Then it talks to Jung's “I” and says: “Do you hear me? I'm far off
now. Heaven is so far away. Hell is much nearer the earth. I found something for you, a discarded
crown. It lay on a street in the immeasurable space of Heaven, a golden crown”. Such a crown bears
an inscription which reads “love never ends”. In this scene, the bird and the serpent come to
represent “Heaven” and “Hell”, respectively. The birds continuously turns itself into the serpent and
goes to hell, and vice versa, while Jung's “I” is hanging between sky and earth and cannot figure out
what is taking place around him. The inscription on the crown symbolises precisely the necessity of
uniting the opposites; as the bird says: “Everything under you is the earth, everything above you is
the sky. You fly if you strive for what is above you; you are hanged if you strive for what is below
you”. By explaining that, “she” also solves the “mystery” of the crown:
B: 'The crown and serpent are opposites, and are one. Did you not see the serpent that
crowned the head of the crucified?'
I: 'What, I don't understand you.'
B: 'What words did the crown bring you? 'Love never ends'- that is the mystery of the crown
and the serpent.'
the serpent and the bird” can be also compared to Nietzsche's aphorism “What is done out of love always takes place
beyond good and evil” (JGB, 153, KSA 5, 99). Jung's personal copy of Beyond Good and Evil presents numerous
underlinings, annotations and comments (available at Jung's personal library in Küsnacht).
110RB II, 2, “The Castle in the Forest”, p. 264. A few lines above, Jung wrote: “when you become the one who is
mocked, the white bird of the soul comes flying. It was far away; but your humiliation attracted it”.
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I: 'But Salome? What should happen to Salome?'
B: 'You see, Salome is what you are. Fly, and she will grow wings.' 111
In another fantasy from “Scrutinies” (3 May 1916), Jung's “I” affirms that both the serpent and
the bird are part of his “soul”, which “has become multiple”. Elijah and Salome are part of her as
well.112 Realising the identity of multiplicity and unity appears as the key to overcome what could
be put as the nonsense perspective, namely the conflict. Only once the conflict is integrated and its
contradictory nature admitted, a progress can happen; that is, a new “God” can come to life. Later
on, Jung explained his vision: “Then my soul divided herself. As a bird she swooped up to the
higher Gods and as a serpent she crawled down to the lower Gods. Soon afterward, she returned and
said, troubled, 'The Gods are outraged that you do not want to be obedient'”. Because he has
“broken the compulsion of the law”, Jung's “I” is considered by the “Gods” as the devil, but such a
sacrifice is necessary to overcome “one-sidedness”, therefore he is also forgiven by them.113
The intervention of a second serpent – the white one – at the end of “Liber Primus” has been
already pointed out, in order to resolve the tension between “forethinking” and “pleasure” through
their connection to “longing”: only by admitting that the serpent has a positive meaning, by the side
of its poisonous nature, such a reconciliation can take place.114 In fact, the serpent is also
“instrument of sacrifice”, according to Transformations and Symbols of the Libido: “It is the knife
that kills, but also the phallus as symbol of the regenerative power of the grain, which, buried I the
earth like a corpse, is at the same time the inseminator of the earth”.115 Precisely in this sense, the
second modality of Jung's interpretation of the serpent symbol in Zarathustra is to be investigated
in Liber Novus. The sacrifice theme appears a couple of times referring to serpents. However, such
meaning is to be found in layer 2 almost exclusively; that is to say, it occurs in Jung's retrospective
reflections and stylistic choices remarkably more often than in visions. As already seen, in chapter
“Descent into Hell in the Future”, Jung is terrified by the vision of “small serpents on the dark rock
walls, striving toward the depths, where the sun shines. A thousand serpents crowd around, veiling
the sun”.116 As it has been argued in the previous chapter, in this vision he comes to realise the
importance of sacrifice on behalf of development; so he reflects on his fantasy:
111RB II, 21, “The Magician”, pp. 325-326. On the sentence “love never ends”, see S. Shamdasani, footnote 331
(ibid.): “This is a quotation from I Corinthians 13:8. Near the end of his life, Jung cited it again in his reflections on
love at the end of Memories (p. 387). In Black Book 4, the inscription is first given in Greek letters (p. 134)”.
112RB “Scrutinies”, § 14, p. 357.
113Ibid., p. 358. In Jung's cosmology, the bird is said to be “heavenly soul” and the serpent is called “earthly soul” (see
RB “Appendix A”, p. 363).
114Cfr 2.2.2.
115CW 5, § 676, WSL, p. 409.
116RB I, 5, p. 237.
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Therefore I take part in that murder; the sun of the depths also shines in me after the murder
has been accomplished; the thousand serpents that want to devour the sun are also in me. I
myself am a murderer and murdered [Mörder und Gemordeter], sacrificer and sacrificed
[Opferer und Opfer]. The upwelling blood streams out of me.
You all have a share in the murder. In you the reborn one will come to be, and the sun of the
depths will rise, and a thousand serpents will develop from your dead matter and fallon the
sun to choke it. Your blood will stream forth. The peoples demonstrate this at the present time
in unforgettable acts, that will be written with blood in unforgettable books for eternal
memory.”117
Interpreting further visions, Jung understands the necessity of “the Conception of the God”. In
that circumstance he states: “Do you think that it is dead in you? But this dead can also change into
serpents. These serpents will extinguish the prince of your days.”118 And not many lines below:
“Therefore on your journey be sure to take golden cups full of the sweet drink of life, red wine, and
give it to dead matter, so that it can win life back. The dead matter will change into black serpents.
Do not be frightened, the serpents will immediately put out the sun of your days, and a night with
wonderful will-o'-the-wisps will come over you.”119 Again, in the description of the sacrifice
committed by Jung's “I”, the atmosphere is introduced through the image of serpents. The “tangle of
human bodies” which is immediately visible, is called “serpent-like”. Among these, the body of a
dead girl lies on the ground. The “daimons” who “have thrown themselves over the maiden's feet
and body” have bodies that “sleek like serpents”.120 The vision continues, and Jung's “I” is forced to
117Ibid., p. 239. Cfr Nietzsche's dithyramb “Amidst Birds of Prey”: “Oh Zarathustra, cruelest nimrod! / Recently still a
hunter of God, /  The snare of all virtue, / The arrow of evil! / Now - / Hunted by yourself [von dir selber erjagt], /
Your own prey [deine eigene Beute], / Bored into your self [in dich selber eingeboh]” (cit., KSA 6, 389). As
remarked above (cfr. infra, 2.2.2, footnote 57), in Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido, Jung makes use of
Nietzsche's dithyramb in order to explain the meaning of the “separation from the mother-image” [Trennung von der
Mutterimago] (WSL, p. 290). A few paragraphs above, however, Jung recalls the same poem precisely in the sense
of Liber Novus: “Daß es nicht von außen kommende Qual ist, die den Menschen trifft, sondern daß er sich selber
Jäger, Mörder, Opferer und Opfermesser ist, zeigt uns ein anderes Gedicht Nietzsches […] wo der anscheinende
Dualismus in den seelischen Konflikt aufgelöst ist unter Verwendung derselben Symbolik” (WSL, p. 282). In 1952,
Jung's interpretation of Nietzsche's poem does not change in regard to this point (CW 5, §§ 446-447). The “Morality
of sacrificial beasts” [Moral der Opferthiere] is also analysed by Nietzsche in Daybreak (M, 215, KSA 3, 191-192).
See also “On the Pale Criminal”: “You do not intend to kill, you judges and sacrificer [ihr Richter und Opferer],
before the beast has bowed its neck?” (Za I, 6, KSA 4, 45). As already recalled, in 1945, Jung will analyse that
chapter indeed, while taking on the issue of “collective guilt” in relation to the Second World War and the rise of
fascism (CW 10, §§ 400-443).
118RB I, 8, p. 243. As showed by Sonu Shamdasani, “The Draft continues: 'But the serpent is also life. In the image
furnished by the ancients, the serpent put an end to the childlike magnificence of paradise; they even said that Christ
himself had been a serpent' (p. 83)” (ibid., footnote 136).
119Ibid., p. 244.
120RB II, 12, “Hell”, p. 288. It is also written: “No one touches me, death and crime lie in wait for you and me. You
smile innocently, my friend? Don't you see that a gentle flickering of your eye betrays the frightfulness whose
unsuspecting messenger you are? Your bloodthirsty tiger growls softly, your poisonous serpent hisses secretly, while
you, conscious only of your goodness, offer your human hand to me in greeting. I know your shadow and mine, that
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eat the liver of the maiden, which causes him nausea and deep discomfort. Again, a similar image is
evoked in order to describe the happening: “A sickening feeling of nausea sneaks up on me, and
abominable, perfidious serpents wind their way slowly and cracklingly through parched
undergrowth; they hang down lazily and disgustingly lethargic from the branches, looped in
dreadful knots”. He walks “hesitantly over the boulders, avoiding every dark place for fear of
treading on a serpent”. Here is the meaning of the sacrifice:
The sacrifice has been accomplished: the divine child, the image of the God's formation, is
slain, and I have eaten from the sacrificial flesh. The child, that is, the image of the God's
formation, not only bore my human craving, but also enclosed all the primordial and
elemental powers that the sons of the sun possess as an inalienable inheritance. The God
needs all this for his genesis.121 
It has already been said that Philemon's “wisdom” is called “the wisdom of the serpents, cold,
with a grain of poison, yet healing in small doses”. What is still to be pointed out, is the way such a
wisdom operates:
Your magic paralyzes and therefore makes strong people, who tear themselves away from
themselves. But do they love you, are they thankful, lover of your own soul? Or do they curse
you for your magical serpent poison? They keep their distance, shaking their heads and
whispering together. 122
By paralysing, Philemon's “poison” scares people and forces them to face themselves. Also in
this case, the serpent has the function to represent a necessary sacrifice, in order to achieve
transformation. The venomous nature is the linking element of this process, and it leads directly to
the third point highlighted through Jung's interpretation of the serpent in Zarathustra. It has been
already said much of this aspect; nonetheless, a few further elements can be brought out,
representing significant parallels with Jung's later seminar. In this case, such meaning appears
recurring with similar consistency in both layers 1 and 2. In a few sections from Liber Novus, a
serpent is associated with Salome. She symbolises pleasure, meant as the counterpart of
“forethinking”. In the fantasy from “The Magician”, she is compared to “the serpent that coiled
follows and comes with us, and only waits for the hour of twilight when he will strangle you and me with all the
daimons of the night.” (ibid., p. 289).
121RB II, 13, “The Sacrificial Murder”, pp. 290-291.
122RB II, 21, The Magician”, p. 315. 
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around [Jung's “I”] and pressed out [his] blood”.123 The couple Elijah-Salome can be regarded as
representing, more specifically, the same relationship between spirit and body, that the couple bird-
serpent symbolised more broadly, by extending the concept to universal categories such as Heaven
and Hell. As discussed in chapter 2, pleasure is the element which permits the one-sidedness of
thinking to overcome itself and get rid of what has been called 'heavy knowledge'. Precisely in this
sense, Jung's comment on “Of the Adder's Bite” deserves a little bit of attention. The phrase “Crush
the head of the serpent and it will bite you in the heel”124 shows the same image used by Jung
himself in Symbols of Transformation: “If you want the snake to bruise your heel you have only to
tread on its head”.125 Such a metaphor, as previously argued, refers to a sentence from “First Day” –
“But the poison of the serpent, whose head you crush, enters you through the wound in your heel;
and thus the serpent becomes more dangerous than it was before” –126, which is directly linked to
the meaning attributed to the serpent in the first Elijah-Salome episode. Quite ironically, in regard to
“Of the Adder's bite”, Mrs. Sigg suggested Jung that “When Nietzsche wrote this part of
Zarathustra he had just had five months of daily discussion with Lou Salomé”, to which he
responded: “Ah, there he met the serpent, that is quite certain”.127 Getting back to the comparison
with Liber Novus, towards the end of the book, Philemon makes clear the meaning of serpents in
transformation processes, namely in their relation to the bird once more. This time, the conflict
symbolised by the animals is expressed in terms of sexuality and spirituality indeed, where serpents
represent the approach of “the daimon of sexuality” to “our soul”:
The daimon of sexuality approaches our soul as a serpent. She is half human soul and is called
thought-desire. 
The daimon of spirituality descends into our soul as the white bird. He is half human soul and 
is called desire-thought. 
The serpent is an earthly soul, half daimonic, a spirit, and akin to the spirits of the dead. Thus
too, like these she swarms around in the things of earth, making us fear them or else having
them arouse our craving. The serpent has a female nature, forever seeking the company of
those dead who are spellbound by the earth, and who did not find a way across to singleness.
The serpent is a whore. She courts the devil and evil spirits; she is a mischievous tyrant and
tormentor, forever inveigling the most evil company: The white bird is a half-celestial soul of
123Ibid., p. 324.
124SNZ I, p. 755.
125CW 5, § 586.
126RB II, 8, p. 279.
127SNZ I, p. 755. In his seminar on Kundalini Yoga, Jung introduces Kundalini – represented as a serpent – as “the
anima”: “That is the very reason why I hold that this second center, despite the Hindu interpretation of the crescent
being male, is intensely female, for the water is the womb of rebirth, the baptismal fount” (C. G. Jung, The
Psychology of Kundalini Yoga. Notes of the Seminar given in 1932, edited by Sonu Shamdasani, Bollingen,
Princeton 1996, p. 22). 
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man. He abides with the mother, descending from time to time. The bird is manlike, and is
effective thought. He is chaste and solitary, a messenger of the mother. He flies high above the
earth. He commands singleness. He brings knowledge from the distant ones, who have
departed before and attained perfection. He bears our word up to the mother. She intercedes,
she warns, but she is powerless against the Gods. She is a vessel of the sun. The serpent
descends and cunningly lames the phallic daimon, or else goads him on. She bears up the too-
crafty thoughts of the earthly, those thoughts that creep through every hole and cleave to all
things with craving. Although the serpent does not want to, she must be of use to us. She flees
our grasp, thus showing us the way, which our human wits could not find.128
The same process is made clear at the very end of Liber Novus, when Philemon meets “the
shade”, his “master”. Here the reference to a serpent – or “worm” – is expressed in Christian terms:
But ΦIΛHMΩN answered, 'Recognize, Oh master and beloved, that your nature is also of the
serpent. Were you not raised on the tree like the serpent? Have you laid aside your body, like
the serpent its skin? Have you not practiced the healing arts, like the serpent? Did you not go
to Hell before your ascent? And did you not see your brother there, who was shut away in the
abyss?'
Then the shade said, 'You speak the truth. You are not lying. Even so, do you know what I
bring you?'
'This I know not,' ΦIΛHMΩN answered, 'I know only one thing, that whoever hosts the worm
also needs his brother. What do you bring me, my beautiful guest? Lamentation and
abomination were the gift of the worm. What will you give us?'
The shade answered, 'I bring you the beauty of suffering. That is is needed by whoever hosts
the worm.'129
Besides the three main characterisations of serpents in Jung's Zarathustra seminar and in Liber
Novus, there are also two further readings, definitely less recurrent, which regard their closeness to
the symbols of spider and scarab, respectively. On 19 May 1937, at the moment of analysing the
chapter “On the Tarantulas”, Jung makes a long digression on the sexual aspect implied by the
tarantula symbol. Zarathustra previous chapter was “On the Rabble”, and Jung had grasped a strong
masculine element, i.e. Wotan, in the recurrent wind image. Because Nietzsche appears nearly
identified with the masculine element, a feminine presence is needed, according to Jung, in order to
counterbalance its effect and prevent such an identification from succeeding. In this sense, its link
128RB “Scrutinies”, § 11, p. 353.
129Ibid., § 15, p. 359. The reference is again to the identity between “Christ” and the “Antichrist” expressed by the
double nature of the serpent (cfr. CW 9, 2, §§ 369-390 ).
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with the earth and sensation in relation to Nietzsche's intuition are particularly treated:
[…] the tarantula is found in southeastern Europe; it lives in a hole in a rock or in the ground,
and it is pretty poisonous, though its sting actually kills only small animals. The legend is that
anybody poisoned by a tarantula goes raving mad and is seized by an uncontrollable desire to
dance, but I think that idea simply comes from the fact that the people who had been poisoned
were forced to dance, which was quite reasonable, in order to induce a heavy perspiration and
give the poison a chance to get out of the body.130
Not too far from these lines, Jung adds: “A tarantula is less dangerous than a venomous snake
for instance, but people make a great story about it, a sort of metaphor”.131 As proposed by Miss
Hannah, the tarantula can also be interpreted as “a symbol for the self”. In response, Jung
comments:
Yes. There are dreams, for instance, where the spider appears as a jewel, perhaps a sapphire, a
blue resplendent gem in the center of the web which is made of golden threads. And people
make pictures like that, not knowing of course what they mean. This is the symbol of the self
but in a certain condition: namely, in the condition of complete unconsciousness. […] Now,
its positive aspect is that there is a central being somewhere that has spread its golden webs
throughout the world to catch the souls of man. Often, however, it is projected in its negative
aspect onto the analyst who is then seen as a spider catching people, getting them under his
influence and sucking them dry, but his is merely the negative aspect of a very positive
thing.132
The scarab symbol in “Of the Vision and the Riddle” offers Jung another occasion for talking
130SNZ II, p. 1077. See also pp. 1075-1076.
131Ibid., p. 1078. Because of the link between the tarantula and intuition, Jung argues that Nietzsche “never saw a
tarantula”, since in his representation it displays a triangle on its back, and that characteristic belongs to a different
kind of spider, namely the Kreuzspinne. According to Jung, Nietzsche would not need to see a tarantula, because his
imagination would be guided by the intuition, and the force of the symbol would be given by Nietzsche's perception
about its deep meaning. However, as pointed out by the editor in one of the footnotes to the text, “The European
tarantula does have a small triangle on its back” (ibid., footnote 2, p. 1079).
132Ibid., p. 1087. In this sense, Jung explains Nietzsche's warning against collectivity in “On the Tarantulas”, which is
seen in terms of infection: “Those people who preach that collectivism of equal units are the ones who are afraid of
the action of the spider. They feel that the spider, or the analyst, is preaching of individuation, that a hostile power is
seeking them, enveloping them as a spider does. They fear that they may get stuck or caught in something, and they
necessarily think that this is absolutely wrong, that they should be free. But people lose their real freedom when they
really succeed in behaving in collectivism and equality. Then they are caught in their equality and there is no
possibility of any differentiation any longer. It is as if all the water were in one lake where nothing moved, where
there was a complete lack of potential. Now, this positive aspect of the spider of course is a symbol, but inasmuch as
that symbol is a triangle it doesn't fit of course, because a triangle just means one-sidedness, while individuation
means everything else but one-sidedness – it means completeness. Therefore individuation is represented by a circle
and a square” (ibid., pp. 1087-1088).
159
about serpents, and relating both symbols to the rebirth theme. Not surprisingly, St. John's depiction
of “Christ” appears in this case as well:
You know, scarabs live on rotten matter: they dig into carrion in order to bury their eggs in it,
or they make balls of manure to feed on and deposit their eggs in, so they are not particularly
nice animals in that respect, though they look all right. If they attain human size they would
be quite dangerous, naturally; those people who have chosen the other way, the way that is not
parallel to the snake, would be in danger of being eaten up by them. Now what is a scarab? It
is a very typical symbol, but one can assume that this child [who dreamt of a snake] had any
notion of its meaning. [...] What is the beetle anyhow? [...] I mean the fact that it has a
sympathetic nervous system and no cerebro-spinal system. To dream of a worm would have
the same meaning – they stand for the sympathetic system. Now I don't know how man
knows that. I assume that it is a wasp knows that the third dorsal ganglion of the caterpillar's
sympathetic system is the motor ganglion and puts it sting just into that, so it lames the
caterpillar without killing it; and then the eggs which the wasp deposits thrive on that
knowledge as key, one can unlock the dream. Then, you remember, the scarab was the symbol
of resurrection in Egypt, the transitory form of Ra when he is invoked as Cheper or Chepra,
the rising sun. Ra in the form of the Chepra is buried in the ball of dung, and then he rises at
the sun. That means man in the incubation sleep, in a state of rebirth, man buried in the
sympathetic system when consciousness […] is entirely extinguished. [...]
In the Evangel of St. John, Christ likens himself to the serpent that was raised by Moses in the
desert, against the many poisonous snakes that were killing the people. That is exactly the
same motif, but instead of the beetle, it was the serpent directly. If one is at variance with
one's cerebro-spinal system plus the sympathetic system, it would be expressed by the
poisonous snake. Many people resist not only their sympathetic system, but the cerebro-spinal
system as well, and they are of course directly threatened by the snake. The serpent becomes
poisonous. […] [Nietzsche] raised himself too high, onto the point of a needle, with his idea
of the superman, so he is naturally in contradiction to his human side and that forms the black
snake”133
Although there is no reference to spiders or tarantulas in Liber Novus,134 the same meaning of
renewal element attributed to the scarab appears twice. In chapter “Descent into Hell in the Future”,
after having seen the head of a wounded man in a cave, Jung's “I” comes across “a large black
scarab floating past on the dark stream”.135 Jung comments: “the black beetle is the death that is
necessary for renewal; and so thereafter, a new sun glowed, the sun of the depths, full of riddles, a
133Ibid., p. 1300.
134 Except a quick allusion to “spider-legged monsters” (RB I, 6, “Splitting of the Spirit”,  p. 241).
135RB I, 5, p. 237.
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sun of the night”.136 In “Dies II”, the same animal appears again: “Over there a small dark beetle is
crawling along, pushing a ball in front of it – a scarab.” As mentioned above, Jung's “I” is tended to
worship the animal, due to his experience in the dryness of the desert. Differently from humans, the
black scarab is living its “myth” – represented by its pushing the ball; therefore, it deserves
admiration.137
3.3.2 FROGS AND SWAMP
Apparently, frogs and toads play only a marginal role in the evolving of Zarathustra.
Nonetheless, Jung dedicates much of his time to the interpretation of their meaning. On 21
November 1934, he comments on Nietzsche's sentence “Or is it this: to wade into dirty water when
it is the water of truth, and not to disdain cold frogs and hot toads?”, from chapter “On the Three
Metamorphoses” with these words:
Here comes in that idiosyncrasy from which Nietzsche suffered; he always was obsessed by
the idea that he ought to swallow a toad. [...] That idea often occurred to him: it is the
expression of the loathsomeness of life, or of the lower man. Frogs and toads are a first
attempt of nature towards making something like man – a most ridiculous, absurd attempt, of
course – so they are symbols or human transformation. First there is the transformation from
tadpoles, and then it is a tailless animal with arms and legs, and that, of course, impresses
itself very much upon the naive mind. […] The meaning of the frog to Nietzsche was of
course the inferior man living in the swamp or mire. And it is quite clear that he feels the
connection with that primitive man here, because he is going to face again the conflict with
the interior man; it is still the same problem of the rope-dancer.”138
On 3 June 1936, Jung analyses the weight of animals in general in one's confrontation with the
unconscious. He defines the relationship between men and animals as a “chain”: “The body is the
original animal condition; we are all animals in the body, and so we should have animal psychology
in order to be able to live in it”. To endorse his hypothesis, he makes use of the alchemical “symbol
of Avicenna”, which “consists of an eagle flying high in the air, and from his body falls a chain
which is attached to a toad creeping along on the earth”. Jung comments on the image by pointing
out: “The eagle of course represents the air, the spirit, and in alchemy it had a very particular
meaning. The eagle would remind any alchemist of the phoenix, the self-renewing god, an Egyptian
136ibid., p. 239. Jung puts the scarab symbol in connection with rebirth in relation to Egyptian myth in CW 5, § 358
and CW 8, § 843.
137RB II, 5, p. 271.
138SNZ I, p. 255. During his comment, Jung refers to Nietzsche's dream which we have already mentioned, and which
he discusses in Symbols of Transformation.
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inheritance”139. On 16 November 1938, he considers the same alchemical image, and compares it to
Zarathustra's animals more specifically: “The flying eagle can be compared to Zarathustra's eagle
and the toad corresponds to his serpent, the eagle representing the spirit or the mind, or a flying
thought-being that consist of breath, while the toad just hops on the earth, an utterly chthonic
animal”.140
In Liber Novus, as partially seen, the toad occurs a few times, always with the same meaning of
the seminar, and plays a crucial role in the evolving of the story. As it was with serpents, also the
image of the swamp means disgust and rebirth at the same time. When it comes to depict a dark and
gloomy atmosphere, Jung makes use of that symbol to enrich his descriptions;141 in a few occasions
though, its meaning gets deeper and comes to signify a necessary step to take on behalf of personal
development. The tone of such reflections – also in this case, the swamp motif recurs more
frequently in layer 2 – does not differ at all from Jung's opinion in the seminar cited above. For
instance, he comments on a vision had on 29 December 1913 by stating:
At your low point you are no longer distinct from your fellow beings. You are not ashamed
and do not regret it, since insofar as you live the life of your beings and descend to their
lowliness / you also climb into the holy stream of common life, where you are no longer an
individual on a high mountain, but a fish among fish, a frog among frogs [ein Frosch unter
Fröschen]. […]
Your heights are your own mountain, which belongs to you and you alone. […] Becoming
belongs to the heights and is full of torment. How can you become if you never are?
Therefore you need your bottommost, since there you are. But therefore you also need your
heights, since there you become. 
[…]
Everything is riddlesome to one who is becoming, but not to one who is. He who suffers from
riddles should take thought of his lowest condition; we solve those riddles from which we
suffer, but not those which please us. 
To be that which you are is the bath of rebirth. In the depths, being is not an unconditional
persistence but an endlessly slow growth. You think you are standing still like swamp water
[Sumpfwasser], but slowly you flow into the sea that covers the earth's greatest deeps, and is
139SNZ II, pp. 967-968.
140Ibid., p. 1413.
141See RB II, 2 “The Castle in the Forest”, p. 261, and RB II, 6 “Death”, p. 273. See also RB “Scrutinies”, § 8, p. 349:
“The following night, the dead approached like fog from a swamp [aus Sümpfen] and exclaimed, 'Tell us more about
the highest God'” (this is the beginning of the “third sermon to the dead”). Interestingly, Vischer writes in Auch
Einer: “Drei sind die Sümpfe, darin man nicht leben soll: der Sumpf der Seen, der Sumpf der Schlaffheit und der
Sumpf des engen Pfahlsinns, der von keinem Vaterland weiss. Wisst ihr denn von einem Vaterland?” (F. T. Vischer,
Auch Einer, cit., p. 201).
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so vast that firm land seems only an island imbedded in the womb of the immeasurable sea.142
And, again, in the Draft version of “Nox Tertia” (pp. 407-408):
The lowest in you is the stone that the builders discarded. It will become the cornerstone. The
lowest in you will grow like a grain of rice from dry soil, shooting up from the sand of the
most barren desert, and rise and stand very tall. Salvation comes to you from the discarded.
Your sun will rise from muddy swamps [aus schlammigen Sümpfen]. Like all others, you are
annoyed at the lowest in you because its guise is uglier than the image of yourself that you
love. The lowest in you is the most despised and least valued, full of pain and sickness. He is
despised so much that one hides one's face from him, that he is held in no respect whatsoever,
and it is even said that he does not exist because one is ashamed for his sake and despises
oneself In truth, it carries our sickness and is ridden with our pain. We consider him the one
who is plagued and punished by God on account of his despicable ugliness. But he is
wounded, and exposed to madness, for the sake of our own justice; he is crucified and
suppressed for the sake of our own beauty We leave him to punishment and martyrdom that
we might have peace. But we will take his sickness upon ourselves, and salvation will come
to us through our own wounds.143
The reference to the lowest is repeated in “Scrutinies” (11 January 1916), when Jung's “I”
speaks to his soul: 
Oh bitterness! You have dragged me through sheer and utter Hell, you have tormented me
nearly to death-and I long for your thanks. Yes, I am moved that you thank me. The hound's
nature lies in my blood. Therefore I am bitter-for my sake, since how does it move you! You
are divine and devilishly great, wherever and howsoever you are. As yet I am only your
eunuch doorkeeper, no less imprisoned than you. Speak, you concubine of Heaven, you divine
monster! Have I not fished you from the swamp [aus dem Sumpfe]? How do you like the
black hole? Speak without blood, sing from your own force, you have gorged yourself on
men.144
In Zarathustra, the protagonist meets the “leech” for the first time while passing by a “swamp”
142RB II, 13, “One of the Lowly”, p. 266.
143S. Shamdasani, footnote 204, in: RB II, 16, “Nox Tertia”, p. 300. Cfr Mt 21:42: “Jesus said to them, 'Have you
never read in the Scriptures: 'The stone the builders rejected has become the cornerstone; the Lord has done this, and
it is marvelous in our eyes'?'”; Mark 12:10: “Haven’t you read this passage of Scripture: 'The stone the builders
rejected has become the cornerstone'”; Luke 20:17: “Jesus looked directly at them and asked, 'Then what is the
meaning of that which is written: 'The stone the builders rejected has become the cornerstone'?'” and Acts 4:11:
“Jesus is 'the stone you builders rejected, which has become the cornerstone'”.
144RB “Scrutinies”, § 5, p. 344.
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[Sumpf]. The character – namely a scientist involved in a meticulous analysis of leech brain – is
submerged by mud and does not even look like a man.145 This is one of the “higher men”
encountered by Zarathustra and invited by him to his cave for the “Last Supper”. As all the other
“higher men”, he represents to Jung Nietzsche's reluctance to deal with his own inferiority. Such
understanding can be said to correspond to the role of the frog as a symbol of transformation and
renewal in Liber Novus as well. Indeed, the “new God” whom Jung's “I” gives birth to is
retrospectively called “the son of the frogs”. It is not easy to accept to give birth to a frog, but
exactly from the overcoming of such difficulty, the transformation can take place. In chapter “The
Magician” it is written:  
My soul, you adulterous whore, you became pregnant with this bastard! I am dishonored; I,
laughable father of the Antichrist! How I mistrusted you! And how poor was my mistrust, that
it could not gauge the magnitude of this infamous act! 
What do you break apart? You broke love and life in twain. From this ghastly sundering, the
frog and the son of the frog come forth. Ridiculous-disgusting sight! Irresistible advent! They
will sit on the banks of the sweet water and listen to the nocturnal song of the frogs, since
their God has been born as a son of frogs.146
In “Scrutinies”, Abraxas is worshipped as “the lord of toads and frogs, which live in the water
and go up on the land, whose chorus ascends at noon and at midnight.”147 Finally, there is another
passage from “Scrutinies” which seems directly to refer to Jung's future interpretation of “On the
Three Metamorphoses”:
In this moment my vision ended. And ΦIΛHMΩN went away and I was alone. And I
remained apart as I had been told. But in the fourth night I saw a strange form, a man wearing
a long coat and a turban; his eyes shone cleverly and kindly like a wise doctor's. He
approached me and said, 'I speak to you of joy.' But I answered, 'You want to speak to me of
145Za IV, 4, KSA 4, 309. Interestingly, in Jung's copy, this chapter presents several underlinings and readings markings.
Among these, the word “compassionately” [mittleidig] is underlined. What follows the Liber Novus passage
mentioned above is this: “Then my soul writhed and like a downtrodden worm turned and cried out, 'Pity, have
compassion.' 'Compassion? Have you ever had compassion for me? You brute bestial tormentor! You've never gotten
past compassionate moods. You lived on human food and drank my blood. Has it made you fat? Will you learn to
revere the torment of the human animal? What would you souls and Gods want without man? Why do you long for
him? Speak, whore!'” (RB “Scrutinies”, § 5, p. 344).
146RB II, 21, “The Magician”, p. 327. See also ibid., p. 328: “The myth commences, the one that need only be lived,
not sung, the one that sings itself I subject myself to the son, the one engendered by sorcery, the unnaturally born,
the son of the frogs, who stands at the waterside and speaks with his fathers and listens to their nocturnal singing.
Truly he is full of mysteries and superior in strength to all men. No man has produced him, and no woman has given
birth to him”.
147RB “Scrutinies”, § 8, p. 350. See also “Appendix C”, p. 370: “The God of the frogs or toads, the brainless, is the
uniting of the Christian God with Satan. His nature is like the flame; he is like Eros, but a God; Eros is only a
daimon”.
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joy? I bleed from the thousandfold wounds of men.' 
He replied, 'I bring healing. Women taught me this art. They know how to heal sick children.
Do your wounds burn you? Healing is at hand. Give ear to good counsel and do not be
incensed.'
I retorted, 'What do you want? To tempt me? Mock me?'
'What are you thinking?' he interrupted, 'I bring you the bliss of paradise, the healing fire, the
love of women.'
'Are you thinking,' I asked, 'of the descent into the frog swamp? The dissolution in the many,
the scattering, the dismembering?'
But as I spoke, the old man turned into ΦIΛHMΩN and I saw that he was the magician who
was tempting me. But ΦIΛHMΩN continued: 
'You have not yet experienced the dismembering. You should be blown apart and shredded
and scattered to the winds. Men are preparing for the Last Supper with you.'
'What then will remain of me? I cried. 
Nothing but your shadow. You will be a river that pours forth over the lands. It seeks every
valley and streams toward the depths.'
I asked, full of grief 'But where will my uniqueness remain?'
'You will steal it from yourself', ΦIΛHMΩN replied, 'You will hold the invisible realm in
trembling hands; it lowers its roots into the gray darknesses and mysteries of the and sends up
branches covered in leaves into the golden air.148
As already anticipated, references to the “turban” and the “Last Supper” put this passage in a
more direct connection with Zarathustra.
3.3.3 DOVES, FEMININE AND JUNG'S “SOUL”
As discussed in the introduction, one of Jung's main criticisms to Nietzsche's experience with
the “unconscious” is the lack of acknowledgement of the Anima in Zarathustra. As already pointed
out, sometimes this archetype is incorporated in some features belonging to Zarathustra (like his
passion for dance); other times it is projected onto feminine personifications, such as life and
wisdom. Occasionally, some of these personifications are read by Jung as a form of immature
eroticism. This is precisely the case with the image of doves, whose presence in Nietzsche's text is
neither particularly recurrent nor crucial, but, according to Jung, calls for a deep psychological
interpretation. Such an interpretation does not differ from that of the dancing maidens in “The
Night-Song”, where Jung expresses himself:
148RB “Scrutinies”, 13, p. 355; italics ours. Cfr. RB I, 1, “The Way of What is to Come”, p. 230: “The spirit of the
depths, however, conquered this arrogance, and I had to swallow the small as a means of healing the immortal in
me”.
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[…] A multiplicity of anima figures is only to be met with in cases where the individual is
utterly unconscious of his anima. In a man who is completely identical with the anima, you
might find that plurality, but the moment he becomes conscious of that figure, she assumes a
personality and is definitely one. This is in contradistinction to the animus in women, who as
soon as she becomes conscious of him is definitely several. […] So from such a symbol you
can conclude that Nietzsche/Zarathustra is profoundly unconscious of his anima. Yet we
cannot assume, inasmuch as Zarathustra is the typical wise old man, that he would be
unconscious of the nature of the anima. The myth of Simon Magus and Helena is a typical
example, and the (tale of) Faust and Gretchen is another, but not so good because she is too
unconscious and he is not wise enough.149
On 25 January 1939, Jung comments on the image of the “laughing lion with a flock of doves”
in “On the Old and New Tables” in a similar way. First, he stresses Nietzsche's solitude once more:
“Think of the picture – a laughing lion and a circle of pigeons sitting around him. Now, I find that
there is a little uncertainty about the question of being alone with oneself and going down to
humanity”. Nietzsche's mistake would be to seek himself “in such utter solitude, but only fall[s] into
[his] unconscious. What is meant is, that you should be with yourself, not alone but with yourself,
and you can be with yourself even in a crowd”. By losing oneself, one “seeks solitude as a sure
means of making him unconscious of himself”. Therefore he concludes: “But the point is not to be
unconscious: the point is to picture the unconscious of oneself but to be with oneself”. In this sense,
“that forced, or chosen, solitude in which Nietzsche lived was a temptation, and one of the reasons
why he lost himself in the unconscious”.150 The image of the lion surrounded by doves is compared
to “the lion of salon, the bel homme in the drawing room with a flock of young girls round him. And
then there is the rooster and the hens. That is a very covert metaphor for somebody whose audience
contains a greater number of ladies”. Jung states: “So the laughing lion is obviously himself with an
audience, and the doves are specifically feminine birds”, which he defines as “lovebirds”; for they
represent the bird of Aphrodite. They are also a symbol for “the Holy Ghost” – that was represented
149SNZ II, p. 1153 (16 June 1937). Previously, on 5 June 1935, while analysing “The Tree upon the Hill”, Jung had
said about the Anima: “that conflict [between the Wise Old Man and the Anima] is settled, for when the anima is
rescued out of the brothel of the world, she follows the wise old man, as his sybilla, his somnambule. If the anima is
in the brothel the old wise man does not exist; he can only appear when the anima is redeemed from the brothel. Of
course she would be the complete opposite of the wise old man when she is in the brothel, but then the opposition is
so complete that the other par is invisible” (SNZ I,p. 530). The editor wrote in a footnote: “Simon Magus, a
prominent early Gnostic, is said to have taken from a brothel in Tyre a girl in whom he recognised a reincarnation of
Helen of Troy and a manifestation of the Divine Mother of all beings, including angels” (ibid., footnote 4). He cross-
refers to H. Jonas, Gnosis und Spätantiker Geist, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1934, vol. I, pp. 353, 358. On
Simon Magus and Helena, see also MDR, p. 206.
150SNZ II, pp.1484-1485.
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as “the mother”, “the wife of God”, and “Mary” herself in Gnostic tradition –, “Sophia”, or the
“Church” (which is said to be “the embodiment of the Holy Ghost”). The lion “is the age-old
symbol of the sun, and the sun in July and August particularly, the domicilium solis”. The fact that
this animal is said to laugh means, to Jung, that there was a moment in which it did not laugh.
Therefore its laughing means that something new is about to happen, that “fulfilment comes”.
Because “Zarathustra compares himself again and again with the setting sun and the rising sun, or
the sun that comes out of the dark clouds, or out of the cave”, Jung postulates the lion being
Zarathustra himself, “and he is laughing because he sees the fulfilment, senses a completion.
Completion is a circle and here it is a circle of lovebirds”. He compares such an image with “the
Shakti circling round Shiva”, which is “of course a pretty grand idea and not necessarily something
to laugh about. But when that becomes concrete, the animal god in Nietzsche laughs. Then Eros
comes up, and of course everybody will say, 'I always told you so, that is the end of it'”. From this
point on, “Zarathustra turns into his own opposite, practically by the law of enantiodromia”.151
According to this interpretation, Nietzsche was not able to recognise his Anima; on the one
hand, he projected her onto the plurality of dancing girls or flying birds, on the other hand, he
intuited her highest meaning – that is her complementary role to his personality – but because his
relation to her was so undeveloped, the erotic aspect of the Anima surpassed the sacrality of her
value. This situation appears to Jung as generated by Nietzsche's incapacity to face his own
solitude, which would lead him to get lost within his unconscious projections. The words
151Ibid, pp. 1489-1492. (in “Then Eros comes up”, italics is our own). Jung adds: “The books begins with that great
spiritual solitude, and at the end come the Dionysian dithyrambs. Now arrives the ass, beautiful and strong, but the
ass is the symbol of voluptuousness, which Nietzsche, as a philologist, knew very well. And when you look through
his poems you see the same element”. Jung mentions the dove as the Holy Ghost embodiment also on 15 February
1939 (ibid., p. 1532). On 28 November 1934, the lion in “On the Three Metamorphoses” was interpreted this way:
“Here I think it is clear why Nietzsche needed the lion to symbolize an attitude which can break laws. It is the royal
self-will, it is the antinomy” (SNZ I, p. 269). In “Concerning the Archetypes, with Special Reference to the Anima
Concept” (1936/1954), in relation to Brother Klaus, Jung points out: “In the visions that marked his initiation into
the state of adoption by God, God appeared in dual form, once as a majestic father and once as a majestic mother.
This representation could not be more unorthodox, since the Church had eliminated the feminine element from the
Trinity a thousand years earlier as heretical. Brother Klaus was a simple unlettered peasant who doubtless had
received none but the approved Church teaching, and was certainly not acquainted with the Gnostic interpretation of
the Holy Ghost as the feminine and motherly Sophia. His so-called Trinity Vision is at the same time a perfect
example of the intensity of projected contents. Brother Klaus's psychological situation was eminently suited to a
projection of this kind, for his conscious idea of  God was so little in accord with the unconscious content that the
latter had to appear in the form of an alien and shattering experience. We must conclude from this that it was not the
traditional idea of God but, on the contrary, an 'heretical' image that realized itself in visionary form; an archetypal
interpretation which came to life again spontaneously, independently of tradition. It was the archetype of the divine
pair, the syzygy” (CW 9, 1, § 133). The same motif is discussed also in “The Concept of the Collective
Unconscious” (1936): “according to an early Christan-Gnostic idea, the spirit which appeared in the form of a dove
was interpreted as Sophia-Sapientia – Wisdom and the Mother of Christ. Thanks to this motif of the dual birth,
children today, instead of having good and evil fairies who magically 'adopt' them at birth with blessings or curses,
are given sponsors – a 'godfather' and a 'godmother.'” (ibid., § 93), and “The dove represents the fructifying agent,
the wind of the Holy Ghost” (ibid., § 108). On “Sophia”, see “Christ, A Symbol of the Self” (CW 9, 2, § 118,
footnote 88). For a more detailed argumentation on the symbol of the dove in relation to the Holy Ghost also in
alchemy, see Mysterium Coniunctionis (1955/56) (CW 14, § 81).
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pronounced in relation to Nietzsche's solitude remind of what Jung said about himself and his
experience with his fantasies at the beginning of Liber Novus, which has been sufficiently discussed
in chapter 2. In particular, it is again the question of the desert that seems to arise: “Is it solitude, to
be with oneself? Solitude is true only when the self is a desert”.152 And, also this time, Nietzsche's
“self” appears to be a desert: as already remarked, in his interpretation, Jung describes Nietzsche's
meeting with the unconscious in terms of “temptation”.153
In 1912, Jung had a first dream of a white bird, namely “a small seagull or a dove”, that rested
on his table, in the garden, and then turned into an eight-year-old girl with blond hair who began to
play with his children. After a while, the creature transformed itself into a bird again, and spoke
these words to Jung: “Only in the first hours of the night can I transform myself into a human being,
while the male dove is busy with the twelve dead”. After having spoken, the dove flew away.154
That dream triggered Jung and anticipated the first visions which led him to write Liber Novus. His
difficulty to interpret it made him seriously think of a collective fundament in the unconscious for
the first time. According to his Black Books, the dove dream was also responsible for Jung's
decision to start an affair with Toni Wolff, whom he had known for three years.155
More generally, in Liber Novus Jung identifies his soul with the “white bird”, or the “dove”, and
the link between doves and feminine recurs quite often,156 as it will happen in his later works. Also
in this case, therefore such a link appears in layer 2 more frequently; however, images of doves
occur in visions as well. Especially towards the end of the story, one of the most significant
apparitions of a “white bird” takes place, namely in chapter “The Way of the Cross”. After that the
black serpent had turned itself into a white one, Jung's “I” felt confused by what was happening,
and “great weight burdened” his “soul”. At this point, as already reported, “the white bird that sat on
[his] shoulder spoke to [him]: 'Let it rain, let the wind blow, let the waters flow and the fire burn.
Let each thing have its development, let becoming have its day.'”157 The images used by Jung to
connect soul and feminine in Liber Novus are the same appearing in his published texts. At the very
end of “Scrutinies”, Philemon is said to be Simon Magus. As already anticipated, in a “hot summer
152RB I, 4, “The Desert”, p. 236. Cfr. 2.2.1.
153SNZ II, p. 1485.
154MDR, pp. 171-172. The dream is also reported in Black Book 2 (pp. 17-18) (S. Shamdasani, “Introduction”, in: RB,
p. 198).
155S. Shamdasani, “Introduction”, in: RB, p. 198.
156Occasionally, the biblical meaning of the dove occurs as well: “That will be a time of salvation and the dove, and
the eternal fire, and redemption will descend” (RB I, 8, “The Conception of the God”, p. 245); “Be crafty like
serpents and guileless like doves” (RB II, 16, “Nox Tertia”, p. 300). This last sentence reminds of Matthew 10:16:
“Behold, I send you forth as sheep in the midst of wolves: be ye therefore wise as serpents, and harmless as doves”.
In Memories, Dreams, Reflexions, Jung makes use of this verse in order to explain the lack of answers of myth for
modern man, who “has suppressed any […] attempts” to develop the meaning offered by “the original version of
myth”: “For what purpose do men need the cunning of serpents? And what is the link between this cunning and the
innocence of the dove?” (MDR, p. 332).
157RB II, 20, p. 310.
168
day” in June 1916, while “taking a stroll” in his garden, Jung came across Philemon again, who was
“strolling in the fragrant grass”. He wrote that when he “sought to approach him, a blue shade came
from the other side, and when ΦΙΛΗΜΩΝ saw him, he said, 'I find you in the garden, beloved. The
sins of the world have conferred beauty upon your countenance. […]'”. Then he welcomed him, but
the shade replied: “Oh Simon Magus or whatever your name may be, are you in my garden or am I
in yours?” And “ΦΙΛΗΜΩΝ said, 'You are, Oh master, in my garden. Helena, or whatever you
choose to call her, and I are your servants. You can find accommodation with us. Simon and Helena
have become ΦΙΛΗΜΩΝ and Bauci and so we are the hosts of the Gods”. It could be stated that
through the figures of Simon and Helena, as well as through the shade and the serpent, the opposites
are conjuncted on a universal level, so that the final transformation can now occur. The shade's
response to Philemon, which resolves the entire Liber Novus plot, has been previously discussed: “I
bring you the beauty of suffering. That is is needed by whoever hosts the worm.”.158
The feminine plays the same role also in the resolution of the Elijah and Salome episode, where
– as already pointed out – the couple of opposites are expressed in terms of “logos” and “eros”.
Later on, Jung will comment:
The old man represents a spiritual principle that could be designated as Logos, and the maiden
represents an unspiritual principle of feeling that could be called Eros. […] The figure of an
old prophet is therefore a fitting allegory for this principle, since the prophetic spirit unites in
itself all these qualities. In contrast, Eros is a principle that contains a commingling of all the
158RB “Scrutinies”, § 15, p. 359. In the Black Books, the shade is said to be Christ indeed (see S. Shamdasani, footnote
153, in: ibid.). In Ovid's and La Fontaine's representations of Philemon and Baucis, the couple host the Gods. In
both versions, their loyalty and hospitality are exalted and rewarded (Ovid, Metamorphoses VIII; J. de La Fontaine,
“Philémon et Baucis”, in: Fables, Livre XII, Fable 25, Barbin, Paris 1693). On the contrary, in Goethe's story, the
couple host Mephistopheles and Faust who, instead of being grateful, kill them (J. W. Goethe, Faust II, 5, cit.). The
reference to Helena seems to allude to Faust again, especially to its final lines: “All things corruptible / Are but a
parable; / Earth's insufficiency / Here finds fulfilment; / Here the ineffable / Wins life through love; / Eternal
Feminine / Leads us above”. Jung made use of Goethe's conception of the “Eternal Feminine” in several texts (See,
for instance, “The Psychology of the Child Archetype”, 1940, in: CW 9, 1, §§ 298-99). In “Concerning Rebirth”
(1939/1950), Jung writes: “Another aspect of this fourth form [rebirth (renovatio)] is essential transformation, i.e.,
total rebirth of the individual. Here the renewal implies a change of his essential nature, and may be called a
transmutation. As examples we may mention the transformation of a mortal into an immortal being, of a corporeal
into a spiritual being, and of a human into a divine being. Well known prototypes of this change are the
transfiguration and ascension of Christ, and the assumption of the Mother of God into heaven after her death,
together with her body. Similar conceptions are to be found in Part II of Goethe's Faust; for instance, the
transformation of Faust into the boy and then into Doctor Marianus” (ibid., §204). In Memories, Dreams, Reflexions,
it is reported: “In the days when I first read Faust I could not remotely guess the extent to which Goethe's strange
heroic myth was a collective experience and that it prophetically anticipated the fate of the Germans. Therefore I felt
personally implicated, and when Faust, in his hubris and self-inflation, caused the murder of Philemon and Baucis, I
felt guilty, quite as if I myself in the past had helped commit the murder of the two old people. This strange idea
alarmed me, and I regarded it as my responsibility to atone for this crime, or to prevent its repetition” (MDR, p.
234). It might be of interest, that Nietzsche reversed the meaning of Goethe's final verses in his “Lieder des Prinzen
Vogelfrei”: “The intransigency / is but your imagery! / God's interagency / Is lyric trickery … / / World rim, rolling
all, / skimming aim to aim: / the must - the spited call, / Insane calls it - the game … / / The game of worlds,
immane, Stains into seen and seem: - / the ever more inane / Stains into ever - we! … ” (FW Anhang, “An Goethe”,
KSA 3, 639).
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fundamental activities of the soul just as much as it masters them, although its purpose is
completely different. It is not form-giving but form-fulfilling; it is the wine that will be poured
into the vessel; it is not the bed and direction of the stream but the impetuous water flowing in
it.  Eros  is  desire,  longing,  force,  exuberance,  pleasure,  suffering. […] The  old  prophet
expresses persistence, but the young maiden denotes movement. Their impersonal essence is
expressed by the fact that they are figures belonging to general human history; they do not
belong  to  a  person  but  have  been  a  spiritual  content  of  the  world's  peoples  since  time
immemorial. Everyone has them, and therefore these figures recur in the work of thinkers and
poets.159
In similar manner, in 1916, Jung writes in Black Book 5: “Above you comes the dove or the
celestial soul, in which love and foresight are united, just as poison and shrewdness are united in the
serpent.”160 In “Systema Munditotius”, Jung's cosmological representation, a more specific link
between the dove and the Holy Ghost is given: “The light realm of rich fullness lies to the right,
where from the bright circle frigus sive amor dei [cold, or the love of God] the dove of the Holy
Ghost takes wing, and wisdom (Sophia) pours from a double beaker to left and right. – This
feminine sphere is that of heaven. –”.161 To this respect, it is not to be forgotten that the Latin word
“Anima” means precisely “soul”, though Jung's idea does not mean to stop at a pure rational
understanding of the concept, but intends to denote a more complete (and complex) “personification
of the unconscious”.162  On 28 September 1916, as reported in Black Books 6, Jung's “soul” spoke to
him about a “golden bird”, which “is not the white bird [...]. It is different. The white bird is a good
daimon, but the golden one is above you and under your God. It flies ahead of you. I see it in the
blue ether, flying toward the star. It is something that is part of you. And it is at once its own egg,
containing you”. Differently from the white one, this bird “is no soul; it is your entire nature. People
are golden birds as well; not all; some are worms and rot in the earth. But many are also golden
birds.” Then she continues:
159RB “Appendix B”, p. 365.
160RB “Appendix C”, p. 370.
161RB “Appendix B”, p. 364.
162Cfr. “Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious” (1934-1954): “The anima is not the soul in the dogmatic sense, not
an anima rationalis, which i s a philosophical conception, but a natural archetype that satisfactorily sums up all the
statements of the unconscious, of the primitive mind, of the history of language and religion” (CW 9, § 54). In “The
Syzygy: Anima and Animus”, Jung refers to Spitteler's phrase “My Lady Soul” [Herrin meines Lebens; Strenge
Frau] (C. Spitteler, Imago, cit.), and opposes to it with his idea of Anima: “I have suggested instead the term 'anima,'
as indicating something specific, for which the expression 'soul' is too general and too vague. The empirical reality
summed up under the concept of the anima forms an extremely dramatic content of the unconscious. It is possible to
describe this content in rational, scientific language, but in this way one entirely fails to express its living character.
Therefore, in describing the living processes of the psyche, I deliberately and consciously give preference to a
dramatic, mythological way of thinking and speaking, because this is not only more expressive but also more exact
than an abstract scientific terminology, which is wont to toy with the notion that its theoretic formulations may one
fine day be resolved into algebraic equations” (CW 9, 2, § 25). In Italian, “anima” is still the word used for “soul”.
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The golden bird sits in the tree of the six lights. The tree grows out of Abraxas's head, but
Abraxas grows out of the Pleroma. Everything from which the tree grows blossoms as a light,
transformed, as a womb of the flowering treetop, of the golden egg-bird. The tree of light is
first a plant, which is called an individual; this grows out of Abraxas's head, his thought is one
among many. The individual is a mere plant without flowers and fruits, a passageway to the
tree of seven lights. The individual is a precursor of the tree of light. The lucent blossoms
from him, Phanes himself. Agni, a new fire, a golden bird. This comes after the individual,
namely when it has been reunited with the world, the world blossoms from it. Abraxas is the
drive,  individual,  distinct  from him, but  the tree of  the seven lights  is  the symbol of  the
individual united with Abraxas. This is where Phanes appears and he, the golden bird, flies
ahead.
You unite yourself with Abraxas through me.
First you give me your heart, and then you live through me. I am the bridge to Abraxas.163
163S. Shamdasani, footnote 125 in: RB “Scrutinies” 12, p. 354.
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CONCLUSIONS
This is how I overcame madness. If you do not
know what divine madness is, suspend judgment
and wait for the fruits. But know that there is a
divine madness which is nothing other than the
overpowering of the spirit of this time through
the spirit of the depths. Speak then of sick
delusion when the spirit of the depths can no
longer stay down and forces a man to speak in
tongues instead of in human speech, and makes
him believe that he himself is the spirit of the
depths. But also speak of sick delusion when the
spirit of this time does not leave a man and
forces him to see only the surface, to deny the
spirit of the depths and to take himself for the
spirit of the times. The spirit of this time is
ungodly; the spirit of the depths is ungodly;
balance is godly (RB I, 5 “Descent into Hell in
the Future”, p. 238)
1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
From what has emerged so far, the core of what was called Jung's confrontation with Nietzsche
concerns first of all the issue of the “death of God”. In Jung's first readings, according to his later
memories, Zarathustra was considered a prophetical text, where the timeless voice of something
similar to his “No. 2” imposed on the individual Nietzsche and drove him towards a powerful
experience. Later on, Zarathustra was associated with other works, whose composition was defined
by Jung as “visionary”. Jung never ceased to attribute such prophetical capacity to Zarathustra; in
fact he even saw prophecies about 19th Century wars and totalitarianisms hidden behind a few
images. In addition to such an impression of the text, Jung also wondered about a connection
between Nietzsche's tragical fate and his experience with Zarathustra, that is, whether what
Nietzsche had come across before and during the composition of his text could be linked to his final
madness. As said above, such a thought occupied Jung's mind especially at the time of his own
experience with the 'timeless voice', namely while writing Liber Novus, especially after 1914. As
argued in chapters 2 and 3, this text presents several references to Nietzsche which are to be read in
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terms of a personal confrontation. Such a confrontation lasted throughout Jung's life and came up
especially during his analysis of Zarathustra at the Psychological Club in Zurich. In that
circumstance, he interpreted some sections or images from Nietzsche's text as if they were the same
images he had come across and described in Liber Novus. In both occasions, Jung's only protection
against ending up like Nietzsche seemed to be to give birth to a “new God”.
The way Jung and Nietzsche understand and react to the “death of God” reflects an
insurmountable diversity not only in their thinking, but also – and more important – in the purpose
of the two works this investigation is focusing on. In the following section, Nietzsche's and Jung's
understandings of the “death of God” more broadly, and then of Christianity more specifically, will
be compared. In fact, both Liber Novus and Zarathustra come to touch and question Christianity
itself. Still in accordance with this issue, in the last section of this conclusive chapter, the meaning
of “self-overcoming” will be discussed. Such concept is indeed central in both works, but the way
its meaning varies from one author to the other reflects again a radical difference in their thinkings,
which definitely affects a hypothetical dialogue between the two – or between their spokesmen
Philemon and Zarathustra – and makes it unilateral.
2. THE “DEATH OF GOD” AND THE MEANING OF “CHRISTIANITY”
2.1 PHILOLOGICAL EXPERIMENTS AND EMPIRICIST REVELATIONS
To Nietzsche, realising that God was “dead” came as the result of a slow investigative process.
As the son of a parson, and the only male heir of an entire family of parsons – in either maternal and
paternal lineage –, since his youngest years, Nietzsche had been expected to study Theology and
become a parson himself. He moved to Bonn indeed, in 1864, in order to attend the faculty of
Theology. After a few months, however, he decided to switch to Philology, and at the end of the last
term, to get back to his home region and complete his education at University of Leipzig.1 Although
Nietzsche was designated by his family to become a theologian, with his final choice, he made clear
to everyone what his profession should have been: he was first of all a philologist. And this has very
much to do with Nietzsche's statement “God is dead”. As stated by Jörg Salaquarda, if
“disagreement  persists  among  Nietzsche  scholars  as  to  when,  and  for  what  reasons  exactly,
Nietzsche broke with Christianity”, one thing which remains certain, is that “as  reason for  his
renunciation of Christianity, in his notes young Nietzsche offered historical criticism”. Above all, it
was the “historical relativity” of Christian doctrines to be highlighted by Nietzsche in his “first
outspoken criticism”, in contrast with their “alleged absolutism”. Besides, “in his writings of the
1 Pretty much simultaneously, Nietzsche's teacher and guide, the philologist Friedrich Ritschl, made the same decision
of teaching in Leipzig, after an argument with his colleague Otto Jahn.
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early 1870s Nietzsche made use of two additional arguments. Together with Overbeck he mocked
the poverty of contemporary Christian trends. He also tried to unmask the inconsistency or
'mendacity,' not only of individual Christians, but of Christian doctrine as such.  In  the  1880s
Nietzsche's criticism became more aggressive and psychological in orientation”.2
As made clear by Andreas Urs Sommer, it is important to maintain a distinction between
Nietzsche and the “Madman” [der Tolle Mensch] from aphorism 125 of The Gay Science, who
announces that “God is dead”. Neglecting the “madman'”s fictional function could lead to
consequences which do not really differ from those deriving from the identification between
Nietzsche and Zarathustra. In fact, the same statement “God is dead” is attributed to the “devil” in
Zarathustra chapter “Of The Compassionate”.3 Considering that, in Nietzsche's notes, the
“madman” was originally named “Zarathustra”, not only does Sommer's hypothesis make sense, but
it also aids to reflect on Nietzsche's position about Christianity. Indeed, although Sommer stresses
Nietzsche's latest criticism to Christianity as meant in the broader sense of his “experimental” and
“sceptic” philosophy, he also points out that such criticism has to be read in terms of historical
analysis. In this sense, he states that Nietzsche's atheism does not have to be confused with a
substitutive dogma for the old Christian values; on the contrary, it represents the starting point of a
creative process of “experimental self-liberation” [experimentelle Selbstbefreiung].4 Following this
line, it can be argued that the sentence “God is dead” achieves its highest value when it is thought as
the result of a careful philological analysis of the history of culture, namely as a necessary process
in the bigger project of Nietzsche's extreme experimentation. As reported in the preface of Twilight
of the Idols, the “hammer” used by Nietzsche – key-symbol of his Umwertung – is not meant as a
violence tool, but as the same instrument used by physicians in order to auscultate body cavities. As
Nietzsche points out, it should be somehow interpreted as a “tuning fork”. His intent, namely
“sounding out idols”, is to show emptiness in all our old values, even in those “most fervently
believed”. In this circumstance, he calls himself a “psychologist”; for his task, his “great
declaration of war”, intends to deconstruct human beliefs psychologically, by disclosing the
original link between human mental attitudes and the developing of “eternal idols”.5 The way such a
2 J. Salaquarda, “Nietzsche and the Judaeo-Christian tradition”, cit., pp. 92-93. As the scholar points out, it is quite
controversial to date Nietzsche's estrangement from Christianity: “In the corpus of his early notes, we find
testimonies of a living faith as late as 1861. But these notes conflict with other texts in which Nietzsche submitted
Christian teachings to a sober analysis or penned rather blasphemous remarks. At any rate, from 1862 or so,
Nietzsche was clearly already estranged from Christianity, and in 1865, when he confined his studies exclusively to
classics, he overtly broke with it irrevocably” (ibid., p. 92).
3 A. U. Sommer, “'Gott is tod' oder 'Dionysos gegen den Gekreutzigten'?”, in: R. Faber and S. Lanwerd (eds.)
Atheismus: Ideologie, Philosophie oder Mentalität?, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2006, pp. 75-90 (p. 77).
4 Ibid., pp. 87-90.
5 GD Vorrede, KSA 6, 57-58. A similar perspective can be found in Nietzsche's comment on Human, All-Too Human,
written in Ecce Homo: “The term 'free spirit' does not want to be understood in any other way: a spirit that has
become free, that has taken hold of itself again. The tone, the sound, has completely changed: you will find the book
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method operates consists of slowly analysing all “idols”, one after the other, and showing the
relativity of their fundamentals. What comes after this process is a more active individual awareness
in dealing with values, which should lead to the “experimental self-liberation” mentioned above:
maintaining the old idols; giving them a new meaning; or creating new ones are precisely
expressions of this kind of freedom. Even though Nietzsche's revaluation concept was defined in
terms of a real project in 1886-1888, several notes concerning the issue of values and re-evaluating
are present among Nietzsche's writings already at the beginning of the 80's, that is, at the time of
Daybreak and The Gay Science. In particular, as pointed out by Thomas Brobjer, in The Gay
Science, 269 it is stated: “In what do you believe? — In this, that the weights of all things must be
determined anew”.6 And “all things” must include also “God”, meant both as a broad symbol for
any kind of safe and steady guidance, and as the Christian God indeed. In the preface to The Anti-
Christ, Nietzsche puts himself in the position of being “born posthumously”: “my day won't come
until the day after tomorrow”. His anti-Christian 'experiment' can indeed be understood only if
possessing “courage for the forbidden” and being “honest”:
The conditions required to understand me, and which in turn require me to be understood, – I
know them only too well. When it comes to spiritual matters, you need to be honest to the
point of hardness just to be able to tolerate my seriousness, my passion. You need to be used
to living on mountains – to seeing the miserable, ephemeral little gossip of politics and
national self-interest beneath you. You need to have become indifferent, you need never to ask
whether truth does any good, whether it will be our undoing … The sort of predilection
strength has for questions that require more courage than anyone possesses today; a courage
for the forbidden; a predestination for the labyrinth. An experience from out of seven
solitudes. New ears for new music. New eyes for the most distant things. A new conscience
for truth that have been kept silent until now. And the will to the economy of the great style:
holding together its strength, its enthusiasm … Respect for yourself; love for yourself; an
unconditional freedom over yourself …7
Not too differently from Nietzsche, Jung's religious crisis  – which took place in his teens –
clever, bold, under certain circumstances harsh and sarcastic. A certain spirituality of noble taste seems to be
constantly fighting a more passionate current in order to stay on top. […] If you look more closely you will find a
merciless spirit who knows all the hiding-places where the ideal is at home, – the mountain where its dungeon lies
and, as it were, its ultimate security. With a steady torch in hand, this underworld of the ideal is illuminated with a
searing clarity. It is war, but a war without powder or fumes, without belligerent posturing, without pathos and
contorted limbs – all this would still be 'idealism'. One mistake after another is calmly put on ice, the ideal is not
refuted, it is frozen to death …” (EH III, 14, KSA 6, 323). In Ecce Homo too, Nietzsche puts himself as a
“psychologist” several times.
6 T. Brobjer, op. cit., pp. 14-17 (cfr. FW, 269, KSA 3, 519).
7 AC Vorwort, KSA 6, 167.
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came from an intense quest. According to Memories, Dreams, Reflexions, Jung experienced God's
almightiness for the first time at the age of eleven, in Basel, when “one fine summer day”, on his
way back from school, an undesired thought concerning God and the new Cathedral took posses of
his mind. Following his description, he tried not to “go on thinking” for nearly three days, during
which he could not sleep and a certain discomfort was visible to anyone around him. The reason
why he did not intend to let his thought come up, was because that was a “sin against the Holy
Spirit”, which would condemn him to Hell for ever. At the end of the last day, he realised that even
sining could respond to God's will: Adam and Eve were “created directly by God, who intentionally
made them as they were”, that means that “God in His omniscience had arranged everything so that
the first parents would have to sin. Therefore it was Gods intention that they should sin”. That
possibility “liberated” Jung, who “now knew that God Himself had placed [him] in this situation”.
God would want him to “show courage” and follow the divine will, against his faith and morals.
Thus he decided to let his thought go and felt relieved: “I saw before me the cathedral, the blue sky.
God sits on His golden throne, high above the world and from under the throne an enormous turd
falls upon the sparkling new roof, shatters it, and breaks the walls of the cathedral asunder”. This
happening made him question his father's faith:
That was what my father had not understood, I thought; he had failed to experience the will of
God, had opposed it for the best reasons and out of the deepest faith. And that was why he had
never experienced the miracle of grace which heals all and makes all comprehensible. He had
taken the Bible's commandments as his guide; he believed in God as the Bible prescribed and
as his forefathers had taught him. But he did not know the immediate living God who stands,
omnipotent and free, above His Bible and His Church, who calls upon man to partake of His
freedom, and can force him to renounce his own views and convictions in order to fulfill
without reserve the command of God. In His trial of human courage God refuses to abide by
traditions, no matter how sacred. In His omnipotence He will see to it that nothing really evil
comes of such tests of courage. If one fulfills the will of God one can be sure of going the
right way.8
8 MDR, p. 40 (italics ours). Interestingly, he also reports: “Oddly enough, I did not think for a moment that the devil
might be playing a trick on me. The devil played little part in my mental world at that time, and in any case I
regarded him as powerless compared with God. But from the moment I emerged from the mist and became
conscious of myself, the unity, the greatness, and the superhuman majesty of God began to haunt my imagination”
(ibid., p. 39). It might be recalled that also in the “Pfahldorfgeschichte” from Vischer's Auch Einer a similar episode
takes place: “Mit durchdringender Stimme rief er [Kallar; one of the druids]: 'Vaterland? Wisst ihr, wo es ist? Im
Himmelszelt bei Selinur und ihren Feen! Er leugnet das himmlische Vaterland wie die Götter! Die himmlische
Seligkeit dem Schützen, der ihn herunterschiesst! Halt, nein, noch höhere Wonne im Himmelssaal dem, der ihn
lebendig fängt! Her mit dem Lästerer, dem Götterleugner, dem Gripposohn [Grippo is another god venerated by the
inhabitant of Kallar's village], dem – dem –' Er drückte und presste, das stärkstmögliche Schimpfwort zu ersinnen
und hervorzustossen, endlich entrang es sich seinen Lippen: 'dem Erzkesser!'” (F. T. Vischer, Auch Einer, cit., pp.
202-203). Kallar, indeed, has just intuited the existence of another god, who lives “in the sun”, and “von deren
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One thing, therefore, was the Bible and its doctrine; another thing was “the immediate living
God” experienced by Jung. But precisely such a discovery upset Jung's beliefs:
It was obedience which brought me grace, and after that experience I knew what God's grace
was. One must be utterly abandoned to God; nothing matters but fulfilling His will. Otherwise
all is folly and meaninglessness. From that moment on, when I experienced grace, my true
responsibility began. Why did God befoul His cathedral? That, for me, was a terrible thought.
But then came the dim understanding that God could be something terrible. I had experienced
a dark and terrible secret. It overshadowed my whole life, and I became deeply pensive.9
The new aspect of God that Jung was experiencing also increased his “sense of inferiority” and
made him compare himself with a “devil”. He then began to read the Bible seriously, especially the
New Testament: “I wanted to find out whether other people had undergone similar experiences, I
never succeeded in discovering so much as a trace of them in others. As a result, I had the feeling
that I was either outlawed or elect, accursed or blessed”. In this new situation, Jung had a new
“secret”. His first “secret” was the revelation in the famous dream of the phallus – occurred to him
when he was only three years old –, the second was his wooden manikin, carved and coloured by
himself at the end of a ruler, dressed up and jealously kept in a pencil case. In Jung's years as a
teenager, the experience of a twofold God, lord of both good and evil, played an important role.
Also in his case, most of his family members were parsons, and, as said above, his father was a
parson himself. In all of them, as anticipated, Jung could see only one of the two sides of faith,
namely the speculative, theological part; but the “secret of grace” was missing.10
Majestät [their] blasser Mondsdienst nichts weiss, nichts wissen will” (ibid., pp. 195-197). After this episode, he will
be imprisoned and condemned.
9 MDR, p. 40.
10 Ibid., pp. 41-42. The dream of the phallus, which “haunted” Jung “for many years”, is described with these words:
“The vicarage stood quite alone near Laufen castle, and there was a big meadow stretching back from the sextons
farm. In the dream I was in this meadow. Suddenly I discovered a dark, rectangular, stone-lined hole in the ground. I
had never seen it before. I ran forward curiously and peered down into it. Then I saw a stone stairway leading down.
Hesitantly and fearfully, I descended. At the bottom was a doorway with a round arch, closed off by a green curtain.
It was a big, heavy curtain of worked stuff like brocade, and it looked very sumptuous. Curious to see what might be
hidden behind, I pushed it aside. I saw before me in the dim light a rectangular chamber about thirty feet long. The
ceiling was arched and of hewn stone. The floor was laid with flagstones, and in the center a red carpet ran from the
entrance to a low platform. On this platform stood a wonderfully rich golden throne. I am not certain, but perhaps a
red cushion lay on the seat. It was a magnificent throne, a real king's throne in a fairy tale. Something was standing
on it which I thought at first was a tree trunk twelve to fifteen feet high and about one and a half to two feet thick. It
was a huge thing, reaching almost to the ceiling. But it was of a curious composition: it was made of skin and naked
flesh, and on top there was something like a rounded head with no face and no hair. On the very top of the head was
a single eye, gazing motionlessly upward. It was fairly light in the room, although there were no windows and no
apparent source of light. Above the head, however, was an aura of brightness. The thing did not move, yet I had the
feeling that it might at any moment crawl off the throne like a worm and creep toward me. I was paralyzed with
terror. At that moment I heard from outside and above me my mother's voice. She called out, 'Yes, just look at him.
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Such an approach to Christianity in particular and religion in general remained consistent in
Jung's life. In “Psychology and Religion” (1937/1940), he writes: “Religion, as the Latin word
denotes, is a careful and scrupulous observation of what Rudolf Otto aptly termed the numinosum,
that is, a dynamic agency or effect not caused by an arbitrary act of will. On the contrary, it seizes
and controls the human subject, who is always rather its victim than its creator”. Indeed, he also
specifies: “At all events, religious teaching as well as the consensus gentium always and
everywhere explain this experience as being due to a cause external to the individual. The
numinosum is either a quality belonging to a visible object or the influence of an invisible presence
that causes a peculiar alteration of consciousness”. Although this is said to be “the general rule”, a
few exceptions may occur, “when it comes to the question of religious practice or ritual”, in which
individuals can effect their conscious state themselves, by “producing at will the effect of the
numinosum”. Such practices or rituals are, for instance: “invocation, incantation, sacrifice,
meditation and other yoga practices, self-inflictd tortures”, etc... However, “a religious belief in an
external and objective divine cause is always prior to any such performance”. More specifically, the
definition given by Jung to the word “religion” regards “a peculiar attitude of mind which could be
formulated in accordance with the original use of the word religio, which means a careful
consideration and observation of certain dynamic factors that are conceived as 'powers'”. Even
though “creeds” are “originally based on the one hand upon the experience of the numinosum and
on the other hand upon πίστις”, by “religion” Jung does not intend to mean only “creeds”. In fact,
“'religion' designates the attitude peculiar to a consciousness which has been changed by experience
of the numinosum”.11
The psyche appears as an independent phenomenon from the individual personality; on the
other hand it also comprehends such an individual personality, along with all the unconscious
manifestations. In this sense, Jung regards religions as attempts to represent the complexity of the
psyche. In particular, he dwells on Catholicism and dogmas, and compares their representative
capacity with scientific theories by affirming: “Dogma expresses the psyche more completely than a
scientific theory, for the latter gives expression to and formulates the conscious mind alone.
Furthermore, a theory can do nothing except formulate a living thing in abstract terms. Dogma, on
the contrary, aptly expresses the living process of the unconscious in the form of the drama and
repentance, sacrifice and redemption.”12 Apart from religion, a similar attempt would have been
That is the maneaterl' That intensified my terror still more, and I awoke sweating and scared to death. For many
nights afterward I was afraid to go to sleep, because I feared I might have another dream like that” (ibid., pp. 11-
12) . The manikin is described at p. 21.
11 CW 11, §§ 6-9 Cfr. R. Otto Das Heilige - Über das Irrationale in der Idee des Göttlichen und sein Verhältnis zum
Rationalen (1917), Breslau 1920, pp. 5-7.
12 Ibid., § 82.
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made by philosophy as well. For example, Jung associates philosophers's quest for a “round
substance” with a similar motif recurring in dream symbolism, where circle and quaternity images
play the main part; as if all these were projections of something else.13 However, Jung makes clear
that “God is an 'unscientific' hypothesis”, or a “'mystical' idea”, and that his “observations” “prove
only the existence of an archetypal God-image, which […] is the most we can assert about God
psychologically”. Shortly after he adds though: “But as it is a very important and influential
archetype, its relatively frequent occurrence seems to be a noteworthy fact for any theologia
naturalis. And since experience of this archetype has the quality of numinosity, often in very high
degree, it comes into the category of religious experiences”.14
Previous theoreticians of the unconscious such as Carus, von Hartmann or Schopenhauer are
seen by Jung as spokesmen for the acknowledgement of the unconscious as something bigger than
“a mere absence of consciousness”. Their attempt to describe the unconscious in terms of “world-
creating principle” would reflect that “they were only summing up all those teachings of the past
which, grounded in inner experience, saw the mysterious agent personified as the gods”. Following
this argument, two kinds of errors are “unavoidable” when dealing with “God”: the materialistic,
and the psychologising one. “Since the throne of God could not be discovered among the galactic
systems, the inference was that God never existed”; because “God is anything, he must be an
illusion derived from certain motives – from the will to power, for instance, or from repressed
sexuality”. Such mistakes recall the attitude of Christian missionaries towards the “idols of heathen
gods”. The difference is that whereas “the early missionaries were conscious of serving a new God
by combatting the old ones, modern iconoclasts are unconscious of the one in whose name they are
destroying old values”. Nietzsche himself is taken as an example in this sense:
Nietzsche thought himself quite conscious and responsible when he smashed the old tablets,
yet he felt a peculiar need to back himself up with a revivified Zarathustra, sort of alter ego,
with whom he often identifies himself in his great tragedy Thus spake Zarathustra. Nietzsche
was no atheist, but his God was dead. The result of this demise was a split in himself, and he
felt compelled to call the other self 'Zarathustra' or, at times, 'Dionysus'. In his fatal illness he
signed his letters 'Zagreus', the dismembered god of the Thracians. The tragedy of
Zarathustra is that, because his God died, Nietzsche himself became a god; and this happened
because he was no atheist. He was of too positive a nature to tolerate the urban neurosis of
atheism. It seems dangerous for such a man to assert that 'God is dead': he instantly becomes
the victim of inflation. Far from being a negation, God is actually the strongest and most
effective 'position' the psyche can reach, in exactly the same sense in which Paul speaks of
13 Ibid., § 95.
14 Ibid., §§ 101-102.
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people 'whose God is their belly' (Phil. 3:19). The strongest and therefore decisive factor in
any individual psyche compels the same belief or fear, submission or devotion which God
would demand from man. Anything despotic and inescapable is in this sense 'God', and it
becomes absolute unless, by an ethical decision freely chosen, one succeeds in building up
against this natural phenomenon a position that is equally strong and invincible. If this
psychic position proves to be absolutely effective, it surely deserves to be named 'God', and
what is more, a spiritual God, since it sprang form the freedom of ethical decision and
therefore from the mind. Man is free to decide whether 'God' shall be a 'spirit' or a natural
phenomenon like the craving of a morphine addict, and hence 'God' shall act as a beneficent
or a destructive force.15
“God”, therefore, represents all those phenomena which appear stronger than human
consciousness and possess it; this is why he cannot die, but just be projected onto a new symbol:
“The individual ego is much too small, its brain is much to feeble, to incorporate all the projections
withdrawn from the world”. Moreover, “when Nietzsche said 'God is dead', he uttered a truth which
is valid for the greater part of Europe. People were influenced by it not because he said so, but
because it stated a widespread psychological fact”. Consequences of such a statement are, according
to Jung, “the fog of -isms” and “the catastrophe” thereafter.16
The idea of God as 'beyond good and evil' is also the core of Jung's polemic against the
definition of evil as “privatio boni”; it is therefore central in his peculiar relationship with Victor
White. In “A Psychological Approach to the Trinity” (1942/1948), Jung expresses his argument this
way:
This classic formula [privatio boni] robs evil of absolute existence and makes it a shadow that
has only a relative existence dependent on light. Good, on the other hand, is credited with a
positive substantiality. But, as a psychological experience shows, 'good' and 'evil' are opposite
poles of a moral judgement which, as such, originates in man. A judgment can be made about
a thing only if its opposite is equally real and possible. The opposite of a seeming evil can
only be a seeming good and an evil that lacks substance can only be contrasted with a good
that is equally non-substantial. Although the opposite of 'existence' is 'non-existence', the
opposite of a non-existing good can never be a non-existing evil, for the latter is a
contradiction in terms and opposes to an existing good something incommensurable with it;
the opposite of a non-existing (negative) evil can only be a non-existing (negative) good. If,
therefore, evil is said to be a mere privation of good, the opposition of good and evil is denied
outright. How can one speak of 'good' at all if there is no 'evil'? Or of 'light' if there is no
15 Ibid., §§ 141-142.
16 Ibid., § 145.
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'darkness'? Or of 'above' if there is no 'below'? There is no getting round the fact that if you
allow substantialilty to good, you must also allow it to evil. If evil has no substance, good
must remain shadowy, for there is no substantial opponent for it to defend itself against, but
only a shadow, a mere privation of good. Such a view can hardly be squared with observed
reality. It is difficult to avoid the impression that apotropaic tendencies have a hand in creating
this notion, with the understandable intention of settling the painful problem of evil as
optimistically as possible. Often it is just as well that we do not know the danger we escape
when we rush in where angels fear to tread.17
Also, the not substantial essence of the evil can certainly not get along with the issue of the
“devil” in Christianity, if regarded as of independent nature from God's will.18 In “Forward to
White's 'God and the Unconscious'” (1952), Jung makes clear that in “the doctrine of the privatio
boni […] the theologian has a certain right to fear an intrusion on the part of the empiricist”. In fact:
“evil is in itself nothing, a mere shadow, a trifling and fleeting diminution of good, like a cloud
passing over the sun”. But:
it is self-evident to the empiricist that the metaphysical aspect of such a doctrine must be left
out of account, for he knows that he is dealing only with moral judgements and not with
substances. We name a thing, from a certain point of view, good or bad, high or low, right or
left, light or dark, and so forth. Here the antithesis is just as factual and real as the thesis. It
would never occur to anyone […] to define cold as a diminution of heat, depth as a
diminution of height, right as a diminution of left. With this kind of logic one could just as
well call good a diminution of evil. […] If your evil is in fact only an unreal shadow of your
good, then your so-called good is nothing but an unreal shadow of your real evil. If he does
not reflect in this way he is deceiving himself, and self-deceptions of this kind have
dissociating effects which breed neurosis, among the feeling of inferiority, with all their well-
known attendant phenomena.
For these reasons I have felt compelled to contest the validity of the privatio boni so far as the
empirical realm is concerned. For the same reasons I also criticize the dictum derived from
the privatio boni, namely: 'Omne bonum a Deo, omne malum ab homine'; for then on the one
hand man is deprived of the possibility of doing anything good, and on the other he is given
the seductive power of doing evil. The only dignity which is left him is that of the fallen
angel.19
17 Ibid., § 247.
18 Ibid., §§ 248-249. Jung also reports a Gnostic belief, according to which “the devil” would be “God's first son”, and
“Christ […] the second”. Then he adds: “a further logical inference would be the abolition of the trinity formula and
its replacement by a quaternity” (ibid., § 249).
19 Ibid., §§ 456-458.
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In this circumstance, as already at the beginning of his lecture “Psychology and Religion”, Jung
calls himself an empiricist, and points out that he does not intend to get involved in metaphysical
issues. Nonetheless, he does not exclude that an archetypal background might exist, which pushes
human mind to create “mythologems, folklore motifs, and the individual formations of symbols”,
namely images or ideas contradicting empirical experience.20 Lastly, the issue is faced again in
“Answer to Job” [“Antwort auf Hiob”] (1952). In the “Prefatory Note”, Jung writes that
“psychological experience shows that whatever we call 'good' is balanced by an equally substantial
'bad' or 'evil'. If 'evil' is not existent, then whatever there is must needs be 'good'”.21 Furthermore,
such a theory implies that “it is impossible for the consciousness of a good God to produce evil
deeds.22
It can be stated that whereas Nietzsche felt the need of 'experimenting', Jung searched for
stability, in order to justify the power he truly 'experienced'. Nietzsche's “God” was an empty idol to
revaluate, beyond – and before – all the ethical implications of that name; Jung's “God” was a real
and tangible experience to defend, that summed up his empirical experience of the “evil” and the
subordination of his will to an external entity. Like Jung, Nietzsche too stresses the necessity of
“evil gods”, by the side of “the good ones: after all, people do not exactly owe their own existence
to tolerance and love of humanity … Why bother with a god who does not know about anger,
revenge, envy, scorn, cunning, violence?”.23 But whereas to Nietzsche ethics had no substantial
essence in itself, to Jung it was at the base of human perception and action, though he recognises
“that clear-cut moral distinctions are the most recent acquisition of civilized man. That is why such
distinctions are often so hazy and uncertain, unlike other antithetical constructions which
undoubtedly have an archetypal nature ad are the prerequisites for any act of cognition […]”.24
2.2 NIETZSCHE AND THE ISSUE OF IMITATION: SOCRATES, WAGNER, CHRIST
Even if not expressly investigated, the problem of imitation has been implicitly central in
Nietzsche's speculation since Birth of Tragedy. Addressing his criticism against Plato, Nietzsche
brings out that the supremacy of logics over ethical issues attributed to Socrates was in fact still part
of Socrates's instinctual acting. Plato did not seem to realise the difference, therefore he would take
such an attitude for a normative rule and build his own philosophy around it. In this sense,
20 Ibid., § 459. Cfr ibid., § 2. 
21 Ibid., “Answer to Job”, “Prefatory Note”.
22 Ibid., § 600, footnote 13. Jung defines the privatio boni as a “nonsensical doctrine”. Cfr also § 685, where the
concepts of “Summum Bonum” and “privatio boni” are said to be incompatible with the Old Testament figure of
Yahweh.
23 AC, § 16, KSA 6, 182.
24 CW 11, “Forward to White's 'God and the Unconscious'”, § 459.
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Nietzsche's aim is “Socratism”, rather than Socrates, whose instinctual acting was contemplated
through him “as […] through a shadow”.25 Nietzsche's relationship with Socrates is deep and
complex; it started off during Nietzsche's years as a young philologist, and evolved throughout the
development of his thinking. As pointed out by Giuliano Campioni, at the beginning, Socrates did
not hold a particular appeal on Nietzsche, who felt more attracted to Democritus; however,
Nietzsche's “confrontation” with Socrates has been carried on with such “passion, vehemence,
excess” [passionalità, veemenza, eccesso], that it can be compared only with Nietzsche's relation to
Wagner. In fact, especially in Nietzsche's latest texts, both Socrates and Wagner represent decadence
and sickness.26 What does not evolve regarding Nietzsche's opinion on Socrates, is the issue of
Socratism. In The Gay Science, 340, “The Dying Socrates” [Der sterbende Sokrates], through his
revelation about owing “Asclepius a rooster”, Socrates would let his “pessimism” come out, that is,
he would reveal his fear of dying and his hate for life, which brings sufferance and pain.27 In the
section from Twilight of the Idols entitled “The Problem of Socrates”, such aspect is related to
Socrates's “ugliness” and “sickness” of life. His “hypertrophy of logic”, together with his
“emblematic rachitic spite”, become “symptoms” of decadence; whilst his “daimon” is regarded as
“auditory hallucinations”. Also in this case, Socrates appears as struggling against his “anarchy of
instincts”:28 he perceives and reflects all the aspects of a transition, namely the beginning of an era
of decadence. Again, Socrates is not to blame for being the first decadent; Socratism as the typical
attitude of decadence, instead, is the kernel of Nietzsche's discussion. The moment when Socrates's
rational instinct was hypostatised corresponds to the very beginning of decadence, whose
approaching was experienced by Socrates as a symptom.
In similar manner, a steady point of Nietzsche's ambivalent relationship with Wagner is
“Wagnerism”. Nietzsche never stopped to recognise in Wagner a talented musician; nor ceased him
to regard him and his wife Cosima as models, and to confront with them.29 Nietzsche met Wagner
25 GT, § 13, KSA 1, 91: “Now, we see here a grotesque defect in mythical consciousness, so that Socrates can be
considered specifically a non-mystic man in whom the logical character has become too massive through excessive
use, just like instinctive wisdom in the mystic. On the other hand, it was impossible for that logical drive, as it
appeared in Socrates, to turn against itself. In its unfettered rush it demonstrates a natural power of the sort we meet,
to our shuddering surprise, only in the very greatest instinctive powers. Anyone who has sensed in the Platonic texts
the merest scent of the god-like naïveté and confidence in the direction of Socrates's teaching has also felt how that
immense drive wheel of Socratic logic is, at it were, in motion behind Socrates and how we have to see this behind
Socrates, as if we were looking through a shadow”.
26 G. Campioni, “Socrate monstrum: egoismo e decadenza”, in: G. Campioni, Nietzsche. La morale dell'eroe, cit., pp.
71-120 (pp. 75-79).
27 KSA 3, 569-570. See also FW, 328, “To harm stupidity”: “[…] Ancient philosophy, by contrast, taught a quite
different main source of misery [Unheil]: from Socrates onwards these thinkers never tired of preaching, 'Your
thoughtlessness and stupidity, your way of living according to the rule, your subordination to the opinion of your
neighbor is the reason why you so seldom achieve happiness -- we thinkers are, as thinkers, the happiest'[…]” (KSA
3, 555).
28 GD II, KSA 6, 67-74.
29 Nietzsche's unpublished “five prefaces” [Fünf Vorreden zu fünf ungeschriebenen Büchern] were dedicated by him to
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for the first time in 1868. The musician and his wife immediately exerted a significant influence
over him, who became an assiduous guest of their house in Tribschen (Lucerne). The starting point
of Nietzsche's estrangement from Wagner is normally said to coincide with the first Bayreuth
Festival in 1876 and with Nietzsche's forth Untimely Meditation (1876). Reading the text, however,
it is clear that the aim of Nietzsche's passionate considerations are Wagnerians and not Wagner
himself. “In Bayreuth” – so Nietzsche – “ist auch der Zuschauer anschauenswerth, es ist kein
Zweifel”.30 What Nietzsche's perception is characterised by, is Jung's relationship with his audience.
As Campioni highlights in one of his studies on Nietzsche and Wagner, Bayreuth “idealism” and
“Germanism” appeared to Nietzsche as a “tremendous accumulation of deformation and
falsification”. Indeed, as reported by Nietzsche himself in Ecce Homo: “Wagner had been translated
into German. The Wagnerians had gained control over Wagner! – German art! The German master!
German beer”.31 Nietzsche's reaction corresponds to the same attitude he had taken in his first
Meditation on David Strauss (1873), where he had expressed himself against Germans and the
“barbarising element” [barbarisiendes Element] of their “men of culture” [Kultur-Menschen].32 The
aim of his criticism, therefore, are the political interconnections hiding behind the relationship
between music and spectators. As argued by Campioni, Wagner's “theatricality” would play a part
in his relationship with the German people in the sense that, his main accent being on the “actor”,
meant as a creator and counterpart of the “mime” – usually protagonist of French drama – that
simply imitates, he would create the illusion of creating something, rather than merely imitating. In
this way, he would assure German supremacy over other countries. Wagner's whole life would be,
therefore, transformed into a theatre.33 Nietzsche's later criticisms to Wagner will also concern this
Cosima Wagner in Autumn 1872 (KSA 1, 754). In the very last letters written by Nietzsche in Turin just a few days
before his oneway journey in the world of madness (January 1889), he addressed to Cosima by comparing her to
Ariadne, and himself to Dionysus (eKGWB, letters n. 1241, 1242 a). According to Cosima's diaries, both herself and
her husband felt hurt by Nietzsche's estrangement (G. Campioni, Sulla strada di Nietzsche, ETS, Pisa 1998, p. 199).
30 UBWB, KSA 1, 432.
31 G. Campioni, Les lectures françaises de Nietzsche, PUF, Paris 2001, p. 110 and G. Campioni, Der französische
Nietzsche, De Gruyter, Berlin 2009, p. 136. See EH III, 15, KSA 6, 323. Nietzsche's description continues this way:
“We who are different, we know all too well the sort of refined artists, the sort of cosmopolitanism Wagner's taste is
aimed at, we were beside ourselves when we found Wagner decked out in German 'virtues'. – I think I know
Wagnerians, I have 'experienced' three generations of them from the late Brendel, who confused Wagner with Hegel,
to the 'idealists' of the Bayreuter Blätter, who confused Wagner with themselves, – I have heard all sorts of
confessions of 'beautiful souls' about Wagner. A kingdom for a sensible word! – It was truly a hair-raising group!
[…] No freak of nature was missing, not even the anti-Semite. – Poor Wagner! What had he got himself into! If only
he had fallen among swine! But among Germans! … As a lesson for generations to come, someone should take a
real Bayreuther and have him stuffed, or even better, preserve him in spirits, since spirits are what he is lacking –,
with the label: this is the sort of 'spirit' the 'Reich' was based on … Enough, I left for a couple of weeks in the middle
of it all”.
32 UBDS, KSA 1, 206. See also Nietzsche's lectures “Über die Zukunft unserer Bildungsanstalten” (1872), KSA 1,
641-753 and “Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen” (1873), KSA 1, 799-872 (in particular 745-
746). The tension between political strength and cultural impoverishment will be also treated in relation to the
educational role of a teacher in Nietzsche's third Untimely Meditation, Schopenhauer as an Educator (1874).
33 G. Campioni, Les lectures françaises de Nietzsche, cit., p. 111. Interestingly, in Wagner's last works, his vicinity to
Schopenhauer and Christianity, appear as a contradiction towards his first revolutionary writings, in which the
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aspect. In the The Case of Wagner, the issue will be defined in terms of decadence, and Wagner's
music will be regarded as an example for German “cloudy education” [Wolkenbildung].34 Lastly, in
the preface to Nietzsche contra Wagner, Nietzsche will distance himself from “Germans” by
counterposing the psychological purpose of his essay to their reading ability: “I have my readers
everywhere, in Vienna, in St Petersburg, in Copenhagen and Stockholm, in Paris, in New York – I
do not have any in Europe's flatlands, Germany … And I might drop a word into the ears of my dear
Italians, who I love as mush as I love myself … Quosque tandem, Crispi … Triple alliance: an
intelligent people can only enter into a mésalliance with the 'Reich' …”.35
A similar discourse has to be made in regard to the figure of “Christ”. In The Anti-Christ,
Nietzsche distinguishes between Jesus as a historical character and “Christ” being considered as the
son of God. He states that “Christianity can only be understood on the soil where it grew, – it is not
a counter-movement to the Jewish instinct, it is its natural consequence, a further conclusion drawn
by its terrifying logic”. Here, “the psychological type of the Galilean is still recognizable, but it had
to assume a completely degenerated form (simultaneously mutilated and full of alien features –)
before it came to be used as a redeemer of humanity”. In fact, he explains that the Jews “defined
themselves in opposition to all the conditions under which peoples so far had been able to live […]
– they took religion, cults, morality, history, and psychology, and twisted them around, one after the
other, to the point where they were in irreversible contradiction to their natural values”. He
describes them as “the people with the toughest life force”, and adds:
when transplanted into impossible conditions they took sides with all the instincts of
decadence and they did this freely and out of the most profoundly shrewd sense of self-
preservation – not because they were dominated by these instincts, but rather because they
sensed that these instincts had a power that could be used to prevail against 'the world'. The
Jews are the opposite of decadents: they had to act like decadents to the point of illusion, they
knew, with a non plus ultra of theatrical genius, how to put themselves at the forefront of all
movements of decadence […] so they could make these movements into something stronger
than any yes-saying defenders of life. [For the] priestly type, decadence is only a means: this
strongest echoes came from Feuerbach's philosophy (in particular Art and Revolution [Kunst und Revolution], 1849,
and Opera and Drama [Opera und Drama], 1852). Such a change seems to reflects precisely Wagner's stress on
theatre as an element of power and domination.
34 WA, § 10, KSA 6, 37.
35 NcW Vorrede, KSA 6, 415. On a detailed representation of how Nietzsche's idea of decadence can be combined with
his criticism to Wagner, see D. Thomä, “Umwertungen der Dekadenz. Korrespondenzen zwischen Richard Wagner,
Friedrich Nietzsche und Sergej Eisenstein”, in: A. Wildermuth (ed.), Nietzsche und Wagner. Geschichte und
Aktualität eines Kulturkonflikts, Orel Füssli, Zurich 2008, pp. 103-140 (107-127). Already in Summer 1875, while
working on Richard Wagner in Bayreuth, Nietzsche wrote: “Hier ist nun der Künstler Wagner ein Symptom des
Entgegengesetzten. Es spricht der Geist der Verneinung des Bisherigen aus ihm; ebenfalls aber das Gefühl des
tiefsten Mitleidens, des Hülfreichen, das den Kampf mit der Nothwendigkeit aufnimmt: das Prometheische des
Künstlers” (NF 11[3] KSA 8, 189).
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type of person has a life-interest in making humanity sick and twisting the concepts 'good' and
'evil', 'true' and 'false' to the point where they endanger life and slander the world”.36
Through the history of Israel, some “priestly agitators” gained power and interpreted “all
happiness as a reward, all unhappiness as a punishment for disobeying God, for 'sins'”.37 In this
sense, Christianity as a religion was founded by Paul, who – as Nietzsche explains later in the text,
“invented for himself a history of the first Christianity. Even more, he falsified the history of Israel
once again, to make it look like the prehistory of his own actions: all the prophets have talked about
his 'redeemer' … Later, the church even falsified the history of humanity into the prehistory of
Christianity”. Paul appears as in search of the “type of the redeemer”; “he needed the death on the
cross and something else besides”. Indeed, Nietzsche wonders: “What was the only thing that
Mohammed would later borrow from Christianity? Paul's invention, his method of priestly tyranny,
of forming the herds, the belief in immortality – which is to say the doctrine of the 'judgement'
…”.38 Other than “redeemer”, and differently from Paul's psychology, the “type” represented by
Jesus is the “idiot”: “We are familiar with a condition where the sense of touch is pathologically
over-sensitive and recoils from all contact, from grasping any solid objects. Just follow this sort of
physiological habitus to its ultimate consequences – as an instinct of hatred for every reality, as a
flight into the 'unimaginable', into the 'inconceivable', as an aversion to every formula, to every
concept of space and time, to everything solid [...]”.39
What distinguishes Christianity from other systems of values is the fact that “Christians are not
characterized by their 'faith': Christians act, they are characterized by a different way of acting. By
the fact that they do not offer any resistance, in their words or in their heart, to people who are evil
to them”.40 But this appears to be only an external attitude, which has nothing to do with its origins:
“Nothing is less Christian than the ecclesiastic crudity of God as a person, of a 'kingdom of God'
that is yet to come, a 'kingdom of heaven' in the beyond, a 'son of God' as the second person in the
Trinity”.41 Christianity came after Jesus and his life. Even more, it started immediately after his
death and evolved through centuries as a “misunderstanding” of its “symbolism”:
36 AC, § 24, KSA 6, 191-193.
37 Ibid., § 25, KSA 6, 194.
38 Ibid., § 42, KSA 6, 215-217.
39 Ibid., § 29, KSA 6, 200. The target of Nietzsche's polemic is Ernest Renan, who depicted Jesus as a “hero” and a
“genius” (Vie de Jésus, Nelson / Colman Lévy, Paris 1863). As argued by Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche is most likely
to have borrowed the phrase “idiot” from Dostoevsky The Idiot (Идио́т, 1869; Wordsworth, London 1996) (W.
Kaufmann, Nietzsche, Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist (1950), Princeton University Press, Princeton /
Chichester 1974, p. 341).
40 AC, § 33, KSA 6, 205.
41 Ibid., § 34, KSA 6, 206.
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the history of Christianity – starting […] with the death on the cross – is the story of the
progressively cruder misunderstanding of an original symbolism. Every time Christianity
expanded to greater and cruder masses of people whose presuppositions were increasingly
remote from the presupposition under which it arose, it became increasingly necessary to
vulgarize Christianity and make it barbaric, – Christianity soaked up doctrines and rites from
all the subterranean cults of the imperium Romanum and bits of nonsense from all kinds of
sick reason. […] Sick barbarism itself finally achieved power in the church, – the church, this
form of deadly hostility to everything honest, to every height of the soul, to every discipline
of spirit, to everything kind and candid in humanity.42
Christian attitude has nothing to do with its original meaning: “Every practice at every moment,
every instinct, every value judgement that people act on is anti-Christian these days: what
miscarriages of duplicity modern people are, that in spite of all this they are not ashamed to call
themselves Christians!”.43 Even more radically, Nietzsche states:
Even the word 'Christianity' is a misunderstanding –, there was really one Christian, and he
died on the cross. The 'evangel' died on the cross. What was called 'evangel' after that was the
opposite of what he had lived: a 'bad tidings', a dysangel. It is false to the point of absurdity to
think that Christians are characterized by their 'beliefs', like a belief in salvation through
Christ: only the practice of Christianity is really Christian, living like the man who died on the
cross … A life like this is still possible today, for certain people it is even necessary: true,
original Christianity will always be possible … Not a believing but a doing, above all a not-
doing-much, a different being … States of consciousness, any sort of belief, as such as taking
something to be true, are (as every psychologist knows) trivial matters of fifth-rate importance
compared to the value of the instincts: to put it more rigorously, the whole idea of spiritual
causation is false. To reduce Christianity, to reduce being Christian to a set of claims taken to
be true, to a simple phenomenalism of consciousness, is to negate Christianity. In fact, there
have never been any Christians. 'Christians', the people who have been called Christian for
two thousand years, are just a psychological self-misunderstanding. Examined more closely
and in spite of all 'belief', they have been governed only by instincts, – and what instincts they
are!44
And, again:
Jesus could not have wanted anything more from his death itself than publicly to give his
42 Ibid., § 37, KSA 6, 209.
43 Ibid., § 38, KSA 6, 211.
44 Ibid., § 39, KSA 6, 211-212.
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doctrine its strongest test, to prove it … but his disciples were far from being able to forgive
this death, – which would have been evangelical in the highest sense; or even more, from
offering themselves up for a similar death in the sweet and gentle calm of the heart …
Revenge resurfaced, the most unevangelical feeling of all. It was impossible for his death to
be the end of the matter: 'retaliation' was needed, 'judgement' […]. Once again, the popular
expectation of a messiah came to the fore; it was considered a historical moment: the
'kingdom of God' will come to judge its enemies … But this is a misunderstanding of
everything: the 'kingdom of God' as a closing ceremony, as a promise! The evangel was
precisely the existence, the fulfilment, the actuality of this 'kingdom'.45
According to Nietzsche's reconstruction, Christianity arose and developed by promoting “pity”,
that is, “practice of nihilism”, “negation of life”, and winning “people over to nothingness”. Also in
this case, Nietzsche speaks of a “depressive and contagious instinct” which “runs counter to the
instincts that preserve and enhance the value of life: by multiplying misery just as much as by
conserving everything miserable, pity is one of the main tools used to increase decadence”.46 In fact,
Christianity “falsifies, devalues and negates reality [Wirklichkeit]”.47
In a sense, it is possible to read the issue of Paul's relation to Christianity in no other way than
Plato's relation to Socratism and Wagnerians's relation to Wagner. What is common to all these
cases is the imitating attitude of followers, all symbols of decadent peoples: the Greeks, the
Germans and the Jewish lower classes, moved by resentment towards Pharisees.48 As visible in
chapters from Zarathustra such as “On the Bestowing Virtue” and “The Intoxicated Song”,
however, such “believers” attitudes are to be rejected, for they do not belong to the proper skills of
the “man of knowledge”. Instead, they reflect that believers “have not found themselves yet”.49
What was called “shadows of God” in The gay Science comes back in the discourse on decadence
in terms of weakness. Decadence, indeed, means nothing more than a form of sickness; as pointed
out for the first time by Bourget and taken again by Nietzsche, it signifies the supremacy of the
single part over the totality.50 Similarly to Bourget, Nietzsche puts himself as a “psychologist”; but
his idea of being a psychologist coincides with being also a “philologist” and a “physiologist”: he
intends to disclose relations and interconnections at the root of contemporary society, as well as to
propose a cure for its sickness at the same time. Such a cure appears to deal with the issue of
45 Ibid., § 40, KSA 6, 213-214.
46 AC, § 7, KSA 6, 173 His criticism also aims at Schopenhauer', who was equally “hostile to life” (ibid., KSA 6, 174).
47 Ibid., § 15, KSA 1, 181.
48 Cfr. Ibid., § 46, KSA 6, 214.
49 Za I, 22, KSA, 4, 101.
50 Cfr. P. Bourget, op. cit., p. 14: “Un style de décadence est celui où l'unité du livre se décompose pour laisser place à
l'indépendance de la page, où la page se décompose pour laisser place à l'indépendance de la phrase, et la phrase
pour laisser place à l'indépendance du mot”.
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imitation; more precisely, with a return to “nature”. He writes, in his “law against Christianity” at
the end of The Anti-Christ, that “every type of anti-nature is a vice. The priest is the most vicious
type of person: he teaches anti-nature”.51 But what does a return to nature mean, if not getting rid of
emulation? Any model imposing from outside does nothing but putting itself as anti-vitalistic, by
suffocating individual inclinations and self-experimentation; with Nietzsche's words, by waging “a
war to the death against this higher type of person”, by making “the strong human being” a
“depraved”.52 In fact, Nietzsche's “great style” proposed in the preface represents the opposite idea
of a decadent style: while the latter loses the idea of 'totality', the former finds its meaning in
“holding together its strength, its enthusiasm”.53
Ironically, Nietzsche's opinion on “Imitatio Christi” seems to anticipate Jung's dialogue with the
librarian in the asylum scene from Liber Novus, just a few minutes before the encounter with the
alleged Nietzsche: 
The Imitatio Christi is one of those books that I cannot pick up without a physiological
feeling of repulsion: it exudes a scent of the eternal-feminine, which is all right if you happen
to be French – or Wagnerian … this saint talks about love in a way that makes even Parisan
woen wonder. – They say that this book was the source of inspiration for that cleverest of
Jesuits, A. Comte, who wanted to lead his Frenchmen to Rome on the round-about path of
science. I believe it: 'the religion of the heart' …54
2.3 JUNG AND CHRIST'S ARCHETYPAL NATURE
In “Psychology and Religion”, Jung states that “The life of Christ is understood by the Church
on the one hand as an historical, and on the other hand as an eternally existing, mystery”. Indeed, he
lived a double life: as a concrete, unique individual and as an archetype presenting “numerous
connections […] with worldwide myth-motifs”. Such a duplicity is what “constitutes the meaning
of the gospels”, and represents difficulty for researchers looking for historical data. Because “the
life of Christ is archetypal to a high degree, it represents to just that degree the life of the archetype.
51 AC “Gesetz wider das Christenthum”, KSA 6, 254.
52 AC, § 5, KSA 6, 171.
53 AC Vorwort, KSA 6, 167.
54 GD IX, 4, KSA 6, 113. Despite several interesting markings and underlinings in Jung's copy of Twilight of The Idols,
this particular passage does not show any sign of interest from Jung. In Winter 1887-88, Nietzsche wrote: “Daß die
Liebe der Tortur gleicht oder einer chirurgischen Operation. Daß Einer von Beiden immer der Henker oder der
Operateur ist. Worin besteht das größte Vergnügen der Liebe? hat man in Gegenwart Baudelaire's gefragt. Einer
antwortete: im Empfangen, ein Anderer: im Sich-geben. Dieser sagte: Wollust des Stolzes, jener: Wollust der
Demuth (volupté d'humilité). Alle diese orduriers redeten wie die imitatio Christi. Endlich fand sich ein
unverschämter Utopist, welcher behauptete, das größte Vergnügen der Liebe bestünde darin, Bürger für das
Vaterland zu bilden. Moi, je dis: la volupté unique et suprême de l'amour gît dans la certitude de faire le mal. Et
l'homme et la femme savent, de naissance, que dans le mal se trouve toute volupté.” (NF [11]174, KSA 13, 77-78).
189
But since the archetype is the unconscious precondition of every human life, its life, when revealed,
also reveals the hidden, unconscious ground-life of every individual. That is to say, what happens in
the life of Christ happens always and everywhere”. He then makes clear that he does not address
himself to “the happy possessors of faith, but to those many people for whom the light has gone out,
the mystery has faded, and God is dead”; for these people, “there is no going back, and one does not
know either whether going back is always the better way”. The disappearance of God, other than
such a psychological condition, is also an archetypical pattern, eternally recurrent in several
religions and beliefs; the same Christian mystery is a representation of it: “Christ always dies and
always he is born; for the psychic life of the archetype is timeless in comparison with our individual
time-boundedness”. As narrated in the Bible, after the crucifixion, Jesus's body could not be found,
and, according to some gospels, he descented into hell and spent there three days. By drawing a
more detailed psychological parallel, Jung sees in Jesus' body “the outward, visible form, the
erstwhile but ephemeral setting for the highest value”; while the descent “describes the sinking of
the vanished value into the unconscious, where, by conquering the power of darkness, it establishes
a new order, and then rises up to heaven again, that is, attains supreme clarity of consciousness. The
fact that only a few people see the Risen One means that no small difficulties stand in the way of
finding and recognizing the transformed value”.55
In Aion. Researches into the Phenomenology of the Self [Aion: Untersuchungen zur
Symbolgeschichte] (1951), Jung depicts “Christ” as “the still living myth of our culture”, and adds:
“He is our culture hero, who, regardless of his historical existence, embodies the myth of the divine
Primordial Man, the mystic Adam”. Not only this, “Christ” even “exemplifies the archetype of the
self. He represents a totality of a divine or heavenly kind, a glorified man, a son of God sine macula
peccati, unspotted by sin”. In this sense, Christ is said by Jung to represent the embodiment of God
“before the fall”, which – psychologically – symbolises the moment in which such “God-image” is
“damaged and corrupted” within human body. Thanks to Christ's soul descending “to hell”, the
restoration “through God's grace” can take place: Christ's descent represents the “integration”
indeed; “its work of redemption embracing even the dead”. Still in a depth psychological
framework, this corresponds to “the integration of the collective unconscious which forms an
essential part of the individuation process”.56 Lastly, as an archetype, Christ also represents
“wholeness”. But, due to the church unilateral view again, and to the doctrine of “privatio boni”,
such wholeness cannot be admitted:
55 CW 11, §§ 146-149.
56 CW 9, 2, §§ 69-72.
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There can be no doubt that the original Christian conception of the imago Dei embodied in
Christ meant an all-embracing totality that even includes the animal side of man. Nevertheless
the Christ-symbol lacks wholeness in the modern psychological sense, since it does not
include the dark side of things but specifically excludes it in the form of a Luciferian
opponent. Although the exclusion of the power of evil was something the Christian
consciousness was well aware of, all it lost in effect was an insubstantial shadow, for, through
the doctrine of the privatio boni first propounded by Origen, evil was characterized as a mere
diminution of good and thus deprived of substance. According to the teachings of the Church,
evil is simply 'the accidental lack of perfection.' This assumption resulted in the proposition
'omne bonum a Deo, omne malum ab homine.' Another logical consequence was the
subsequent elimination of the devil in certain Protestant sects.57
 As a consequence, the complementary side of “Christ” is projected onto his opposite character,
the “Antichrist”:
Thanks to the doctrine of the privatio boni, wholeness seemed guaranteed in the figure of
Christ. One must, however, take evil rather more substantially when one meets it on the plane
of empirical psychology. There it is simply the opposite of good. In the ancient world the
Gnostics, whose arguments were very much influenced by psychic experience, tackled the
problem of evil on a broader basis than the Church Fathers. For instance, one of the things
they taught was that Christ 'cast off his shadow from himself.' […] The Antichrist develops in
legend as a per- verse imitator of Christ's life. He is a true ἀντιµιµὸν πνεῦµα, an imitating
spirit of evil who follows in Christ's footsteps like a shadow following the body”.58
In this sense, Jung calls the “Antichrist” the “shadow of the Self”:
The psychological concept of the self, in part derived from our knowledge of the whole man,
but for the rest depicting itself spontaneously in the products of the unconscious as an
archetypal quaternity bound together by inner antinomies, cannot omit the shadow that
belongs to the light figure, for without it this figure lacks body and humanity. In the empirical
self, light and shadow form a paradoxical unity. In the Christian concept, on the other hand,
the archetype is hopelessly split into two irreconcilable halves, leading ultimately to a
metaphysical dualism the final separation of the kingdom of heaven from the fiery world of
the damned.59
57 Ibid., §§ 73-74.
58 Ibid., § 75.
59 Ibid., § 76.
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The “Antichrist” is said to equally represent the Self, but it incarnates its “dark aspect”. It is as
important as the two thieves crucified together with Jesus: “the progressive development and
differentiation of consciousness leads to an ever more menacing awareness of the conflict and
involves nothing less than a crucifixion of the ego, its agonizing suspension between irreconcilable
opposites”.60 Jung then goes back over the history of Christianity and finds evidence for his ideas in
Gnostic theories, as well as in alchemy. In particular, he associates the symbol of the “fish” of the
earliest Christians with the alchemical “lapis philosophorum”: both these images reflect
psychological attempt to express the “wholeness” of the “Self”. In order to be grasped as such, such
“wholeness” has to be revealed, and not simply represented; for a representation would show only
one of its sides, but not its “numinosity”. The Self appears as expressed universally, and its
“wholeness” is normally indicated through the unification of opposites, which is usually perceived
as a paradox, “since a union of opposites can be thought of only as their annihilation”. Indeed,
“Paradox is a characteristic of all transcendental situations because it alone gives adequate
expression to their indescribable nature.” Ultimately, the importance of “redemption” in Christianity
becomes meaningful because of its attributing “moral accentuation” to the “Self”, thus recognising
only its divine element of the “Self”. If a Christian “voluntarily takes the burden of completeness on
himself, he need not find it 'happening' to him against his will in a negative form”; but if he follows
his religious teaching, then the opposites within himself become unreconcilable. Similarly to
Eastern religions, such a conflict did not exist in the Old Testament.61
3 SELF-OVERCOMING
In a Zarathustra seminar session dated 29 January 1936, while introducing his comment on “On
the Bestowing Virtue”, Jung explains Nietzsche's symbol of the “golden ball” in terms of “a
reaction against the Christian spirit, since Christ really did not die for the earth but for the spirit”.
So, he continues: “The golden ball has that meaning; it symbolizes Nietzsche's most important idea,
the relation to the earth”.62 A bit later, he adds: “So this chapter and the idea of the bestowing virtue
in itself, has not only a Christian aspect, but a Christian value, there is no doubt about it. You see,
when Zarathustra, or Nietzsche, returns to life, he surely will be forced to participate in the life of
mankind as it is in that moment, and then he will see the positive values of it”.63 As can be read
through these lines, Jung understands a return to collectivity as the essential element not only to
60 Ibid., § 79. Jung also points out that the most significant attempt to integrate evil in Christian symbolism has been
made by the Gnostics.
61 Cfr. Ibid., §§ 122-126.
62 SNZ, II, p. 788.
63 Ibid., p. 791.
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interrupt Nietzsche's inflation, but also to overcome the unilateral perspective of Christianity. That is
to say, to integrate the opposites, and reach a new and more complete psychological state. The issue
of Self-overcoming is the main element in both Zarathustra and Liber Novus. These texts can be
regarded as peculiar lenses, through which the two radically different perspectives on the “death of
God” and Christianity analysed above can be investigated. In both texts, indeed, self-overcoming is
strongly linked with the “death of God”.
As argued above, Nietzsche's criticism to Christianity aims at emulation and imitation, at the
Christian attitude of pure exteriority; it can be inserted in the same line of his criticism to Socratism
and Wagnerism as decadent attitudes. A life like that of Christ – as already remarked – “is still
possible toady, for certain people it is even necessary: true, original Christianity will always be
possible”.64 For “types” like Jesus, such a life can happen regardless of time or space. Only in Jesus'
life, moreover, speaking of “Christianity” makes sense; for what is meant today by that word is
nothing but the attitude of imitating followers. As previously said, this all has to be contextualised
in the wider framework of Nietzsche's experimental philosophy, his continuos challenge of: “How
much truth can a spirit tolerate, how much truth is it willing to risk?” [Wie viel Wahrheit erträgt,
wie viel Wahrheit wagt ein Geist?]”, which “increasingly became” Nietzsche's “real measure of
value [Werthmesser]”.65 In such consistent experimenting, all the old “values” have to die, also
“God” and his “shadows”. One of the symbols for repugnancy towards revaluation is represented in
Zarathustra by the “Geist der Schwere”. This is Zarathustra's archenemy, i.e. resistance against
change, and this is precisely the kind of attitude needing to be overcome. Zarathustra warns his
pupils against himself; indeed, he embodies the spirit of Nietzsche's radical experimental
philosophy, and such a philosophy cannot 'teach' any 'truth'.
Differently, Jung sees in “Christ” the representation of a timeless symbol, an archetype, that
needs to be integrated by consciousness and reunited to his “shadow” – the “Antichrist” – to finally
reunify earth and heaven, nature and spirit, and achieve the wholeness of the Self. “Christ” being a
symbol, his meaning and representation are expected to change and live accordingly with the
evolving of human beings' representative patterns.66 Jung criticises the exteriority of “Imitatio
Christi” too, but, because of Christ's symbolic meaning, he does not admit the possibility that such a
life could occur again on earth. The self-overcoming described in Liber Novus is always oriented
towards the realisation of a “new God”, that is to say, of a new way to give meaning and sense to
the aridity of concepts; with other words, to integrate irrationality in contemporary rational mind.
Jung's God – or at least his presence – has been experienced by Jung himself, for this reason he
64 AC, § 39, KSA 6, 211.
65 EH Vorrede, 3, KSA 6, 259.
66 Cfr. Jung's definition of “Symbol”, in CW 6, §§ 814-829.
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cannot die without being brought to life again. After all, Jung calls himself an “empiricist”, and the
inscription above his entrance door in Küsnacht reads “vocatus atque non vocatus Deus aderit”,
indeed. If Nietzsche's purpose is to overcome the “Geist der Schwere”, Jung's inspirational inner
voice, responsible for the fantasies narrated in Liber Novus, is the “Geist der Tiefe”. This
symbolises the communication with the deepest – timeless – spirit, necessary to overcome the static
perspective of the “I”. As pointed out in the introduction, the whole Liber Novus seems to teach
how to overcome the dichotomy between “sense” and “nonsense” towards “supreme meaning”;
Jung's faith in a “supreme meaning” is represented by Philemon, whose teachings guide Jung's “I”,
and appear as the only possible way to overcome the one-sidedness of rationality.
Both Nietzsche and Jung, lastly, can be said “untimely”. Nietzsche called himself that way
several times, and often considered his ideal readers as yet to come, thus orienting his hope towards
the future. Jung, in a similar sense but in a radically different perspective, waits for his fate to be
accomplished. Nietzsche's being “untimely” concerns the understanding of his thinking, he is
untimely to his contemporaries; Jung is “untimely” in the sense that he tries to overcome the barrier
between his time and the time of the “spirit of the depth”. Indeed, as argued since the beginning, the
leading thread of “visionary” works is the prophetical nature of their composition. Precisely in this
sense the diversity in their conceptions of “self-overcoming” has to be understood. In fact, whereas
Zarathustra intends to overcome the “Three Evil Things”, namely “Sensual pleasure, Lust for
power, Selfishness”,67 Jung looks forward to the “Three Prophecies” announced by his “soul”: “The
misery of war, the darkness of magic, and the gift of religion”.68 In other words, Nietzsche's “self-
overcoming” is oriented towards a higher self-responsibility which denies obscure explanations,
faith attitudes or beliefs, and it has to be understood only in relation to his 'experimental'
philosophy; Jung aims at opening up and embracing the totality of the unknown, trying to preserve
its irreducibility to logical categories, by stressing human need for 'meaning'. Finally, all this can
also cast more light on Jung's interpretation of Nietzsche: as retrospectively remarked by Jung in
relation to “The Magician”, “One can teach the way that leads to chaos, but one cannot teach
magic”.69 Magic is therefore something which follows chaos, and brings wholeness. Nietzsche,
instead, would stop there, when he claimed that “one must have chaos in one, to give birth to a
dancing star”.70
67 Za III, 10, “On the Three Evil Things”, KSA 4, 235-240. Interestingly, in his Zarathustra seminar, Jung interprets
these elements as prophecies on Freud, Adler and himself, respectively (see SNZ II, pp. 1450-1451).
68 RB II, 18, “The Three Prophecies”, p. 306.
69 RB II, 21, “The Magician”, p. 314.
70 Za Vorrede, 5, KSA 4, 18.
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